A Chronology of Arms Control Events
Related to Chemical and Biological Weapons

 
1899 — JULY 29
THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land declares "it is especially prohibited to employ poison or poisoned arms." (See June 17, 1925)

1915 — APRIL 22
CHEMICAL WEAPONS DURING WWI
The first major use of chemical weapons (CW) in the modern era takes place as Germany launches a large-scale poison gas attack against French troops on the battlefield of Ypres. The New York Tribune reports that "its effect on the French was a violent nausea and faintness, followed by an utter collapse." As the war continues, the allies respond in kind and, by the time of the armistice, chemical warfare has inflicted over 1 million casualties, of which around 90,000 were fatal. (See March 20, 1995)

1925 — JUNE 17
THE GENEVA PROTOCOL
The Geneva Protocol, which prohibits "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare," opens for signature. Over the next decade, some 40 countries ratify the Protocol, including all of the Great Powers except Japan and the United States. It enters into force on Feb. 8, 1928. (See April 10, 1972 and Jan. 22, 1975)

1937
JAPANESE BW EXPERIMENTS
A Japanese army biological weapons (BW) research and development group, Unit 731, begins BW experiments in Manchuria. Over the course of the program, more than 10,000 prisoners of war are killed.

1939 DECEMBER — 1945 MAY
CHEMICAL WEAPONS DURING WW II
During WW II, hydrogen cyanide (HCN, called Zyklon B by the Germans) and carbon monoxide are used by the Nazis to murder millions of people in extermination camps (e.g., at Majdanek, Auschwitz, Sobibor and Treblinka).

1962-1970
VIETNAM
During the Vietnam War, the United States uses tear gas and several types of defoliant, including Agent Orange.

1963-1967
WAR IN YEMEN
Egypt uses phosgene and mustard gas against Yemen. Casualties are probably in the low hundreds.

1969 — NOV. 25
U.S. RENUNCIATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
President Richard Nixon declares that the United States unilaterally renounces the first use of lethal or incapacitating chemical weapons, and unconditionally renounces all methods of biological warfare. The U.S. biological program will be confined strictly to research on defensive measures such as immunization. The president further instructs the Department of Defense to draw up a plan for the disposal of existing stocks of biological agents and weapons. (See Feb. 14, 1970)

1970 — FEB. 14
U.S. BAN ON TOXIN WEAPONS
The United States closes a potential loophole by extending its ban on BW to include toxins (agents which are produced through biological or microbic processes).

1972 — APRIL 10
SIGNATURE OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC) is opened for signature. Parties to the convention undertake not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes," as well as related weapons and means of delivery. The BWC does not prohibit BW research and does not contain provisions to verify compliance. (See April 1979 and Sept. 30, 1986)

On March 26, 1975 the United States, the United Kingdom and Soviet Union ratify the convention, thus triggering its entry into force. (See Dec. 26, 1975 and April 1979)

1975 — JAN. 22
U.S. RATIFICATION OF GENEVA PROTOCOL
The United States ratifies the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which it had originally signed on June 17, 1925. This protocol bans the use of chemical weapons, but not their manufacture or stockpiling. (See Jan. 7-11, 1989)

1975 — DEC. 26
U.S. DESTRUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
In implementation of the BWC, the United States completes the destruction of all its biological weapons.

1979
NEW RULERS IN MIDDLE EAST
Two important changes of power during the year greatly increase tensions in the Middle East:

	On Feb. 1 Ayatollah Khomeini flies into Tehran, and on Feb. 11 the government of the Shah of Iran is effectively overthrown by Islamic fundamentalists.
	In Iraq President al-Bakr formally retires on July 16, and Saddam Hussein becomes chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and President of the country. (See 1980-88)

1979 — APRIL 2
PULMONARY ANTHRAX EPIDEMIC IN THE SOVIET UNION
An epidemic of human pulmonary anthrax kills at least 64 civilians in Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union. The exact cause of the epidemic remains controversial for years and the incident generates questions about Soviet compliance with the BWC.

