It appears that several pages of history will be written in December 2002 and
January 2003. Saddam Hussein has bowed to international pressure and agreed to
allow weapons inspectors back into his country. The inspectors are armed with
Resolution 1441, approved unanimously by the Security Council that warns of
"serious consequences" if Iraq does not cooperate fully with the
inspectors. The advance team has arrived in Baghdad with preliminary inspections
resuming on Nov. 27. Full-scale checks will begin after Iraq files a declaration
of its banned weapons programs by a Dec. 8 deadline. Chief inspector Hans Blix
then has 60 days to report his findings to the UN Security Council. A full team
of up to 100 inspectors will be in place by the end of December. The
challenges facing Blix and Dr. Mohammed El Baradei, who head the UN and
International Atomic Energy Agency inspection teams, are numerous and complex.
It should be apparent before the end of January whether the allegations that
Iraq has pursued development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for over two
decades is true, and, if so, whether Saddam wants to avoid a war and is willing
to comply with the demands of the United Nations.
Q. Is there any hope that the UN inspectors will be
successful?
A. Yes. I think that many of the people
that have already doomed the inspectors to certain failure are the same pro-war
people that said there was absolutely no way that Saddam would ever let
inspectors back into his country. Many intelligent professionals have described
Blix's task as "mission impossible," but it makes no sense to put the
cart too far in front of the horse right now. The inspection process is just
beginning. It should be understood in Washington that inspections can not offer
a 100 percent guarantee of success anymore than the Pentagon can ensure a
bloodless war or zero collateral damage in a major conflict with Iraq.
Skepticism certainly is warranted, but we need to have some patience and see
if Iraq will be cooperative and let the inspectors do their job. UN Resolution
1441 is a good and tough resolution that requires "anywhere - anytime -
anybody" inspections. This places the inspectors in a much stronger
position then they were back in the 1990s. Additionally, this time it looks as
if the Security Council will back the inspectors more strongly than it has in
the past, partly because of the intense and unrelenting media attention that the
process continues to receive.
Saddam, under significant international pressure and visibility, has nothing
to lose and everything to gain by "complying." He will play for time,
try to exploit disorganization, and gamble on being able to get a clean bill of
health over the next 60 days. This does not mean, however, that at the end of
January, if there has been no discovery of WMD, the inspectors will pack up and
go home, sanctions will be lifted and Iraq will be able to celebrate another
victory over the infidels. Most likely, further inspections will be conducted
throughout 2003.
The United States is hoping Saddam will make mistakes and certifiable proof
will be found to show the world that Iraq's WDM programs present a clear and
present danger, and therefore that Iraq must be disarmed.
Iraq is quite adept at camouflage, concealment and deception. Saddam's
experts have had four years to conceal any weapons of mass destruction or
programs that support chemical, biological and nuclear weapon development. Iraq
covers 168,000 square miles, an area which could be looked at as a large storage
facility for WMD. According to reports, bioweapons have been placed across the
rural landscape in sealed wells drilled 60 feet deep, and stocks of chemical
components placed in residential basements, under man-made lakes, in palace
bunkers or mobile trucks that are constantly on the move. Saddam is a gambler,
and may believe that he has concealed any and all incriminating evidence well
enough that the inspectors will be unable to find anything of significance.
Therein lays one of the biggest challenges for the inspectors: can they ever
find undeniable proof of Iraqi WMD programs? The quality of intelligence that
the inspectors receive is critical to success. Saddam does not know what
intelligence countries such as the United States, Britain and Israel have
supplied the United Nations, nor what recent defectors have told other countries
that has been passed along. The United States wants any proof of WMD to be
irrefutable. A list of more than 1,000 sites of interest has been compiled, with
the implication that over 100 are certain to contain evidence of illegal
activity. Additionally, a list exists identifying over 1,200 nuclear scientists
and weapon technicians by name.
It is important that the inspectors immediately test the completeness of
Iraq's declaration by specifically focusing on things that are not declared.
