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CDI's Inspections Update #5 ~ Jan. 30, 2003
Disarm, or else! This was the message the United States hoped to convey to Iraq through the language of Security Council Resolution 1441. After years of obfuscation and evasion, Saddam Hussein was to be given one final opportunity to come clean and give up his weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their development programs, and the means to deliver them. The resolution passed and the inspectors returned to Iraq. On Jan. 27, Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, co-chiefs of the United Nations Monitoring and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC), reported to the Security Council on the state of Iraqi compliance with resolution 1441. In a wide ranging but specific critique of Iraq's behavior, Blix reported that Iraq was cooperating in process but not in substance. In Blix's words, "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance - not even today - of the disarmament which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and live in peace." Iraq's failure to disarm constitutes a material breach of resolution 1441. It appears to be time for "or else."
…Or not. In order to gain support of the more skeptical members of the Security Council resolution 1441 back in November 2002, Washington toned down much of the language governing exactly what would happen if Iraq failed to comply. France and Russia wanted a second resolution sanctioning the use of force. Washington wanted an automatic mechanism that would allow the use of force in the event of Iraqi non-compliance. The result was a deliberately ambiguous compromise that left each side feeling vindicated. In the process, the explicit threat of "all means necessary" became the somewhat more vague threat promising "serious consequences." This middle ground guaranteed unanimous passage of resolution 1441 by the Security Council, but it also left how to proceed if Iraq failed to disarm far from clear.
Washington thinks it knows the answer. Everyone knows that "serious consequences" means military force, said Secretary of State Colin Powel recently. The administration of President George W. Bush has declared that Washington requires no second resolution to proceed, and assures the international community that the United States will disarm Iraq alone if necessary. From the administrations perspective, the international community is wavering on its commitment to see Iraq rid of WMD and the Security Council is approaching irrelevance. The administration argues with some justification that it was never UNMOVIC's job to disarm Iraq and searching for smoking guns misses the point. It was Iraq's job to disarm itself while UNMOVIC oversaw and verified the process. In their report to the Security Council on Jan. 27, Blix and ElBaradei confirmed that this had yet to occur.
Still, the inspector's reports offered plenty for those nations currently lobbying against military action to rally around. Neither inspector used the words "material breach." ElBaradei said that inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found "no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons program since the elimination of the program in the 1990s." This assessment contradicts an assertion to the contrary made by Bush last October. Most importantly, ElBaradei suggested that inspections be allowed to continue. "Inspections are time-consuming, but" said ElBaradei, "if successful, can ensure disarmament through peaceful means." Though Blix did not make the same request during his report to the council, he is believed to feel the similarly. UNMOVIC capabilities have expanded rapidly and will continue to do so. Close to 300 inspections have been conducted. But, argued the inspectors, there is much more to accomplish. The Security Council meets on Jan. 29 to deliberate further.
On Jan. 28, Bush made his case for action in the annual state-of-the-union address. The president stressed that Iraq had failed to disarm despite 12 years of international demands requiring it to do so. The president reiterated the U.S. position that it was not the job of inspectors to uncover a smoking gun that would point to Iraq's guilt: "It is up to Iraq to show exactly where it is hiding its banned weapons, lay those weapons out for the world to see and destroy them as directed." Bush added that 'nothing like this has happened." He then proceeded to enumerate the banned materials believed to be in Iraq's possession. Surprisingly, Bush also referred to an attempt by Iraq to purchase high strength aluminum tubes, allegedly to aid in the enrichment of uranium. This accusation has been largely discounted by the IAEA's ElBaradei, who said that the tubes appear have been destined for a conventional Iraqi rocket program. Bush said that Powell would address the Security Council on Feb. 5. In what may be a final U.S. effort to secure UN support for the ouster of Saddam, Powell will share with the council "information and intelligence about Iraq's illegal weapons programs, its attempts to hide those weapons from inspectors and its links to terrorist groups." The president repeated his pledge to disarm Iraq with force if Iraq will not disarm peacefully.
