Organization for Homeland Security:
Issues and Options

Following the Sept. 11 disaster, debate has begun on what institutional changes need to be made so that the United States can better prepare for and prevent such attacks. The chief imperative for restructuring comes from recognition that many different agencies and branches of agencies are involved in defending against terrorism, and that more integration of their various efforts is necessary.

The two main areas of focus reflect the distinction sometimes made between "homeland security" and "homeland defense." Homeland security is often used as a broader term than homeland defense - homeland defense usually refers somewhat more narrowly to preventing and defeating attacks, while homeland security also includes the functions of handling the consequences of attacks that get through defenses, largely using civilian and local agencies.

A broad definition of homeland security missions could include:

	land, sea, and air defense of the United States
	"consequence management" - dealing with the effects of attacks by weapons of mass destruction, including military support to civilian authority
	national missile defense
	computer network defense
	counter-terrorism operations
	counter-drug operations
	immigration control and border security.

Army Secretary Thomas White, the Defense Department (DoD) executive agent for Homeland Defense, has noted regarding DoD, "We're not the lead agency for the homeland security task."¹ The armed forces do have a role in dealing with the consequences of attacks, but it is a supporting role to other agencies, in contrast with its primary role in homeland defense. Likewise, the armed forces have been playing a role in border security for the "drug war," but their role is in support to agencies like the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Border Patrol.

Restructuring proposals are focused on what re-organization might be necessary government-wide and also within the military. To improve coordination of all government efforts relating to homeland security, President George W. Bush has already established a new Office of Homeland Security headed by former Gov. Tom Ridge. Vice Adm. (Ret.) Arthur Cebrowski has been appointed by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to head military efforts to "transform" force structure to better meet future threats including terrorism.

The Problem
The principal concern over the current structure is that the new forms of attack the nation faces may be so unexpected, complex, devastating, multidimensional, and simultaneous that a well-coordinated response and strategy will be necessary both to deal with attacks immediately and to defeat the broad threat over time. The new security challenges involve responses from so many different bureaucracies and military specialties that a natural conclusion is to draw the organizations together. Such re-slicing of missions, however, may muddy other responsibilities and complicate the smooth functioning of organizations, so pros and cons must be considered.

Some Organizational Principles
Several general principles of organizational theory and military command are relevant to decisions about command structure:

	A clear chain of command is usually an essential element of successful military operations. Also known as "unity of command," this principle means making sure that "who is responsible for what" is clear, so that different people or organizations are not issuing contradictory or competing orders to the same unit.
	A principle of military strategy is to try to exploit the "seams" and "gaps" of an enemy's forces and organizations. Earlier, the concept primarily meant the gaps between different units on the battlefield, but now it includes much broader and figurative exploitation of gaps, barriers, and communication or coordination discontinuities between agencies, branches of government, networks, or sectors of a national economy or population. National security organizational design should try to minimize the vulnerabilities created by organizational seams.
	Another organizational principle is that responsibility and authority should go together - in other words, an official responsible for a function or mission should be given sufficient authority (for example, authority to set budgets) to accomplish it.
	An issue of organizational theory without clear answers is whether to have centralized or decentralized authority. The question is where to set the level of centralization and decentralization along a continuum in order to achieve central goals while taking advantage of the initiative, flexibility, knowledge, and quick response time provided by decentralized decision-making units.

 
Federal Government Reorganization

More that two dozen federal agencies and a myriad of state and local offices are involved in homeland security activities. Some of the federal agencies most prominently involved include:²

	Office of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council - oversight and coordination
	Department of Justice, including FBI and Border Patrol - law enforcement, domestic intelligence, border security
	Department of Transportation, Coast Guard - border and maritime security
	Department of the Treasury, Customs Service - border security
	Department of the Commerce - computer security
	Federal Emergency Management Agency - response to attacks
	Department of Health and Human Services - medical preparedness and response to attacks
	Intelligence agencies, including CIA - intelligence gathering and covert operations
	Department of State - prevention abroad
	Department of Defense - homeland defense, response to attacks, offensive operations

Prior to Sept. 11th, the multiplicity of federal agencies plus the local agencies involved in homeland defense activities led to lack of coordination, overlap of missions, and a shortage of established communication channels.³ The creation of an Office of Homeland Security within the White House is intended to rectify these problems, but the role given to the office has been controversial.

Office of Homeland Security
In October 2001, the administration established an Office of Homeland Security with a mission "to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks." This office and the homeland security "czar" heading it are not yet formally required by statute, and the post does not require congressional confirmation. In a key decision, the office was not given formal budget authority over programs relating to homeland defense, nor operational control of agencies. It is not clear yet what the relationships with Cabinet secretaries and other key figures, such as the DoD coordinator for homeland defense, the director will have. Without statutory language, the position and its functioning could change dramatically from administration to administration.

