"I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer." U.S. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, Jan. 29, 2002.

Much has happened in Iraq since December 1998, when UN inspectors left that country. Saddam Hussein has had more than three years to covertly further research on and enhance the development of chemical and biological weapons. The current U.S. administration fears that Iraq will serve as a conduit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), providing terrorists the means to wreak destruction on innocent civilians in the United States or other free civilized societies abroad. Because the world has been held at more than arm's length for such a long time, the location of the majority of Iraq's alleged WMD facilities is unknown. If all peaceful efforts for inspections in Iraq fail throughout this year, the U.S. administration may determine that there is only one sensible option: a war campaign that allows the extensive searches required to achieve true awareness of the presence of chemical and biological weapon facilities.

U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney visits Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Qatar, and Oman in March 2002. Besides strengthening the U.S. relationship with these countries, one reason for that trip may be to share the latest top secret intelligence concerning existing chemical and biological development at facilities in Iraq, including the capabilities of Iraq's Al-Abbas rocket that could hit any U.S.-friendly state in the region.

Cheney may well have the mission of establishing a baseline for offensive actions in Iraq. He wants to convince many countries - especially Britain, France, Russia, Turkey, Israel and Jordan - that the United States is serious, and that Washington is working on a winnable plan to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime while eliminating a horrendous threat to world peace. President George W. Bush's visit to Russia in May likely will have the same agenda.

Of prime importance is the need for Cheney to convince the Fahd family that the threat to Saudi Arabia is real, and that the United States has to directly counter Iraq's production and proliferation WMD before it's too late. The Saudi people will also have to be sold on an Iraqi operation. The perception among many Saudis that sanctions unfairly harm Iraqi civilians remains a sensitive issue that has hampered American access in the Kingdom.

In fact, some in the United States fear that a Saudi veto of basing rights would be a show-stopper for any military campaign against Iraq; all other neighboring countries currently have their bases and pre-staged areas filled close to capacity. But with the acquiescence of Saudi Arabia, the other nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states would follow suit and also reconfirm their support for any U.S. offensive and provide access to their critical airports and military facilities.

In addition to working out an arrangement with Saudi Arabia, a U.S. decision to go to war against Iraq would require dialogue with Iran so that Tehran understand it is not the target as U.S. forces escalate in the region.

Scenarios that could be a tripwire to directly confront Iraq:
The United States may already have made up its mind about war with Iraq. On the other hand, it may not - the subject has been a matter of intense debate within the Bush administration. Plans are far from complete and all contingencies /options will be looked at intensely over the next several months. There are a number of scenarios that likely would tip the debate decidedly:

1. A major terrorist attack (not necessarily against the United States) occurs, and hard, credible evidence indicates it was supported (at least in part) by Iraq.

2. Same as #1, but the act is discovered and prevented.

3. An "inspections crisis" triggers a small surgical campaign executed against several suspected WMD facilities in Iraq. (The scenario that could unfold this year is that Saddam has repeatedly refused months of political pressure to let UN forces into the country for inspections to the point that the United States can't stand it any longer ). U.S. Special Forces assault teams are inserted into select sites and obtain quantitative proof to the world that WMD production is present in Iraq and that evidence is used to escalate to a full campaign against Iraq.

What an offensive might look like:
Assuming that throughout the spring, summer and fall of this year, all diplomatic attempts, international foreign policy pressures, and UN actions to resume weapons inspections fail, the United States is likely to feel compelled to invade Iraq. The U. S. administration does not envision significant allied help and is ready to do this alone, but probably will seek and obtain logistical help such as air-to-air refueling from Britain and hopefully base facility rights throughout the region. Besides bases in Gulf countries, the United States would also seek rights to use NATO facilities at Incirlik air base in Turkey, and Vincenza in Italy.

The political impact of an unsuccessful campaign would be simply unacceptable to the Bush administration. Thus, any offensive would be an all-out, no-holds-barred war that would use overwhelming force and every conventional asset in the U.S. inventory to assure success.

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) already has the basics of a major campaign put together. Component commanders of each service are now at their forward headquarters in the region with more than 1,000 war planners, logistics experts and support specialists. This operations plan is being refined regularly and the target list is being validated and updated daily.