In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin acknowledges that the outbreak was caused by an accidental release of anthrax spores from a Soviet microbiology facility. This suggests the Soviet Union was in violation of the BWC. (See Feb. 1, 1992)

1980 — MARCH
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
The UN Committee on Disarmament (CD) begins work on a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). (See April 18, 1984)

1980-1988
CHEMICAL WEAPONS DURING IRAN-IRAQ WAR
On Sept. 22, 1980 Iraq launches a surprise cross-border attack on Iran. Meeting with heavy Iranian resistance, the Iraqi invasion soon escalates into full-blown war.

Reports of Iraqi chemical weapon attacks first begin to emerge in 1983. On March 7, 1984, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) announces that 160 wounded combatants visited in a Tehran hospital "presented a clinical picture whose nature leads to the presumption of the recent use of substances prohibited by international law." Other cases are soon reported and on March 26, 1984, UN Document S/ 16433, referring to an event in August 1983, officially concludes, "Iraqi forces have used chemical warfare against Iranian forces."

Cases of Iraqi CW use, namely mustard gas, tabun and hydrogen cyanide, continue throughout the rest of the war and culminate with the attack on Halabja. (See March 16, 1988)

1984 — APRIL 18
U.S. DRAFT TREATY BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS
At the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, U.S. Vice President George Bush presents a draft U.S. treaty banning the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. The plan calls for systematic on-site inspection of CW facilities to ensure compliance. (See Nov. 21, 1985)

1984 — JUNE 28
REESTABLISHMENT OF BILATERAL U.S.-SOVIET TALKS
In parallel with the multilateral negotiations on a chemical weapons ban at the CD, the United States and the Soviet Union reestablish bilateral talks on chemical weapons that had begun in 1976 but were broken off in 1980. (See Jan. 28, 1986)

1985 — JUNE
FIRST MEETING OF THE AUSTRALIA GROUP
In reaction to the use of CW in the Iran-Iraq War, the United States, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Australia and 10 European Community members establish the Australia Group in 1984. The group begins meeting in June 1985 to develop a system of export controls on the precursor chemicals required to manufacture the weapons being used in the war. At the June meeting, the group adopts a Core List of five controlled chemicals. (See June, 1990)

1985 — NOV. 21
GENEVA SUMMIT
U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General-Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev issue a joint statement calling for an accelerated timetable to conclude an effective and verifiable CW ban and to begin discussions on preventing the proliferation of CW. (See Feb. 5, 1987)

1986 — JAN. 28
U.S.-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS
The United States and the Soviet Union begin the first round of intensified bilateral discussions on a CW ban. (See Feb. 7-9, 1996)

1986 — SEPT. 30
SECOND BWC REVIEW CONFERENCE
The second BWC Review Conference adopts four "politically binding" confidence-building measures (CBMs):

	The declaration of all high-security containment facilities.
	The declaration of unusual outbreaks of disease.
	The encouragement of the publication of research results.
	The encouragement of international scientific contacts. (See Sept. 1991)

1987 — FEB. 5
PROPOSED GLOBAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN
At the CD, the United States asserts that it gives achieving a global CW ban "the highest priority." However, it "will not accept...a ban without sound machinery of verification." See Aug. 11-12, 1987)

1987 — AUG. 11-12
SOVIET STATEMENT ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze announces that the Soviet Union will henceforth be willing to accept the principle of "mandatory challenge inspections without right of refusal" as part of the verification provisions of a CW ban. This removes a critical remaining obstacle to an international ban. He also invites CD participants to a Soviet military facility to observe the destruction of CW. (See October-November, 1987)

1987 — OCTOBER-NOVEMBER
U.S. AND SOVIET VISITS TO CHEMICAL WEAPONS FACILITIES
On October 3-4, the Soviet Union hosts an international delegation of experts at its previously secret CW production facility at Shikhany. In a reciprocal visit Nov. 19-20 Soviet scientists and diplomats tour the U.S. CW storage and destruction facility at Tooele, Utah.

