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In the wake of the events of Sept. 11, a number of voices called for the United States to enhance intelligence relationships with other nations, especially those with proximity to Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, this intelligence will play an important role in managing international terrorism. But the countries on the frontline of the terrorist conflict are governed by authoritarian regimes with conflicted priorities not always in line with American interests. These nations have intelligence services that reflect different ethics regarding intelligence, questionable levels of professionalism, problematic internal agendas, and varying degrees of corruption. American intelligence officials will confront these problems in their pursuit of timely and accurate information.
Pakistan
Pakistan is a strong case-in-point. The 40,000 strong Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI) exerts a great deal of influence within the Pakistani political dynamic. Moreover, the ISI spent much of the last decade financing, supplying, and advising the Taliban. Consequently, it has developed an intimate knowledge of the movement, and most likely, the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan. ISI intelligence would be an invaluable resource for the United States.
But factions within the service are conflicted by President Pervez Musharraf's call for the agency to share intelligence with the CIA. On Oct. 7, Musharraf was forced to purge some ISI officers sympathetic to the Taliban, including the agency's chief, Gen. Mahmoud Ahmad. Several of the officials purged from the ISI and the Pakistani military, including Gen. Ahmad, played key roles in the 1999 military coup that placed the current regime in power. The ISI is peppered with officers who identify strongly with the Taliban and its militant Islamic ideology.
In late September, a small delegation of Pakistani military and intelligence officials visited the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar, reportedly to assist the Taliban in military preparations. The trip, which seems to have been a private initiative of these officers, reflects the degree of resistance to cooperation with America that exists within some intelligence and military circles in Pakistan. Currently, CIA and ISI officials are discussing the ground rules for conducting covert operations on or originating in Pakistani territory. But there are compelling reasons to suspect that disclosure of any operation to the ISI would mean disclosure to the Taliban as well.
Saudi Arabia
A reluctance to cooperate with U.S. intelligence officials is also apparent in Saudi Arabia, and predates the Sept. 11 attacks. Following the bombings of U.S. military installations in Riyadh and Dhahran in 1995-1996, American intelligence officials complained that Saudis denied access to detained suspects. Moreover, according to U.S. officials, the Saudis were reluctant to discuss any broader implications of the attacks that might have pointed to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda.
Unlike their counterparts in Pakistan, the reluctance of the Saudi Directorate of Intelligence to cooperate with U.S. officials emanates from the top down. The directorate reports directly to the King, who shares the royal family's ambivalence about bin Laden. As a former member of the political elite in the Kingdom, Osama bin Laden retains a nebulous array of contacts within influential circles. More importantly, the regime is acutely aware of bin Laden's antipathy to its reign, as well as his popularity within the conservative religious establishment. This community is an important pillar of support for the House of Saud. Government efforts to roll up al Qaeda and arrest bin Laden remain a sensitive issue with connotations for Saudi stability.
After the Sept. 11 attacks, intelligence sharing between the United States and Saudi Arabia continued to follow this problematic pattern. Officials in the administration of President George W. Bush complain that the Saudis are failing to cooperate fully with U.S. intelligence officials attempting to investigate the hijacking suspects.
Central Asia
The Central Asian states pose a set of unique challenges for American intelligence and diplomatic officials. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan all have a number of intelligence organizations responsible for providing domestic and foreign intelligence. Both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have a Committee for National Security (KNB), though the latter also has the Barlau, the external intelligence agency. In Uzbekistan, the National Security Service (NSS) handles a broad range of security issues. Finally, in Tajikistan, the Ministries of Interior, Security, and Defense share responsibility for security and intelligence matters.
These nations are a product of the security vacuum that emerged in the region after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Both Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan sponsored extremist Islamic insurgencies in Central Asia in the last decade. As such, these fledgling states found common interest in cooperating with the United States on security issues as a hedge against internal insurgencies and Russian and Chinese pressure.
Taken together, however, the region characterized by dubious political systems, tenuous stability, economic stagnation, and seriously flawed human rights records. Their security and intelligence services may possess valuable resources for the United States. But they are also key actors in extinguishing even benign internal dissent and propping up heavily authoritarian personalities. Moreover, civil control of the security services cannot be taken for granted. In Tajikistan, for instance a small group of commanders use their forces to support internal fiefdoms. Corruption is an enduring problem throughout the region and within the security services. Clearly, the proximity of the Central Asian states to Afghanistan enhances their value to the United States. But security associations in the region will have to be forged at the price of U.S. diplomatic exposure.
Conclusion
If the United States is to penetrate international terrorist networks, it will need access to resources outside the purview of Western intelligence sources. But information provided from the nations listed above will come with its own set of biases. There is little reason to believe that many of these security services approach the business of intelligence with the concept of neutral analysis that is the ideal of their Western counterparts. A reluctance to cooperate, political spin, selectivity, or simple miscommunications will play a part to corrupt or obfuscate what may be a wealth of information.
Sources: U.S. Department of State, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights: Kazakhstan; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Central Asian Report, Washington Post, New York Time, Las Angeles Times, London Daily Telegraph, The New Yorker.
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