The United States and Iran have remained adversaries for more than two decades.  Washington has imposed on Tehran a broad set of unilateral sanctions designed to isolate the country internationally and moderate Iran’s recalcitrant behavior.  Following the events of Sept. 11, a temporary warming of relations between the two countries seemed to suggest the possibility of an eventual rapprochement.  But the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush has reaffirmed its view that Iran remains a ‘rogue’ state and a member of the “axis of evil.”  Thus, Washington continues its efforts to contain Iran even as America’s allies throughout Europe engage the country unconditionally.

Both approaches are flawed.  European ‘over-engagement’ holds some countries hostage to the commercial interests they share with Iran.  But Washington’s unilateral policies increasingly isolate the United States rather than Iran.  A coordinated approach by the United States and its European allies could produce both incentives for constructive change in Iran and deterrents where radical policies hold sway.

U.S.-Iranian Relations

The United States and Iran have decades-old reasons for enmity.  Iranians bitterly resent American involvement in the 1953 coup d’etat in Iran and subsequent support for the dictatorship of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran.  Likewise, the 1979 seizure of the American Embassy, the ensuing hostage crisis, and Iran’s revolutionary zealotry turned that country into a pariah from the U.S. perspective.  Animosity between the two countries remained at a fever pitch throughout the 1980s and the reign of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. 

More recently, Washington’s concerns regarding Iran have focused on three themes: obstruction of the Middle East peace process; support of foreign terrorist organizations; and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Though Washington has not ruled out a dialogue between the two governments, it has addressed these concerns primarily through unilateral sanctions designed to commercially and politically isolate Iran.

For its part, Iran remains deeply suspicious of the U.S. regional presence and resentful of sanctions.  According to Secretary of State Colin Powell, Iranian diplomats performed a constructive role in Bonn and Tokyo in the formation of an interim Afghan government.[1]  Tehran now feels the United States is trying to freeze Iran out of future deliberations about its neighbor and box-in Iran regionally.  Some members within the governing elite believe that a U.S. invasion of Iraq would be a prelude to an attempted regime change in Iran.  Tehran also believes that the United States is disingenuous in its approach to arms control, choosing to demonize Iran while turning a blind eye to other proliferating nations. 

Following the events of Sept. 11, American and Iranian interests converged, and there seemed to be a possibility for improved relations.  Both conservatives and reformists in Iran immediately denounced the attacks in New York and Washington and later offered to assist in the rescue of downed American pilots.  Viewing immediate regional stability as fundamental to its economic and commercial relationships, Iran had long since embarked on a good neighbor policy in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia. The one exception was the Taliban, and relations between Tehran and the Afghan movement were bitter and often hostile.  Iranian acquiescence, if not material assistance, played an important role in American successes in Afghanistan.  The British government, with Prime Minister Tony Blair in the lead, argued that the time was ripe to strengthen the hand of reformers within Iran through engagement.  Continued hostility, British officials said, played into the hands of hardliners who used Western aggression as an excuse to mask their own failure in governance.  Moreover, dual containment of both Iran and Iraq, some argued, had proved both costly and ineffectual.  There seemed to be compelling reasons to repair the two-decade-old breach between Washington and Tehran.

Iran and the “axis of evil”

Hopes for a better relationship were quickly dashed amid allegations that Iran was funneling weapons and support to Palestinian rejectionist groups and causing mischief in Afghanistan.  In the context of the Bush Doctrine – states that support terrorists shall be treated like terrorists – Iran looked to be squarely in the terrorist camp.  Moreover, the administration’s approach to terrorism expanded to include a strategic component.  Rogue states and terrorist groups like al Qaeda have a common interest in the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Unless proactive steps are taken to intervene, terrorists will eventually find a state willing to supply them with a WMD capability.  Guilty by association, Iran was labeled a member of the “axis of evil.” 

Few doubt Iran's intention to develop a covert nuclear weapons program.  Most analysts agree that Iran is not able to fund or staff a program equal to the Iraqi effort prior to the Gulf conflict.  Russian technicians with experience in Iran indicate that the civilian nuclear program lacks cohesion and is marked by technical deficiencies.[2]  Absent a more capable nuclear infrastructure, or a covert input of fissile material from a foreign source, it appears that the focus remains on developing military research capabilities.  Such an approach allows for a practical military program to be rapidly instituted at a more opportune time.  This approach also allows Iran to walk a fine line of legality insofar as international safeguards and controls are concerned.

In addition to Iran’s nuclear ambition, the country is also thought to have developed some chemical and biological capabilities.  According to the States Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Iranian weapons labs have developed and stockpiled blister, blood, choking, and possibly nerve agents.  Iran has also stockpiled the munitions to deliver these agents.  According to INR’s assistant secretary of state, Carl W. Ford, Jr., Iran “may have some limited capability to weaponize [biological weapons].”[3]  These capabilities date back to the 1980s when Iran used chemical weapons in response to Iraqi gas attacks during the Gulf war.

