Many key players in a potential U.S.-led counter-terrorism coalition have reservations with the anticipated American response to the Sept. 11 attacks.

President George W. Bush's proclamations and Congresses' joint resolution both target a military response not only upon the terrorist perpetrators but also upon those who harbor them. "The Taliban must act immediately," declared Bush in his Sept. 20 speech before Congress. "They (sic) will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate."

There is near-universal international support for multilateral, UN-sanctioned attacks on any terrorist network if the United States provides convincing evidence of guilt. However, support — especially from Afghanistan's neighbors — comes with qualifications and it may evaporate if the United States stages massive retaliation against Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, or any other state harboring terrorists.

Privately and publicly, the key players have made the following arguments urging the United States to narrow its military focus to terrorists.

1.	For China and Russia, U.S. attacks on states that harbor terrorists would perpetuate Washington's increasing intervention into what are generally considered internal affairs. Violating sovereignty is a major issue for Beijing and Moscow, and any attack must follow international law and receive the imprimatur of the UN Security Council (where China and Russia have veto power and thus can bargain with the United States for quid pro quos and limitations on military operations). For Russia, a U.S. military action in or near Afghanistan also represents an incursion into its zone of influence.
2.	For states with large Muslim populations, America making war on brother Islamic states could unleash a backlash on their streets that could destabilize any government friendly to Washington. The war is likely to appear to be the West (and Israel) versus Islam, and support would inevitably swell for Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda terrorist network. This message has been delivered by Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, and others.
3.	For states neighboring Afghanistan, notably Tajikistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Uzbekistan, a war could produce a flood of refugees on their borders, a problem already noticeable even before any attacks. Angry refugees joining disaffected local populations would add further problems to coalition governments, according to these sought-after coalition partners. On the other hand, some neighboring governments are angling for better relations with the United States, and many would like to see removal of the Taliban as a regional thorn.
4.	All key states in the potential coalition, therefore, warn that the counter-terrorist coalition could fall apart if the United States carries through and makes the contest a wide-scale, high-intensity war. They are pointing out that such a war could escalate and have far-reaching consequences for regional instability, the loss of energy supplies, worldwide recession, increased support for Palestinians against Israel, and diminished U.S. prestige. Moscow has repeatedly told Washington to avoid a ground war in Afghanistan, an experience and failure so vivid in Russian memory. Russian officials call their 1979-89 war "our Vietnam."
5.	Arab states are particularly urging that the United States engage Israel in ending its use of force against the Palestinians in order to facilitate their support of U.S.-led counter-terrorism operations. Secretary of State Colin Powell anticipated this argument and succeeded in his demands upon Israel and the Palestinian Authority to declare a cessation of their use of armed force against each other.

The following is a review of current positions of some critical coalition members.

 
ASIA

Pakistan

Pakistan is the key state for counter-terrorism against al Qaeda. It possesses the optimal geography for access to Afghanistan, essential agents in place, and vast amounts of information on bin Laden's network. Under intense pressure from the United States, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf agreed to open its airspace for missile and aerial attacks, share intelligence on bin Laden, control its border with Afghanistan to stop the smuggling of fuel and weapons, and offered to send a delegation to Afghanistan to request that Taliban leader Muhammad Omar order the expulsion of bin Laden. In return, Musharraf was offered so-far-undisclosed economic assistance on its enormous debt and the removal of some economic and military sanctions imposed in 1992 and 1998 over Pakistan's nuclear program.

Musharraf consulted with Chinese officials, traditional supporters of Pakistan, before making the offer to Washington. He also expressed concern over the civil backlash from Islamic groups in his country - and with good reason. In Lahore, 35 Islamic groups warned the United States that an attack on Afghanistan would incite "the entire Muslim world." Nevertheless, on Sept. 15 after four days of intense debate led by Musharraf among Pakistan's political elites, Pakistan's foreign minister made the following announcement: "We have reached a consensus on the policy of giving full support to the world community in combating international terrorism." The preference, clearly, was for prior "world community" authorization. Islamabad also offered an additional service; U.S. and other personnel could operate within Pakistani military bases and ports in support of operations against bin Laden.