1987 — DEC. 26
SOVIET CW STOCKPILE DECLARATION
The Soviet Union declares for the first time the size of its CW stockpile. According to the official statement, "the stocks of chemical weapons in the Soviet Union do not exceed 50,000 tons of poisonous substances." (See July 28, 1988)

1988 — MARCH 16
HALABJA ATTACK
Saddam Hussein uses chemical weapons in an attack on the Kurdish town of Halabja, which had just been occupied by Iranian forces. An estimated 5,000 civilians are killed and more than 10,000 injured. Further chemical attacks on the Kurds follow in the summer during the "Anfal" campaign. (See Aug. 8, 1988)

1988 — JULY 28
U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES
At the CD, the United States declares the location of all its CW production facilities and outlines plans for their elimination under a CW ban. The United States calls on other states with CW to do the same. (See Jan. 7-11, 1989)

1988 — AUG. 8
END OF IRAN-IRAQ WAR
A cease-fire ends the Iran-Iraq War. Although casualty figures are highly uncertain, as many as one million people may have been killed in the conflict.

1989 — JAN. 7-11
PARIS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONFERENCE
In the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, 149 nations meet at a conference in Paris to restore respect for the Geneva Protocol and its prohibition against the use of CW. In a concluding document, the nations "solemnly affirm their commitments not to use chemical weapons," and stress "the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction."

On Jan. 8, Shevardnadze announces at the conference that the Soviet Union plans to begin destruction of its CW stockpile upon completion of a destruction facility. He also says that the Soviet Union has ended production of CW and calls on other states to follow this example. (See Sept. 23, 1989)

1989 — FEB. 21-23
U.S. TRIAL INSPECTION
The United States conducts a trial inspection of a private chemical production plant. This is part of an experiment by the CD to develop procedures for a routine inspection regime that would satisfy confidence and security requirements without significantly disrupting the civilian chemical industry. The Soviet Union and other members of the CD subsequently conduct similar trial inspections of their own chemical industries. (See Sept. 18-22, 1989)

1989 — SEPT. 18-22
CANBERRA CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONFERENCE
Sixty-seven nations attend an International Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons hosted by the Australian government in Canberra. In an unprecedented statement, chemical industry participants:

	Express willingness to work for an early conclusion of a global CW ban.
	Oppose misuse of industrial products for the dangerous proliferation of CW.
	Commit industry to continue its dialogue with governments on ways to implement a chemical weapons convention.
	Accept a self-policing role.

1989 — SEPT. 23
U.S.-SOVIET MEMORANDUM ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS
At a ministerial meeting in Wyoming, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Shevardnadze reaffirm the objective of an early conclusion of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and global ban on CW. To intensify efforts toward this goal, and to enhance openness and confidence between the two countries, they sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on CW. The MOU provides for a voluntary exchange of CW stockpile data in the first phase, including "the aggregate quantity of its chemical weapons in agent tons," the "specific types" of chemicals possessed, and the "precise location" of CW production, storage and destruction facilities. Phase I also provides for reciprocal visits to CW facilities. (See Dec. 29, 1989) Phase II calls for more detailed data exchanges and "the opportunity to verify Phase I and II data by means of on-site inspection." (See Sept. 25, 1989)

1989 — SEPT. 25
PRESIDENT BUSH'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS INITIATIVE
Speaking to the United Nations, Bush reaffirms the U.S. commitment to a multilateral treaty to eliminate CW in 10 years provided all CW-capable states become parties to the treaty.

To accelerate agreement on, and implementation of, a total ban on the production, storage, transfer and use of chemical weapons, the president offers the following initiatives:

	The United States will destroy more than 98 percent of its current CW stockpile within eight years after entry into force of a multilateral CWC, provided the Soviet Union is also a party to the treaty.
	The remaining 2 percent of the stockpile will be destroyed in the next two years after all CW-capable states become parties to the convention.
	While working to complete a global CWC, the United States and the Soviet Union will destroy a major portion of their CW stockpiles to an equal, interim level set at about 20 percent of the current U.S. level. The process of destruction would take place on mutually agreed terms and would include verification provisions.
	The United States will accelerate and significantly expand its efforts to improve verification capabilities and resolve the problems associated with verifying a ban on chemical weapons. (See May 13, 1991)