The clerical elite’s rejection of the Middle East peace process also has been a persistent concern for Washington.  Tehran does not recognize Israel’s right to exist, and actively supports Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to varying degrees.[4]  U.S. administration officials have accused Iran, Iraq and Syria of  “inspiring and financing a culture of political murder and suicide bombing” against Israeli targets.[5]  Following the Sept. 11 attacks, Washington sought to enlist the cooperation of moderate Arab regimes by increased engagement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  Tehran’s obstinate rejection of a two-state solution was thus in direct conflict with U.S. interests.      

The immediate affect of Bush’s “Axis of Evil” address was a closing of ranks by Iranians of all political stripes.  Most Iranians believed the speech presaged a confrontation between the two countries.  American deployments in Afghanistan did little to ease their concerns.  Additionally, hard-liners in Tehran may now identify with the regime in Baghdad more so than in the past as they seek a common response to what they view as an increasingly hostile U.S. posture.[6]   

The Debate Within

Given this list of transgressions, strict application of the Bush Doctrine to Iran might seem sensible.  However, branding Iran as an “evil” state belies the complex political drama that is unfolding in Iran.  Unlike Kim Jong Il’s North Korea or Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Iran can boast a genuine internal political dialogue.  The overwhelming victory of moderates in the 2000 elections has changed the political landscape in Iran, perhaps permanently.  The country’s evolving democratic process is yielding a generation of reform minded politicians led by President Mohammad Khatami.  Many of these individuals favor a more responsible role for Iran in the world and better relations with Washington.  Bellicose rhetoric by Washington strengthens the position of hard-liners in Tehran at the expense of more moderate elements.  It confirms the worldview of the most confrontational clerics and leaves reformists disenfranchised and exposed.

The power of the conservative camp is derived from the financial muscle of its supporters among the bazaaris (mercantile class) and its control of the state’s security institutions.  A great deal of wealth is controlled by bonyads, which are in turn administered by the Supreme Leader.  These charitable trusts were created following the revolution to manage the appropriated wealth of the Pahlavi family and other elites.  Bonyads have evolved into independent centers of power functioning in support of clerics or well-connected businessmen, each with a stake in perpetuating the status quo. 

The state institutions controlled by conservative elements include the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards), the Artesh (regular army), the Basij (Islamic militia), and the various intelligence agencies.  These forces have a demonstrated capability to deal with civil unrest, but their personnel are increasingly affected by the same economic hardships as the general population.[7]  In the long run, the security services will not provide an adequate substitute for meaningful reform and government performance.  Iranian society is unlikely to accept indefinitely the corruption and economic mismanagement of the clerical establishment.  While the clerics have been effective in limiting the scope and pace of economic and political reform in Iran, they have altogether failed to provide attractive or widely accepted alternatives to the reformist platform. 

In as much as there exists a “reformist agenda,” given the disparate factions that comprise the reformist camp, it roughly corresponds to several broad issues.  Among these are the diffusion of power, the continued evolution of the democratic process, government accountability and transparency, and enhanced civil liberties.  Not surprisingly, conservatives see this platform ostensibly as a threat to the Islamic revolution, and also as a challenge to their own positions of privilege. 

This factional debate inevitably influences Iranian foreign policy in ways that make it appear inconsistent or at cross-purposes.  Not all reformists in Iran favor rapprochement with the United States and not all conservatives object to the idea.  The reformist tendency is to embrace improved relations, and this has been reflected in the largely reformist Foreign Ministry.  Yet the issue remains a political third rail, and advances in one direction are often matched by setbacks in another.  Khatami and his foreign minister, Kamal Kharrazi, probably hope to preserve Afghanistan as a venue in which the United States and Iran can cooperate.[8]  However, reports that Iranian intelligence and Republican Guard personnel are meddling in unhelpful ways in western Afghanistan may represent efforts to forestall engagement in this arena.     

Similarly, Iran’s policies toward Israel are exceptions to a trend in foreign policy that is increasingly moderate.  Both factions in Iran support the Palestinian “resistance.”  But reformists do not view the issue as fundamental to Iran’s national security and would prefer to limit participation to moral and ideological support.  Similarly, Tehran’s obdurate rejection of the peace process is the product of the conservative clerical establishment, and not necessarily representative of Iran’s articulate and politically sophisticated younger generations.  Conservatives favor direct material support to the major Palestinian rejectionist groups.  From their point of view, the failed venture earlier this year to supply the Palestinian Authority with Iranian weapons was a win-win situation.  The success of the operation would have dealt another blow to the U.S. backed peace process.  Failure of the operation, as it turned out, put the brakes on greater U.S.-Iranian cooperation after Sept. 11.           