What will happen next remains unclear, but the clouds of war are gathering. For the United States, support remains the perennial problem. Last week, France and Germany lined up squarely against and invasion. Though few analysts would contend that Iraq no longer possesses a residual WMD inventory, the argument now seems to hinge on the quality of the intelligence Powell will share with the Security Council. It is likely that this evidence is going to be more of the same circumstantial data that points to possible violations rather than laying them bare. After all, does the United States possess dramatically better information than the French intelligence services? No matter how much the administration stresses (correctly) that searching for a smoking gun misses the point, this doesn't change the fact the many at home and abroad require one before they will sign on to overthrow Saddam. The administration's argument, that the absence of proof is all the proof that is needed, is unlikely to sway the other council members. Without UN authorization of the use of force and the political cover it conveys some key countries will remain reluctant allies in the endeavor. Consequently, the coalition of the willing that Bush says he will lead against Iraq continues to look more like a pretty exclusive club.
Yet support may be less of a problem than appears now to be the case. French and German unwillingness may have more to do with their own domestic political agendas than with a genuine compulsion to hinder Washington's unilateralist tendencies. On Jan. 30, the leaders of Spain, Britain, Italy, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Portugal published joint op-ed pieces in European and American newspapers supporting the U.S. line on Iraq. Russian President Vladimir Putin also publicly warned Iraq that time was running out and patience was at a premium. On Jan. 23, the foreign ministers of Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey met in Istanbul and issued a statement warning Iraq to take advantage of the opportunity left to it to avoid war. The debate in the Security Council is not over. Powell's presentation to the council on Feb 5 is likely to clarify little more than the contours of the debate. Washington might agree to give the inspectors more time to search while it finalizes military preparations. But the administration believes it has ample reasons for war. It will not debate them indefinitely.
CDI's Inspections Update #4 ~ Jan. 17, 2003
On Jan. 16, inspectors searching the Ukhaider Ammunition Storage Area 90 miles outside of Baghdad discover a stock of 12 122-millimeter rockets with warheads configured to carry chemical warfare agents. Initial reports indicate that these warheads were not included in the Iraqi weapons declaration submitted to the Security Council on Dec. 7. Inspectors stressed that, while the warheads could carry chemical weapons, 11 of those found were empty, and one other required "further evaluation." The warheads found are similar to those imported by Iraq in the 1980s and used to deliver chemical weapons against Iranian troops during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. Iraq is allowed to possess short-range rockets under existing UN resolutions. But telltale plastic liners inside the warheads indicate that these were designed to carry chemical weapons, and that may constitute a material breach of UN resolutions concerning Iraq's WMD capabilities. Nevertheless, Washington's response to the revelation has thus far been cautious, reflecting the ambiguous nature of the find. Indeed, this is the kind of evidence that is likely to reinforce existing opinions, regardless of what those might be. American officials will surely point to these warheads as evidence that Iraq cannot be trusted to disarm itself. Others will surely argue that a few empty warheads testify to the meager state of Iraq's WMD capabilities and hardly justify a military showdown.
On Jan. 9, Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei gave an interim report on the status of weapons inspections in Iraq. The report was highly critical of Iraq's December weapons disclosure, which Mr. Blix characterized as "rich in volume but poor in new information." Inspectors admit that they have uncovered no evidence to suggest that Iraq continues to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Nevertheless, the two inspectors asserted that Baghdad has failed to fully appraise the United Nations Monitoring and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC) as to the extent of its WMD programs. Blix noted a "significant discrepancy" in the Iraqi declaration regarding the number of chemical munitions held by Iraq. The existence of other chemical warfare agents also remains open to question. The inspectors added that Baghdad had failed to adequately respond to UNMOVIC's request for a complete list of Iraqi weapons specialists.
In the absence of definitive proof showing that Iraq continues to design, procure, produce, and or store WMD, the U.S. position seems to be focused on Baghdad's failure to cooperate with the inspections process. A lack of cooperation on the part of Iraq would in itself constitute a material breach of Security Council Resolution 1441. According to the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, John D. Negroponte, "there is still not evidence that Iraq has changed its approach from one of deceit to a genuine attempt to be forthcoming." Negroponte said Iraq had until the next report by inspectors to the Security Council on Jan. 27 to mend its ways. The ambassador's comments seemed to suggest that Jan. 27 represents the final deadline for Iraqi compliance in the view of the United States.
However, comments by other diplomats have been less definitive. British ambassador to the United Nations, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, supported the view that the inspections process could go on for some time. Greenstock encouraged everyone to "calm down" about the Jan. 27 report and allow inspectors "time to do their business." Likewise the Russian ambassador to the United Nations, Sergey Lavrov, asserted that the inspections process was still in its early stages. Media reports indicate that some officials within the French, Russian, German, and even British governments may favor extending the inspection process well beyond Jan. 27.