1989 — DEC. 29
U.S.-SOVIET DATA EXCHANGE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILES
The United States and the Soviet Union provide each other with general data on their CW stockpiles and facilities, in accordance with their MOU on CW signed Sept. 23, 1989. This exchange is designed to facilitate negotiations on a multilateral CW ban. (See Jan. 22, 1996)

1990 — FEB. 7-9
MOSCOW MINISTERIAL
Following meetings between Baker and Shevardnadze, they issue a joint statement on CW that includes the following points:

	The sides agree to work "to expedite the negotiations [on a CWC] in Geneva with the view to resolving the main outstanding issues as soon as possible and to finalizing the draft convention at the earliest date." (See May 13, 1991)
	Pending the multilateral CWC, the sides will seek to complete a bilateral agreement calling for the destruction of the bulk of their CW stocks to equal low levels. (See June 1, 1990)

1990 — MAY 22
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS ANTI-TERRORISM ACT
Bush signs The Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act making it illegal for the United States to develop or possess biological weapons. This piece of legislation completes U.S. implementation of the BWC.

1990 — JUNE 1
U.S.-SOVIET CW ACCORD
Bush and Gorbachev sign the bilateral Agreement on Destruction and Non-production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons during a summit meeting in Washington. The agreement requires:

	The destruction, beginning in 1992, of CW stockpiles down to no more than 5,000 agent tons each by Dec. 31, 2002.
	A halt to CW production upon entry into force of the accord.
	On-site inspections to confirm that destruction has taken place.
	Annual data exchanges on stockpile levels to facilitate monitoring.
	Support for conclusion of a global ban on CW "at the earliest date."

1990 — JUNE
AUSTRALIA GROUP EXPANDS LIST OF CONTROLLED ITEMS
At a meeting of the Australia Group in Paris, the United States obtains an agreement "to control additional chemicals, expand the group's activities into biological weapon proliferation, pursue further standardization, and create an export data base." (See May 21-23, 1991)

1990 — NOV. 16
U.S. CW/BW POLICY
Bush issues Executive Order 12735, which finds that the spread of CW and BW constitutes an "unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States," and declares a state of national emergency to deal with this threat. The order reiterates U.S. policy to lead and seek multilaterally coordinated efforts to control the spread of CW and BW and directs the secretaries of State and Commerce to adopt a variety of export controls.

1991 — JAN. 16
PERSIAN GULF WAR
In response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on Aug. 2 1990, an allied coalition force goes to war against Iraq. Destruction of Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological research, development, and production facilities is established as a key war aim. (See April 3, 1991)

1991 — APRIL 3
UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 ON IRAQ
Following the Persian Gulf War, when Iraqi CW/BW threatened allied troops, the UN Security Council (UNSC) establishes a Special Commission (UNSCOM) to monitor the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in Iraq. UNSC Resolution 687 empowers UNSCOM to carry out on-site inspection and elimination of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons capabilities as well as its ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers. (See Aug. 7, 1995)

1991 — MAY 13
U.S. MODIFICATION OF CWC POSITION
In a significant modification of the U.S. position on the draft CWC, Bush states that "[w]e are formally forswearing the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation, against any state, effective when the convention enters into force, and will propose that all states follow suit. Further, the U.S. unconditionally commits itself to the destruction of all our stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years of entry into force and will propose that all other states do likewise." In addition, the White House announces that the United States will revise its position on CW verification, dropping its insistence on "anytime-anywhere" challenge inspections. This revision leads the way to the adoption of a "managed access" CW verification regime. (See Sept. 3, 1992)

1991 — MAY 21-23
AUSTRALIA GROUP CHEMICAL EXPORT RULES
The Australia Group expands its list of controlled chemicals to 50 and further requires member country chemical manufacturers to obtain a license for the sale of any controlled chemicals to non-member nations.

1991 — SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER
DISSOLUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION
A series of historic events brings about the end of the Soviet Union and the creation of 15 independent republics:

	On Sept. 6, 1991 the State Council of the Soviet Union releases the three Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia from its ranks and recognizes their independence.
	The remaining 12 republics have all proclaimed their independence by December 1991 and, at a meeting held in Alma-Ata on Dec. 21, they declare that they now constitute the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and that with the formation of the CIS "the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceases to exist."
	On Dec. 25, 1991 the Soviet Union formally dissolves as Gorbachev resigns as president.

