The Iraqi Army, Air Force, and Navy

The regular Iraqi Army had a strength of about 955,000 and numbered 47 divisions plus other smaller units before Operation Desert Storm in 1991.¹  (Iraqi divisions generally now number 8,000-10,000 men.)  After Desert Storm, the Army was reduced to an estimated 350,000 men and 24 divisions.  It retained some 2,300 tanks and 1,000 artillery pieces.  Since that time, division numbers have dropped and the accuracy of available information has improved; current estimates from the respected International Institute for Strategic Studies give a total of 375,000 men, with 17 divisions equipped with a total of 2,200 tanks and 1,900 artillery pieces.²

While those figures are important, they do not convey the whole story. An Iraqi division cannot hope to face any U.S. formation of the same size, as was proven in the Gulf War.  Significant difficulties include severe shortages of spare parts, resulting from the UN embargo, shortage of numbers, as only half Iraq’s divisions are even at 80 percent strength, maintenance difficulties with its large, varied fleet of armored vehicles, and poor ability to use both its tanks and its artillery.³ 

The Iraqi Air Force has its own difficulties.  It lost more than 500 combat aircraft in and immediately after the Gulf War, many when they fled to Iran and did not return.  Thirty-four aircraft were lost in combat against coalition forces, and the Iraqi air defense system proved totally inadequate to withstand the battering it received.⁴  Today the force seems to consist of around 130 attack aircraft and 180 fighters, plus support aircraft, though one recent report said only around 90 were active.⁵  While the figures may look impressive, the UN embargo has had an effect on the Air Force similar to that of the Army; no new aircraft, surface to air missiles, or sensors have arrived since 1990.  The introduction of Matra Magic 2 short-range air to air missiles has been the only major improvement in air force equipment since the war.  Their origin is not clear.⁶  Helicopter serviceability is poor, and only about 55 percent of fixed-wing aircraft are serviceable.⁷  Taken together, the relative ineffectiveness of the Air Force has led to greater resources being allocated to the Air Defense Command’s surface-to-air missiles.⁸  Despite these resources the Air Defense Command’s missiles, radars, and support systems are mostly out-of-date and are unable to stop continual U.S. and British air operations in the no-fly zones.

The Iraqi Navy is a small, weak force that was shattered during Desert Storm.  Currently it only has operational one missile boat, plus five other non-operational inshore patrol craft.⁹  A tanker and corvette are laid up in Alexandria, Egypt and La Spezia, Italy, respectively, stranded by the UN embargo since 1990.  There is also a non-operational training frigate in Iraqi waters.  The only potential dangers posed by the Navy rest in its five batteries of Silkworm anti-ship missiles, as well as its mine warfare capability.¹⁰

The Republican Guard

The Republican Guard Forces Command is a ground force more trusted by the regime than the regular Army, and was at its original formation the regime’s most elite force.  A totally separate armed service, it was formed first as a brigade-sized formation to protect the Presidential Palace in Baghdad, and due to successes in the field against the Iranians during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, and the ineptness of regular Army heavy forces at complex armored operations it was expanded greatly.  In August 1990, it numbered 150,000 personnel whose loyalty was ensured with higher pay and extra rations and leave.  After the battering the force took during Desert Storm, it was reduced eventually to six divisions with 60-80,000 men, about 65-75 percent of the required total manning for their combat units.  This indicates Iraqi manning difficulties even with its most prestigious field force.¹¹  Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies judges the Guard as the “most effective land forces in the Gulf region,” however, its capabilities remain insufficient to defeat U.S. forces.¹²

The Special Republican Guard

Despite its special status, the Republican Guard is not deemed trustworthy enough to maintain Saddam Hussein’s security in central Baghdad.  This role is given to the four brigades of the Special Republican Guard, which could number up to 26,000 in wartime, but in peacetime is usually less.  In summer 1998, it numbered 15-16,000.¹³  It is the only significant military formation allowed in central Baghdad, apart from the intelligence services’ military arms (see below).  Its forces secure all the major roads into the city, and include a small armored brigade, and air defense command.  To secure the SRG’s loyalty, many of its personnel are drawn from areas that support Saddam strongly, including his home town of Tikrit.  Several senior officers are related to Saddam by blood or marriage, and the force as a whole receives privileges unavailable to the general public.¹⁴

The Security and Intelligence Services 

Saddam Hussein maintains a variety of security and intelligence forces that are designed to compete with one another in protecting himself, his family, and the regime.  A number of these forces maintain paramilitary formations.  They include forces from the Special Security Service, General Intelligence Directorate, Military Security Service, and Military Intelligence.  Each has a brigade, while in addition military intelligence maintains a clandestine operations ‘Unit 999’ with five 300-man battalions.¹⁵  There are also the Border Guards and a further paramilitary service, Saddam’s Fedayeen (‘Saddam’s Men of Sacrifice’), with 9,000 and 18-20,000 men respectively.¹⁶