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U.S. MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN AFGHANISTAN: YEAR IN REVIEW  FUTURE OF U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF ENDURING FREEDOM
On Oct. 7, 2001, U.S. military forces launched a campaign in Afghanistan with four objectives: to bring Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network he leads to justice; to render al Qaeda incapable of posing a threat to American interests; to end the harboring of terrorists in Afghanistan; and to ensure a break between the Afghan leadership and international terrorism, replacing the leadership if necessary. One year later, the U.S. military can claim some definitive victories, but it has had some significant failures as well and not one of the original objectives has been conclusively realized. With unpredictable, changing conditions on the ground and mission objectives only partially accomplished, the U.S. Central Command (U.S. CENTCOM) must identify and assess the elements that contributed to both its successes and failures, and deliberate how those elements might play out in the future.
The military campaign in Afghanistan can be divided into two basic phases. The first phase began with massive air strikes that persisted through the first few weeks of combat operations. Land-based bombers and carrier-based strike aircraft raided Taliban operation facilities such as radar, command-and-control centers and aircraft, as well as al Qaeda camps and headquarters, with support from Tomahawk cruise missiles launched by American and British warships and submarines. The intense air campaign succeeded in destroying all major fixed targets by late October, but by and large enemy forces were only scattered, not eradicated.
Having run out of large enemy infrastructure targets, U.S. military commanders turned their focus in early November to striking al Qaeda and Taliban operatives in the field with increasing emphasis on digitally coordinated attacks. Using Afghan opposition forces to identify enemy targets, small teams of Special Operations Forces (SOFs) were able to pinpoint target positions using the Global Positioning System (GPS) and call in air strikes to precise coordinates. Allied aircraft could then destroy enemy targets using precision-guided weapons, reportedly less than 20 minutes after receiving target details in some cases.
"Smart bombs" such as Tomahawk cruise missiles were used in conjunction with Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), i.e., conventional bombs equipped with GPS satellite-guidance system kits and navigational fins, capable of hitting within a few yards a designated target. JDAMs are cheaper than Tomahawk cruise missiles ($18,000 to $1 million apiece, respectively), can navigate better in bad weather, can vary their trajectory patterns, and can be carried by long-range B-2 and B-52 bombers. Further, targets must be programmed into Tomahawks prior to launch, while air-launched munitions can be directed "as needed," providing greater flexibility on the battlefield. More than 70 percent of ordnance delivered during the Afghan bombing campaign were precision-guided, as opposed to 30 percent in Kosovo and 10 percent in the Gulf War, resulting in more effective sorties. The U.S. Air Force has reported 90 percent accuracy in the bombing campaign, the highest in history.
This concentrated, digitally linked search-and-destroy system that developed after the initial heavy bombing signified an intensification of U.S. efforts and characterized the first phase of the war. It was further enhanced by the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance, reconnaissance, communications and strike operations. Predator UAVs, for example, are able to hover for 24 hours over a target, record high-resolution images and communicate them to command centers in real-time. Predators are now also being armed with Hellfire missiles, and on one occasion, were able to use them to destroy moving Taliban vehicles attempting to escape an air strike, marking the first time a drone has launched a combat attack.
It was the Afghan opposition proxy force element of the American warfighting scheme, however, that proved invaluable in negotiating the surrender of Afghanistan's major cities. With allied SOFs and air support, opposition forces were able to take the initiative when matched against enemy forces and appeal to other Afghans to join the effort to shake off Taliban rule. Many opposition fighters felt they were waging war against the Taliban for themselves and not for the sake of a foreign occupation force, while others joined to profit from being on what increasingly appeared to be the winning side.
In early November, Mazar-e-Sharif surrendered. Northern Alliance forces, backed by allied SOF and air support, advanced nearly 90 kilometers from their positions south of Kisindeh and Aq-Kopuk to the outskirts of the city in just a few days. Taliban defenses retreated without much resistance to Northern Alliance advances, and there were numerous reports of Taliban defections. As the attack continued, the Northern Alliance accrued momentum and gained new recruits while the confidence of Taliban forces in the north waned.