Such an operation would be no "cake walk," it instead would be very complicated militarily and politically. It will take time to get U.S. forces in place and plans at a satisfactory level of detail and readiness to execute. But if all other avenues to confront Iraq hit dead ends, it is almost inevitable that the Bush administration will see offensive operations as necessary. That said, any action is likely to wait until at least the mid-fall of 2002 or, more probably, the spring of 2003. There are several reasons for this, besides the need to build up a political rationale. The U.S. inventory of precision-guided munitions has been depleted substantially from operations in Afghanistan. The major aerospace companies are working overtime to refurbish these arsenals as well as testing some weapons that are just being developed, such as 30,000-pound bunker busters and improved sensor packages for unmanned aerial vehicles. The carrier battlegroups and associated airwings are looking at future training schedules and deciding what is essential and what can be accelerated. Strategic sea-lift assets, pre-positioned ordnance and aviation fuel supplies, and other logistic requirements such as the massive air refueling operation that would be required are being identified and plans being readied. The Air Tasking Order template for conducting the air war and initial steps needed to ensure air superiority are being formulated. Required active duty manning levels, which would need to be supplemented by Reserve call-ups, for all services is being evaluated.

Up to 100,000 U.S. troops and 25,000 support personnel would need to be pre-staged throughout the Gulf for a major ground offensive. They most likely would stage out of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and especially Kuwait. Special Forces will be more active than ever, and could be flown in from the Red Sea to forward operating bases established in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and eventually Iraq itself. Overall, the U.S. forces used likely would be lighter and more agile than during the Desert Storm conflict. Lessons learned in Afghanistan with the use of Special Forces guiding the crosshairs for smart bombs from tactical aircraft will be exploited to the fullest, keeping in mind that there is no Northern Alliance-like entity - at least for the moment ? to assist U.S. forward air controllers.

One of the primary objectives would be to seek out and destroy all WMD facilities in the country, but a lot would need to be done before this is possible. Although a substantial number of tactical aircraft are necessary, the offensive will not require 50,000 plus fighter/bomber sorties or 90,000 tons of bombs used in Desert Storm. One could expect up to 90 percent of weapons delivered to be precision guided. At least four carrier battlegroups would probably pre-position for offensive air strikes: one or two in the Red Sea, two or three in the Arabian Gulf. The Air Force, unlike their operations in Afghanistan, would have a substantial number of tactical fighter/bombers involved. They would most likely operate primarily out of bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey and Diego Garcia.

The first phase of war would be a massive around-the-clock campaign to neutralize command and control facilities, the surface-to-air threat and aircraft threat. This would not, however, be like the air campaign in Afghanistan - B-52's doing lazy figure eights over potential targets will not happen. As Iraq has substantial air defense capabilities, the surface-to-air threat to U.S. pilots could be significant - making initial air operations more complicated. Another objective could be the establishment of "No Movement" zones to allow U.S. ground forces to incrementally search and destroy WMD facilities with help from knowledgeable Iraqis. Intelligence may indicate that once access is gained in Iraq, groups of Iraqi scientists and military officials would assist in revealing the location of these WMD sites.

The general expectation among U.S. military planners - but not a given - is that Iraqi air defenses, command and control facilities, the Iraqi army and Republican Guard would be rapidly overwhelmed and defeated swiftly.

Nonetheless, Saddam has watched the U.S. forces in Afghanistan and their operations very closely. He certainly will expect a massive air campaign with precision-guided munitions as the first onslaught. His contingency plans may include locating the majority of his Republican Guard and WMD devices in the hospitals, schools, mosques, and public institutions surrounding Baghdad. Collateral damage thus will be a major concern for U.S. targeteers.

Sensitivities/Questions:

Scuds and WMD - As the high value target list is refined, the Scud II would be of the highest priority. U.S. planners will have to honor reports that over a dozen of these weapons are hidden and functional, and thus set up a robust theater missile defense network. The threat of biological or chemical weapons targeting Israel, neighboring countries, or U.S. troops will be a major concern. Handling this threat will be one of the hardest, most challenging missions in Iraq. Fortunately, because of technology improvements, U.S. forces may now actually have the capability to find and destroy mobile missile launchers, something which was non-existent throughout Desert Storm. Around the clock, ISR (Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance) assets, such as armed Predators and unmanned aerial vehicles linked to AC-130 gunships receiving live-stream video and scores of tactical aircraft, would be tasked extensively throughout the operation with the primary mission of being able to immediately respond to the threat of Scuds. Israel undoubtedly would expect more deployments of U. S. Patriot missile batteries in country to offer greater protection.

Kurds to the North - The Kurdish issue in northern Iraq is problematic for several reasons. The Kurds might be willing to participate in an operation to unseat Saddam, but formal autonomy would assuredly be their price for cooperation. Turkey has its own restive Kurdish minority to worry about, and such an accommodation could jeopardize Ankara's support for an operation. The CIA is currently actively sorting out and assessing potential help from the Kurds in Northern Iraq.