1991 — SEPTEMBER
THIRD BWC REVIEW CONFERENCE
The third BWC Review Conference reaffirms the four confidence-building measures (CBMs) developed at the second Review Conference and strengthens the convention by adding three more CBMs to provide information on

	National legislation related to the BWC.
	Past BW research and development programs.

Human vaccine production facilities.

The conference also creates an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts on BWC Verification (VEREX) to "identify measures which would determine whether a state party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining" BW. (See Sept. 1993)

1992 — FEB. 1
END OF RUSSIAN BW RESEARCH
Russian President Boris Yeltsin announces the end of Russian BW research. He further states that several Russian BW centers and programs have already been closed and that no further budget allocations will be made to that program. On April 11, Yeltsin signs a decree On Fulfilling International Obligations with Regard to Biological Weapons, banning BW programs. (See Sept. 15, 1992)

1992 — SEPT. 3
CD AGREEMENT ON THE CWC
Greatly aided by the fears of Iraqi chemical attack raised during the Persian Gulf War, the CD agrees on the CWC and forwards it to the United Nations. (See Jan. 13, 1993)

1992 — SEPT. 15
TRILATERAL STATEMENT ON BW
The United States, United Kingdom and Russia agree to establish a trilateral process of information sharing and reciprocal site visits in order to increase the transparency of unauthorized Russian BW programs. (See Sept. 1993)

1993 — JAN. 13
THE CWC IS OPENED FOR SIGNATURE IN PARIS
One hundred and thirty nations, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China, sign the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC).

The purpose of the CWC is to achieve the global elimination of chemical weapons within 10 years of the treaty's entry into force. It bans the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling, and use of chemical and toxin weapons and mandates the destruction of all CW and CW production facilities. It further seeks to control the production and international transfer of the key chemical precursors of these weapons. The treaty also creates a wide-reaching verification system which includes extensive reporting requirements, baseline inspections, and on-site and challenge inspections. (See Nov. 24, 1993)

1993 — SEPTEMBER
VEREX REPORT ON BWC VERIFICATION
A group of verification experts (VEREX) submits its report on 21 potential BW verification measures including data exchanges and on-site inspections. (See Sept. 19-20, 1994)

1993 — SEPT. 27
PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON'S UNGA SPEECH
U.S. President Bill Clinton announces in a speech to the UN General Assembly that, to help deter violations and enhance compliance with the BWC, the United States will promote new measures to increase the transparency of "every nation's biological activities and facilities..."

1993 — NOV. 24
CWC SUBMITTED FOR RATIFICATION
Clinton submits the CWC to the U.S. Senate for ratification. Numerous delays follow before the CWC finally comes to a vote April 24, 1997. (See Sept. 12, 1996)

1994 — SEPT. 19-20
SPECIAL CONFERENCE ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
The 79 state-parties attending the Special Conference on BW in Geneva agree to establish an Ad Hoc Group to consider the 21 verification measures suggested by VEREX, and make proposals to strengthen the treaty at the fourth BWC Review Conference in late 1996. (See Jan. 4-6, 1995)

1995 — JAN. 4-6
AD HOC GROUP
The Ad Hoc group convenes for its first meeting in Geneva. Chaired by Ambassador Tibor Toth of Hungary, it is to meet for 24 sessions over the next six years, aiming to complete the work of negotiating a verification protocol in time for the fifth BWC review conference, to be held Nov. 19 to Dec. 7, 2001. From July 1997 onwards, its work focuses on a rolling text of the draft protocol in which areas of controversy are bracketed. Negotiations and compromise are aimed at removing these brackets of disagreement and advancing a clean text of the protocol. (See Nov. 25 - Dec. 6, 1996)

1995 — MARCH 20
NERVE GAS INCIDENT IN JAPAN
Concern is heightened over terrorist activities involving CW and BW when members of a Japanese religious sect, the Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth), release the nerve gas sarin in the Tokyo subway system. Although the CWC is not designed to deal with terrorism directly, the treaty would be accompanied by domestic implementing legislation criminalizing activities by individuals who attempt or intend to make or use CW.

