U.S. Counter-Terrorism Strategy Depends on Clear Goals

Specific U.S. counter-terrorism goals have yet to be revealed. Everyone expects the al Qaeda terrorist network to be destroyed and Osama bin Laden brought to justice — or "justice brought to him," according to U.S. President George W. Bush. Similarly, the Taliban is targeted to share the same fate as those it harbors.

Three very different sets of goals can be envisioned within this general aim of U.S. counter-terrorism. Each will require different strategies, and the one chosen will have enormous repercussions in relations with allies, coalition partners, and anti-American movements throughout the world. (An additional goal — that the Taliban voluntarily turns over bin Laden and his terrorist network for trial — is considered improbable and is not analyzed below.)

The three sets of goals outlined below begin with strategies that require the heavy use of diplomacy and the light use of military force, and proceed to those that require the heavier use of military force and the lighter use of diplomacy.

 
First set of goals

In order, the goals for this set are:

1. Create a government of national unity for Afghanistan replacing the Taliban, one that includes all tribal representatives.

2. Have this government approve UN assistance in training public administrators and re-constructing the economy.

3. Apprehend Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda associates for trial (or destroy them if they resist).

 
Goal One

Creating a government of national unity would necessarily require major roles for coalition partners, especially from the Islamic states. It must not appear to be a U.S.-imposed operation a la Cold War. Such an operation would appear offensive to most Muslims, especially in Pakistan with its anti-government Islamic forces. In addition, the coalition partners must be convinced — with hard evidence — that Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda was directly involved in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks upon the United States. A White Paper from Washington, as clear and detailed as possible without endangering sources, is essential.

The United States would rely on tribal leaders themselves — Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras from the Northern Alliance, but also including Pashtun dissidents disenchanted with the Taliban regime — for organizing a grand tribal council. Exiled King Zahir Shah could facilitate its convening, especially if he continues to deny any ambition to return to the throne.

Reports from those who before Sept. 11 had been working in mine disposal and relief operations say that many, even most, Afghans no longer support the Taliban. Afghans see Taliban as being propped up by Osama bin Laden's foreign "Arabs." They experience drastically deteriorating living conditions, producing massive civilian suffering. They also suffer under ever-tightening radical "Islamic" law enforcement and repression. A strategy of patience would allow the fading legitimacy of Taliban to fade even more.

Washington, behind the scenes, would encourage Islamic states to back the formation of a government of national unity with pledges of reconstruction assistance.

During this period when anti-Taliban political forces are being mobilized, the United States would pursue two seemingly contradictory strategies. One entails an acceleration of food aid to the people under Taliban control (without allowing the Taliban to seize the food for its own use) and to those in refugee camps on the Iran and Pakistan borders. This would demonstrate to the Afghan people a lack of hostile intent towards them and indicate that better times could be their future if the Taliban were removed.

The second strategy requires the United States and willing partners to maintain the military threat to the Taliban, a strategy that already has produced general panic and unease throughout the country. It has also spurred heightened Taliban repression of Afghan citizens, such as the practice of forced conscription of young and old. Taliban's legitimacy rests on its ability to maintain peace and stability within society — a welcome change when the Taliban took over after the previous regime's bloody intramural warfare — and that ability must be eroded. Undoubtedly, this will create more internal refugees that need to be fed, but the effect will be to weaken the Taliban and remove these additional Afghan refugees from its control.

The military threat can be maintained by a variety of actions: disinformation on the insertion of Special Forces into Afghanistan, military deployments, and dramatic overflights of warplanes. For these two strategies to work, actual military strikes must be put on hold. The killing of innocent civilians would be unacceptable.

With external military aid and cash, the Afghan people would bear the burden of removing top Taliban leaders via a general uprising.

 
Goal Two

The seemingly non-interventionist strategy for the first goal would serve to preserve the diverse and fragile coalition supporting the United States. This would be necessary to facilitate UN Security Council and General Assembly approval for resolutions that pledge to reconstruct Afghanistan.