This requires a thorough and intrusive search with new state-of-the-art
equipment and an aggressive exploitation of the latest available intelligence
from reconnaissance and surveillance assets. Finding any hidden facilities,
activities or materials may also require some luck.
Q. Do you think Saddam will actually admit that he
has weapons of mass destruction?
A. No. The first test of compliance and
cooperation by Saddam is Dec. 8, by which time Iraq must provide "a
currently accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its
programs to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic
missiles, and other delivery systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles and
dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft, including any holdings and
precise locations of such components, stocks of agents, the locations and work
of its research and development facilities, as well as other chemical,
biological, and nuclear programs, including any which it claims are for purposes
not related to weapon production;"
This is a dilemma for Saddam. The burden of proof lies with Iraq, not the
other way around as in the past. Omissions or outright defiance could be used as
justification for war. Yet if he admits anything, he shows to the world,
upfront, that he has lied all these years. I suspect that he will restate his
claim that Iraq "has nothing to declare."
What Iraq might do is submit a massive list of chemical and biological agents
that are portrayed as "dual-use" goods for agricultural or
petrochemical programs, in an attempt to completely overwhelm the inspectors and
consume all their manpower and time in simply sorting through the list. I would
also expect Iraq to claim that it has destroyed weapons stockpiles that were
unaccounted for the last time UN inspectors were there in 1998. Saddam may even
supply some new information, about, for example, a cache of artillery shells
capable of delivering chemical weapons that have not been destroyed.
There is always the remote possibility that Saddam has decided that
his survival and that of his regime is more important than his WMD programs, and
will therefore "come clean." He has, however, given up $166 billion in
oil revenues in just the last four years rather than let inspectors back into
his country. I think it will become evident very early on if Iraq will comply
with Resolution 1441, and whether this "last and final opportunity" is
being taken seriously.
There is also the possibility that the United States already has some
conclusive evidence and will produce it at the earliest opportunity to
demonstrate to the UN Security Council a pattern of Iraqi deceit. Bush has been
quite vocal regarding the issue of "zero tolerance" in reference to
any Iraqi omissions or false statements. U.S. Special Forces and CIA
paramilitary units have probably been active throughout this summer and fall
inside Iraq preparing for an invasion. Their current operations could include
scouting for WMD arsenals and artillery in order to supply hard evidence to the
Security Council.
This scenario is reminiscent of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 when
Ambassador Adlai Stephenson, the U.S. representative to the United Nations,
confronted Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin, demanding an honest answer about
Soviet missiles on the Caribbean Island. He then produced pictures taken by a
U-2 reconnaissance plane to a stunned audience. The same type of drama could be
played out between U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte and Iraq's Ambassador to the
UN, Mohammad Al-Douri, next month if U.S. claims are backed up by solid proof of
the existence of WMD programs or weapons in the country.
Q. How is the U.S. military responding to the
resumption of UN inspections in Iraq?
A. Planning and preparation for an
all-out conflict with Iraq continues and has not slowed down. The president has
promised "any delay and defiance will be met with the severest of
consequences." The U.S.-led coalition has to be able to respond quickly,
and for that reason war supplies and equipment will continue to flow into the
region, with troops, aircraft and carrier battlegroups "on call" to be
in place within two weeks. Resolution 1441 provides some justification for a
continued buildup of American military assets in the region. Contingency plans
are being continually refined to provide options for a military response ranging
from "coercive" inspections, to the surgical destruction of WMD
facilities, to a full-scale invasion and regime change in Iraq. The new
resolution also makes it easier politically for the Gulf countries to provide
base and overflight rights to coalition forces. Preparations for an invasion of
Iraq will be essentially completed by the end of December.
The Security Council will look at the entire inspection process as it unfolds
before making any determination on what degree of Iraqi non-cooperation would
justify war.
Bush sincerely wants the inspections to work and considers war with Iraq and
all the risks that go with it to be a last resort. He will not be looking for
any "flimsy, hasty excuse to go to war." The president will also
clearly describe boundaries beyond which he thinks Saddam cannot be allowed to
go. Only when Iraq was confronted by a credible threat of U.S. military action
did Saddam decide to allow renewed inspections. For that reason, it makes sense
to have that credible force present in the Gulf area as inspections commence.
