The U.S. response to the Sept. 11 terror attacks on New
York and Washington has been clear and concise: “If
you’re not with us, you’re against us.”
As the United States develops an international coalition
against terrorism, the administration of President George
W. Bush is looking for partners who will join in the
military, political, economic and diplomatic efforts
necessary to stamp out the terrorists and their networks.
To that end, the Bush administration has expressed a
willingness to provide weapons to countries that in the
past have been criticized for human rights violations,
lack of democracy and even support of terrorism.
Initially, the administration proposed allowing arms sales
to countries currently ineligible to receive U.S. weapons
because of such concerns. Met with stiff domestic and
international criticism, the lifting of such bans may now
apply only to India and Pakistan. However, this fact
remains: The United States is committed to arming
potential allies in the war against terrorism with U.S.
weapons as quickly as possible.
As the antiterrorism bill makes its way through
Congress, the reality is that there is no need for new
arms export legislation. There is existing U.S. law —
specifically Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act —
that provides more than enough wiggle room for Bush to
waive existing regulations governing arms exports and
sell weapons to whatever country he chooses,
regardless of their human rights or democratic practices.
As the Bush administration weighs its military options,
U.S. export law should not be given an end-run simply
because the United States is “at war.” The regulations in
the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control
Act were developed to ensure that U.S. weapons went
into the hands of only so-called desirable actors. The
principles supporting U.S. export law are still relevant,
irrespective of the coalition being built. It is a standing
tenet of U.S. policy that weapons exports should not
undermine long-term security and stability, weaken
democratic movements, support military coups, escalate
arms races, exacerbate ongoing conflicts, cause arms
build-ups in unstable regions, or be used to commit
human rights abuses.
All of these criteria remain in the U.S. interest. The
United States should want now, more than ever, to limit
the quantity of U.S. weapons in circulation. The U.S.
government already has problems with the effectiveness
of the end-use monitoring system designed to ensure
that exports do not fall into the wrong hands. Weapons,
especially small arms — those that will be particularly
useful for any ground invasion of Afghanistan or
attempts to uproot terror networks — are difficult to
control once they leave U.S. borders. The risk of
diversion, especially for light weapons, is incredibly
high.
The United States could find itself facing down terrorists
armed with its own weapons. In fact, the Stinger
antiaircraft missiles now threatening any U.S. effort in
Afghanistan were supplied by the U.S. government to
help the mujahadeen during their war to oust the Soviet
Union from the country. It is not infeasible to believe
that any weapons sent to Pakistan or India might be
used in the conflict between the two countries over
Kashmir, and eventually might fall into the hands of
Osama bin Laden’s many followers in Pakistan.
The United States simply cannot afford to provide mass
quantities of weapons abroad and do nothing but hope
they will be used properly in the end.
The basis for offering weapons — either sold or given
away — seems to be a kind of quid pro quo. Many
countries desire military upgrades in exchange for
intelligence sharing, use of bases and airspace, as well as
loyalty. However, if an exchange of some sort is needed,
the United States should send these countries — many
of them part of the developing world — resources they
really need, those that strengthen democracy and
support infrastructures that create an unfriendly
environment for terrorist elements.
Providing weapons to countries that have been on the
U.S. blacklist for poor human rights records, consistently
harboring and supporting terrorism, and those involved
in military coups, undermine the very principles for
which the United States stands — freedom, justice and
democracy. Moreover, such a policy rewards bad actors
and sends the message that the United States will
forgive past sins (and perhaps look aside later), as long
as the effort to hunt down al-Qaida takes center stage.
It makes no sense to throw out arms export practices that
have served well for so long in a moment of passion and
fear. The core values and principles underlying current
restrictions on arms transfers still make sense. It would
be illogical to exempt human rights abusers or harborers
of terrorists who may, for this moment, be on our side.
Just like in Afghanistan, we can’t predict whose side
they may be on tomorrow.
Rachel Stohl is a senior analyst at the Center for
Defense Information, Washington.
First appeared in Defense News Sept. 26, 2001.
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