Georgia: Fighting Terrorism in Another Failed State

That the Pankisi Gorge has fallen beyond the control of the Georgian government will come as no surprise to long-term observers of the small, embattled Caucasus state. Indeed, the Pankisi Gorge is only one of the several regions of Georgia that are not under central control. Georgia is a weak state in which the central government controls little territory outside the capital Tbilisi.

Besides the Pankisi Gorge, Georgia's problems include three separate regions enjoying varying degrees of independence - Abhkazia, South Ossetia, and Ajaria. Yet another province, Javakheti, is in severe danger of falling into further conflict when the Russians pull out of the Akhalkalaki military base there, which serves as the largest employer and for most people the only source of income. In addition to territorial issues, the government of Eduard Shevardnadze faces unwelcome Russian military presence, rampant corruption, and a collapsed economy.

The small U.S. contingent deployed on counter-terrorist operations will enter a country that has been in turmoil unceasingly since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 100 plus U.S. Army Special Forces that will deploy there will train Georgian troops for the recapture of the Pankisi Gorge.

Georgia did not have an easy separation from the Soviet Union. Nationalist poet Zviad Gamsakhurdia became Georgia's first president in May 1991, after Georgia's declaration of independence from the Soviet Union in April 1991. However Gamsakhurdia's authoritarian and erratic policies quickly became intolerable. Anti-government demonstration rapidly turned into armed clashes between Gamsukhurdia's supporters and opponents. Street fighting ensued, ending with the besieging of Gamsakhurdia in the Parliament building. Even though the president managed to flee in early 1992, he died during a subsequent attempt to retake power. A temporary Military Council made up of various militias and political groups asked Eduard Shevardnadze, an ethnic Georgian still serving as the Soviet Foreign Minister, to return and lead the country.

Shevardnadze obliged and was eventually elected president in November 1995. He retains that post having survived two assassination attempts. However, he has never been able to fully reign in the militia groups that installed him in power. His hold on the government was also quickly tested by revolts in Georgia's rebellious provinces.

While independence and its immediate aftermath occupied the attention of Tbilisi, several outlying regions stepped up efforts to achieve greater autonomy or to secede.

Ajaria, located on the Black Sea along the Turkish border, passed out of the Tbilisi government's control from 1990 after then-President Gamsukhudia appointed Asland Abashidze as the chair of the then-Ajarian Supreme Soviet (parliament). Abashidze has ruled Ajaria as an autocratic dictatorship. He used the independent source of income generated by the region's proximity with Turkey (and the resulting customs revenue) plus the trading port city of Batumi to keep Ajaria prosperous and relatively conflict-free.

The same cannot be said for Abhkazia and South Ossetia, which both seceded from Georgia amidst violence and massive exoduses of refugees. The Abhkaz Supreme Soviet declared independence on Aug. 25, 1990, after a ruling from the Georgian Supreme Soviet that would have prohibited all regional political parties from participating in elections. The Georgian 'National Guard', a quasi-official militia group formed during the anti-Gamsakhurdia revolt, entered Abkazia in August 1992 officially to recover 11 Georgian officials who had been held by followers of former President Gamsukhurdia. Instead, then-Defense Minister Tengiz Kitovani, leading the group, decided to continue toward Sukhumi, the Abhkaz capital, to try to bring Abkazia back under Georgian control. Thus began a war that ended with Georgian forces repelled by the Abhkaz, and 250,000 ethnic Georgians expelled from Abhkazia. The fighting also involved North Caucasus ethnic groups distantly related to the Abhkaz, such as Chechens, who sent fighters to assist them against the Georgians. A ceasefire accord signed in Moscow in May 1994 (after a failed July 1993 ceasefire) ended the fighting. A 'CIS Peacekeeping Force', made up entirely of Russian troops, deployed to police the agreement in June 1994. It was monitored by a UN mission, which had deployed after the failed July 1993 agreement.