Generally, reformists pursue a more responsible line in foreign affairs than their conservative counterparts.  The broad spectrum of Iranian society tends to be powerfully nationalistic, so there are some areas where all camps agree.  Weapons of mass destruction are cases in point.  All factions see the necessity for defense and value weapons that are seen as enhancing Iranian security.  However, factions will differ in their perception of various threats and apply their own values and cost-benefit analysis to these weapons programs accordingly.  In this context, reformists in Iran tend to place less emphasis on force and greater importance on integrating Iran into the international community.  Consequently, they have a less threat-driven worldview and a dampened appetite for WMD.  Nevertheless, it is unlikely that even reformist elements would advocate abandoning WMD projects in the absence of other security guarantees.              

Today, the debate in Iran is driven almost entirely by economic and domestic political issues.  Ultimately, however, the debate is about competing visions of a future Iran.  As the analysts Shahram Chubin writes:  “For [Supreme Leader] Khamenei, Iran represents a model of revolutionary Islam:  militant, defiant and activist.  For Khatami, Iran represents a model for Islamic democracy.”[9]  The United States has a tremendous interest in the outcome of the debate. 

A New Approach

A more balanced approach by the United States could reap substantial dividends.  But it should not be taken alone.  American and European aims in Iran are not that far apart, but the strategies for achieving them differ greatly.  European countries favor the use of the carrot – economic and diplomatic incentives to encourage responsible behavior.  The United States seeks to compel the same behavior with the stick – economic and diplomatic sanctions backed up by the threat of force.  One approach, taken without coordination, simply undermines the other.

The United States should participate in engagement principally because it is in its interest to do so.  The importance of Iran’s strategic position is well known.  Iran is a key energy producer situated adjacent to the major transit routes for oil and gas from Central Asia and the Persian Gulf.  Iran also constitutes a land bridge between the Middle East and the emerging states of Central and South Asia.  The Iranian population is disproportionately young, well educated, politically articulate, and largely moderate in their worldview. 

In the long run, détente is in the interest of both countries.  The Unites States is prohibited from investing in these existing and potentially valuable markets while Russian and European competitors are not.  Many Iranians would welcome American investment and business experience.  Moreover, opening the Iranian economy to American investment and competition will stimulate the transparency and rule of law needed for modernization and liberalization.  Most importantly, greater economic engagement will demonstrate the advantages of the reformist agenda and lay the groundwork for eventual political engagement.

European nations, for their part, will have to accept that constructive engagement is not sufficient when radical policies hold sway.  It is likely that Tehran was instrumental in reining in Hezbollah operations against Israel in response to Washington’s stiff warnings in the spring of 2002.  Likewise, Iran’s ideological support for the Palestinian cause need not impede engagement.  But Iranian material support for groups resorting to violence cannot be tolerated.  European capitals can do more to reinforce this point.

Better relations between the United States and Iran could provide a foundation for an improved regional security environment.  Iran is already a party in good standing to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions and well as the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Improved coordination between the United States and Europe should include recognizing Iran’s legitimate security concerns while continuing to deter WMD proliferation.  Iranian and Western security concerns in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia overlap to a remarkable degree.  Folding the American approach in with that of Europe could ameliorate Iran’s traditional sense of insecurity and build confidence on all sides.[10]  Eventually, the stage could be set for the ultimate bargain:  Iranian rejection of WMD programs in return for security assurances.[11]  Integrating Iran into such a security framework would dramatically enhance the stability of the Middle East as a whole.  

Time is on Washington’s side.  But this should not be an excuse for passivity or bellicose rhetoric.  The stakes are high, and the West has much to loose should Iran spiral into ignominy.  Washington should work in conjunction with those allies already involved in Iran to develop a road map for engagement.  Preliminary moves could involve U.S. acquiescence to Iran’s applications to the World Trade Organization and other financial institutions, expanded nongovernmental contacts, free investment in the petroleum and gas sectors of the economy, and security cooperation where common issues such as transnational crime overlap.  The United States should also accept that Iran has a traditional and legitimate interest in Afghanistan’s future.  Cooperation here could do much to build confidence down the road.

In the final analysis, engagement and the success of reform in Iran will prove to be codependent.  It is important that Washington recognize that many of the policies it objects to are designed to serve the interests of the radical clerical factions of the regime rather than those of the Iranian nation.  If this distinction can be made, then reform in Iran can be encouraged.  Meanwhile, European states will have to move beyond the narrowly focused economic self-interest that has motivated their own Iran policies.  Working together, the West can support reform and bolster those in Tehran who would turn Iran into a responsible member of the world community. 

 

Dr. Michael Donovan CDI Research Analyst mdonovan@cdi.org

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