1995 — AUG. 7
VX REVELATIONS
Iraq hands over documents to UNSCOM that reveal, contrary to its previous declarations, it has produced the nerve agent VX, an extremely toxic agent first produced in the 1950's. Iraq declares that it had produced 3.9 tons of VX for "research" purposes and that this has already been unilaterally destroyed. However, UNSCOM regards this as a serious underestimate and has uncovered precursors sufficient for the production of 200 tons. Also disputed is whether any of the VX has been weaponized. (See Oct. 29, 1997 and June 1998)

1996 — JAN. 22
U.S. DISCLOSURE OF STOCKPILE
The United States discloses the exact amount (30,599 tons of unitary agents and 680 tons of binary age components) and location (nine storage facilities) of its chemical weapons stockpile.

1996 — SEPT. 12
DELAY OF UNITED STATES CWC RATIFICATION
Supporters of the Chemical Weapons Convention are forced to remove the treaty from the U.S. Senate calendar rather than risk its possible defeat, or the adoption of amendments to the resolution of ratification that would effectively block U.S. ratification. (See Oct. 31, 1996)

1996 — OCT. 31
65th RATIFICATION OF THE CWC
The government of Hungary deposits its instruments of ratification of the CWC with the UN Secretary-General. As 65 countries have now ratified the convention, the 180-day entry into force is thus triggered. (See March 21, 1997)

1996 — NOV. 25-DEC. 6
4TH BWC REVIEW CONFERENCE
The fourth review conference of the Biological Weapons Convention meets in Geneva, but members are unable to agree on measures to strengthen verification provisions of the 1972 BWC. Conference members instead call on the Ad Hoc Group, the body tasked with drafting a legally binding document to strengthen the BWC, to prepare such verification provisions.

1997 — MARCH 21
HELSINKI SUMMIT
At the Helsinki Summit, Clinton and Yeltsin issue a Joint U.S.-Russian Statement on Chemical Weapons, in which the presidents agree that both leaders will "take the steps necessary to expedite ratification in each of the two countries" and pressure their respective legislatures to ratify the convention. (See April 24, 1997 and Nov. 1997)

1997 — APRIL 24
U.S. SENATE RATIFIES CWC
Just five days before the CWC enters into force (see April 29, 1997), the Senate consents to its ratification by a vote of 74 to 26. However, the domestic laws intended to implement the treaty contain three crucial exemptions to the monitoring regime which are widely considered to undermine the treaty:

	The president is allowed to refuse an on-site inspection if it is deemed to "pose a threat" to national security.
	No sample collected during an inspection of a U.S. site can leave U.S. territory for analysis.
	The number of industrial facilities that are required to declare mixtures or solutions containing chemicals that pose a proliferation risk is greatly narrowed.

1997 — APRIL 29
CWC ENTERS INTO FORCE
The CWC enters into force and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the monitoring and verification organization of the convention, is established in The Hague. By this time, 87 states have ratified the convention. (See Nov. 1997)

1997 — OCT. 29
UNSCOM EXPULSIONS
In a letter from Tariq Aziz, the deputy prime minister of Iraq, to the president of the UN Security Council, Iraq demands that UNSCOM withdraw all of its American personnel whom it accuses of spying. Iraq also alleges that UNSCOM is being used as a "cover" for the American U-2 spy-plane. (See Dec. 12, 1997)

1997 — NOV. 3-5
IRAN AND RUSSIA RATIFY CWC
On Nov. 3, Iran, suspected of pursuing an offensive chemical weapons program, ratifies the CWC.

