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U.S. MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN AFGHANISTAN: YEAR IN REVIEW  FUTURE OF U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF ENDURING FREEDOM
What is commonly referred to as the "war in Afghanistan," is, in fact, better described as a "complex emergency." With the year-old U.S.-led military campaign there long resembling a low-intensity, counterinsurgency operation, the focus is increasingly shifting from combat missions to humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts as Afghans struggle to overcome the catastrophic effects of more than two decades of conflict. In Kabul, the Transitional Government under Hamid Karzai holds sway, but its rule of law extends only haltingly past the city limits, and is upheld within them largely by the presence of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
Outside the Afghan capital, some warlords still refuse to relinquish their arms or fiefdoms, and in the months following the Taliban's ouster, factional fighting erupted in the north, south and west (where there are also charges of Iranian interference). Meanwhile, in Kabul itself, peacekeepers have been fired upon, and the Interim Authority's transport minister and then the subsequent government's vice president was assassinated. Meanwhile, on Sept. 5, 2002 an assassination attempt was made on Karzai himself in Kandahar, three hours after a huge bomb exploded in Kabul killing 30 and injuring 160 — the largest in a series of explosions in the Afghan capital. Tribal rivalries and the drug trade continue to threaten the country's stability, as do human rights abuses, banditry, and attacks on aid workers. There are also fears that extremist forces in Afghanistan, including disgruntled Pashtuns and remaining Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, will rally around the leadership of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar — an Islamic extremist much given to anti-American rhetoric — and intensify military operations against U.S. forces.
Such security issues must be addressed to a greater degree than is currently the case if donor countries are to be assured of Afghanistan's stability and follow through on the pledges of aid made in Bonn last December. However, the underlying causes of these security problems cannot be adequately addressed within the constraints of ongoing anti-Taliban/al Qaeda operations alone, but require the expansion and consolidation of Afghanistan's central authority countrywide. The new Afghan National Army (ANA) is the best tool with which to guarantee the sovereignty of the Afghan government. Efforts to train the ANA have had mixed results, however, with ethnic loyalties often exerting greater influence over recruits than the administration in Kabul.1
Many trainees have also dropped out due to the low pay, and thus far the ANA currently numbers just 1, 270 troops rather than the 2,400 planned for by now.2 Indeed, as an estimate by the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington shows, even if the rate of growth of the force where to be maintained at the projected 2,700 per annum, meeting the goal of 60,000 troops would still take more than eight years.3 While the ANA might well be strong enough to defend its monopoly on legitimate military power in Afghanistan before this figure is reached, this is not yet possible. An expansion of ISAF's mandate and area of operations could greatly aid in this, buying Kabul the time needed for the West to help it build the Afghan government forces to a point where they are able to enforce their authority upon recalcitrant internal powers.
To some observers, such a move may appear like social engineering or "king-making." However, having toppled the Taliban regime and helped install first the Interim Authority and then the Transitional Government in its place, the United States already is a king-maker. Moreover, the kings in question are not much cared for by many of their subjects. U.S. forces strengthened the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance and various regional warlords militarily and politically in the course of using them as proxy forces against al Qaeda and the Taliban. Meanwhile, the Pashtuns, who have historically held the balance of power in Afghanistan, perceive themselves to have become effectively disenfranchised — something the selection of the Tajik-dominated government by a Loya Jirga (Pashto for "Grand Council") last June further compounded. The assassination of the Pashtun vice president and friendly fire casualties among Pashtun civilians inflicted by the United States have also added to the tribal grouping's sense of beleagurment, as well as fomenting their unease with the manner in which the United States is pursing military operations in their country. The concerns of Pashtuns are ripe for manipulation and exploitation by "spoilers" like Hekmatyar. Players like Hekmatyar — along with the regional warlords who continue to bedevil Afghanistan's security (as witnessed by the most recent factional fighting in the west of the country) — cannot yet be adequately dealt with by the Transitional Government without outside military assistance.
Such assistance, were it to come from U.S. and other forces currently engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), could lead the Karzai government to be viewed as a puppet regime propped up by foreign forces. As the respective British and Soviet experiences in Afghanistan have shown, this could make the Afghan people turn against their government en masse and cause U.S. forces in the country to be viewed as an army of occupation. This in turn could lead to a popular military uprising against American troops in Afghanistan. A similar scenario is also possible if ISAF assists the Transnational Government in enforcing its rule of law countrywide. However, ISAF comes with less "baggage" than OEF forces, not having engaged in erroneous air strikes against Afghan civilians in the past or mistaken raids on outlying villages. While such incidents have marred the current campaign against the Taliban and al Qaeda, breeding indigenous resentment against the troops who conducted them, ISAF has thus far enjoyed comparatively better relations among the Afghan population.