On Jan. 13, Blix said that the Jan. 27 report to the Security Council should be seen as an update that would mark the beginning of the inspection process rather than the end. Blix made it clear that he would proceed according to a timetable set by the United Nations rather than the United States. Some inspectors have suggested that it could take as long as a year for inspections to yield results, depending on the level of Iraqi cooperation. Though resolution 1441 does not mandate inspections beyond the Jan. 27 date, it does not proscribe them either. According to the chief inspector, the next couple of weeks of inspections are unlikely to produce definitive evidence pointing to Iraqi noncompliance. Without such evidence the Security Council is unlikely to easily arrive at a consensus regarding the use of force in Iraq. Consequently, UNMOVIC is prepared to continue its work and, barring unforeseen circumstances, may report again to the Security Council in March.
Of course, if Washington were to produce its own evidence of Iraqi guilt, the situation would change dramatically. But it seems increasingly clear the Washington probably does not possess the kind of concrete intelligence that would lead inspectors to Iraq's hidden weapons or convince doubtful members of the Security Council to sanction the use of force. It is more likely that the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies have the kind of circumstantial evidence that will continue to drive the inspections process by pointing to discrepancies the Iraqis cannot, or will not account for. Bickering continues between UNMOVIC and American officials regarding the quality and utility of the intelligence Washington has provided to inspectors. While Blix says little of the information he has thus far received has not been "actionable," Washington says it has provided good data, with better information to follow. U.S. intelligence agencies have also contributed names to a list of Iraqi weapons specialists that Washington feels should be taken outside Iraq for interviews, something for which the Bush administration continues to lobby.
In Iraq, both the pace and profile of inspections has risen. The inspection force is now equipped with eight helicopters and will soon be expanded in size to 200 personnel. UNMOVIC has also opened offices in Mosul and Basra. Inspectors have now visited well over 250 sites. Inspection targets have recently included another presidential site in Baghdad, the private homes of two members of the Iraqi nuclear program, and the offices of the Iraqi agency overseeing the inspection process. On Jan. 19-20, Blix and ElBaradei will visit Baghdad themselves to press the Iraqis on the inconsistencies in their arms declaration.
A strenuous debate within the Security Council appears to be inevitable. The United States will almost certainly militate against an indefinite extension of the inspections program. Washington will also continue to insist that the United States need not obtain a second resolution sanctioning the use of force before taking action against Iraq, if only to demonstrate to Saddam Hussein that U.S. options will not be constrained by the Security Council. The Bush administration is clearly loosing patience with what it sees as more evasion from Baghdad. Washington will continue to argue that, even if inspectors have failed to turn up proof that Iraq is cheating the process, Iraq has failed to prove its innocence as required by the Security Council. Meanwhile the pressure on Saddam mounts with every new American military deployment to the Persian Gulf. On Jan. 16, Hans Blix warned Baghdad that the only alternative to cooperation with UNMOVIC is military intervention; tough talk that has been welcomed in Washington.
But an American-led invasion remains far from inevitable. There are some signs that the administration sees a great deal to gain from working with the United Nations, and a good deal to lose by acting unilaterally. Even the normally pliant Turks have balked at assisting the United States in it endeavor to overthrow the Iraqi regime without better proof. There is no shortage of domestic political and economic liabilities associated with action, and recent polling numbers indicate that the Bush administration's approval rating seems to be slipping. The continuing crisis in North Korea will probably add to the administration's caution. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Washington's most ardent ally, is experiencing domestic political pressure of his own. The two heads of state will have a lot to talk about when they meet at Camp David on Jan. 31. One topic of conversation may well be the virtue of acquiescing to another round of inspections in Iraq.
CDI's Inspections Update #3 ~ Jan. 6, 2003
Iraq's weapons declaration was submitted on Dec. 7 in the midst of a great deal of speculation. On Dec. 19, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell asserted that in the view of the United States, "material omissions" in the declarations "constitute another material breach" by the Iraqi government. The secretary suggested that the declaration's title, "Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Declaration," was hardly a fair representation of the documents' contents. According to Powell, the Iraqi declaration "may use the language of Resolution 1441, but it totally fails to meet the resolution's requirements."
Among the omissions Washington finds most alarming is information pertaining to a possible 26,000-liter stockpile of anthrax, a possible 38,360-liter stockpile of botulinum toxin, and the existence of mobile biological production units. Washington also believes Iraq is concealing information regarding precursor chemicals required for the production of mustard gas, sarin gas, and VX nerve gas. In the sphere of nuclear weapons, the declaration omits reference to the attempted procurement of high-strength aluminum tubes that could be used in the uranium enrichment process.
