Iraqi Scuds: A Threat We Have to Respect

The United States will face a number of risks as part of any invasion of Iraq that are quite serious, and could be even more serious in some cases than those that existed 12 years ago. The best, most capable, intelligence agencies in the world the CIA, the British MI5 and Israeli Mossad Special Operations Division are all very wary of the potential threat posed by Iraqi Scud missiles. Several of the latest CIA reports and recent defector statements indicate that Iraq has biological/chemical weapons on hand. Blister agents, mustard gas, VX gas, anthrax, and the nerve agents Sarin and Taburn are all possible payloads for Scud missiles.

Saddam Hussein may be profiled as a calculating manipulator, but he is also an irrational risk taker. Intelligence analysts believe that Saddam is most dangerous when he is cornered: that he would sacrifice his life to secure his legacy and that he would try to wreak maximum destruction on his foes if attacked. Of particular note, the CIA has recently released a threat assessment that asserts that Saddam is unlikely to use his lethal arsenal against the United States unless he comes under military attack.

We cannot rule out the possibility of Saddam's first use of chemical/biological weapons in a war if he feels it is to his advantage. U.S. war planners have to acknowledge that threat. This would be one of our worst-case scenarios a U.S. offensive turns out to be the catalyst for Iraqi biological or chemical weapons to be launched into Israel or friendly coalition forces.

For these reasons, expect anti-Scud missions to be of the highest priority at the onset of any hostilities with Iraq. The threat of conventional, biological or chemical weapons hitting Israel, neighboring countries, or U.S. troops is one of the greatest concerns of Pentagon planners.

The tactical capability and the actual damage a Scud can achieve is limited, but it can be quite effective as an area denial weapon or simply one of terror. To clean up the remnants of a biological or chemical Scud attack in Kuwait, for example, while dealing with the resulting horrendous humanitarian problem, would be a daunting challenge and require a tremendous amount of time and effort.

U.S. planners will have to take seriously reports that Iraq may have a small inventory of the Scud C variant al Hussein missile with a range of over 310 miles. Iraq may also possess over a dozen well-hidden mobile Scud launchers that can be configured to be operational within 90 minutes. Iraqis are noted masters at deception, decoys and camouflage. Handling this threat will be one of the most challenging missions in a conflict with Iraq. It is probable that the Scud launch areas in western Iraq will be one of the first areas that coalition forces move to control.

During the Gulf War, the U.S. capability to counter the Scud threat was negligible. Iraq attacked with approximately 88 Scuds, with 46 striking in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (as far south as Qatar), and 42 in or near Israel. Coalition air forces flew 2,400 Scud strike sorties in an attempt to attack and destroy the elusive mobile launchers. On 42 occasions, patrolling aircraft spotted a launch plume, leading to eight attacks. Overall, tactical aircraft reportedly failed to destroy any Scud launchers.

Gen. Wayne Downing, former assistant to the president on counterterrorism and a Gulf War veteran who commanded part of the Special Operations forces in the 1991 conflict, recently stated that he has seen Desert Storm helicopter-gunship video of successful Special Forces strikes on Iraq Scuds and debriefed their operators. He asserts that Special Operations Forces helicopters operating 250 miles behind enemy lines and guiding in airstrikes took out six to eight Scuds, including a couple destroyed by anti-tank missiles launched by the teams.

Fortunately, the ability to find and destroy mobile missile launchers has improved to the extent that U.S. forces may now have an effective capability. Time critical targeting skills have been developed and honed during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. For example, more than 80 percent of the combat sorties launched off aircraft carriers into Afghanistan did not have specific target coordinates until on scene, with targeting information relayed in-flight. The Tactical Exploitation Systems and Battlefield Ordnance Awareness sensors will significantly shorten the "sensor-to-shooter" time frame — the amount of time between a target's detection and an actual attack on it — a critical factor when attacking "pop-up" or mobile targets. State-of-the-art sensors are now available to provide accurate and timely launch information to area commanders, defensive missile batteries, pilots and Special Forces on the ground throughout the Gulf region, including Israel. The current objective is to be able to put precision-guided ordnance on a target within 10 minutes of detection.

An integrated picture of the intelligence data from multiple sources is now available to the ground commanders who actually have their "fingers on the trigger." A substantial number of tactical aircraft, ranging from AC-130 gunships receiving live-stream video, to Apache Longbow helicopters to F-15E Strike Eagles, are now linked to surveillance aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and would be available to immediately respond to the threat of Scuds.

Special Operations Forces will be equipped with a laptop software program called 'Rover' that allows troops on the ground to draw directly on photographic imagery of the target area, just as John Madden does in analyzing NFL plays on television. They will be able to annotate friendly and hostile forces, and then transmit the information directly to airborne tactical aircraft. Navy F-14 Tomcat fighters are able to transmit and receive imagery with Special Forces on the ground using the Navy's Fast Tactical Imagery (FTI) system. FTI is also compatible with the Army's AH-64 Apache helicopters.

Microwave energy weapons or "radio frequency weapons" that can disable electrical systems by sending bursts of high-powered microwave energy could disable computers controlling Scuds. These weapons produce a short spike of energy that can damage electronic devices, scramble computer memories or disable ignition systems.

Air power alone is not enough to effectively suppress the Scud threat, however. Special Forces will be extremely active throughout Iraq. All of the elite Delta Force and Seal Team counter-terrorism units will be in high demand for specialized covert operations.

U.S. Special Forces, possibly augmented by British SAS forces, will play a critical role in the effort to hunt down Scud missile launchers. Lessons learned in Afghanistan by Special Forces working with CIA field teams and targeting smart bombs dropped by tactical aircraft will be fully exploited.

Prior to the commencement of hostilities, Special Forces will likely be flown in to forward operating bases established in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq to assist in the Scud hunt. There have been reports that select Special Force units have been working with CIA and Israeli paramilitary units deep inside Iraq throughout the fall of 2002 in preparation for an invasion. The Special Forces involved consist primarily of specialized SEAL Teams and Army Delta Force soldiers. Such ongoing covert operations probably include scouting for arsenals of weapons of mass destruction and their artillery delivery systems, and detailing preparations for contingency sabotage raids in the event of an invasion.

The U.S. Army 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) is assigned responsibility for the Southwest Asia and the Middle East region. The SFG consists of about 1,400 personnel, and is organized into three battalions capable of deploying 18 12-person Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs). The 82nd Airborne, Special Force Green Berets and the Rangers augment these units.

Rear Adm. (Ret.) Stephen H. Baker, USN CDI Senior Advisor sbaker@cdi.org

Rear Adm. (Ret.) Stephen H. Baker is former Chief of Staff for Naval Forces Central Command in Bahrain and was the Operations Officer for the Theodore Roosevelt Battle Group throughout Operation Desert Storm. He is currently a senior advisor at the Center for Defense Information. Standard Version