France: Preparing For New Types of Warfare
in a New Century

Since Sept. 11, the world security environment has appeared to change for the worse.  Once low-priority threats have assumed critical importance. America’s allies, including France, will play key roles in the new war on terror.  But how relevant are the priorities of French military transformation, begun in 1996, in the new security environment?  Is French military modernization really focused on the right initiatives to fight the wars of the 21st century?

Before September 2001, France’s primary defense modernization concern was completing its transition from conscript to professional armed forces.  The process started in February 1996 when President Jacques Chirac announced his decision to end conscription by 2002 and in the process cut the armed forces from half a million to 350,000.  Before 1996, the conscripts who formed most of France’s forces could not be deployed outside France and Germany without Parliamentary consent.  The professionalization of the armed forces aimed to raise the size of the fully deployable force from 10,000 to 50-60,000.¹  The changes would also re-orient the French Armed Forces from a mostly European force focused on repelling a Soviet invasion, to a professional, flexible, and highly mobile force capable of deploying worldwide to fight or conduct peace support operations.  The aftermath of Sept. 11 brought little change, as French forces were well-suited, apart from some deficiencies in precision attack capabilities, for the anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan.

The change to professionalism necessitated a major restructuring of the French armed forces.  The Army was most affected, with its previous divisional structure swept away in favor of smaller more flexible brigades.  The Army formed a new Land Force Command to oversee 51 maneuver regiments organized into nine brigades.  Four Force Headquarters were formed to control up to a division-sized force in an emergency.²  The size of the Army will ultimately drop to around 172,000 but around 100,000 troops should be ready for rapid deployment.³  The Air Force dropped from 93,000 to 71,000, closed three bases, and shed three combat squadrons with over 70 aircraft.  The Marine Nationale (Navy) saw the number of its aircraft carriers drop from two to one, and eventually declined by seven submarines and seven surface ships between 1996 and 2001.  Its personnel strength now stands at 63,300.⁴  It did secure the new aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, but it is uncertain whether a second carrier will be built to replace the aging Foch, which was sold to Brazil.

French conscription ended finally on Nov. 30, 2001, when the final group of conscripts left the armed forces after six months’ service.  Only 23,000 conscripts were called up in 2001 compared to 200,000 in 1996 and 260,000 in 1990.  French Ministry of Defense officials said that they had ‘encountered little trouble’ in attracting suitable personnel for military service.⁵

The Kosovo war, NATO’s Operation Allied Force, revealed some French military deficiencies whose remedies were integrated into modernization plans.  A French Ministry of Defense (MoD) report revealed that transport capability, suppression of enemy air defenses, air-to-air refueling, and offensive jamming capabilities were all found lacking.⁶  European reconnaissance capabilities (air and satellite) were also found to be lacking.⁷

Operation Allied Force confirmed the need for a tactical transport with 25-30 tonne payload for airlift missions.  However, difficulties remain with the chosen aircraft, the Airbus Military Company A400M, of which France requires 50.  Airbus has stated that it will not proceed until at least 180 aircraft are ordered by the eight European states involved.  However the German parliament has only allocated 5.1 billion euros (for 40 aircraft) rather than the required 8.5 billion euros (for 73 aircraft) in its 2002 budget, which would mean the total order would only number 163 aircraft.  Germany intends to provide the remaining money in its 2003 budget.  However, a German election is due in September before any further German funds can be allocated.  France is willing to wait “a few days or even weeks” for Germany to clarify its position, but not until fall.⁸  Thus the program remains in disarray, with no obvious solution in sight.

French suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) capabilities were limited in Kosovo because the Air Force lacked an anti-radar missile that could track and destroy a target after the radar is switched off.  France has not had anti-radar missiles since it removed the Martel missile from service in the early 1990s.⁹  However, the French MoD report said that this capability would receive attention, as it ”determined the efficiency of air raids.¹⁰”  France, in common with other European countries, also has a shortage of air refueling aircraft, with only 11 KC-135FRs.  French pilots flew 563 of a total of 7,454 sorties (7.5 percent) during Operation Allied Force.¹¹  Because of the shortage of tankers, numerous combat aircraft had to be moved closer to Kosovo.  Hastily established improvised forward bases had to be created for aircraft moved forward from their permanent stations.

The Marine Nationale lacked the submarine-launched cruise missiles that the Royal Navy and U.S. Navy found so useful in Kosovo and later in Afghanistan; its submarines are limited to the 50-kilometre range anti-ship Exocet.  France had been working toward acquiring GPS-guided munitions to match the Tomahawks and U.S. gravity bombs, but not in time for Kosovo.  France was in the process of deploying Matra BAE Apache standoff air-to-surface missiles; continuing deliveries mean that by the end of 2002 the Air Force will have received 72 of its 100-strong order.

