New Homeland Unified Command’s Establishment
Full of Difficulties

The intermittent debate over the reorganization of the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) unified combatant commands to include responsibility for the U.S. homeland gained great immanency after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks upon the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.  After some delay, the decision to establish a new command was made public in late January 2002.  But what does this decision mean, and is it the correct move in managing the military contribution to homeland security?  The military will not secure the homeland alone – a myriad of other federal agencies, led by the new Office of Homeland Security will be involved – and the establishment of a new four-star command will face many coordinating challenges.

At present, the U.S. military manages the operation of its worldwide forces through nine unified combatant commands, led by four star general or admiral commanders in chief (CinCs).  These commands manage operations for either a specific mission or region, and are usually made up of components from most of the military departments. There are five regional commands and four “functional commands”, conducting missions across the globe, like Special Operations.  One regional command, the U.S. Joint Forces Command, which covers the Atlantic, has additional functional responsibilities in the training and integrating of its joint forces – the majority of home-based U.S. air and land forces, as well as the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet.

Homeland defense is a multifaceted mission that will involve a new and unique type of command.  Home defense responsibilities are currently divided between the Joint Forces Command, responsible for civil support missions in the lower 48 states, and NORAD, the combined U.S.-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command, responsible for air defense.  Additionally, U.S. Space Command, which oversees computer systems defense, plus the Pacific and Southern commands, who have drug interdiction roles along the western and southern coasts, have roles to play.

On Jan. 28, 2002, a Washington Post piece broke the news that the Pentagon was going to ask White House approval to establish a new homeland command, and Vice-President

Dick Cheney endorsed the concept that same day.¹  Three days later, the new command’s name, U.S. Northern Command, was revealed after Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave a speech at the National Defense University.²  Apparently, the Northern Command is supposed to be in place by Oct. 1.  The headquarters will located close to, but not in the Washington, D.C., area; disused Fort Ritchie, Md., has been mentioned as a possible location.  All of NORAD’s air defense authority, as well as DoD’s Joint Task Force-Civil Support, a civil attack aid unit, will fall under the new command.³

Recent news reports also indicate that the current U.S. Southern Command is also being considered for integration under the new Northern Command.⁴  Since its four-star former commander, Marine Gen. Peter Pace, was reassigned as the vice chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting command has fallen upon a two-star Army general, Gen. Gary D. Speer. With the new ‘Unified Command Plan (UCP)’, which formalizes such matters, due out later this year, Speer may stay in his position until it is downgraded.  However, this is unlikely; bringing Southern Command under the new command would bring two divergent, different missions under the same commander.

A Task Full of Difficulties

The difficulties involved in establishing the right military role in homeland security are many and varied.  In addition to the strictly military missions, the new command would have to coordinate with Canada and Mexico, along with state and federal homeland security agencies, as well as Congress.  Air defense authority will have to be carefully transferred from NORAD, and that may see that U.S. commander of NORAD down-graded so he becomes junior to the new four-star commander of the Northern Command.

The commander of NORAD currently has a second hat as commander of the U.S. Space Command; one report indicates the upcoming UCP changes may merge the Space Command and the Strategic Command, which manages nuclear strike forces.⁵  This would leave the NORAD commander free to be de-linked and down-graded so as to report to Northern Command.  Organizational changes in the aerospace defense arena are certain, though the final arrangements are not yet clear.

The U.S. military has not had to operate on home soil since World War II, and thus the dynamics of interactions with Congress and the state governors and their homeland security functions have not been tested.  The military has not recently wanted to become involved with domestic roles, and has strictly adhered to the spirit of the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, which, along with related legislation, restricts U.S. military enforcement of U.S. law.  At the state and local level, the new Command will have to create liaison arrangements, but will only act in support of local responding forces.  Civilian authorities and fire and police chiefs at the scene of an incident will be controlling activities while the military provides specialized support.

A further major political issue, the role of the National Guard, is also entangled in the Northern Command debate.  Sen. Kit Bond, R-Mo., has already introduced a draft bill into the Senate that would have the deputy commander of the new command be either a Air or Army National Guard officer.  The National Guard, though its units are designed for federal missions overseas, has a long-established state and federal dual role, and will almost certainly have the nearest troops to any incident due to their basing throughout the continental United States.  Some Guard officers are also very reluctant to take on a domestic role.⁶  But this new mission will mean their role will have to be re-thought, and the most efficient arrangement of the new command may not survive the political battles over enhancing the influence of the National Guard.

The current arrangements see U.S. Joint Forces Command holding both the security mission and the command of the main U.S. strategic reserve of land and air conventional forces.  Joint Forces Command will probably keep these forces, as administration of the strategic reserves would only divert Northern Command from its civilian support orientation.  Yet, this will increase the difficulties if Northern Command needs to use those forces, and make the command little more than a heavyweight coordinating headquarters and a few minor units spread around the United States.

The role of the Coast Guard is a further factor that must be considered.  Though this is a ‘war on terror’, the Coast Guard has not been reassigned to the Department of Defense, as wartime plans call for.  Though the military hats assigned to the Coast Guard’s Atlantic and Pacific commanders – the ‘Maritime Defense Zones’ – could be reassigned to the Northern Command, the Coast Guard remains a split agency, with unambiguously peaceful purposes such as navigation buoy maintenance and oil spill cleanup alongside its ship inspection and port security tasks.  Establishing its proper place will be another of the many tasks required before an efficient homeland defense structure is in place.

Given the numerous challenges summarized above, and the expense and time required to establish a totally new unified command to handle the task, some have advocated that existing organizations be upgraded, rather than a totally new one created.  Commander Michael Dobbs of the Joint Staff wrote on the issue in ANSER’s Journal of Homeland Security in October 2001, before the new command was announced.⁷  He advocated that the Joint Forces Command shoulder the load, in view of its previous expertise and control of home forces, with two subordinate commands specifically to handle the joint experimentation and homeland defense roles.  The subordinate homeland defense command would have been created from the Joint Task Force Civil Support.  His arguments have some merit – Northern Command’s initial establishment may well mean a longer period of heightened vulnerability in its formative period, which will no doubt involve much political argument and teething troubles.

Yet Northern Command’s establishment has been decided, quite possibly to create a four-star unified commander whose focus will be solely defense support for the security of the homeland.  His primary job will be coordination, given it seems he will have few (though critically important) forces available.  It will be one of the more difficult unified commands to run, given its complex mission and array of necessary liaison arrangements.  However, an efficiently organized homeland defense oriented command, with strong links to appropriate civilian agencies, will be vital to assure the security of the continental United States.