In view of these and other reported omissions, Powell outlined how the United States and the United Nations should approach the inspections process in the coming weeks. First, the Iraqi declaration should be further examined and audited. Second, UN inspectors should place a high priority on the interrogation of Iraqi weapons specialists. Third, member states should provide inspectors with the support they need to accomplish their mission. Finally, Washington would consult its allies and members of the Security Council to establish the best way to compel Iraqi compliance.
It remains unclear whether Washington views these omissions as a justification for military action, but this seems doubtful. The omissions may constitute a breach of Iraq's obligations to come clean to the Security Council, but they do not as yet represent hard and fast proof that Iraq is developing weapons of mass destruction. In Powell's words, the "burden remains on Iraq to cooperate fully and for Iraq to prove to the international community whether it does or does not have weapons of mass destruction." Thus it is up to Baghdad to prove a negative. Until such time as the United States or UN inspectors can verify Iraq's innocence or guilt, it is likely Washington will indulge the inspection process. Nevertheless, Washington clearly believes that Baghdad responded to its final opportunity to comply with UN resolutions with predictable deception, and U.S. military deployments to the region continue apace.
The same day as Powell's briefing, chief UN weapons inspectors Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei offered a more guarded assessment of Iraq's declaration. Blix forthrightly declared that the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission (UNMOVIC) was not in a position to confirm or disprove allegations that Iraq continues to design, procure, produce, and or store weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although Iraq continues to insist on its innocence, Blix noted that Baghdad provided little new information in its declaration regarding proscribed weapons programs. Consequently, a number of issues remain outstanding in the absence of supporting evidence. In some instances, however, UNMOVIC is said to possess evidence that contradicts Baghdad's claims altogether, as in its accounting of anthrax stocks.
Blix also said that the capabilities of inspectors would soon be enhanced by the use of new monitoring equipment, sensors, over-flights, and various other techniques. He confirmed that UNMOVIC viewed interviews with Iraqi weapons specialists as a potentially valuable source of information, something that Washington has been pressing for for weeks. Iraq initially balked at allowing personnel to leave the country for interviews, but did not obstruct interviews inside the country. Interviews with some of Iraq's nuclear specialists began in December. On Dec. 26, Baghdad said it would allow Iraqis to leave the county for interviews, but said the decision to do so would be left to the individuals concerned.
For their part, Iraqi officials continue to deny the existence of any proscribed WMD programs. In reaction to critical statements from Washington and the United Nations, Baghdad insisted that it was ready to respond to any outstanding questions regarding its arms declaration. In a bizarre shift, Gen. Amir Saadi, an advisor to President Saddam Hussein, invited analysts from the CIA to take part in the inspections process. Prior to the departure of inspectors in 1998, Iraq accused UNMOVIC's predecessor, the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), of spying on behalf of the CIA. Officials from the White House and the State Department quickly declined Iraq's offer.
In the meantime, inspections continue at a brisk pace. Currently, there are 110 UNMOVIC inspectors on the ground in Iraq, including ten specialists from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iraqi officials continue their prompt cooperation with the inspectors. On Jan. 1, inspectors made surprise visits to four sites in Baghdad notwithstanding the New Year's holiday. On Jan. 5, inspectors visited 16 sites in Iraq, the largest one-day total since inspections resumed.
Exactly what UN inspectors have uncovered remains unclear. However, some reports indicate that UNMOVIC has been frustrated in its efforts to uncover evidence of Iraqi WMD development. After five weeks and 250 inspections, some UN personnel have reportedly confessed privately that they have turned up no information that would support allegations against Iraq. They also cite a lack of intelligence being supplied to them by the United States and other countries. American officials are apparently equally frustrated that inspectors have failed to act on the information that has been supplied. It appears that the stage is being set for some finger-pointing should the inspectors come up empty-handed.
A clearer picture of what UNMOVIC has uncovered in Iraq should become evident this week when Blix provides a status report to the Security Council, and again on Jan. 27 when he provides a full report on his mission. Some members of the Security Council are said to view the Iraqi declaration in a more favorable light than the United States or Great Britain. Blix could help to further divide the council if he brings little new information to the briefing. That would complicate U.S. efforts to build a coalition of the willing to effect a change of regime in Baghdad. If UNMOVIC cannot provide proof that Iraq is in the WMD business, then it will be up to Washington to furnish it. This is something that the White House seems reluctant to do. An alternative would be for the United States to acquiesce to another round of inspections, and another report by Blix somewhere down the line. This would make the timetable for a Winter/Spring invasion of Iraq even tighter than it is already.