The Pakistani delegation to Afghanistan headed by Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed returned to Pakistan on Sept. 19 after telling Taliban authorities that "time is short, patience has run out." The Taliban then summoned a council of leading clerics to ponder the question of bin Laden's expulsion, a decision very few held to be possible in light of bin Laden's "guest" status under Islam and his service in the war against the Soviet Union. Instead, the council on Sept. 20 recommended to the Taliban that it persuade Osama bin Laden to leave Afghanistan voluntarily.

On the same day and in response, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and White House spokesman Ari Fleischer rejected the council's action by saying "the United States could not wait." In his later address, Bush was more emphatic. "From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime."

In response, Taliban spokesman in Pakistan, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, said "We are not ready to turn over Osama bin Laden without evidence." The reaction in Kabul was more emphatic. Bin Laden would not be expelled. Reports from Kabul reflect the widely-held belief that the Bush administration's quick refusal to accept the council's actions prove that the United States is determined to attack Afghanistan.

In a strange twist, The News, in Lahore, Pakistan on Sept. 21 reported that Osama bin Laden left Afghanistan for an undisclosed destination on Sept. 17, thereby honoring the expected Islamic council finding that he leave voluntarily.

 
Saudi Arabia

Of the aircraft hijackers, 14 of 19 had some tie to Saudi Arabia (although the FBI now believes some used stolen identity papers). On Sept. 13, Crown Prince Abdullah declared: "We in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are fully prepared to cooperate with you [the United States] in every matter conducive to reveal the identity of the perpetrators of this criminal act and bring them to justice." The focus of Saudi support, therefore, will be providing intelligence information on bin Laden, his associates, connections, finances, and whereabouts. Saudi officials led by Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal, arrived in Washington on Sept. 19 reportedly with boxes of information on al Qaeda.

It is not known what Saudi Arabia will be offered for its cooperation. What Saudi Arabia seeks is an American commitment not to attack Muslims and Arabs in general and, in line with the requests of other Arab governments, efforts to energize the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

 
India

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee promptly informed Bush "that we stand ready to cooperate with you in the investigations into this crime and to strengthen our partnership in leading international efforts to ensure that terrorism never succeeds again." On Sept. 16, Indian officials privately relayed to Washington the offer to allow its military bases to be used to attack terrorist targets. Publicly, they said: "We have given unconditional and un-ambivalent support for any action the United States may take to deal with the problem of international terrorism."

India also has considerable information to offer on Kashmiri terrorists operating out of Pakistani-controlled Kashmir who have ties to bin Laden's network. With more than 100 million Muslims, India has not offered to be an active military partner in any counter-terrorism operation against Muslims. So far, no specific requests have come from Washington asking for India's military support in counter-terrorism operations. With Pakistan the main U.S. partner, such cooperation by Islamabad's principal rival would be awkward.

New Delhi has sought closer relations with Washington, and any political support it can give would only tighten those relations.

 
Japan

In a Sept. 13 telephone conversation with Bush, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi pledged "all possible and necessary cooperation" against terrorists. In fact, as with Japanese support during Desert Storm, very little "possible" cooperation is possible. Speaking the next day, Koizumi ruled out the use of force. "If you are talking about taking military action alongside the United States, along with other G-8 nations," he told reporters, "under the existing Japanese constitution it would not be possible for Japan to do so." On further consideration, Koizumi announced on Sept. 19 that he would introduce legislation in the Diet to allow logistical support for America's counter-terrorism efforts. If passed, it would be the first time members of Japan's Self-Defense Force would be authorized to engage as non-combatants in an overseas military conflict. Koizumi said it is a moral obligation as a U.S. ally to do more than just write a check as it did (for $13 billion) during Desert Storm. "Japan would like to take an active role in the fight against terrorism," Koizumi declared.

