An invasion plan for Iraq will have to contend with the challenge of Saddam’s left over Scud missile fleet.  During the Gulf War, intercepting the Scuds on the ground and in the air was a challenge beyond the capabilities of coalition forces.  But while these weapons have proved in the past to be of limited military value, their usefulness as political weapons remains intact.  

Under the provisions of UN Security Council resolution 687, Iraq is forbidden from possessing ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers.  By the end of 1997, inspectors believed that they had accounted for 817 of the 819 prohibited longer-range missiles.¹  Iraq used 516 of these missiles against Iran during the “war of cities” between February and April 1988.  Iraq used another 93 missiles against Israel and coalition forces during the Gulf War in 1991.  Testing activities account for another 69 missiles.   In an effort to conceal the scope of their missile programs, the Iraqis covertly destroyed 83 missiles themselves.  Finally, The United Nations Special Commision (UNSCOM) supervised the destruction of 48 long-range missiles following the end of the Gulf War.² 

Most analysts, however, have concluded that Iraq still has a small inventory of Scud-C variant al Hussein missiles at its disposal, although estimates vary.  UNSCOM was unable to account for key components from the missiles Iraq unilaterally destroyed, indicating that these may have been stripped from the missiles prior to their demolition.  Moreover, in 1996 UNSCOM concluded that Iraq had produced 80 Scud variants indigenously, thus casting doubt on the accuracy of the original accounting of the Iraqi inventory.  Though the United States struck at the missile infrastructure during Operation Desert Fox in 1998, it is also thought that Iraq retains the requisite expertise and most of the material to support a limited missile program.  While some have concluded that as many as 60 of the original 819 missiles are unaccounted for, most analysts estimate that Iraq can deploy between one and three dozen Scud variants.³  UNSCOM believes that between six and 16 al Hussein missiles remain at large.  Iraq still possesses an indeterminate number (between 12 and 20) of mobile Scud launchers.⁴  

UNSCOM oversaw the destruction of 30 al Hussein warheads, but the whereabouts of another 45 to 70 units remain a mystery.  All of these munitions can be used to deliver chemical or biological weapons (CBW).  The Iraqis produced 80 nonconventional warheads themselves: 50 chemical, 25 biological, and five for trial purposes.  Baghdad claims to have unilaterally destroyed 25 of these warheads, but Iraqi claims in this regard have been conflicting and remain unsubstantiated. UNSCOM inspectors did uncover CBW warheads not declared by the Iraqis.  Because no concrete initial inventory of Iraqi warheads is possible, these numbers must be considered rough estimates.⁵  The Iraqis were known to have weaponized the BW agents anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin for delivery in missile warheads.  Additionally, UNSCOM found evidence of VX nerve agent in missile warheads in 1998, despite persistent denials that Iraq even maintained a VX program.  Iraq was also known to have tipped some munitions with sarin gas, 16 of which were destroyed by UNSCOM.  These munitions used to deliver a range of CBW agents beyond those discussed here.

Accuracy remains an important problem for the Iraqi missile force.  Iraq has participated in sustained efforts to both covertly import guidance components and to reverse engineer those components it has on hand.  The outcomes of these efforts remain unclear.  Still, other factors will continue to inhibit accuracy.  An Iraqi Scud warhead does not have the ability to “spin up” or rotate along its longitudinal axis like a bullet from a gun.  Rather, this warhead tumbles about its center of gravity as it falls upon its target, making it very inaccurate.⁶  Consequently, these weapons have little military utility when deployed against a highly mobile adversary in the field. 

Assuming the existence of these delivery systems, Baghdad has the ability to strike at its neighbors, including staging areas for any future invasion in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.  As demonstrated during the Gulf War, Iraq also has the capability to strike at urban targets inside Israel.  Because the range of the al Hussein missile is limited to around 650 km., these missiles must necessarily be launched from western Iraq if they are to target Israeli cities.  In Saudi Arabia, the casualty toll from scud attacks was 31 dead and 400 injured.  The majority of the dead, 29, were victims of a single attack on the U.S. barracks in Dharhran, Saudi Arabia, apparently a lucky shot for the Iraqis.  In Israel, two civilians were killed by direct Scud attacks.  However, another 18 died from heart attacks and gas mask malfunctions, illustrating the psychological impacts of a scud attack.  A few hundred Israeli citizens were injured in the attacks.   

