Much has happened in
Iraq since December 1998, when UN
inspectors left that country. Saddam Hussein has had more than three years to
covertly further research and enhance the development of chemical and biological
weapons. The administration of U.S. President George W. Bush fears that Iraq
will serve as a conduit for weapons of mass destruction (WMD), providing
terrorists the means to wreak destruction on innocent civilians in the United
States or other free civilized societies abroad.
Because the
world has been held at more than arm’s length for such a long time, the
location of the majority of Iraq’s alleged WMD facilities is unknown. If all
peaceful efforts to resume inspections in Iraq fail throughout this year, there
may be only one sensible option for the United States: a military campaign that
allows the extensive searches required to achieve true awareness of the presence
of chemical and biological weapon facilities.
U.S. Vice
President Dick Cheney’s around-the-Gulf visit last month to Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, Kuwait, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Qatar and Oman
certainly had Iraq on the agenda. He may have shared the latest top secret U.S.
intelligence concerning existing chemical and biological development at
facilities in Iraq, including the capabilities of Iraq’s Al-Abbas rocket, a
ready-to-go weapon of mass destruction that could hit any U.S.-friendly state in
the region.
Besides the
desire to strengthen the U.S. relationship with these countries, Cheney hoped to
establish a baseline for offensive actions in Iraq. The administration wants to
convince many countries — especially Britain, France, Russia, Turkey, Israel
and Jordan — that the United States is serious, and that Washington is working
on a winnable plan to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime while eliminating a
horrendous threat to world peace. The on-going bloody conflict occurring between
Israel and Palestine is, however, on the front burner with the leaders of the
Middle East. There are also indications from the Arab League summit meeting in
Beirut on March 29, 2002, that Iraq is being slowly accepted back into
mainstream Arab affairs.
Of prime
importance if the United States plans to conduct a major military operation in
the region is the need to convince the Fahd family that the threat to Saudi
Arabia is real, and that the United States must directly counter Iraq’s
production and proliferation of WMD before it’s too late. The Saudi people
will also have to be persuaded that a successful Iraqi operation can be
conducted that will not bring additional turmoil to the area. The perception
among many Saudis that sanctions unfairly harm Iraqi civilians remains a
sensitive issue that has hampered American access in the Kingdom.
Some in the
United States fear that a Saudi veto of basing rights would be a showstopper for
any military campaign against Iraq (it is not); all other neighboring countries
currently have their bases and pre-staged areas being filled close to capacity.
That said, the acquiescence of Saudi Arabia would ensure that the other nations
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) would follow suit, reconfirm their support
for any U.S. offensive, and provide access to their critical airports and
military facilities. Ongoing efforts to improve the Al Udeid airbase in Qatar
will provide an alternative command center. The NATO bases established at
Incirlik, Turkey, and Vincenza, Italy, would see heavy usage as well. Dialogue
with Iran would also be important so that Tehran understands it is not the
target of any build-up of U.S. forces in the region.
The United
States may already have made up its mind about war with Iraq. On the other hand,
it may not — the subject has been a matter of intense debate within the Bush
administration. Plans are far from complete and all contingencies/options will
be looked at intensely over the next several months. There are a number of
scenarios that likely would tip the debate decidedly:
1) A
major terrorist attack (not necessarily against the United States) occurs, and
hard, credible evidence indicates it was supported (at least in part) by Iraq.
2) Same
as #1, but the act is discovered and prevented.
3) An ‘inspections crisis’ triggers
a small surgical campaign executed against several suspected WMD facilities in
Iraq. (The scenario that could unfold this year is that Saddam has repeatedly
resisted months of political pressure to let UN forces into the country for
inspections, to the point that the United States cannot stand it any longer).
U.S. Special Forces assault teams are inserted into select sites and obtain
quantitative proof for the world that WMD production is occurring in Iraq and
that evidence is used to escalate to a full campaign against Iraq.
Assuming that
throughout the spring, summer and fall of this year, all diplomatic attempts,
international foreign policy pressures, and UN actions to resume weapons
inspections fail, the United States is likely to feel compelled to invade Iraq.
The U.S. administration does not envision significant allied help and is ready
to do this alone, but probably will seek and obtain logistical help such as
air-to-air refueling from Britain and hopefully base access rights throughout
the region.