A domino effect ensued. Taloqan, the former headquarters of the Northern Alliance, surrendered with almost no resistance soon after the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif, scoring an important psychological victory for opposition forces. Heart and Shindand quickly followed. Next, Kabul surrendered, and then Jalalabad. The conquering of Konduz in the north and the transformation of Bagram Airfield near Kabul into a Forward Operating Base (FOB) came soon after. According to Brookings Institute scholar Michael O'Hanlon, "By Nov. 16, Pentagon officials were estimating that the Taliban controlled less than one-third of the country, in contrast to 85 percent just a week before."
In December, Kandahar the last Taliban stronghold in the country fell to allied forces and Kandahar Airport was secured. Osama bin Laden and more than 1,000 al Qaeda operatives were tracked to the mountains of Tora Bora on the Afghan border with Pakistan, and allied forces scrambled to apprehend them and seal off escape routes. Most of the al Qaeda operatives, perhaps including Osama bin Laden himself, successfully evaded capture and filtered into Pakistan, calling into question the appropriateness of trusting Afghan opposition and Pakistani forces to regulate the border in such an important operation. The U.S. warfighting tactics that had seemed so successful up to this point met with their most glaring shortcoming and exacerbated the existing debate regarding a need for a greater number of conventional ground forces to increase operational security and muscle in support of SOFs and allied aircraft.
During operations at Tora Bora, just over 200 SOFs and cooperating Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives were in Afghanistan; too few to monitor the entire Pakistani border without substantial help from Afghan and Pakistani forces. The rationale behind small teams of SOFs and CIA personnel leading larger foreign proxy forces was to avoid leaving a large "footprint" in Afghanistan that might alienate the Afghan population, and to minimize American casualties. In retrospect, it is likely that the decision to withhold from committing conventional troops at Tora Bora and relying on foreign proxy forces ultimately permitted the escape of many al Qaeda fighters. Legitimate concerns about logistical difficulties and force protection drove the decision-making process, however, and the Tora Bora operations still succeeded in clearing the caves of almost all enemy presence.
In January, a major al Qaeda complex at Zawar Kili was captured. Bombing continued intermittently through February, and an operation near the city of Shahi Kot was criticized for relying too much on proxy forces to stop al Qaeda from escaping into Pakistan. On March 2, the 17-day Operation Anaconda was launched to root out hundreds of suspected Taliban and al Qaeda holdouts in the Khost and Patika provinces. Although an increased number of conventional forces participated in this operation, proxy forces were once again relied upon to seal off important escape routes, and as with Tora Bora and Shahi Kot operations, many enemy forces escaped as a result, inviting allegations that U.S. CENTCOM had not learned from past failures.
Continued reliance on air strikes and proxy forces also led to other complications. Sometimes proxy force members communicated bad intelligence to U.S. forces and requested air strikes for the purpose of settling personal and tribal disputes. Also, civilian casualties from large air strikes produced anti-American sentiments among Afghans; even though a strategy of using limited ground troops supported by air power was used precisely to avoid doing just that.
On July 1, a misguided missile launched as part of U.S. military operations in the central Uruzgan province resulted in numerous civilian casualties. Locals claim 48 people were killed and 117 were wounded, many of whom were attending a wedding party. American officials denied the claim at first, but after an investigation, admitted that a U.S. AC-130 "Spectre" gunship may have caused the casualties. They insisted, however, that the attack was in response to anti-aircraft artillery fire in the area. Locals say the only fire in the vicinity was from celebratory shots fired into the air, a tradition at Afghan weddings. In response to accusations of too much reliance on air power after the incident, the commander of allied forces in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Dan K. O'Neil, called for a larger, more conventional military presence in Uruzgan and more civil affairs and security teams to provide aid and regain American rapport in the area.