The White House also established a Homeland Security Council that includes the president, vice president and relevant Cabinet secretaries and agency directors.

Advantages:
Most observers think it is useful to at least have a federal spokesperson to communicate with the public on homeland security issues. The homeland security czar is well suited to perform this role. But if the office is to play a useful role in coordinating efforts of the numerous different agencies that have some role in homeland security, the director will have to be given a powerful role, either in statute or in practice. So far, predictions have not been positive.

The new office has been criticized, especially in Congress, for having responsibility for homeland security without the authority to effectively ensure it, particularly budget authority and operational control. A similar structure existed for the federal "drug czar," a position that is not regarded as having been very effective. A former occupant of the drug position, retired Gen. Barry McCaffrey, has suggested that the homeland defense director "has an inadequate mechanism to do the job."⁴ The administration has, however, claimed that the director will indeed have sufficient authority to control the activities of agencies on homeland defense: Mitchell Daniels, director of the Office of Management and Budget, has stated, "It will quickly become clear that he has the authority to make decisions and make them stick."⁵

Disadvantages:
The Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council may compete with the existing structures responsible for national security, including homeland security, particularly the National Security Council. Some have suggested that problems in homeland security are attributable to poor functioning of the National Security Council in recent years, more than the lack of a parallel Homeland Security Council focusing on those specific issues. The National Security Council is seen as having failed to develop sufficient strategic direction for national security policy, since it has focused on reactive crisis management rather than strategic planning.⁶ As in indication of continuing difficulty in focusing on forward thinking strategy, this administration's National Security Council has not yet produced a National Security Strategy document that was mandated by Congressional legislation to be delivered by June 2001.

Some observers have suggested that the homeland defense coordination job is so large that even the office's planned staff of nearly 200 will be insufficient to handle it.⁷ Rather than establish a new "czar," the U.S. Commission for National Security/21st Century, better known as the Hart-Rudman Commission after its distinguished chairmen, recommended establishing an operational agency that would take over various agencies and offices engaged in homeland security including the Customs Service, Border Patrol, Coast Guard, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and infrastructure protection offices.⁸ The administration is reportedly considering merging some of these agencies together and will issue a plan in Spring 2002. Rep. Mac Thornberry, R-Texas, and Sens. Joseph Lieberman, D-Conn., and Arlen Specter, R-Pa., have introduced legislation to merger the agencies in a similar way.

In contrast, another national commission advised against such an additional operational agency. The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (The Gilmore Commission) strongly recommended creating an office focused on homeland security within the Executive Office of the President, such as has been created, but felt the office should not take operational control from the agencies that already exercise it.⁹

 
Defense Department Reorganization

Rumsfeld reportedly favors centralizing the homeland defense efforts of DoD offices under a new undersecretary of defense for national preparedness and combating terrorism.¹⁰ The undersecretary would oversee three new assistant secretaries, for counter-terrorism, support for civil authorities, and humanitarian support, and would take over the existing assistant secretary for special operations and low-intensity conflict. The Hart-Rudman Commission endorsed the creation of a special office to oversee DoD homeland defense activities in its February 2001 report.¹¹ Concerns expressed so far about creating a new undersecretary and assistant secretaries have focused on the possibility that the move will create new layers of bureaucracy without necessarily improving focus and coordination.

 
Military Reorganization

Current Structure The command structure of the military is laid out in the Unified Command Plan, which establishes nine unified combatant commands. There are four geographic commands:

	Central, covering military operations in the Middle East and Central Asia
	European, covering Europe and Africa
	Pacific, covering East Asia, and
	Southern, covering the Caribbean and Latin America.

There are four functional commands:

	Special Operations, to train and equip special operations forces
	Strategic, to conduct nuclear war
	Space, to conduct operations in space
	Transportation, to move forces and supplies

There is one combined geographic and functional command:

Joint Forces, both to prepare U.S. forces through training and doctrine development, and to conduct operations in a geographic area, the North Atlantic region.

Forces from any of the armed services are assigned to the commands as needed. Forces training within the United States are often assigned to Joint Forces Command until they are deployed for a mission overseas under one of the geographic commands. National Guard units, who have a disaster response role with the United States, can be activated either under the control of state governors, or under national military control in a "federalized" role.