 
Goal Three

Once the Taliban leadership - the ones who do not defect to the government of national unity - and bin Laden and his al Qaeda network have been politically isolated, they would likely also be geographically isolated in the remote mountains in central Afghanistan. This situation would create the conditions for Afghans themselves, with coalition logistical and intelligence support, to seize the fugitives and bring them to justice either before an international tribunal or a domestic court.

 
Second Set of Goals

Again in order, this set of goals includes:

1. Apprehend or eradicate bin Laden, his al Qaeda staff, and top Taliban leaders.
2. Insert a coalition of Afghan leaders to overthrow the Taliban regime and seize power.
3. Get the United Nations to approve the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Military force begins the strategies necessary to attain this set of goals.

 
Goal One

Agents from the Northern Alliance, Pakistan, and dissident or former Taliban fighters would be employed to track bin Laden and his supporters. If found in an urban area, Special Forces on the ground would raid their sanctuaries. If in remote rural areas, precision munitions and massive B-52 aerosol bombs (technically called Fuel/Air Explosives or FAEs) would be dropped to flush or kill the targets. FAE weapons have the ability to kill those in bunkers and caves. They were used with success against dug-in Iraqi soldiers in Desert Storm. The Taliban leadership likewise would be hunted down by Special Forces and paid agents.

 
Goal Two

Once the Taliban and al Qaeda leadership are politically removed, an alternate Afghan regime would find it easier to establish itself in Kabul and other major cities. Recognition of the new government would be prompt and aid would flow. U.S. and coalition forces would not be prominent, and so would not appear to be foreign invaders, all of whom have been historically hated and attacked. Those few coalition forces that would be visible in supporting the new government would come only from Islamic states.

 
Goal Three

Although initially militarily intrusive, the U.S. footprint would fade as the new government assumes control. This would facilitate UN approval of reconstruction efforts.

 
Third Set of Goals

In order, the goals include:

1. Defeat and eliminate the Taliban regime and its armed forces.

2. Install a multi-tribal government under U.S. and coalition protection.

3. Hunt down and destroy bin Laden and his network.

4. Establish UN peacekeeping and reconstruction programs.

 
Goal One

Taliban leaders and their armed forces would be lured out of the cities by Special Forces inserted in defensible areas. There, they would be engaged by U.S. air and Special Forces using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), precision and aerosol munitions, and interdiction attacks. Those Taliban forces remaining in cities would be attacked by Special Forces units trained in urban warfare. Amnesty would be offered to those who surrender. Defeat of the Taliban would not require the eradication of all its forces, only their dispersal and fragmentation to allow the second goal.

 
Goal Two

Once the cities are secured and protected, a purely Afghan government can be inserted, recognized, and urged to begin peace talks with Taliban remnants.

 
Goal Three

Joint Afghan and coalition forces would pursue bin Laden and his al Qaeda network once his Taliban base of support disappears.

 
Goal Four

Again, although it will be more difficult because of the more unilateral use of U.S. military might, the United Nations would be asked to approve a program of Afghan peacekeeping (until Taliban forces are disarmed) and reconstruction.

 
Evaluation

The more counter-terrorism is treated as a police and not a military action: the more patient diplomacy will be required; the greater will be the likelihood of keeping a supportive coalition united; and the less likely will long-term intervention in Afghanistan be necessary. The first set of goals is far more complex than the other two. It is also far less likely to produce military casualties than would the muscular use of American armed force. Even more important, the first set of goals would make it less likely that collateral damage would be produced, where the killing of many Afghans would force the population to rally to the Taliban in order to repel the foreign invader.

These benefits are, some would say, offset by the non-use of available massive, high-tech military force that could bring decisive results. Counter-terrorism, after the intolerable events of Sept. 11, demands that bin Laden, al Qaeda, and those that harbor them be destroyed. A reliance on diplomacy risks failure. These more military-minded advocates say the second, or better yet, the third set of goals should be preferred.

However, those who favor the more diplomatic- and police-oriented first set of goals can argue that if their goals cannot be realized, then the more military second and third set of goals and strategies can be threatened and, if necessary, employed.

The strategic point is that all the goals share the same bottom line: the destruction of bin Laden and al Qaeda.

By Dr. Nicholas Berry

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