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A long history of
suicide bombings and other attacks on Israeli civilian and military targets has
earned Hamas a well-deserved reputation as a murderous terrorist organization.
The organization shares many of al Qaeda’s attributes.
It is vehemently anti-Western, believing the Israeli state to be a
creation of the West imposed upon the Arab world. Hamas is, therefore, dedicated to the eradication of Israel
and willing to use violence and terror to achieve its goals.
Hamas is a well-positioned obstacle to the peace process in Palestine,
and by extension, a danger to American interests in the region and beyond.
Given the level of support the organization enjoys and its
quasi-political status in the occupied territories, it is unlikely that Hamas
could ever be completely rolled up. Hamas
will, therefore, remain a threat to American interests and an opponent of peace
in the Middle East for the foreseeable future.
Hamas is an Arabic acronym for the Islamic Resistance
Movement. Though the group’s
roots stretch back decades through the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, Hamas
took shape during the early years of the Intifada.
The genesis of Hamas represented not only resistance to the Israeli
state, but also rejection of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
primacy in the Palestinian national movement.
By the end of the 1980s, the PLO’s role as the vanguard of Palestinian
nationalism had been called into question by the organization’s expulsion from
Lebanon, and later, its acceptance of a two state solution in Palestine.
Hamas expanded into the void left by the PLO’s rejection of violence,
participation in the peace process, and recognition of the Israeli state’s
right to exist.
The distinct Islamic character of Hamas also set the group
apart from the more secular PLO. While
Hamas shared the Palestinian national aspirations identified with the PLO, it
placed nationalism squarely within an Islamic context. This distinction manifests itself in two important ways.
First, it provided Hamas with an organic connection to Palestinian
society that was not available to the PLO.
Like other Islamic movements, Hamas assumed an array of social functions
such as healthcare, education and grass roots political representation.
Thus the group mixed militancy with a strong social agenda. Second, it conferred upon the struggle against Israel the
qualities of jihad (holy war). Thus
Hamas seeks the expulsion of Jews and the Israeli state from Palestine.
Hamas became the most militant participant in the Intifada.
Initially, the group kept its activities within carefully controlled
parameters, seeking to avoid direct confrontations with Israeli security forces.
This was a reflection of the group’s limited membership and support.
But the scope of Hamas operations grew as the group competed with other
rejectionist movements for influence and prestige.
Hamas emerged from the Intifada with a tightly compartmentalized
origination that effectively separated its rank and file civilian membership
from its covert cells, and a well-developed operational infrastructure.
If Hamas was born of the Intifada, then it came of age
with the conclusion of the Oslo agreement and the mutual recognition of the PLO
and Israel in 1993. The creation of
the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip presented Hamas
with a potential crisis of legitimacy. Though
Hamas sought to provide a political alternative to the PLO, it also sought to
avoid violent confrontation with fellow Palestinians.
The PLO’s acceptance of a political track and a two state solution now
raised the possibility of conflict between the two organizations.
The Israelis expected the PA to police Hamas and other violent
rejectionist groups. Moreover,
Hamas could not ignore the fact that the PLO had won a measure of independence
for the West Bank and Gaza. The
majority of Palestinians responded to the prospect of limited self-governance
favorably.
Nevertheless, Hamas rejected a political solution that fell
short of recouping all of Palestine. Hamas
embarked upon a dual strategy that sought at once to strike at Israeli interests
and avoid confrontation with the PA. It
was a strategy that satisfied both tactical and strategic aims.
By targeting Israel, Hamas could inhibit and hopefully retard the peace
process. This would, in turn,
foster an environment in which Hamas’ brand of Islamic militancy could thrive
and gain support. Hamas thus
sought to coexist with the PA while making every attempt to expose the Oslo
agreement as a betrayal of Palestinian aspirations and bring about its
abolition. This remains the modus
operandi of the organization.
Over the last decade, Hamas’ tactics have grown more
violent. Operatives in the Izz
el-Din al Qassam Brigades, clandestine military cells, have demonstrated
increasing levels of sophistication. In
1992, Israel deported hundreds of Islamic activists to Lebanon, an act with
profound consequences. The Lebanese
Shiah terrorist organization Hezbollah had a decade of experience fighting
Israeli occupation forces. Hezbollah
shared its knowledge about the construction of car bombs and the conduct of
suicide attacks. Both became
hallmarks of Hamas operations following the return of these activists to the
occupied territories.
Today, Hamas can boast supporters numbering in the tens of
thousands. The size of its
clandestine militant cells is unknown. Its
power base remains in the Gaza Strip, though the group has had success in
expanding to areas in the West Bank. The
Palestinian Authority has tried to control Hamas violence.
But the PA found, like the Israelis, that the group’s military wing is
organizationally resilient. Hamas
gains support at the expense of the Palestinian Authority.
Should Yasir Arafat’s Fatah faction prove ineffective at delivering
concrete Israeli concessions to the populations of the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
support for Hamas will expand further. Nevertheless,
the degree to which most Palestinians share Hamas’ vision of an Islamic state
remains an open question.
The Hamas campaign of assassination, car bombings, and suicide
attack will continue as the group seeks to subvert a political solution in
Palestine that includes Israel. Nevertheless,
the group has demonstrated surprising flexibility and an ability to supplant
ideology with pragmatism. That
Hamas might one day choose to focus on its overt political activities in order
to share in the governance of a future Palestinian state is not entirely out of
the question. In the long run, a
successful campaign to end Hamas terror may depend less on the ability of
Israeli and PA security services, and more on the ability of the peace process
to deliver on the promise of an improved life for the majority of Palestinians.
Sources:
Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas:
Vision, Violence, and Coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press,
2000).
Michael Field, Inside The Arab World (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1994).
United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000,
April, 2001.
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