 
China

Bush telephoned President Jiang Zemin on Sept. 13, asking China's cooperation at the UN Security Council in the common fight against international terrorism. According to Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao, Jiang replied "that China is ready to strengthen dialogue and cooperation with the United States and the international community in the joint efforts in combating all sorts of terrorist violence." Zhu went on to say "we are ready to make joint efforts with parties concerned to carry out anti-terrorism activities on the basis of the UN Charter." This position was expanded on Sept. 18. "Any military action against terrorism" must be based on "irrefutable evidence and should aim at clear targets so as to avoid casualties to innocent people." He indicated that there should be no U.S. strikes on Afghanistan.

Zhu also hinted at the conditions that might ensure China's UN support for American counter-terrorism efforts. "The United States has asked China to provide assistance in the fight against terrorism," he said. "China, by the same token, has reasons to ask the United States to give its support and understanding in [China's] fight against terrorists and separatists." In other words, back off on verbal and any material support for Taiwan, Tibet, and separatists in Xinjiang.

 
Iran

Reports from Tehran indicate that general expressions of sympathy have been forthcoming over the tragic consequences of the Sept. 11 attack. Iran, with a Shi'a population, has its own problems with the Sunni Taliban and bin Laden. Besides the religious rivalry and Taliban's warring causing a flood of refugees (1.4 million are now in Iran), Taliban fighters murdered 10 Iranian diplomats and journalists in 1998. On Sept. 18, President Mohammad Khatami said he would honor UN resolutions that authorize a response against terrorists. Former president Hashemi Rafsanjani probably spoke for many in the country when he called the terrorist attack "a bitter human catastrophe," but cautioned against a "hasty, illogical, and miscalculated" response. In a telephone conversation with British Prime Minister Tony Blair on Sept. 20, Khatami repeated the caution. "A tragedy must not be answered with another tragedy and innocent people in Afghanistan, or any other place, must not be attacked or hurt."

Iran would likely cool its more typical anti-U.S., anti-Israel rhetoric if progress could be made on the Palestinian front, however.

By Dr. Nicholas Berry
CDI Senior Analyst

THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Russia

Russia expressed strong moral support for U.S. campaign against terrorism. Following the attacks on New York and Washington, President Vladimir Putin immediately sent a message to President George W. Bush saying that "the entire international community should unite in the struggle against terrorism." Moscow claims to be facing the same terrorist threats in Chechnya. Elements close to Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network have indeed been reported to operate there, even though vast majority of the population in this breakaway republic fights for independence from Russia rather than religious goals. To bolster Putin's campaign against Chechnya, often criticized in the West, Russian intelligence services already sought to link Chechnya to terrorist attacks in the United States. The Russian security service, FSB, announced that it discovered flight manuals in a hideout allegedly used by Chechen fighters.

Russia's initial statements of support were quickly modified by pragmatic political considerations. Moscow wants to maintain and perhaps expand its influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. It quickly sought to maneuver itself in the position of a mediator between Washington and the independent republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, bordering on Afghanistan, whose bases the United States would like to use for military operations against Osama bin Laden and Afghanistan. Moscow sought to preempt NATO or U.S. presence in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the organization of former Soviet republics, by declaring, in the words of the country's Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, that "Central Asia is within the zone of competence of the CIS Collective Security Treaty…[there are] no grounds, even hypothetical, for a possible NATO deployment in Central Asian States." However, after Washington apparently approached Central Asian countries directly, Moscow modified its stance. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said on Wednesday that "each country will decide for itself to what degree it will be cooperating with the U.S.A.."

