The Bush Homeland Security Strategy: A Mixed Bag

On July 16, the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush released its National Strategy for Homeland Security, 40 days after proposing the creation of a new Department of Homeland Security.  This is a bit like barring the barn door after the horse is gone.  The way the process is supposed to work is quite different: one comes up with the strategy first and then proceeds to make the necessary organizational changes.  As a result, the relationship between the administration’s strategy and its reorganization proposal is not at all clear. 

Yet in the aftermath of Sept. 11 and the need to create a whole new homeland security establishment and paradigm, this is not such a big problem.

Commendably, the administration did not mince words in stating the threat:  "Unless we act to prevent it, a new wave of terrorism, potentially involving the world's most destructive weapons, looms in America's future."  Preventing such attacks "is a challenge as formidable as any ever faced by our nation," the document states.

The 90-page strategy is actually a laudable attempt to bring some coherence to a hugely ambitious undertaking.  It is a good first step, though hardly the final word.  Many of the recommendations are old initiatives that the government has tried to enact for years but have recently enjoyed renewed popularity  Many fall outside the scope of the proposed new department.

The report identifies three key objectives: preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing the nation's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing the damage while speeding the recovery from attacks that do occur.  The objectives are refined into six mission critical areas: intelligence and warnings, border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure and key assets, defending against catastrophic terrorism, and emergency preparedness and response.  The new department that Bush wants Congress to create would coordinate much of the work.

In coping with such threats, the strategy relies heavily on science and technology.  The White House is calling for research on new vaccines and antidotes, the creation of standardized biometric travel documents for foreign visitors and the development of screening tools to predict human behavior, such as "hostile intent."

The strategy lays out numerous proposals to help improve homeland security, including creating a plan to protect U.S. infrastructure and reviewing laws that regulate the military’s role in domestic law enforcement. In addition, the strategy suggests improving interagency communications, creating national standards for state driver’s licenses, and increasing inspections of shipping containers at foreign ports and U.S. borders.

One of the more innovative ideas is creating an “intelligence threat division” in the proposed Homeland Security Department.  In the division, teams of experts would improve U.S. defenses by simulating terrorist attacks on vulnerable U.S. targets, the plan says. 

This is similar to the traditional “red teams” the military uses to figure out its vulnerabilities.

One useful recommendation is to ensure that government agencies can communicate with one another, something successive administrations have tried and failed to do.  It does not sound very exciting but it is usually the prosaic improvements that are among the most worthwhile. 

Also, on the positive side, in international cooperation – not usually seen as Bush’s strength – the plan lays out a rationale for engagement with other nations.  A major element of U.S. foreign policy will now be helping other countries fight terrorism, getting them to combat passport fraud, and more.  Unfortunately, even before Sept. 11 the administration was increasingly seen as arrogant and unilateralist, and it remains to be seen just how cooperative other nations will be.

The strategy also called for the first comprehensive review of critical public and private U.S. infrastructure and for development of a plan to protect it.  The inventory would include, for example, highways, pipelines, agriculture, the Internet, databases and energy plants.

Less useful is the call for an increase in the use of sensors to detect nuclear and radiological weapons at borders, ports and highways.  The United States would provide funds for developing improved sensors to detect chemical and biological weapons, according to the plan.  Those who follow the issues closely believe that efforts to secure materials that could be used for building such weapons should concentrate on detecting the materials in their respective homeland.  A new study by the Brookings Institution, released the day before the national strategy, found that “a sound homeland security strategy should focus first and foremost on prevention – by ensuring terrorists and their material do not enter the United States.”

Unfortunately, the strategy also reinforces the administration’s preference for secrecy.  To safeguard sensitive information about U.S. chemical and nuclear plants, Bush would also ask Congress to place new restrictions on laws that allow the public to access government and private sector information.

The plan also says the United States should review the military’s abilities to operate within its territory.  The strategy calls for use of the military for civilian defense, including the enforcement of quarantines in case of an attack using a contagious virus.  Previously, Defense Department officials had said they would not request Congress to amend the Posse Comitatus Act, which restricts the military’s ability to act as domestic law enforcement. 

One paradox that has not received much attention is in the executive summary which says:  "One fact dominates all homeland security threat assessments:  terrorists are strategic actors."  That same paragraph, however, concludes: "Our society presents an almost infinite array of potential targets that can be attacked through a variety of methods."  Thus, the administration's core premise – enemies will act strategically so we must defend everything – presents taxpayers with a hopeless choice.  There is no acknowledgement of the necessity of having to make hard choices.  If choices are necessary in the military world, something that we daily demand of Pentagon officials, why doesn't that logic apply to homeland security?  Someone should have reminded Gov. Tom Ridge of the famous saying of Frederick the Great of Prussia, that he who ends up trying to defend everything ends defending nothing.

Under the strategy, Washington stands to gain significant new powers: from establishing a network of national laboratories, to study anti-terrorist techniques, to giving the president broad authority to reorganize the government without explicit congressional approval.  Such centralization of powers, however, is wrong on two counts.  First, it continues the trend of trying to put everything into one homeland security basket, in which not all security issues fit.  Second, it counters the federalist principle of American democracy.  As the strategy itself says, “a national strategy requires a national effort.”  The more things are centered in Washington, the less effective that effort will be.

Sources:

National Strategy for Homeland Security

http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf

Assessing the Department of Homeland Security

http://brookings.edu/dybdocroot/fp/projects/homeland/assessdhs.pdf

 

By David Isenberg Independent Consultant sento@earthlink.net

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