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Comprehensive UN sanctions were placed on Iraq following that country's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. They have remained in place to this day. It is generally recognized that sanctions have failed to achieve their stated purpose: the disarmament of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. A review of the their history demonstrates that sanctions are only effective when supported by a strong international consensus. Over the years, political and commercial pressures weakened this consensus with regard to Iraq. The events of Sept. 11 have reinvigorated support for "smart sanctions," due to take effect in May. Whether smart sanctions will pave the road for renewed weapons inspections in Iraq remains an open question. Saddam has avoided unfettered inspections for eleven years. But the Bush administration is running out of patience.
United Nations Security Council resolution (SCR) 661, adopted Aug. 6, 1990, imposed comprehensive economic and financial sanctions on Iraq in an effort to compel Saddam to withdraw his troops from Kuwait. SCR 661 failed to bring about an Iraqi retreat prior to the deadline of Jan. 16, 1991. Nevertheless, the resolution provided a valuable rallying point around which to construct an international coalition against Saddam. It is likely that the coalition put together by the United States in the Persian Gulf War would not have been constituted to the degree it was without imposing sanctions prior to the opening of hostilities.
SCR 687 was adopted on April 3, 1991. Dubbed the "mother of resolution," SCR 687 codified the end of the Gulf conflict, established the UN Special Commission on weapons (Unscom), and developed a sanctions regime to be reviewed every 60 days. The sale of oil was forbidden and sanctions covered most imports except medicines and humanitarian aid. At the heart of the resolution was the effort to uncover and eliminate Saddam's weapons of mass destruction program. Thus, Iraq was called upon to disclose all chemical and biological weapons stocks and facilities, nuclear materials, and surviving ballistic missile capabilities.
Critics charge that the United Nations did not possess the legal authority to intervene in Iraqi internal affairs. Some members, including UN Secretary General Javier de Cuellar, correctly believed that the invasive character of the resolution was intended to encourage eventual regime change in Baghdad. On the surface, sanctions were designed to bring about Iraqi disarmament. But their comprehensive scope, theoretically, provided the Iraqi people with the incentive to topple Saddam's regime. Consequently, the resolution did not pass without controversy. Resistance was overcome only after the sanctions committee agreed to supply food and other humanitarian goods to Iraq.
Saddam's noncompliance with SCR 687 provided the basis for the isolation of Iraq over the next 11 years. Continual obfuscation and obstruction by Iraqi authorities finally led to Unscom's departure from the country. In 1998, the United States and Britain launched a number of punitive strikes (operation Desert Fox) in response, but Saddam remained obstinate. Weapons inspectors have never been readmitted to Iraq.
In the meantime, the ban on Iraqi oil exports has brought the economy to a virtual standstill. Some reports estimate lost oil revenue at $150 billion. The Iraqi people have paid a heavy price for Saddam's refusal to comply, but the Iraqi leader has been remarkably effective at turning their plight to his advantage. Incidents of malnutrition, poor health, and infant mortality, though difficult to quantify independently, have grown at an alarming rates. Saddam enjoys some success exploiting these incidents for propaganda purposes. Washington has had less success convincing member states that sanctions are a result of Saddam's intransigence. UN resolution SCR 986 was passed on Dec. 9, 1996 in response to growing concern about the humanitarian impact of sanctions. SCR 986 provided for the limited "oil for food" program. Initially, the limit was set at $2 billion every six months. This amount was raised to $5.6 billion in 1998 with the passage of SCR 1153. The proceeds are administered through an UN-managed escrow account and used for the purchase of foodstuffs, medicines, and basic infrastructure items.
The perception that sanctions were failing to compel Iraqi disarmament led to the adoption of SCR 1284 in December 1999. SCR 1284 sought to entice Iraqi compliance through the promise of lifting trade sanctions on civilian goods once cooperation with arms inspections was achieved. The United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (Unmovic) was created to replace Unscom. Past resolutions called for the lifting of trade sanctions only after complete disarmament had been achieved. Thus SCR 1284 represented a favorable departure for Iraq. Nevertheless, Iraq categorically rejected the resolution and the corresponding sanctions regime.
The track record of sanctions on Iraq is mixed. From the outset Washington hoped sanctions would precipitate regime change in Baghdad. Yet this was never an explicit goal of the sanctions, nor was it an objective shared by all the participating countries. Moreover, American declarations that sanctions will remain in place until Saddam is gone have fostered the impression that the United States will bully the United Nations in pursuit of its own goals. To the extent that sanctions were designed to modify Saddam's behavior and disarm Iraq, sanctions could again be judged a failure. However, though Unscom was never able to finish its mission, sanctions have significantly reduced Saddam's ability to reinvigorate his weapons of mass destruction programs or rebuild his conventional forces. Saddam remains isolated internationally, and his ability to threaten his neighbors is significantly constrained.
Despite these accomplishments, the international consensus surrounding sanctions was wavering by the end of the decade. The Security Council adopted SCR 1284 in December 1999, but France, China, and Russia each abstained from the vote. This sanctions "fatigue" was a product, in part, of the ongoing concern about the impact of sanctions of the Iraqi population. But there were political and commercial pressures at work as well. Hoping to profit from lucrative commercial contracts in Iraq, France and Russia have both called for an easing of sanctions with a view toward the eventual conclusion of business deals. Russia, in particular, would like to begin collection of Soviet era loans it made to Iraq. This is not likely as long as sanctions are in place and Iraq is prevented from exporting oil. Saddam has also improved relations with many of his neighbors, who no longer view him as an imminent security threat. Consequently, the same states that are most important in patrolling sanctions, Iraq's immediate neighbors, are now profiting from illicit trade. Jordan, Turkey, and Syria have all participated in under-the-table oil deals. According to one report, Iraq now receives between $1.5 billion to $3 billion in hidden oil revenues.
Britain and the United States have attempted to address sanctions fatigue within the UN Security Council by proposing a new set of smart sanctions. First proposed in 1999, smart sanctions were designed to shift the blame for the humanitarian crisis in Iraq back to Saddam. They would allow for the import of a far greater range of civilian goods while maintaining tight control over Iraq's oil revenues and military imports. Bickering over the details of the proposal was intense. France and China were unsupportive of modified sanctions, and some neutral counties were calling for their lifting altogether. The proposal was dropped July 2001 following a Russian veto threat.
The events of Sept. 11, 2001, revived the consensus supporting sanctions. In November 2001, the Security Council adopted SCR 1382. Passage of the resolution represented a success for Anglo-American attempts to recast sanctions. Due to come into effect in May, the smart sanctions are expected to provide some relief to the debilitated Iraqi economy. SCR 1382 also calls for renewed weapons inspections and Iraqi compliance with previous resolutions.
The adoption of SCR 1382 may now be academic given the American administration's commitment to regime change in Baghdad. In his annual 'State of the Union' address earlier this year, U.S. President George W. Bush linked international terrorism to "rogue regimes" and weapons of mass destruction. The president also warned of the consequences should Iraq continue to forestall weapons inspections. The United States envisions an intrusive inspection regime that will leave no stone unturned. Even if Saddam decides to cooperate, it is not likely to be to a degree that would now satisfy Washington. The Bush administration is out of patience and satisfied that Saddam must go. There is momentum in Washington for extending the war on terrorism to Iraq.
The United States has spent over a decade garnering international support to keep sanctions alive. But it may now be the United States that brings the sanctions saga to a close.
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