The political
fallout of an unsuccessful campaign would be simply unacceptable to the Bush
administration. Thus, any offensive would be an all-out, unrestrained war that
would use overwhelming force and every conventional asset in the U.S. inventory
to assure success.
A military
plan is under construction, but not ready yet. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
already has the basics of a major campaign put together. Component commanders of
each service are now at their forward headquarters in the region with more than
1,000 war planners, logistics experts and support specialists.
Such an
operation would be no ‘cake walk’; it instead would be very complicated
militarily and politically. It will take time to get U.S. forces in place and
plans at a satisfactory level of detail and readiness to execute. However, if
all other avenues to confront Iraq hit dead ends, offensive operations will
almost inevitably result.
Again, this
likely will not take place until at least the mid-fall of 2002 or, more
probably, in the early months of 2003. There are several reasons for this,
besides the need to build up a political justification. For example, the U.S.
inventory of precision-guided munitions has been depleted substantially from
operations in Afghanistan. In addition, up to 100,000 U.S. troops and 25,000
support personnel would need to be pre-staged throughout the Gulf for a major
ground offensive — something that would take time.
There are a
number of challenges facing any U.S. campaign. As the high value target list is
refined, the Scud II would be of the highest priority. The threat of biological
or chemical weapons targeting Israel, neighboring countries, or U.S. troops will
be a major concern. Handling this threat will be one of the hardest, most
challenging missions in Iraq. Fortunately, the capability to find and destroy
mobile missile launchers has increased to the extent that U.S. force may
actually have an effective capability, something that was non-existent
throughout Desert Storm.
Kurds to the North –
The Kurdish
issue in northern Iraq is problematic for several reasons. The Kurds might be
willing to participate in an operation to unseat Saddam, but formal autonomy
would assuredly be their price for cooperation. Turkey has its own restive
Kurdish minority to worry about, and such an accommodation could jeopardize
Ankara’s support for an operation. The CIA is currently actively sorting out
and assessing potential help from the Kurds in Northern Iraq.
Shi’ites to the South
– Both
the United States and Saudi Arabia are suspicious of any potential Shi’ite
government in Baghdad that might overly identify with their coreligionists in
Iran. However, Shi’ites are the majority in Iraq, and any future regime will
have to take this into account.
Iranian Reaction – The Iranians
might have been more disposed to help before they were included in Bush’s
designated “axis of evil.” Now, large-scale U.S. military operations in the
Gulf will be viewed with even more suspicion. Tehran’s greatest concern will
be to ensure stability in Iraq, preferably with the creation of a Shi’ite
government friendly to the Islamic Republic.
Potential of Anti-Saddam
Forces in Country Being of Assistance – The 3.6 million Iraqi Kurds may be less
enthusiastic about another move against Saddam. They do not view themselves as a
comparable force to the Northern Alliance. The United States will have to
demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to Saddam’s downfall in order to get the
Kurds fully on board.
The Southern
Shia Arabs rose against Saddam shortly after the Gulf conflict, only to be
brutally suppressed by the security forces as the international coalition looked
on. Thus, they will view any new attempt by the United States to unseat Saddam
with a certain amount of cynicism. Again, Washington’s ability to convince the
Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq that it is fully committed to Saddam’s departure will be an
important factor in enlisting the group’s cooperation.
Destabilizing the Entire
Arabian Gulf – Once
Saddam’s out, who’s in? Many of the Gulf States believe that instability
would be the likely product of Saddam’s downfall. They see Saddam as the devil
they know, and there is no common vision of the kind of government that should
replace him. There are a number of tribal, ethnic, religious and political
fissures that could easily generate tensions once Saddam’s iron thumb has been
removed, and these have the potential to spill over national boundaries. The
financial and political investment in a post-Saddam Iraq will have to be
substantial. Long-term U.S. security interests in the region demand some form of
a stable Iraq that can protect itself after Saddam. This is a very critical
problem and should not be underestimated.
To
engage Iraq in a war will be the hardest decision Bush will make to date. If all
other options prove fruitless, the words of Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz on Feb. 15, 2002, will continue to weigh heavier on the
president’s mind: “We now, after Sept. 11, have a graphic, clear
understanding of what commercial airliners can do. We can’t wait until we have
a graphic, clear understanding of what biological weapons or nuclear weapons can
do before we do something about breaking that connection.”
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