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The
Iraqi Army, Air Force, and Navy The
regular Iraqi Army had a strength of about 955,000 and numbered 47 divisions
plus other smaller units before Operation Desert Storm in 1991.1
(Iraqi divisions generally now number
8,000-10,000 men.) After Desert
Storm, the Army was reduced to an estimated 350,000 men and 24 divisions.
It retained some 2,300 tanks and 1,000 artillery pieces.
Since that time, division numbers have dropped and the accuracy of
available information has improved; current estimates from the respected
International Institute for Strategic Studies give a total of 375,000 men, with
17 divisions equipped with a total of 2,200 tanks and 1,900 artillery pieces.2
While
those figures are important, they do not convey the whole story. An Iraqi
division cannot hope to face any U.S. formation of the same size, as was proven
in the Gulf War. Significant
difficulties include severe shortages of spare parts, resulting from the UN
embargo, shortage of numbers, as only half Iraq’s divisions are even at 80
percent strength, maintenance difficulties with its large, varied fleet of
armored vehicles, and poor ability to use both its tanks and its artillery.3
The
Iraqi Air Force has its own difficulties. It
lost more than 500 combat aircraft in and immediately after the Gulf War, many
when they fled to Iran and did not return.
Thirty-four aircraft were lost in combat against coalition forces, and
the Iraqi air defense system proved totally inadequate to withstand the
battering it received.4
Today the force seems to consist of around 130 attack aircraft and 180
fighters, plus support aircraft, though one recent report said only around 90
were active.5
While the figures may look impressive, the UN embargo has had an effect
on the Air Force similar to that of the Army; no new aircraft, surface to air
missiles, or sensors have arrived since 1990.
The introduction of Matra Magic 2 short-range air to air missiles has
been the only major improvement in air force equipment since the war.
Their origin is not clear.6
Helicopter serviceability is poor, and only about 55 percent of
fixed-wing aircraft are serviceable.7
Taken together, the relative ineffectiveness of the Air Force has led to
greater resources being allocated to the Air Defense Command’s surface-to-air
missiles.8
Despite these resources the Air Defense Command’s missiles, radars, and
support systems are mostly out-of-date and are unable to stop continual U.S. and
British air operations in the no-fly zones. The
Iraqi Navy is a small, weak force that was shattered during Desert Storm. Currently it only has operational one missile boat, plus five
other non-operational inshore patrol craft.9
A tanker and corvette are laid up in Alexandria, Egypt and La Spezia,
Italy, respectively, stranded by the UN embargo since 1990.
There is also a non-operational training frigate in Iraqi waters. The only potential dangers posed by the Navy rest in its five
batteries of Silkworm anti-ship missiles, as well as its mine warfare
capability.10
The
Republican Guard Forces Command is a ground force more trusted by the regime
than the regular Army, and was at its original formation the regime’s most
elite force. A
totally separate armed service, it was formed first as a brigade-sized formation
to protect the Presidential Palace in Baghdad, and due to successes in the field
against the Iranians during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, and the ineptness of
regular Army heavy forces at complex armored operations it was expanded greatly.
In August 1990, it numbered 150,000 personnel whose loyalty was ensured
with higher pay and extra rations and leave.
After the battering the force took during Desert Storm, it was reduced
eventually to six divisions with 60-80,000 men, about 65-75 percent of the
required total manning for their combat units.
This indicates Iraqi manning difficulties even with its most prestigious
field force.11
Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies
judges the Guard as the “most effective land forces in the Gulf region,”
however, its capabilities remain insufficient to defeat U.S. forces.12
Despite
its special status, the Republican Guard is not deemed trustworthy enough to
maintain Saddam Hussein’s security in central Baghdad.
This role is given to the four brigades of the Special Republican Guard,
which could number up to 26,000 in wartime, but in peacetime is usually less.
In summer 1998, it numbered 15-16,000.13
It is the only significant military formation allowed in central Baghdad,
apart from the intelligence services’ military arms (see below).
Its forces secure all the major roads into the city, and include a small
armored brigade, and air defense command. To
secure the SRG’s loyalty, many of its personnel are drawn from areas that
support Saddam strongly, including his home town of Tikrit.
Several senior officers are related to Saddam by blood or marriage, and
the force as a whole receives privileges unavailable to the general public.14
Saddam
Hussein maintains a variety of security and intelligence forces that are
designed to compete with one another in protecting himself, his family, and the
regime. A number of these forces
maintain paramilitary formations. They
include forces from the Special Security Service, General Intelligence
Directorate, Military Security Service, and Military Intelligence.
Each has a brigade, while in addition military intelligence maintains a
clandestine operations ‘Unit 999’ with five 300-man battalions.15
There are also the Border Guards and a further paramilitary service,
Saddam’s Fedayeen (‘Saddam’s Men of Sacrifice’), with 9,000 and
18-20,000 men respectively.16
1 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1990-91, Brassey’s, London, 1991. 2 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2001-02, Oxford University Press, 2001. 3 Anthony Cordesman, The Gulf and Transition: U.S. Policy Ten Years After the Gulf War: the Challenge of Iraq, www.csis.org/gulf/reports/subiraq.pdf, updated Oct. 30, 2000, pp.49-60, accessed Apr. 1, 2002. 4 Anthony H. Cordesman and Ahmid S. Hashim, Iraq Sanctions and Beyond, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1997, p.264 5 Both IISS’s Military Balance 2001-02 and Cordesman’s The Gulf in Transition (Notes 2 & 3) agree broadly on the first figure; the second figure is from Sean Boyle, “Iraq retains ability to quell revolts”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 2002, pp.42-44. 6 Washington Times, Sept. 5, 1996, p.A-1, via Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf in Transition, op. cit., p.62 7 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2001-02, Oxford University Press, 2001, p.134. 8 Sean Boyle, “Iraq retains ability to quell revolts”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 2002, p.44. 9 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2001-02, Oxford University Press, 2001, p.134 10 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf in Transition, op. cit., p.69 11 ibid., p.50 12 ibid., p.49 13 Sean Boyle, “Saddam’s shield: the role of the Special Republican Guard”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 1999, p.29 14 ibid., p.29-32. 15 Sean Boyle, “Inside Iraq’s Security Network”, Parts 1 & 2, Jane’s Intelligence Review, August and September 1997. 16 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2001-02, op. cit., p.135
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