Shi'ites to the South - Both the United States and Saudi Arabia are suspicious of any potential Shi'ite government in Baghdad that might overly identify with their coreligionists in Iran. However, Shi'ites are the majority in Iraq, and any future regime will have to take this into account.

Iranian Reaction - The Iranians might have been more disposed to help before they were included in the "axis of evil." Now, large scale U.S. military operations in the Gulf will be viewed with even more suspicion. Tehran played a helpful role in the creation of an interim government in Kabul. The Iranians feel that they have legitimate interests in Afghanistan, but these have been ignored by the United States, which unfairly demonizes Tehran. Now there is a growing feeling that Iran is being boxed in. American troops in Iraq will reinforce this impression. Nevertheless, Iran has a strong interest in seeing Saddam overthrown. Iran has supported the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and there are reports that Tehran might assist the INC as a challenger to Saddam. Their greatest concern will be to ensure stability in Iraq, preferably with the creation of a Shi'ite government friendly to the Islamic Republic.

It should also be noted that Iraq's neighbors, notably Iran, Syria, Jordan, and Turkey, have begun to profit from Saddam's isolation as conduits for smuggled Iraqi oil and other goods. The sudden end to this black economy could bring about unforeseen consequences.

Potential of Anti-Saddam Forces in Country Being of Assistance - The 3.6 million Iraqi Kurds may be less enthusiastic about another move against Saddam. They do not view themselves as a comparable force to the Northern Alliance. They also remember how Saddam has brutally quelled past Kurdish uprisings. In recent years, the United Nations has diverted cash from Iraqi oil proceeds to northern Iraq. This has given the Kurds a much improved standard of living and some independence. Thus they have a great deal to risk. The Kurds would like to see Saddam depart the scene, but they remain concerned about the uncertain future that will follow a regime change in Baghdad. The United States will have to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to Saddam's downfall in order to get the Kurds fully on board.

The Southern Shia Arabs rose against Saddam shortly after the Gulf conflict, only to be brutally suppressed by the security forces as the international coalition looked on.

Thus they will view any new attempt by the United States to unseat Saddam with a certain amount of cynicism. The Iranian-backed SCIRI is a Shi'ite guerrilla force that has harassed Saddam in the past. It is not capable of overthrowing Saddam alone, but the group's interests will have to be considered in any future government. The United States has tried to woo SCIRI in the past, but these efforts have met with limited success. Like the Kurds, SCIRI does not view a strategy similar to that employed in Afghanistan as a viable option for regime change. Again, Washington's ability to convince SCIRI that it is fully committed to Saddam's departure will be an important factor in enlisting the group's cooperation.

Destabilizing the Entire Arabian Gulf - once Saddam's out who's in? Many of the Gulf States believe that instability would be the likely product of Saddam's downfall. They see Saddam as the devil they know, and there is no common vision of the kind of government that should replace him. Questions regarding who will be responsible for internal security once the regime has been removed will have to be answered. Iraq's neighbors, particularly Syria and Iran, might try to take advantage of the situation to settle old scores. There are a number of tribal, ethnic, religious and political fissures that could easily generate tensions once Saddam's iron thumb has been removed, and these have the potential to spill over national boundaries. Violence is a prominent feature of Iraqi political culture, and it manifests itself both internally and externally. Another strong man might be what is needed to keep the peace in Iraq. But there is little reason to believe that the next tyrant will hold views regarding weapons of mass destruction, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel that are dissimilar to Saddam's own. The financial and political investment in a post-Saddam Iraq will have to be substantial, as will the risks. Long-term U.S. security interests in the region demand some form of a stable Iraq that can protect itself after Saddam. This is a very critical problem and should not be underestimated.

To engage Iraq in a war will be the hardest decision Bush will make to date. If all other options prove fruitless, the words of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz on Feb. 15, 2002, will continue to weigh heavier on the president's mind: "We now, after Sept. 11, have a graphic, clear understanding of what commercial airliners can do. We can't wait until we have a graphic, clear understanding of what biological weapons or nuclear weapons can do before we do something about breaking that connection".

Rear Adm. (Ret.) Stephen H. Baker was former Chief of Staff for Naval Forces Central Command in Bahrain and the Theodore Roosevelt Battle Group Operations Officer throughout Desert Storm. He is currently a senior advisor at the Center for Defense Information. (202) 797-5288 or sbaker@cdi.org

Michael Donovan is a Research Analyst at the Center for Defense Information. He was awarded a Ph.D. in History from the University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom. His doctoral dissertation examined U.S.-Iranian relations and political stability in Iran. (202) 797-5564 or mdonovan@cdi.org

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