However, no political settlement to the conflict materialized, and both the UN mission and the CIS force are still in place. Indeed, fighting broke out again the Gali district in May 1998, primarily between Abhkaz forces and two Georgian guerilla groups, the White Legion and the Forest Brothers. Similar outbreaks of violence continue along the Abhkaz-Georgian border, and a resolution of the conflict appears distant. The guerilla groups, recruited from Georgian refugees, are not strong enough to defeat the Abhkaz in battle; they instead make the creation of a stable environment by the Abhkaz government impossible.¹ The Georgian government wants refugee return before a political settlement; the Abkaz want a political settlement before refugee return, as any solution that saw most of the refugees return would reduce the Abhkaz to a minority in their own land.²

South Ossetia is the third major region of Georgia that the central government lost control over during the early 1990s. The conflict actually predates both the Abhkazia revolt and the anti-Gamsakhurdia civil war. It began in late 1990 with competing declarations from the South Ossetian and Georgian legislatures, one declaring the region a fully-fledged sovereign republic within the then-still existing Soviet Union, and the other from the Georgian parliament abolishing the region's autonomous status in response. Subsequently Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev annulled both declarations.³ In December 1991, the South Ossetian legislature again called for independence and unification with North Ossetia, a constituent Republic of the Russian Federation. Fighting broke out, ending only with quadripartite negotiations and an agreement for the deployment of a Russian peacekeeping force in July 1992.⁴ Despite some return of refugees, and relatively cordial links between Shevardnadze and Ossetian leaders, both north and south, the conflict still remains frozen with no sign of settlement.⁵

The final regional issue of concern is the Samtskhe-Javaketi region bordering Armenia. This region is 90 percent Armenian and has few links with Tbilisi due to dilapidated roads and poor telecommunications infrastructure. Assuring its de facto independent status is the presence of the Russian 62nd Military Base at Akhalkalaki. Directly and indirectly, 7-8,000 local people depend on the Russian military presence. Yet the Georgian government would prefer the Russian forces to leave within two years as a part of a total Russian military withdrawal from the country. (Russia wants 13 years for the withdrawal).⁶ In Samtskhe-Javaketi, Russian departure threatens to create major unrest as it would leave behind an economically destitute population more aligned to neighboring Armenia than to Georgia. This situation is made worse by the inhabitants' fears of Turkey, mindful of the 1920 massacres of Armenians by that country. Rumors that Turkish troops will arrive when the Russian base is removed only increase the level of apprehension in the area.⁷

Russia's military bases in Georgia and its other activities in the country make Russia Tbilisi's top security concern. In 1990, Soviet forces in Georgia consisted of the Transcaucasus Military District headquarters, the 31st Army Corps, and three divisions were located in Georgia. By 2000, that presence had shrunk to the Akhalkalaki base, and bases at Vaziani (near Tbilisi), Batumi in Ajaria, and Guduata in Abkazia⁸ (the reductions were partly offset by deployments by Russia of substantial new Border Guard force, since withdrawn, as well as peacekeeping troops in Abhkazia and South Ossetia). Georgia has long suspected Russian bases of being used to support initiatives against the Georgian government. For example, it is alleged that the 1995 assassination attempt against Shevardnadze was supported from the base at Vaziani. Many influential Russians maintain a long-held historical outlook that sees events in Georgia as rightfully Russia's to shape. Interference in the Pankisi Gorge, and support for separatists in South Ossetia, Abkazia, and Ajaria give Russia leverage over the country.⁹ Russia continues to stir these concerns with actions such as passing a July 2001 law which would allow un-recognized states to join Russia as republics, should the countries they wish to secede from agree. Not surprisingly, Georgian officials objected vehemently.¹⁰

Thus the first decade of the post-Soviet period has seen Georgia become uneasily independent but very weak. The wars in the immediate post-independence period together with the general uncertainty has left the economy in tatters as refugee waves strained the country's resources while Georgia's numerous conflict discouraged investment and other economic activities. Georgian frontiers on most world maps today simply do not reflect the real situation on the ground. Russia's presence and its interference in Georgia's affairs have kept the country unstable. The spillover effect from the war in Chechnya, right on Georgia's northern border, only further aggravated relations with Moscow as Russia suspects Tbilisi of aiding the Chechen separatists while Georgia accused Russia of taking advantage of the Chechen incursions to further destabilize Georgia.

U.S. troops, coming to Georgia's aid to root out Chechen militants as well as suspected Arab terrorists from the Pankisi Gorge, will be stepping into a veritable political and military minefield.