Q. What events might evoke a military response?
A. There is no "hair trigger"
for war. Issues such as Saddam's willingness to cooperate, the completeness of
his Dec. 8 declaration regarding Iraq's WDM programs, how aggressively intrusive
the inspections will be or how the Security Council will respond to any
violations are all unknowns at this point.
A significant material breach or a series of flagrant deceptions that are
clear and credible violations of UN resolutions may cause the Security Council
to decide that a military invasion is necessary to disarm Iraq.
The UN resolution requires that any "A-Ha! What do we have here?"
discovery by the inspectors be reported immediately to the Security Council. The
Security Council, in turn, must decide what "serious consequences" are
appropriate. The discovery of caches of VX, anthrax or mustard gas, Scud
missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles configured for delivering WMD, biological or
chemical artillery rounds, or geiger counters that go off in research facilities
would immediately cause worldwide attention and concern. Depending on the
magnitude of the material breach, military action is an option.
It seems apparent that United States will attempt to patiently build a case
that shows indisputable evidence of deceit and flagrant violation of the
resolution. There have been threats to go to war without UN approval, but I
think the administration clearly realizes the advantages and importance of
strong domestic and international support if a military response is deemed
necessary.
If Iraq is engaged in WMD development, it is hoped that the next two months
will provide proof to the world that Saddam represents a serious enough threat
to require military action. Yet approval of a use of force by the UN Security
Council still does not mean that a U.S.-led coalition will automatically hit
1,000 targets with precision-guided weapons the next night. The actions of Iraq
will have to provide the justification for a full-scale invasion of their
country. I suspect that in order for Security Council to adopt a resolution that
calls for military action, the inspection process will have to be an ugly
sequence of events and flagrant instances of non-compliance that clearly show
Iraq's refusal to cooperate.
Iraq's intentions should become obvious within the next two months. There are
some red flags already popping up. There have been increases this month in the
number of engagements of U.S. and British aircraft in both the Northern and
Southern no-fly zones by Iraqi anti-aircraft batteries an indication that Saddam
is not on his best behavior. A "golden BB" that actually downs a
coalition aircraft, together with the continuing hostile environment, might
potentially lead to war, and the ongoing game in the no-fly zones underlines the
fact that Saddam is a risk taker, willing to gamble at anytime.
Q. What do you think a military invasion will look
like?
A. The first phase of war would be a
massive around-the-clock air campaign to take out all key nodes of command,
control and communications, and the threat to coalition aircraft posed by
surface-to-air batteries. This will be a multi-axis campaign, and a lot will
happen very quickly and simultaneously. Critical to success will be achieving
air dominance within the first 48 to 72 hours. The Iraq air forces and
airfields, integrated air defense zones, command and control facilities,
surface-to-air missile sites and anti-aircraft batteries will all be on the
first night's target list.
Tactics will focus on a relentless, overwhelming onslaught. A very robust
network of intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance assets will maintain a
continuous presence over the battlespace to support the offensive. Attacks will
be launched on Saddam's palaces, bodyguards and bunkers as well as the
communications networks used to direct troops in the field. The objective would
be to quickly eliminate Saddam's center of gravity his ability to be militarily
effective or stay in power. Targets will include the Special Republican Guard,
Special Security Service, the Revolutionary Command Council and Baath Party
leaders who enforce Saddam's rule in the provinces. This would be a narrowly
focused but extremely intense attack aimed at toppling the regime as quickly as
possible, while minimizing the suffering inflicted on the Iraqi population.
Iraqi infrastructure and regular Army troops would not necessarily be the
primary targets; instead, the focus will be on Saddam and the
people/institutions that keep him in power.
