America’s plans to unseat Saddam Hussein by invading Iraq have aroused little enthusiasm among its Arab allies in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.  However, Washington has powerful political and economic leverage at its disposal, and its ability to persuade some countries to cooperate is significant.  All these states declare publicly that they will not participate in a military operation in Iraq, but many may find it difficult to say no to Washington.   

For obvious reasons, Kuwait remains a lynchpin for any future operation to unseat Saddam.  Publicly, the Kuwaitis stand against a unilateral invasion of Iraq.  The United States currently has a great deal of personnel and materiel pre-positioned in the country, and there are reports that advance elements of the U.S. Army are currently scouting for accommodations for five more divisions.¹  Clearly, the loss of Kuwait as a staging area would almost certainly end an invasion of Iraq before it began.  The airbases at Ali al Salem and Ahmad al Jabr would play an irreplaceable role in the event facilities in Saudi Arabia remain off limits.  The ports, Mina al Ahmadi and Mina Abdallah, will likewise be crucial, even if access to other facilities in the region is allowed.  Kuwait is likely to remain Washington’s partner in any effort at regime change in Iraq.   

Despite a recent thaw in relations between Kuwait and Iraq, Kuwait remains acutely aware of threat to regional stability posed by Saddam.  The Iraqi leader has rejected his previous claims on Kuwait in an effort to ease tensions and disrupt the forces arrayed against him.  The Kuwaitis have responded cautiously.  Owing to the role played by the United States in liberating Kuwait during the Gulf War, many among the ruling elite in Kuwait will feel compelled to support Washington’s position.  Nevertheless, Kuwaitis are understandably concerned about the regional implications of a move to oust Saddam, as well as the military fallout that might result from the operation.  For reasons of political cover, Kuwait would prefer that the Arab-Israeli peace process be revived prior to undertaking such an effort, and that the operation be carried out with the acquiescence, if not blessing, of the United Nations.   

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia remains the most attractive staging area from which to launch an invasion into Iraq.  The command and control facilities at Prince Sultan airbase outside Riyadh are the most sophisticated in the region.  The desert kingdom’s long border with Iraq also offers a far greater degree of operational flexibility.  While the pre-positioning of personnel and materiel necessary for an invasion will test the limits of Kuwaiti port facilities and infrastructure, Saudi Arabia can accommodate a substantial U.S. military “footprint.”  Because Saudi Arabia remains the most influential Gulf state, the participation of Saudi forces in an invasion would confer important credibility, and ease the concerns of other five Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.      

However, Saudi Arabia remains a staunch critic of plans to overthrow Saddam.  Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah has pursued a more independent approach to foreign policy in order to ameliorate some of the royal family’s domestic critics, and this has created some obvious daylight between Riyadh and Washington.  The Saudis insist that the Arab-Israeli crisis is the most divisive issue in an otherwise close relationship, but they are still loath to sign on to Washington’s invasion plans.  The strains of discontent in Saudi society that were so noticeable following Sept. 11 remain in place, and there are few reasons to believe that active participation in an invasion would enhance Saudi stability.  However, the Saudis may seek some middle ground.  The Saudis could, for instance, provide over flight permission and allow surveillance and other non-combat flights to continue from the Kingdom.  Such an approach would help to preserve the special relationship between the two capitals while sparing Saudi Arabia the associated political risks.               

Turkey

Washington would value an Islamic ally in an operation against Iraq and Turkey’s proximity to Iraq makes it a potentially important staging area for any invasion strategy.    

During a 4-day visit to Washington in January, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit said that a U.S. strike on Iraq would be “catastrophic” for his country, even if Turkey did not participate in the operation.  Ankara is concerned that such a move would strain Turkey’s already beleaguered economy, upset relations with the country’s Arab neighbors, and incite the restive Kurdish populations that straddle the boarder with Iraq.  Ecevit is in failing health, however, and probably satisfied to leave Turkey’s policy formulation on Iraq in the hands of the military.  In the past, Turkish General Staff (TGS) has tried to dissuade Washington from invading Iraq.  Nevertheless, the TGS probably recognizes the leverage Washington maintains over Ankara.  Turkey is dependent on International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans championed by Washington.  Several personalities within the political and military elite in Ankara favor closer ties to Washington rather than Europe, which they see as a less reliable partner.  There have already been some indications that Turkey will allow the United States use of critical air bases for an operation against Iraq.  Privately, some within the TGS admit that they may be compelled to deploy troops in northern Iraq in the event of an attack, if only to keep the Kurds in check following Saddam’s downfall.²     

Jordan

Jordan publicly rejects the use of force to unseat Saddam. Washington hopes to station troops in Jordan as a buffer between Iraq and Israel.  Jordan would also provide a convenient access point for Special Forces operations in the “Scud boxes” of western Iraq, and there have been unconfirmed reports that some U.S. Special Forces units are already in the kingdom.³  The Jordanians strictly deny the presence of foreign troops on their soil.  On July 10, Jordanian Information Minister Mohammad Affash Adwan insisted: “We will not allow our land and our skies to be used as a launching pad for any foreign troops to mount an attack on Iraq.”⁴ 

Jordan has attempted to plot a neutral course between Washington and Baghdad for some time.  Jordan is a traditional market for Iraq, and in recent years all of the Kingdom’s oil has come from Iraq, much of it for free.  The administration of U.S. President George W. Bush has earmarked $500 million in economic and military aid designed to lure Jordan away from its shared interests with Iraq.⁵  Relations between Washington and Amman have traditionally been close, but King Abdullah will come under tremendous pressure from his large Palestinian population to sit out a war in Iraq, as was the case in 1990.  Continued bloodshed in the Arab-Israeli conflict will severely limit the King’s room to maneuver and check Jordan’s support for an invasion.             

Qatar

In recent months the United States has been quietly moving materiel out of the bases it inhabits in Saudi Arabia in order to bolster facilities in Qatar.  The move has been widely viewed as a way to afford U.S. forces greater latitude in striking Iraq.  Publicly, Qatari officials voice concerns regarding such an operation, insisting that Doha would need “to know the real objectives of the war and to have solid assurances that Iraq’s unity would be maintained and no chaos would result from the campaign.”⁶  But it is likely that Doha will not place limits on American forces operating from Qatar, unlike their Saudi neighbors. 

Because of its own limited military capabilities, Qatar has been an eager host to U.S. forces over the past few years as a counterweight to its raucous Gulf neighbors.  Thus, the shift away from Prince Sultan airbase in Saudi Arabia to the Al Udeid airbase outside Doha probably has as much to do with bilateral relations between Qatar and the United States as any plan to invade Iraq.  Several thousand troops are stationed at Al Udeid, and intelligence and command and control assets are currently being upgraded.  Fighter and reconnaissance aircraft as well as aerial tankers round out the bill.  Qatar hopes to lure an increased U.S. presence stationed on a permanent basis, and has pledged $400 million for the construction of facilities in support of these forces.⁷  The price for the security guarantee that would accompany the permanent deployment of U.S. forces will assuredly include use of these facilities for any future operation in Iraq.

Through a combination of economic and diplomatic inducement, Washington will continue to encourage acquiescence, if not outright cooperation.  But Washington’s ability to persuade could put many of these governments in the uncomfortable position of choosing between the United States and the wishes of their people.  In the long run, the United States may be trading cooperation on Iraq for instabilities elsewhere in the region.  Thus far, the Bush administration has given little hint that is conducting this kind of cost-benefit analysis.  In the final analysis, the United States may gain allies in the region for its war with Saddam, but it may risk losing some of its few remaining friends.

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