The Problem
As with the government-wide response to terrorism, the problem within the military is that numerous headquarters and commands perform missions relevant to preventing and responding to attacks on the homeland. Clever adversaries can again try to bypass U.S. military strengths by exploiting the seams between different agencies or commands. An offensive counter-terrorist campaign such as the current one could include major participation from:

	Central Command (to conduct offensive operations abroad),
	the Joint Chiefs of Staff (to advise civilian authorities),
	Special Operations Command (to train and equip counter-terrorist special forces),
	Joint Forces Command (to develop doctrine and training for U.S. forces), and
	military intelligence organizations.

Reorganization Options
Several options exist for military reorganization to for homeland defense.

1. One option is do not centralize military functions more. Currently, homeland defense efforts are split primarily among:¹²

	Secretary of the Army - coordination of Defense Department efforts with the White House's Office of Homeland Security
	Joint Forces Command - land and maritime defense of the continental United States, plus assistance to civil authorities through the command's Joint Task Force - Civil Support
	North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)13 - aerospace defense
	Space Command - computer network defense
	Pacific Command - defense of Alaska and Hawaii
	Southern Command - defense of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.

Altogether, seven of the nine combatant commands, plus NORAD, were identified as having some function relating to homeland defense in one recent report.¹⁴ These organizations are not currently directly commanded by a higher headquarters that specifically coordinates homeland defense. Conceivably, the lack of strong higher coordination could be redressed by expanding and improving contact and communication between agencies rather than establishing a new headquarters. For example, regarding coordination outside of DOD for counter-terrorism work, all four major combatant commanders in chief asked in October 2001 for officers from the FBI, Treasury Department, and possibly other agencies to be detailed to their headquarters.¹⁵

Advantages:
Agencies like Space Command and Strategic Command have such specialized areas of expertise (such as cyberwar for Space Command) that pushing decision-making higher up may just slow down the quick response time needed in their areas. Also, a combatant command could become overburdened if it is saddled with too many responsibilities. Some suggest that Joint Forces Command - which is a leading candidate for taking responsibility for homeland defense - may already be over-tasked with responsibility for North Atlantic military operations, for developing doctrine and training for the armed forces, and for coordinating military support for civil responses to attacks on the homeland.

Disadvantages:
Less central coordination could increase the opportunity for adversaries to exploit institutional or geographic seams. For example, an adversary could choose to establish a base of operations across borders dividing the geographic areas of responsibility of two different U.S. combatant commands (such as between European Command and Central Command in the conflict zones of the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Africa, or between Central Command and Pacific Command in Central and South Asia), and hence somewhat complicate the ability to fashion a unified response. Similarly, an adversary could simultaneously mount attacks in cyberspace and on physical infrastructure, such that the responsible commands might not initially realize the attacks were related.

2. Centralize homeland defense military functions under a new combatant command. Options being discussed include giving the functions to:

(a)	Joint Forces Command, which already is responsible for coordination of military support to civilian authorities and for land and maritime defense of the United States,
(b)	an additional combatant command, while retaining the other existing commands,
(c)	a merged combatant command that incorporated Joint Forces Command, Strategic Command, Space Command, and Southern Command, while merging the other geographic commands into two - East and West, or
(d)	NORAD, which is already responsible for air and space defense, or the closely-linked Space Command.

Reportedly a consensus in the Defense Department was reached in favor of centralizing homeland defense functions, and using an existing command, either the Joint Forces combatant command, or NORAD.¹⁶

Advantages:
The primary benefit would be that terrorists would have a much harder time finding and exploiting inter-organization seams. The control of disparate forces used in homeland defense operations would be clarified, and the principle of unity of command would be established.

Disadvantages:
As mentioned above, adding in additional missions may overburden an existing CINC. Some argue, however, that the CINCs already practice handling multiple issues and organizations, and so could handle other ones. Some feel that Joint Forces Command should transfer its doctrine and joint concept development duties to another organization (for example the National Defense University or the Joint Chiefs of Staff), then additional homeland defense duties could be more sensibly combined with its existing control of most conventional forces based in the continental United States. (Comparably, the Army strengthened its doctrine development after the Vietnam War by separating its doctrine and unit management commands into a Training and Doctrine Command and a Forces Command.)

A February 2001 report commissioned by the Joint Staff assessed the pros and cons of a new command for homeland defense and recommended against establishing one until more of the effects of the new command relationships could be clarified.¹⁷ The report emphasized that the differences between narrow military homeland defense functions and post-attack support to civil authorities, and the operational difficulties of taking aerospace warning, control, and defense away from Space Command argued against a new command.

Some officials also fear that a homeland defense CINC might subtract funding from the military's real mission, to deter and defeat adversaries away from U.S. shores. The sharp expansion of military participation in counter-drug activities that began in the 1980s has long been criticized inside and outside of the armed forces as a distraction from the primary mission.