In addition, any expansion of the force would come after express and repeated requests by the United Nations, the Transnational Government, and a large cross-section of the Afghan population. The goodwill such legitimization would bestow upon any expansion would be significant. The window of opportunity for such a move may not remain open forever, however. Indeed, while attacks on ISAF have not been widespread, it has been targeted in the past, and may simply be enjoying the "honeymoon period" of good relations with the locals that is often experienced during the early days of such peace support operations. The force's future operations could prove much more difficult, especially if its numbers and area of operations are expanded. In ethnic Pashtun areas, the deployment of ISAF troops could incite the same violent backlash that an American presence would. Any expansion of peacekeepers from Kabul must thus be carefully and sensitively undertaken, especially as such troops must be deployed in sufficient strength to defend themselves and enforce their mandate. As such considerations indicate, expanding ISAF is not necessarily an easy option. However, it is arguably easier and less risk-laden than U.S. troops acting as de facto peacekeepers in Afghanistan instead.
U.S. support is crucial to such an expansion, but has thus far been grudgingly given. Indeed, the first movement towards any explicit endorsement of such an expansion did not come until a day after the Karzai assassination attempt and Kabul bombing, when U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz indicated that ISAF could possibly be used to assist the new Afghan National Army (ANA) and patrol outside Kabul. 4 More recently, U.S. Undersecretary for Defense Douglas Feith stated that the administration would be "perfectly delighted" should the size and scope of ISAF be expanded. 5
This is welcomed. But any new-found enthusiasm for the peacekeeping and nation-building so long disdained by the Bush administration must include more overt and enthusiastic support for ISAF's expansion. Allied participation is unlikely to be forthcoming unless the United States takes a leadership role in promoting such a move. Similarly, the military and logistical support that U.S. forces would bring to such a venture would greatly enhance its chances of success, as would some form of direct U.S. participation in an expanded ISAF. Such participation has been consistently opposed by U.S. officials, such as Bush's Special Envoy to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalidzad. 6 This reluctance to commit U.S. troops to such an undertaking will no doubt leave other nations less inclined to do so. Conversely, even a token U.S. contribution to the force would convince others of American commitment to it. Moreover, it would avert any replay of the Balkan peacekeeping missions where America's desire to participate via the use of airpower but refusal to commit peacekeepers on the ground clashed with the considerations of European nations who had already deployed such troops.
U.S. leadership of ISAF would not necessarily require a large commitment of American soldiers, and would further facilitate coordination between the peacekeeping force and those committed to OEF. Conversely, a lack of U.S. support in this is equivalent to U.S. opposition. Unless America leads the way in proposing and initiating such a move, it is unlikely to take place. Moreover, while it is conceivable that eleventh-hour U.S. military intervention could avert Afghanistan's falling back into the abyss of failed statehood should such appear imminent, this will probably be more difficult and more costly than taking action now. Expanding ISAF may not be an easy option, but it may yet prove the easiest if the reconstruction of Afghanistan is to succeed and Operation Enduring Freedom live up to the promise explicit in its name.
Endnotes
1 Kashnay Jadded Garrison, "Ethnic Loyalties Exert Stronger Pull Than Afghan Army," Associated Press, Aug. 9, 2002.
2 "Another Battalion Graduates into Army," International Herald Tribune, Oct. 4, 2002.
3
Victoria K. Holt, "Peace and Stability in Afghanistan: U.S. Goals Challenged by Security Gap," Stimson Center Peace Operations Fact Sheet, online at : http://www.stimson.org/fopo/?SN=FO20020702378#27
4
Vernon Loeb and Thomas E. Ricks, "U.S. Seeks to Broaden Peacekeeping," Washington Post, Sept. 6, 2002.
5
Quoted in, "US Military Takes a Softer Tack," Washington Post, Oct. 1, 2002.
6
Vernon Loeb and Thomas E. Ricks, "U.S. Seeks to Broaden Peacekeeping," Washington Post, Sept. 6, 2002.
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