The first two or three days of the massive air campaign will attempt to
quickly prepare the battlefield for the initial ground campaign. Armored
divisions, Marines and Special Forces will enter Iraq from Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia and Jordan. Coalition forces could isolate the key cities of Tikrit,
Basra, Al Kut and Karbala from Baghdad. The ground campaign may deliberately
bypass large Iraqi concentrations of troops while the air campaign focuses only
on select "regime" targets.
Anti-Scud missions will also be of the highest priority at the onset of
hostilities. The threat of conventional, biological or chemical weapons hitting
Israel, neighboring countries, or U.S. troops, is a major concern. The Scud
launch areas in western Iraq will be the first that coalition ground forces must
control.
To negate any Iraqi "scorched earth" option, most of the oil fields
will also be quickly secured and protected. It is likely that Special Forces
units will seize the critical Bamerni airport in northern Iraq. The airport,
just outside the Kurdish region, lies 50 miles north of the big Iraqi oil cities
of the north, Kirkuk and Mosul.
Beachheads in the north, south, east and west regions will be established
while select Iraqi airfields are quickly seized. U.S. forces could initially
invade the western tip of Iraq that borders Jordan and take control of the
airports H-2 and H-3 to create an in-country base of operations for Special
Forces. (Coalition forces struck the H-3 airfield air defenses in early
September 2002 in preparation for such an option.) The initial ground assaults
could begin with lightning strikes by forces already in the region while more
troops and aircraft are brought in.
"No Movement" zones will be established to clear the way for
advancing U.S. forces. The railway network from Iraq to Syria that has allegedly
been used to supply Baghdad with a vast range of military equipment would also
be one of the Iraqi assets coalition forces would want to control early. The
Iraqi port of Basra in the southeast area of the Gulf and two airports in that
region have been looked at as another possible staging area for Marines to
launch further attacks from within the country.
Initial goals would be to quickly demolish the majority of air-defense and
command and control sites, decimate the Iraqi leadership Saddam and key members
of the Arab Socialist Ba?ath Party - and target all "presidential
sites," such as the Republican Palace, the Ba?ath Party Headquarters,
Special Republican Guard compounds, Special Security Directorates and palaces
that house military and government officials. All symbols of power or means of
communication for Saddam television / radio capabilities and transmitting towers
will destroyed. All mobile communications will be jammed. Iraqi forces will be
cut off from any communications, electricity, or supplies, making it impossible
for them to regain any lost territory and subjecting them to constant air
attack. The ability of the Iraqi command authority to exercise any strategic or
operational control over their forces will be completely negated. Saddam will be
isolated and incapable of communicating with his forces, hopefully causing the
regime to crumble rapidly.
Q. Isn't Saddam's strategy to lure U.S. soldiers
into door-to-door urban warfare in Baghdad in order to achieve a horrendous
American casualty rate?
A. Urban warfare is dangerous and the
risk of heavy casualties is well known. There have been numerous reports that
say Saddam's aim is to thwart an invasion by avoiding open desert fighting and
massing his military in major cities where civilian and American casualties
would be highest. Iraqi defectors and opposition groups have substantiated these
reports, saying that Saddam wants to draw forces into Baghdad and other urban
settings where his equipment and troops are not fully exposed to America's
warplanes and precision-guided weapons.
In 775AD, Baghdad was the first city in the world to have a population of
over a million. Current estimates put the population near 5 million. It is one
of the largest cities by area in the world, five times that of New York City:
with an estimated 1,571 square miles of land area that constitutes the city
proper.
It also has one of the most dense air defense networks in the world. During
Desert Storm, more than 3,000 antiaircraft guns and 60 surface-to-air missile
batteries protected the city. As part of the initial phases of the air campaign,
allied warplanes dropped more than 3,000 bombs (including sea-launched cruise
missiles) on 772 targets. Current defenses probably are of the same magnitude.
Saddam's most elite force, the Special Republican Guard, numbering roughly
15,000, rings Baghdad. That force is the only paramilitary unit allowed in the
city. The commanders, mostly drawn from Saddam's home city of Takrit, are his
most loyal and trusted men. Iraqi contingency plans probably include locating
the majority of Special Republican Guard and surface-to-air defenses around the
hospitals, schools, mosques, and public institutions throughout Baghdad. His
last line of defense, these forces most likely will put up a hard fight.