Finally, if establishing a homeland defense command would inherently increase the role of active component forces inside the United States, legal problems could be encountered since the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 and related legislation may somewhat constrain the actions of federal military forces within U.S. borders.¹⁸ Internal discussions on the role of a new command have reportedly considered substantially increased roles for the military in responding to nuclear, chemical, or biological attacks.¹⁹

3. Centralize Offensive Counterterrorism
As with homeland defense, a single existing CINC or an additional one could be tasked with conducting counter-terrorism operations abroad. This could be the same or a different CINC as the one tasked with homeland defense.

Advantages:
Offensive counter-terrorist operations would be conducted with a single vision, and efforts against global terrorist organizations would not be hampered by the artificial barriers of cross-cutting regional commands.

Disadvantages:
One difficulty would be the violation of "unity of command." It might not be clear whether a particular military operation should fall under the command of a global counter-terrorism CINC or a regional CINC in whose area the operation would take place. Also, a major strength of the regional command structure is the personal relationships that U.S. CINCs and their staffs develop with foreign leaders and governments. A global counter-terrorism CINC would not have time to build many of these close relationships.

4. Centralize Coordination Above the CINC Level
If a single CINC is not tasked with coordinating homeland defense, some elements of coordination may gravitate upwards to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and their offices.

Advantages:
If strong centralized coordination on homeland defense is needed, and no CINC is tasked with it, then it might well be better to have the JCS play a role than to have no sustained focus on the issues at high levels.

Disadvantages:
The principal problem with the JCS taking a greater role is that legislation restricts their functions - they are not permitted to "operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no executive authority."²⁰ The operational chain of command technically runs from the president and secretary of defense directly to the combatant commands, although the JCS may be used as the conduit for missions and orders to flow to the CINCs.

End Notes:

¹  "Pentagon Plays Supporting Role in Security," Gail Kaufman and Frank Tiboni, Defense News, Oct. 29 - Nov. 4, 2001, p.44.

²  For a clear layout, see briefing on Hart-Rudman Commission at National Defense University, Frank Hoffman, Nov. 7, 2001.

³  Executive Order Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council, White House Office of the Press Secretary, October 8, 2001.

⁴  "Ridge Defends His Role As 'Coordinator,' " Eric Pianin and David Broder, Washington Post, Nov. 18, 2001.

⁵  "U.S. Roadmap for New Office Set for Next Spring," Bridgette Blair, Defense News, Dec. 3-9, 2001.

⁶  The Transformation of Defense and Proliferation Policies after September 11 conference, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in cooperation with the Center for Defense Information, Oct. 24, 2001, presentation by Frank Hoffman.

⁷  "Ridge Taps Multiple Agencies to Fill Roster," Bridgette Blair and Gail Kaufman, Defense News, Dec. 10-16, 2001.

⁸  Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, February 15, 2001, p.15 ff.

⁹  Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Second Annual Report, Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 15, 2000, p.13.

¹⁰  "Rumsfeld Seeks Consolidation of DoD Agencies," Gail Kaufman and Amy Svitak, Defense News, Nov. 12-18, 2001.

¹¹  Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, February 15, 2001, p.23.

¹²  "SecDef Designates Commanders for Homeland Defense," DOD News Release, Oct. 26, 2001.

¹³  The commander in chief of NORAD is "dual-hatted" as commander in chief of Space Command. NORAD is technically a binational command, shared with Canada.

¹⁴  Developing the Unified Command Plan for "Homeland Security, Michael B. Donley with MG Donald E. Edwards, Thomas K. Candon, Neal A. Pollard, Hicks & Associates, February 2001.

¹⁵  "4 Commanders Say They Want Civilian Agents," Eric Schmitt, New York Times, Nov. 20, 2001.

¹⁶  "Military Favors A Homeland Command," Bradley Graham, Washington Post, Nov. 21, 2001.

¹⁷  Developing the Unified Command Plan for "Homeland Security, Michael B. Donley with MG Donald E. Edwards, Thomas K. Candon, Neal A. Pollard, Hicks & Associates, February 2001.

¹⁸  18 US Code 1385. The Posse Comitatus legislation may not be as restrictive as generally thought - it includes broad exceptions, it may conflict with other laws, and federal troops have been used in a domestic role since it was passed, anyway. (Interestingly the Posse Comitatus legislation itself does not cover the Navy or Marine Corps, although other regulations do.)

¹⁹  "Pentagon and White House Consider New Command Against U.S. Attacks," Yochi Dreazen and David Cloud, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 21, 2001.

²⁰  10 US Code 155 subsection (e).

 

Marcus Corbin CDI Senior Analyst mcorbin@cdi.org

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