Russia ratifies the treaty two days later, on Nov. 5, and thus commits the largest CW stockpile in the world to destruction. Russia is estimated to have around 40,000 tons of CW. This will cost around $6 billion to eliminate and international assistance is sought to support this destruction effort. (See May 15-19, 2000)

1997 — DEC. 12
INSPECTION OF PRESIDENTIAL SITES IN IRAQ
Iraq denies UNSCOM access to eight of Saddam Hussein's presidential sites on the basis that these were "sovereign territory" and thus beyond the prerogative of the United Nations. A crisis unfolds as, on Dec. 22, the president of the UN Security Council demands Iraq give "immediate, unconditional access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transportation." Despite this, Iraq continues to block inspections to presidential sites and tensions rise against the background of threatened allied air strikes. (See Feb. 23, 1998)

1998 — FEB. 23
UN - IRAQ MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
After the personal intervention of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, a MOU between the United Nations and the Republic of Iraq is signed in Baghdad. It reaffirms the commitments made by the Iraqi government to cooperate fully with UNSCOM and IAEA, and to accord their inspection teams "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access." At the same time, the MOU requires UNSCOM "to respect the legitimate concerns of Iraq relating to national security, sovereignty and dignity"

The MOU also lays out special procedures for the inspection of the eight presidential sites. A Special Group comprising "senior diplomats appointed by the secretary-general and experts drawn from UNSCOM and IAEA" is to be formed for the task. They will operate under the established procedures of the IAEA and UNSCOM, as well as under "specific detailed procedures which will be developed given the special nature of the presidential sites."

The MOU provides temporary respite, but over the summer the situation once again begins to deteriorate. (See September-December, 1998)

1998 — JUNE
REPORTS OF WEAPONIZED VX
In April and May 1998, UNSCOM obtains samples from 45 special missile warheads to verify Iraq's claims that 25 had been filled with biological warfare agents and 20 with a mixture of alcohols. In June 1998, a U.S. laboratory examining these samples reports that traces of VX have been found in 11 of the 46 swabs it analyzed. International controversy follows as subsequent tests at French and Swiss laboratories produce contrasting results. A meeting of VX experts on Oct. 22-23, 1998 concludes, "The existence of VX degradation products conflicts with Iraq's declarations that the unilaterally destroyed special warheads had never been filled with any CW agents. The findings by all three laboratories of chemicals, known as degradation products of decontamination compound, also do not support Iraq's declarations that these warhead containers had only been in contact with alcohols."

1998 — SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER
WORSENING OF THE IRAQI SITUATION AND UNSCOM WITHDRAWAL
After continuing obstruction, the United Nations, on Sept. 9, suspends its regular review of economic sanctions on Iraq. In response Iraq announces on Oct. 31, 1998 that it will cease all forms of cooperation with UNSCOM and halt all its activities inside Iraq, including monitoring. In the face of this deadlock, UNSCOM withdraws its staff from Iraq on Dec. 16, 1998. (See Dec. 16-19, 1998)

1998 — DEC. 16-19
U.S. - BRITISH BOMBING OF IRAQ
In response to the termination of UNSCOM operations, the United States and Britain launch 70 hours of air strikes against military and national security targets in Iraq. Clinton declares: "I believe we cannot allow Saddam Hussein to dismantle UNSCOM and resume the production of weapons of mass destruction with impunity." A great deal of world opinion is critical of the strikes, with Annan declaring "it was a sad day for the United Nations and the world," and Yeltsin saying that the action "evokes the most serious concern, as well as a feeling of dismay and alarm."

The strikes deepen divisions over how to deal with Iraq, which will plague the formation of a unified strategy in 1999. (See Jan. 30, 1999)

1999 — JAN. 30
FORMATION OF UN PANELS ON IRAQ
In an attempt to break the deadlock over Iraq, the Security Council creates three panels to investigate various areas of concern and suggest ways to proceed. All the panels chaired by Amb. Celso Amorim of Brazil. They deal with:

	Humanitarian issues in Iraq.
	Missing Kuwaiti property and prisoners of war.
	Iraqi disarmament, and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification issues.

The disarmament panel is comprised of 20 members, 14 of whom come from either UNSCOM or IAEA. The Security Council is to receive recommendations from all three panels "no later than April 15, 1999." (See March 27, 1999)

1999 — MARCH 27
UN DISARMAMENT PANEL REPORTS
In its report to the Security Council, the special UN disarmament panel describes how the absence of UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors from Iraq has "exponentially increased the risk of compromising the level of assurance already achieved." In most major weapons categories, "critical gaps need to be filled" with biological proliferation and development being the major concern as "Iraq possesses the capability and knowledge base through which biological warfare agents could be produced quickly and in volume."