CDI's Inspections Update #2
Initial reports suggest that little new information is included in Iraq's weapons declaration. On Dec. 11, the CIA delivered a preliminary assessment of the 12,000-page declaration to the White House concluding that much of the report is recycled material from earlier Iraqi declarations. The section on Iraq's nuclear weapons program, totaling over 2,000 pages, is reportedly virtually identical to the declaration submitted to the United Nations in 1996. Likewise, sections covering Iraq's chemical and biological warfare programs are apparently pieced together from earlier reports submitted to inspectors prior to their departure from Iraq in 1998. Inspectors rejected these earlier reports as inconsistent or incomplete. It is not known yet whether the new declaration addresses any of the specific questions posed by past inspections efforts, but U.S. officials assert that the report is riddled with omissions. A complete and public U.S. assessment of the declaration is not expected for weeks.
Hans Blix and Mohamed El Baradei, from UNMOVIC and the IAEA respectively, are scheduled to provide a preliminary assessment of the declaration to the Security Council on Dec. 19.
In the meantime, the UN presence in Iraq is growing. By week three, an additional 28 inspectors from UNMOVIC and 20 from the IAEA had arrived in Iraq. On Dec. 15, 15 more inspectors arrived, raising the total number of personnel in the country to 105. Helicopters and additional inspection equipment has also arrived.
Inspectors have visited close to 100 sites since inspections resumed on Nov. 27. On Dec. 10, inspectors conducted five searches, including an inspection of a uranium mine in the northwest corner of the country. Other sites recently visited included the Center for Biotechnology in Baghdad, the Tuwaitha nuclear installation south of Baghdad, the Qaim phosphate complex northwest of Baghdad, the Qa Qaa explosives facility south of Baghdad, and the Furat chemical plant, also south of the capital. With the exception of the Biotechnology site, all of these installations were once involved in the Iraqi nuclear program. The sprawling al Tuwaitha facility once housed research reactors and played an important role in the uranium enrichment process. Al Qaim housed a uranium separation facility for the production of yellow cake. Al Qa Qaa was Iraq's principle facility for the production of explosives for use in implosion-type nuclear weapons. Al Furat was to mass-produce centrifuges for uranium enrichment. Equipment at all of these sites was either destroyed during the 1991 bombing campaign that preceded the Gulf War or dismantled under the supervision of inspectors prior to 1998. Nevertheless, the status of some of these installations remains unverified, and elements of some of the facilities remain operational. The site at al Qa Qaa is believed to be active in covert military-applied activities. Inspectors have not said what they found at any of these installations, but the visits follow on the heels of an admission by a senior Iraqi official last week that Iraq was six months away from completing a nuclear weapon in 1990, prior to the Gulf War.
Other sites inspected include a couple of sites connected with Iraq's ballistic missile program, and a number of lesser nuclear facilities. All of the inspections were reported to have gone smoothly. On Dec. 14, inspectors visited 12 sites, the highest single day total.
Inspections are continuing against the backdrop of disagreement between the U.S. government and UNMOVIC regarding the interrogation of Iraqi weapons specialists. Washington reportedly maintains a list of some 500 specialists from the various Iraqi WMD programs it would like to see questioned, and feels the inspectors are not pursuing this option aggressively. UNMOVIC representatives say they would also like the opportunity to question Iraqi scientists, but admit the process is complicated. Iraq has dealt ruthlessly with officials and their families who, in the past, provided information to inspectors. Washington has suggested that Iraqi specialists be allowed to leave the country with their families so that they might be interviewed, and perhaps, encouraged to defect. UNMOVIC head Blix has thus far resisted encouraging defections for fear of politicizing the inspections process.
The Iraqi response to inspections continues to be compliant, though the rhetoric from Baghdad is mixed. On Dec. 10, Iraq accused the United States of extorting the UN Security Council in order to gain early access to the weapons declaration. Iraq also suggested the United States might use its rarefied access to the weapons declaration to forge details in the report that would suffice as a cause for war. On Dec. 12, however, Gen. Hussam Muhammad Amin of the National Monitoring Directorate applauded the professionalism of UN inspectors and appeared confident that their work would exonerate his country.