As for Russia's own participation in the campaign, Moscow has extended intelligence cooperation while holding back on use of force. Russia and the United States remain divided over the questions of NATO enlargement, the alliance's roles, and what Russia calls "U.S. unilateralist policies." Despite shared interest in fighting terrorism, Moscow is unwilling to take part in a U.S.-led coalition, especially one operating on or near the territory of the former Soviet Union. "The United States has armed forces powerful enough to handle the task by themselves," said Gen. Anatoly Kvashin, chief of Russia's General Staff.

 
Uzbekistan

Moscow's warnings to its former satellites to seek guidance from Russian on participation in the U.S. campaign seem to have fallen on deaf ears in Uzbekistan. The country's president Islam Karimov offered to "combine efforts to fight terrorism" and, in a pointed reference to Russia, said that his country is "not obliged to coordinate foreign policy with anyone." U.S. media are reporting that the Pentagon is indeed moving forces to Uzbekistan. The country's exact participation in the anti-terrorist campaign is unclear. Uzbekistan denied having agreed to let the United States use its bases on the Afghan border but it may have a number of incentives to do so.

Uzbekistan has its own problem with terrorism. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, operates partly out of Afghanistan and has suspected links with Osama bin Laden. In the past, IMU staged attacks on Uzbek territory and attempted to assassinate Karimov. In a possible attempt to rally Uzbek support, Bush pointedly listed the IMU as a threat in his speech on September 20. The analogy is partly misleading - IMU has very different goals from those of bin Laden and al Qaeda; most regional observers agree that the IMU emerged primarily as a response to the Uzbek government's nepotism, corruption, and its crackdown on some Islamic institutions. Cooperation with the United States on fight against terrorism would allow Karimov to bolster his campaign against the IMU and other Islamic groups such as the Islamic Party of Liberation (Hizb ut Tahrir).

Participation in a U.S. led anti-terrorist campaign would also enable Uzbekistan to strengthen its ties with the West and further distance itself from Moscow. Karimov's foreign policy has shifted several times between Moscow and the West but overall, Uzbekistan has moved closer to Europe and the United States than Russia in recent years. The country dropped out of the CIS Collective Security Treaty and joined a rival regional grouping, the pro-Western GUUAM (Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) alliance in 1999. Uzbekistan seeks alliances wherever it can secure financial help and military assistance in its fight against domestic militant groups. Washington is likely to extend all forms of support to Uzbekistan in exchange for the use of its bases; hence the planned military campaign is likely to shift Uzbekistan's foreign policy even closer to the West.

 
Tajikistan

Tajikistan is the poorest of all former Soviet Republics. It depends almost entirely on the Russian military (6,000-10,000 troops) and border guards (15,000-20,000 troops) to guarantee its stability against fighter incursions and refugee waves from neighboring Afghanistan. Unlike Uzbekistan, Tajikistan is also bound to Russia by the CIS Collective Security Treaty. It has the little leverage vis-ŕ-vis Russia and is likely to take its instructions on participation in the U.S. anti-terrorist campaign from Moscow. Even though Foreign Minister Talbak Nazarov said that Tajikistan was ready to cooperate with the United States, Prime Minister Okil Okilov added that the government will "obligatorily consult with Moscow first."

Perhaps in response to Russia's warnings against NATO operations in Central Asia, Tajikistan further distanced itself from Washington on Sept. 16. The Tajik Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying that reports of planned U.S. military strikes staged from Tajikistan are "totally without foundation." Somewhat surprisingly, U.S. media reported on Sept. 19 that U.S. forces are moving to Tajikistan after all. These reports were further denied by the Tajik authorities, who said on Sept. 21 that they have "no information on any negotiations… held between our countries [Tajikistan and the United States]."

If Tajikistan indeed relented on U.S. bases in its territory, the information would likely never be made public, in part because the cooperation could jeopardize the stability of the country's government. The current administration contains a strong radical Islamic faction, a vestige of 1992-1997 civil war in which the United Tajik Opposition fought the ex-communist authorities of Tajikistan.

By Tomas Valasek
CDI Senior Analyst
tvalasek@cdi.org