Over the past decade, terrorism has turned Jammu and Kashmir into one of the
world's most dangerous war-stricken places. Since 1990, more than 35,000 people
have died in political violence in Jammu and Kashmir, and increased U.S.
involvement in the area in the aftermath of Sept. 11 stimulated Muslim-Hindu and
Muslim-Western clashes. Three primary terrorist groups operate in Jammu and
Kashmir: Harakat ul-Mujaheddin (HuM), Lashkar-i-Taiba, and Jaish-e-Muhammad. The
U.S. State Department has listed all three organizations as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTOs). This essay will survey Harakat ul-Mujaheddin.
Foundation and History
The first organization carrying the name Harakat ul-Mujaheddin was formed in
1985 as part of the jihad against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Most of
its original members walked out of another group, the Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami
(HuJI), and some trace the original members' training to the CIA-led campaign in
Afghanistan.
With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan the group concentrated its
efforts on Kashmir and Jammu. The Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI)
stimulated a reorganization of Pakistani-Kashmiri forces, which included a
HuM-HuJI merger to form the Harakat ul-Ansar (HuA) in October 1993. Maulana
Saadatullah Khan served as HuA leader in the mid-1990s.
This merger apparently failed as Indian forces cracked down on the new
organization, arresting three of its leaders within several months. Several
attempts to abduct Indian forces and tourists, and to demand the release of its
leaders have failed. These attempts, along with rumors of the group's ties to
Osama bin Laden reached the United States, which in 1997 officially declared the
organization a terrorist organization.
After the U.S. State Department listed Harakat ul-Ansar as a terrorist
organization, its ability to raise funding and to publicly recruit diminished
significantly. It then changed its official name to Harakat ul-Mujaheddin. In
its height, the group acted as a trans-national movement, feeding Islamic
fighters worldwide. Lately there have been increasing presence of militants that
are not native Pakistanis or native Kashmiris, but those remain the majority.
In 2000, many of HuM members followed Maulana Massod Azhar, a prominent
Islamist leader in the area, and joined the new Jaish-e-Muhammad. Since the
foundation of Jaish-e-Muhammad, HuM activities have decreased significantly, and
recent crackdowns on Islamic militants in Pakistan have left the group
under-funded and under-supported.
Goals and Doctrine
Unlike the secular nationalist movement in Kashmir, the Jammu and Kashmir
Liberation Front (JKLF), who strive for a total independence for Kashmiris,
Harakat ul-Mujaheddin struggles for the secession of Jammu and Kashmir from
India and the formation of a pan-Islamic entity under Pakistan.
Operating Methods
Originally, the group was based in Pakistan and operated in Afghanistan. It
established its base (as the Harakat ul-Ansar) in Muzaffarabad, capital of
Pakistani Kashmir. Lately, under increasing pressure from the Pakistani
involvement in the U.S. anti-terrorism coalition, it has moved its operations to
Kashmir, and its presence has decreased overall.
HuM members received ideological and military training in Afghanistan and
Kashmir, but the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan forced the group to adjust
and close its operations there. The group attacks Indian troops, civilians, and
officials, as well as non-Muslim civilians in Kashmir. On Dec. 24, 1999, the
group hijacked an Indian Airline flight from Nepal to Afghanistan, which
resulted in the release of some of its leaders from Indian jail.
Pakistani authorities have recently arrested three members of Harkat ul-Mujaheddin al-Almi, a HuM sub-faction. The men admitted to carrying out the car bomb attack on the U.S. Consulate in Karachi on June 14, 2002. At least 11 people were killed and tens injured in the blast, which failed to kill any Americans.
HuM members have also participated in operations in Burma, Tajikistan,
Bosnia, and other places where Islamic resistance arise.
The group's fundraising efforts concentrate on Pakistani and Kashmiri
communities in Europe (mainly Britain), and on sympathizers in the Persian Gulf
states.
Leadership
The HuM leader is Farooq Kashmiri Khalil, who received the position from
Fazlur Rehman Khalil when the latter stepped down in mid-February 2000. Other
figures that held key positions throughout the years: Nasrullah Mansur Langrayal,
Maulana Masood Azhar and Ahmad Omar Sheik (who were both released from jail in
the 1999 Indian Airlines flight hijacking affair), and Sajjad Afghani (who was
killed in a jailbreak attempt in 1999).