July 27 marks an important change in the military situation on the ground. A guerilla-like attack on a joint U.S.-Afghan reconnaissance patrol near the eastern city of Khost by as-yet unidentified enemy forces wounded five American soldiers; at least six people fired on them and threw grenades. Since the rather inconclusive end of Anaconda, al Qaeda and Taliban forces seemed to have melted away into neighboring countries and local villages, and few enemy targets were left to identify and destroy, causing a lull in the fighting. The July 27 attack, however, was followed by an intensification of attacks on U.S. military and interim Afghan government targets that suggest the possible reorganization of al Qaeda and Taliban elements into small, decentralized fighting units employing guerilla tactics.
Increasing guerilla-like attacks from enemy forces, along with the recognition of shortcomings of some earlier operations, led to the second phase of operations in Afghanistan. The change became most apparent in late August, when there was a significant shift toward more conventional forces and tactics. On Aug. 19, about 600 soldiers from the Army's 82nd Airborne Division stormed into Zormat and the Shahi Kot area for Operation Mountain Sweep, which was designed as part of an effort to thoroughly comb the Pakistan border area and clear it of any remaining enemy forces and arms caches. Villagers and SOFs in the area complained that soldiers from the 82nd, trained for more conventional warfare, conducted the operation without much heed to local customs. As a result, villagers felt terrorized and the trust that SOFs had worked for months to gain was damaged. Soon after Mountain Sweep, SOFs reported a decrease in the friendly intelligence they had once enjoyed from locals, and SOF estimates indicate that the behavior of members of the 82nd may have set back counterinsurgency and intelligence operations by about six months.
According to U.S. CENTCOM, however, Mountain Sweep was a great success. CENTCOM officials said many arms caches were destroyed and more than a dozen suspected Taliban affiliates were taken into custody for questioning. By the beginning of October, about 2,000 soldiers from the 82d were involved in similar operations along the Pakistani border. Clearly, the increased use of U.S. conventional forces provides a higher degree of operational security than relying on proxy forces; but as a tradeoff, the larger "footprint" left by such tactics is more likely to alienate the Afghan population, which in turn may also compromise intelligence efforts.
It is not clear that bringing in more conventional forces is the best way to either confront increasing attacks by regrouping enemy forces using guerilla tactics, or realize the original mission objectives. Simply falling back on the concentrated, digitally linked search-and-destroy system from the first phase of the war, however, is not the answer. The challenge to the U.S. military is to devise a way to effectively combine and balance available tactics and capabilities to meet the emerging threat from re-organizing enemy forces in a developing low-intensity conflict, whether guerilla warfare or more conventional combat evolves.
Sources:
Dodge Billingsley, "The Fall of Mazar," Combat Films and Research, Nov. 9, 2001. http://www.combatfilms.com/Frontline-Afghanistan/fallmazar110901.htm
Alan Woods, "The Fall of Kabul," In Defense of Marxism, Nov. 13, 2001. http://www.marxist.com/Asia/fall_of_kabul.html
Mark Burgess, "The Afghan Campaign One Year On," The Defense Monitor, Volume XXXI, Number 8, Sept. 2002. http://www.cdi.org/dm/2002/dm8-2002.pdf
Colin Soloway, "I Yelled at Them to Stop," Newsweek, Oct. 7, 2002.
"Operation Hunts Enemy in Afghan Mountains," USA Today, Oct. 3, 2002.
Michael E. O'Hanlon, "A Flawed Masterpiece," Foreign Affairs, Volume 81, Number 3, March/April 2002.
Gunnery Sgt. Charles Portman, "October 7th Marks Year of Strategic Change," U.S. CENTCOM Public Affairs Office, Oct. 7, 2002.
Joseph Fitchett, "High-Tech Weapons Change the Dynamics and the Scope of Battle," International Herald Tribune, Dec. 28, 2001.
Dr. Milan Vego, "What Can We Learn from Enduring Freedom?" Proceedings, July 2002.
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