CDI's Inspections Update #1
Dec. 10, 2002
Inspectors from the United Nations Monitoring and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) returned to Iraq on Nov. 25, 2002. The first two weeks of inspections have yielded few surprises and no smoking guns. On Dec. 5, Saddam Hussein reiterated his assertion that Iraq possesses no illicit weapons programs, and suggested that the presence of inspectors affords an opportunity to prove his case. Inspectors will now spend the next several days digesting the mountain of information included in Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) disclosure. What will follow will largely depend of the veracity of that report.
The goals of inspectors at this early stage are both mixed and modest. Even before returning to Baghdad, representatives from UNMOVIC and the IAEA asserted that the inspection process would start slowly. Rather than search for a smoking gun that might indicate the extent of Iraqi WMD programs, inspectors have sought to establish a baseline upon which to measure future progress. Thus searches have initially focused on previously inspected sites in order to establish what has changed in the years since UN personnel were last in Iraq. Inspectors hope to confirm their inventory of Iraqi equipment, account for any discrepancies, and give first time members if the team some valuable experience. At the moment, these goals are necessarily modest. Only 17 inspectors have thus far arrived in Baghdad, though this number is expected to increase to around 100 by late December. Consequently, UNMOVIC does not have the manpower to carry out inspections of some of Iraq's more expansive and complex facilities in the Baghdad area and elsewhere in the country. This problem will be alleviated somewhat this week when 35 new inspectors will arrive along with a fleet of UN helicopters.
Nevertheless, UNMOVIC chief Hans Blix quickly sought to establish Baghdad's willingness to cooperate with his new mandate for full and unfettered access. On Dec. 3, inspectors demanded and received access to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's Sijood palace in central Baghdad. It is not known what, if anything, UN officials found inside the palace, but their entrée was regarded as an important test of Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions. A UN spokesman later said that full access to the entire site had been granted without difficulty. Though Sijood palace was searched in April 1998, then inspectors had to go through a number of formalities that included providing prior notice. The Dec. 3 inspection nonetheless incensed Iraqi officials who charged that inspectors where acting as spies for Israel and the United States.
Inspection teams also visited a variety of other sites. On Nov. 28, inspectors accessed the Al Dawrah veterinary medicine laboratory, once known for the production of the biological weapon botulinum toxin. In the Summer on 2002, the British government released a documented that suggested renewed activity at the site. Inspectors neither confirmed nor denied the allegation, but reporters who toured the site afterward indicated that the laboratory appeared abandoned. IAEA inspectors also searched the Al Nasr industrial site north of Baghdad. This site housed equipment for the production of centrifuges necessary for the enrichment of uranium. In October, U.S. officials said that Iraq was restoring the plant, but again inspectors offered no evidence to support this allegation. Altogether, inspectors have visited well over a dozen Iraqi weapons sites, but what they have thus far found remains a matter of speculation.
On Dec. 7, Baghdad submitted the WMD declaration required by the terms of Resolution 1441. The package included over 12,000 pages of documents as well as 10 compact discs. Assessing the declaration will take some time. The documents have to be translated, digested and analyzed before any conclusions can be gleaned. Though the five permanent members of the Security Council (all nuclear states) will receive copies of the declaration in full, the remaining 10 members of the council will get copies only after UNMOVIC censors any information that could help other countries to develop WMD.
The sheer size of the declaration probably means that there is good amount of material from former Iraqi declarations included. Under the terms of resolution 1441, Iraq is obliged to submit a declaration that is "full, accurate and complete." This means disclosing an inventory of all equipment and facilities involved in the production of WMD including anything that falls into the category of "dual-use." Despite the breadth of the report, Iraqi officials insist that they have no current WMD programs to disclose. Presumably then, the information they have provided refers to WMD programs already known to UNMOVIC and the IAEA. If this is the case, Washington will be eager to contradict Baghdad's claims. The question then will be whether or not Washington has the intelligence to prove its case.
International response to the progress of inspectors has been mixed. There are signs that officials in Washington remain divided regarding Iraq. Secretary of State Colin Powell feels the inspections have started fairly well. Others in the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush are less sanguine. American officials pressed inspectors to be more aggressive in their selection of sites early on, and some believe the process to date has been too timid. Reaction from Great Britain has also been skeptical. In contrast, Russian officials indicate that they are satisfied as to Iraq's willingness to comply.
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