The military would conduct urban warfare in Baghdad and other cities only as
a last resort. U.S. military exercises have shown that as many as 30 percent of
urban warfare combatants can end up as casualties. Although our forces have
trained in this environment more so than any other military force this type of
combat is a "worst-case scenario" for military planners. Expect the
full brunt of available airborne firepower, psychological warfare and
intelligence assets to be focused in an effort to avoid it. War planners want no
part of a scenario where coalition troops are bogged down in street fighting.
All strategies, tactics and weapons will be focused on keeping U.S. casualties
and civilian casualties to an absolute minimum.
This is not to say that a "bloodless war" mentality is driving
tactics. For instance, the urban layout, streets, sewer systems, and invasion
routes, throughout Baghdad are being studied intensely. There will likely be a
plan in place to neutralize the complex of underground tunnels in Baghdad used
by security forces to move about and store key war materials.
The bottom line is, however, that urban warfare is a scenario warfighters
want to stay away from as much as possible. It is therefore more probable that
U.S. and coalition forces surround and besiege any hold-out city, rather than
resort to street-by-street fighting. Many days of intense combat and many failed
tactics and strategies would have to have occurred before U.S. military leaders
decided that U.S. forces should be heavily engaged in the worst-case scenario -
urban warfare. To avoid this, the campaign is intended to be decisive, swift and
psychologically devastating for Iraqi forces. It is hoped that a blitzkrieg
attack moving rapidly will have a tremendous snowball effect, rapidly collapsing
the regime and ending hostilities.
Q. The recent audio tape of Osama bin Laden proves
that he is alive. Why can't we find him?
A. It appears that the most wanted
terrorist on this planet is still alive. This is not 100 percent certain because
the poor quality tape made proper voice authentication very difficult, but the
National Security Agency experts judge it to be authentic. The last hard
evidence the CIA had that bin Laden was alive was in December 2001.
The on-going hunt is more difficult than many people realize. To put the
difficulties somewhat in perspective, Afghanistan's area of over 250,000 square
miles (one-third larger than Iraq) provides a sprawling mountainous landscape
with hundreds of miles of porous borders and countless places to hide. With a
$25 million price tag on his head, I do not think bin Laden has gone near any
populated areas because of the risk of being recognized. The CIA now believes he
is most likely hiding somewhere along the Afghan-Pakistani border.
Counting all U.S. military forces in the country including aircraft
maintainers, security, support, and combat soldiers - there are around 9,000
troops, the majority of which are centrally located near Kandahar and the
airbase at Bagram. By comparison, the New York City, Chicago and Los Angeles
police departments each are substantially larger (NYC - +40,000, Chicago -
+16,500, LA - +12,000). The U.S. military simply does not have the assets to
cover all this ground, and correctly, has not placed the hunt for bin Laden at
the top of all other operational priorities.
We shouldn't try to measure our success in stopping terrorists and the
overall war on terrorism by the capture of bin Laden. The dragnet will continue
until he is captured, but he is just one man and his effectiveness to serve as
the leader for al Qaeda is certainly questionable as he remains in hiding. We
will act immediately on quality intelligence when it comes, and I think it will
come eventually.
Meanwhile, we are methodically finding hard-core Taliban and al Qaeda
followers in Afghanistan and elsewhere. For example, recent headlines say that
Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, an al Qaeda leader believed to be a key planner of the
USS Cole bombing and the operations chief for Persian Gulf, is in U.S. custody
in Yemen. U.S. Special Forces and Yemeni counterterrorism forces had mounted a
determined hunt for him for several weeks.
Rear Adm. (Ret.) Stephen H. Baker is former Chief of Staff for Naval Forces
Central Command in Bahrain and was the Operations Officer for the Theodore
Roosevelt Battle Group throughout Operation Desert Storm. He is currently a
senior advisor at the Center for Defense Information.
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