Europe as a whole was found wanting in reconnaissance capabilities during Kosovo.  France provided some of the most potent assets, however, within the European partners. The Helios 1 imaging reconnaissance satellite and Air Force Mirage IVPs were reported as making a significant contribution to allied bomb damage assessment efforts.¹²  The Mirage IVP is a conversion of the Mirage IV strategic bomber.  Unhappy with U.S. satellite intelligence provision, France launched two Helios 1 satellites in July 1995 and December 1999, and will follow them will a pair of more advanced Helios 2 satellites, of which the first will be launched in 2002.  France also lofted an electronic intelligence gathering satellite, Cerise, in 1995 and a follow-on, Clementine.  Finally, France will contribute financially to the five-satellite German SAR-Lupe synthetic aperture radar program, whose components will be launched between 2004 and 2006.  Furthermore,the European Union is moving forward with the development of its own global positioning system, Galileo, which is planned to be fully in service by 2008.

The War on Terror: Contributions and Consequences

In contrast with other U.S. European allies such as Germany, France’s military posture, since the end of the Second World War, is far more suited to the demands of the world-wide deployments implicit in the demands of Operation Enduring Freedom.  Like Britain, France retains a network of forces and bases spread across Africa, Asia, and the Pacific Ocean.  This pattern of forward deployments coupled with elite troops used to far-ranging deployments has seen France in good stead for numerous contingency operations in Africa and the Middle East since the end of the Algerian war in 1962.

France’s contribution to the U.S.-led war on terror started to materialize in October 2001 when Chirac confirmed that French reconnaissance aircraft had begun operations over Afghanistan.  The aircraft involved were the Mirage IVPs previously used during Operation Allied Force joined by C.160G Gabriel electronic intelligence gathering aircraft.  Both aircraft were supported by two KC-135FR tanker aircraft.  However, France’s sensors do not match the U.S. capabilities, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), that are making the U.S. Afghanistan operations possible.  A number of UAV projects are under way, however, to remedy this deficiency.  The supply ship-turned-intelligence-gatherer Bougainville has also been deployed to the Arabian Sea to boost the available listening assets.  French aircraft are also now operating out of Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan.  Mirage 2000D aircraft from Manas first struck targets in Afghanistan on March 7.

A number of ships were deployed in the Arabian Sea soon after Sept.11.  France usually maintains a flotilla in the Indian Ocean.  From this force, two frigates, two mine-hunters, and the support ships Var and Loire were assigned to Operation Enduring Freedom missions, with two maritime patrol aircraft in support.  However, the most robust French maritime contribution came on Dec. 1 in the form of the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, which left Toulon that day leading a battle group of three frigates and destroyers, a replenishment vessel and the nuclear powered attack submarine Rubis.  It arrived in the Arabian Sea on Dec. 19 and is to stay in the area until June 2002.  The battle group’s core air strike force, its 16 Super Etendard aircraft, had logged a total of 590 hours of close air support and reconnaissance missions up to Jan.15.¹³

In land forces terms, France temporarily deployed an infantry company group from the 21st Marine Infantry Regiment to Mazar-e sharif to provide security while the condition of the airfield was assessed.  Furthermore, it is now confirmed that French Special Forces are in action in Afghanistan alongside their U.S. and allied comrades.  French Special Forces were reported as fighting al Qaeda forces as part of a multinational effort in the Shahikot mountain range near Gardez on March 5.¹⁴  France now has a Special Operations Command — Commandement des Operations Speciales — which includes the Foreign Legion's single parachute regiment as well as an army special forces regiment.  In addition, France’s airborne brigade is inherently capable of rapid deployment.  French parachute formations have a long history of such operations.

Given France’s history of maintaining a military posture suited for far-flung deployments, Operation Enduring Freedom has not revealed many deficiencies that were not already highlighted by the Kosovo campaign or the preparations for a common European Union defense policy.  The French Ministry of Defense did not add funding or make changes to the 2001 budget after Sept. 11; Defense Minister Alain Richard said that “Our budget forecast has not been put into question, and our strategic choices are durable”.¹⁵  However, two months after that decision was reported in late September 2001, it was revealed in early December that an additional $404 million would be allocated to expand the French Special Forces Command (Commandement des Forces Speciales, COS).¹⁶  The money will be used to raise the Command’s 2,000-strong personnel by 700-900.

Conclusions

France had a good forward basing infrastructure and readily deployable land, naval, and air forces to contribute to Operation Enduring Freedom.  However, the core capabilities that have been vital to the operation so far are good Special Forces and precision air strike capabilities.  France has the required Special Forces capability but it lacks the level of precision strike capability of the United States.  This has remained the case since the Kosovo campaign, though efforts are under way to rectify this gap.  Along with the Apache stand-off air-to-surface missile, the Scalp air-launched cruise missile is being procured, and it is hoped that the Scalp will begin to enter service later this year.  France’s lack of air defense suppression capabilities is also being investigated, as is noted above.  Reconnaissance capabilities, especially via satellite, are also being improved, as is UAV capability.

The French capability gaps with respect to Operation Enduring Freedom are thus being addressed.  However, the wider deficiencies revealed by Kosovo, and the missing requirements to make European Union headline goal force operational, will take further time, concerted multinational effort, and consistent defense spending to rectify.

Colin Robinson CDI Research Assistant crobinson@cdi.org

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