If scuds are used again in a future conflict with Iraq, similar casualty figures can be expected assuming they are conventionally armed.  This works out to 1 to 5 casualties per weapon.  Casualty rates for Scuds carrying nonconventional chemical or biological payloads are more difficult to estimate.  The technical challenges involved in effectively disseminating a biological weapon in this way are many, and it is not clear that the Iraqis have the know-how to surmount these challenges.  Scuds carrying chemical weapons can be expected to kill dozens of people per warhead depending on variables such as weather conditions, type of agent used, civil defense preparations, and degree of advanced warning.⁷

Because Iraqi missile forces are restricted to a finite “launch basket” in western Iraq, an invasion forces task of locating and destroying Scuds is simplified somewhat.  In 1991, coalition pilots flew permanent combat air patrols over western Iraq, aided by satellite intelligence and Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Systems (JSTARS).  Nevertheless, these air forces and Special Forces were unable to locate and destroy individual Scud launchers (0 for 42) hidden in desert.  The United States has made progress in the area of time critical targeting, and can also employ armed, unmanned aerial vehicles in the search for Scuds.  U.S. pilots will probably enjoy some success.  But Iraqi mobile launchers are well hidden, and some estimates contend that they can be made operational within 90 minutes.  For these reasons, some advocates of invasion believe that a large-scale deployment of troops (one airborne division) into western Iraq will be necessary to deprive Baghdad of this launch basket.⁸  Even so, an invasion force will probably fail to interdict all of the missiles Iraq has concealed.  It is likely that some of Saddam’s Scuds will get of the ground.

During the Gulf War, Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems were equally ineffective as a counter measure to the Scud threat.  Initially, it was believed that the Patriot Advanced Capabilities 2 (PAC-2) systems deployed in Saudi Arabia and Israel achieved close to a 100 percent success rate in intercepting incoming Iraqi missiles.  But even before the end of the conflict Israeli analyses were pointing to a much lower success rate – around 20 percent.  Later analyses lowered the success rate still, and some questioned whether any Scuds had been intercepted by PAC-2 systems.  Because Iraqi Scud variants are poorly designed and constructed, they have a tendency to disintegrate as they fall to their target.  Consequently, they present a very low radar signature and TMD systems are confused by the presence of attendant decoys.⁹  Today, the next generation of TMD systems (PAC-3 and the Israeli Arrow system) is in development, but while they are expected to perform better than the PAC-2 systems did, their capabilities remain a subject of debate.  These systems may mitigate the threat of Iraqi Scud missiles, but they are unlikely to eliminate it altogether.    

The efficacy of TMD is important because, though Iraq’s missiles are of limited military utility, they remain an important political weapon.  Just as in 1991, Saddam will probably try to disrupt and divide the forces arrayed against him by striking at Israel.  The Iraqi strategy failed during the Gulf War because the conventionally armed Scuds caused minimal damage to Israeli cities and did not provoke a military response from Jerusalem.  Had the Israelis responded, there was a very real danger that Arab support for the anti-Iraq coalition would collapse.  That the Israelis did not respond was a reflection of the considerable pressure Washington was exerting on Jerusalem, and a reluctant acceptance of the merits of restraint among Israeli policy makers. 

A scenario involving a future invasion of Iraq would have to confront a similar challenge.  However, the circumstances will be different in important ways.  Some Israelis believe that Jerusalem’s forbearance in 1991 eroded the credibility of the Israeli military deterrent.  If Saddam chooses to loose missiles armed with chemical or biological weapons at Israel, Israeli policy makers will feel compelled to respond regardless of pleas of restraint from Washington.  An Israeli strike against Iraq will invariably run the risk of a broader confrontation with Iraq’s Arab neighbors, and endangering regional stability at a time when the United States is already deeply engaged.  The Israeli nuclear deterrent, though unlikely to be used, cannot be discounted depending on the severity of an Iraqi attack. 

Finally, it is likely that few Arab states will openly support any coalition seeking to unseat Saddam.  An Israeli strike on Iraq, however, would enrage Arab populations, placing even more pressure on these regimes to actively oppose an invasion.  In 1991, Arab regimes refused to play into Saddam’s hands, but their nervousness increased with every Scud that fell on Israel.  It is difficult to assess how these regimes might react in the next time around.  If Saddam’s Scuds again fall on Israel, it will be in a conflict these regimes do not support.

Notes:

¹ “Inspecting Iraq,” in Joseph Cirincione, ed., Repairing the Regime:  Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 181.

² Anthony Cordesmen, “US Policy Ten Years After the Gulf War:  The Impact of Changes in the Regional Military Balance,  The Challenge of Iraq”  Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 30, 2000, http://www.csis.org/gulf/reports/subiraq.pdf.  

³ Anthony Cordesmen, “If We Fight Iraq:  Iraq and Its Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 17, 2002, http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/Iraq_ConMil_Bal_1.pdf; Kenneth Pollock, “Next Stop Baghdad?” Foreign Affairs March/April, 2002.  

⁴ “UNSCOM and Iraqi Missiles,” Federation of American Scientists, no date, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/missile/unscome.htm.

⁵ “UNSCOM and Iraqi Missiles.”

⁶ “Al Hussein / Al Husayn Al Hijarah,” Federation of American Scientists, no date, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/missile/unscome.htm

⁷ “Military Options towards Iraq,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Comments, Volume 8, Issue 3, April 2002.

⁸ Kenneth Pollock, “Next Stop Baghdad?” Foreign Affairs March/April, 2002.  

⁹Rick Atkinson, Crusade, The Untold Story Of The Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), p. 182.

 

Dr. Michael Donovan CDI Research Analyst mdonovan@cdi.org

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