In addition, the group is aligned politically with Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam
Fazlur Rehman faction, a prominent radical Islamic group in Pakistan and
Kashmir.
Pakistani Support and al Qaeda
Connection
For years, India has blamed Pakistan of supporting Islamic fundamentalist
terrorism in Kashmir through the Pakistani ISI. The Pakistani agency wanted in
part to spread Pakistan's pan-Islamic intentions, and in part to shift its
support from secular nationalistic Kashmiri elements, which strive for an
independent Kashmir apart from Pakistan. Consequently, the ISI has funded
members of Islamic groups, provided training facilities, and aided them in
crossing the Line of Control in Kashmir. Overall, there is a general agreement
that Pakistan helped injecting Islamic fundamentalism into the Kashmiri
conflict.
All signs point at a close HuM-al Qaeda relationship. Many of the HuM
members have been in Afghanistan, as part of the Afghan jihad or for training
purposes. Like al Qaeda militants, HuM fighters turn out in many places where
Islamic fundamentalist resistance appears. Khalil has long been linked to Bin
Laden, and in 1998 he signed Bin Laden's Fatwa calling for attacks on Americans
and U.S. allies. The group has been operating inside Afghanistan under the eyes
of the fundamentalist Taliban regime.
Sept. 11 Aftermath
After the events of Sept. 11, the Bush administration
increased pressure on Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf to crack down on
terrorist organizations. In response, Musharraf banned Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad,
but did not specify Harakat ul-Mujaheddin. Musharraf did, however, pressed down
on many Islamic elements in Pakistan, which ended up in mass arrests of
militants. A Sept. 29, 2001 USA Today report described closure of HuM offices in
Pakistan under government orders.
Indian officials have continued to claim that Musharraf's acts were merely
cosmetic and that militants' infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir continues. The
U.S. involvement during the latest standoff between Indian and Pakistani forces
forced Musharraf to put a halt to such infiltration. His efforts reduced border
crossing and reduced the ability of Islamic groups, such as Harakat
ul-Mujaheddin, to recruit inside Pakistan, but Indian officials demand further
actions.
The United States recognizes, it seems, that pressure on Musharraf must not
be too high as to threaten Pakistani domestic stability. Musharraf's position is
delicate to say the least. He seized power in a 1999 coup, and is supported by
Islamic elements that are sympathetic to the radical groups. Religious leaders
have repeatedly criticized Musharraf's cleanup attempts in Pakistan's tribal
areas, where support for Islamic militants is high. "I am trying my best to
cool down my party in tribal areas, but things will slip out of my hands if
these American-backed operations continue there," said Maulana Fazle
ur-Rehman, chief of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, in an interview with The
Associated Press. Musharraf's pro-Western agenda in the war on terrorism has
raised criticism from within and without, and it seems that allowing Islamic
elements to cross into Kashmir is a way for Musharraf to please his domestic
criticizers.
Conclusion
At the turn of the century, the five-decade long conflict over
Jammu and Kashmir placed Islamic militants in south Asia in a position to
stimulate a nuclear war. Both Pakistan and India claim Kashmir as their own, in
a conflict where pride and nationalism overcome rational process. American
interests in the area, under the Bush administration's anti-terrorism campaign,
dictate support of Musharraf's policy. While an alternative to Musharraf, a
documented human rights abuser, may be an even more radical government, the
Pakistani president seems unwilling to completely eliminate the Islamic
fundamentalist militants. In trying to prevent a nuclear holocaust in this most
delicate place, luck, it seems, is the best ally Indians, Pakistanis and
Kashmiris have.
Sources:
"Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001," U.S. Department of State.
"Terrorism: Q&A: Harakat ul-Mujahedeen, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Kashmir, Islamists," Council on Foreign Relations.
"Terrorist Groups: an Overview," "Harkat-ul-Mujahideen,"
"Harkat ul-Ansar," South Asia Terrorism Portal.
Various articles by The New York Times (www.nytimes.com),
The Associated Press, BBC (www.bbc.co.uk),
the Washington Post (www.washingtonpost.com), and USA TODAY (www.usatoday.com).
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