With such an atmosphere, the panel recommends a "reinforced ongoing monitoring and verification" system that would be "if anything more intrusive than the one so far practiced." Dealing with the diplomatic difficulties of implementing this is "in the hands of the Security Council." (See Dec. 17, 1999)

1999 — DEC. 17
REPLACEMENT OF UNSCOM BY UNMOVIC
After months of diplomatic wrangling and deadlock over how to deal with Iraq, the Security Council adopts resolution 1284, which replaces UNSCOM with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). The resolution is passed unanimously (11-0) but with four key abstentions - China, France, Malaysia and Russia. The failure of three of the Security Council's permanent members to support the resolution suggests a gloomy outlook for its implementation in the face of Iraqi opposition. This concern is reinforced by comments made both during the debate and after the vote. Russian Amb. Sergey Lavrov declares that "without cooperation from Iraq, any plans or projects will just remain on the paper they are written on," while Chinese Rep. Qin agrees that "the implementation of this draft resolution before us is highly questionable."

UNMOVIC retains UNSCOM's mandate and Iraq is instructed to provide "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transport which they wish to inspect." If Iraq provides such cooperation and support then a suspension of sanctions is promised. The organizational and leadership details of UNMOVIC are left deliberately vague to allow negotiations over the coming months to craft a body more acceptable to Russia, China, France and Iraq than UNSCOM. (See February-March, 2000)

2000 — FEBRUARY-MARCH
IRAQI REJECTION OF UNMOVIC
The future of UNMOVIC is rapidly thrown into doubt as Iraq rejects the new body. On Feb. 10, the Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan declares that Baghdad would not allow a return of the "so-called inspection teams. We reject the infiltration of our country by spies using such cover." This opposition does not abate with Ramadan arguing on March 2 that resolution 1284 reflects "the wickedness of old British colonialism and modern American hegemony," and on March 12 that UNMOVIC would establish "a protectorate under endless sanctions." To date, UNMOVIC has still not been allowed back into Iraq.

2000 — MAY 15-19
RUSSIAN DEADLINE EXTENDED
During the fifth Conference of States Parties to the CWC Russia receives an extension on its April 29, 2000, deadline to destroy 1 percent of its Category 1 chemical weapons. Russia is allowed to merge the missed deadline with its next timetabled commitment, the destruction of 20 percent of its Category 1 chemical weapons by April 29, 2002. Russia blames funding shortfalls for the delay.

2001 — MARCH 30
BWC AD HOC GROUP CHAIRMAN'S COMPOSITE TEXT CIRCULATED
The chairman of the BWC Ad Hoc Group, Amb. Tibor Toth, who is responsible for negotiating a legally binding protocol to the convention, circulates a composite text to encourage conclusion of the negotiations. The protocol is intended to provide reasonable and mutually reinforcing mandatory measures to enhance compliance with and transparency of the BWC. It includes off-site measures, such as data declarations, and on-site measures, such as, non-challenge visits and challenge investigations.

2001 — JULY 25
UNITED STATES ANNOUNCES IT CAN NOT SUPPORT THE CHAIRMAN'S COMPOSITE TEXT
At the Ad Hoc Group meeting in Geneva, the United States announces that it cannot support the chairman's composite text of a BWC Verification Protocol.

2001 — Sept. 11
TERRORIST ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES
Terrorists attack and destroy the World Trade Center in New York City and heavily damage the Pentagon in Washington.

2001 — NOV. 19 - DEC. 7
5TH BWC REVIEW CONFERENCE SCHEDULED TO CONVENE IN GENEVA

Edited by Jack Mendelsohn CDI Senior Associate Excerpted from a White Paper for the Lawyers Alliance for World Security. Assisted by David Graham, former Research Assistant at Lawyers Alliance for World Security and Catherine R. Mendelsohn, former Research Assistant at at Dyn-Meridian Corp.

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