Lessons from History:
U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan, 1978-2001

In his statements and speeches since Sept. 11, U.S. President George W. Bush has been careful to distinguish the members of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization and the Taliban, from the people of Afghanistan and Muslims of the world.

Still, with military action in Afghanistan expected soon, it is necessary to look hard at Afghanistan's past two decades of turmoil and seek to learn lessons from that past. And while there are many factors leading to the dismal situation of Afghanistan today, it also is the case that missteps in U.S. foreign policy are, in part, to blame. U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, Russia and the region during the 1980s helped, at least indirectly, nurture the growth of anti-American and fundamentalist forces now controlling Kabul, and indeed, even some of the terrorists now being sought by the United States for the Sept. 11 attacks against New York and Washington. In planning for intervention in Afghanistan now, the Bush administration must work hard to avoid the mistakes of the past.

 
U.S Covert Operations in the Afghanistan War

With the 1979 invasion of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the war between anti-communist rebel forces and the Soviet-backed Afghan government was well underway. The number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan reached 100,000 by early 1980. Anti-communist guerrilla forces, jointly called the mujahidin (Islamic warriors), actively fought both the Soviet troops and the pro-Soviet Afghan government led by President Babrak Karmal.

From the Soviet invasion onward, the United States sought ways to back the anti-Soviet forces. By 1983, the CIA was purchasing assault rifles, grenade launchers, mines, and SA-7 light antiaircraft weapons, totaling 10,000 tons, mainly from China. The Reagan administration had them shipped to Pakistan, a country that at the time was working closely with Washington.

Then, in a move that marked a turning point in the relentless war, in 1985, President Ronald Reagan made a secret decision to escalate covert support to the mujahidin. Soon after, the CIA began to supply an extensive array of intelligence, military expertise and advanced weapons to the Muslim rebel forces. They included satellite reconnaissance data of Soviet targets in Afghanistan; Soviet plans for military operations based on satellite intelligence and intercepts of Soviet communications; covert communication technology for the rebels; detonating devices for tons of C-4 explosives for urban targets; long-range sniper rifles; a targeting system linked to a U.S. Navy satellite; and wire-guided anti-tank missiles.¹   Furthermore, amidst intensifying debate within the CIA over the extent of U.S. involvement in the war, Reagan made the decision to equip the mujahidin with sophisticated U.S.-made Stinger antiaircraft missiles. American-trained Pakistani officers were sent to Afghanistan to set up a secret mujahidin Stinger training facility, which was complete with a U.S.-made electronic simulator. By 1987, the CIA was sending a steady supply of 65,000 tons of arms to the mujahidin.

While it funneled equipment, intelligence and money to the mujahidin, Washington maintained its armchair supervisory role in the war by entrusting Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) to handle direct contact, operations with, and training of the mujahidin. In all, the United States provided over $2 billion in weapons and money to seven Islamic mujahidin factions in the 1980s, making this last Cold War battle the largest covert action program since World War II.²  

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev announced the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1988. With the Soviets out of the picture, however, the victorious mujahidin focused next on fighting the Afghan "puppet government" now headed by Mohammad Najibullah, who had replaced Karmal in 1986. Najibullah fell from power when the mujahidin finally captured Kabul in the spring of 1992. But the guerrilla factions proved unable to unite, and began another arduous power struggle amongst themselves. Afghanistan thus became a fragmented country of several independent zones, each ruled by different warlords. These political divisions exacerbated the schism already present between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, and between the many tribal and ethnic groups that reside in the country.

 
Backfiring of U.S. Policy

Then emerged the Taliban. They came together in Pakistan in late 1994 as a militia of Pashtun Islamic fundamentalist students. These students had received training in Pakistan's religious schools attended by refugee men who had formerly fought as the CIA-backed mujahidin. Indeed, a man who played a significant role in the advent and growth of the Taliban movement was Mullah Mohammed Omar, the current chief of the Taliban and former fighter under a CIA-trained commander. Garnering power and support during a peak of political fractiousness, the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996, declaring themselves the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

They appealed to many Afghans with their promises of peaceful rule. As a result, some of the people trained under CIA command in the 1980s turned into loyal fighters for the Taliban. Armed and inflamed by religious zeal, the Taliban spread throughout Afghanistan declaring to end the civil war, corruption and lawlessness. As they rose in popularity among other Pashtun Afghans, they also intensified in violence that displayed their Islamic extremism. The training grounds that the CIA maintained and operated during the anti-Soviet war soon became camps and safe havens for militant terrorists, among whom was Osama bin Laden. Indeed, when the U.S. launched cruise missile attacks at a camp near Khost in 1998, it was discovered that the training camps were being occupied by Pakistani military intelligence to train the Harakat-ul-Ansar, an Islamic guerrilla organization identified as a terrorist group by the U.S. State Department.

By the time the world recognized the oppressive nature of the Taliban, both the United States and the United Nations had long ceased taking interest in Afghanistan. U.S. economic and military assistance to Afghanistan decreased dramatically after 1989, and no provisions were made for rebuilding the nation, demobilizing fighters or organizing relief aid. When the mujahidin took over Kabul in 1992, the UN Development Program (UNDP) in Afghanistan relocated to Pakistan, annulling what minimal rehabilitation assistance the agency had planned. The leadership vacuum facilitated the growth of the Taliban, who continued to recruit men from both its own ideological circles and from mujahidin factions throughout the late 1990s.³   Today, they rule more than 90 percent of the country, imposing on the Afghan people their rigid Islamic laws, edicts that are regarded internationally as blatant violations of human rights.

And, ultimately, the destructive persistence of the Taliban, the group's link with bin Laden, and the consequences of its extremist rule became part of American history on Sept. 11.

 
Two Decades of Humanitarian Crisis

Afghanistan was devastated by the anti-Soviet war. More than 1 million Afghans died, millions were injured, and more than 5 million became refugees in neighboring countries. In addition to the human toll, economic and ecological damage proved enormous and lasting. More than 5 million mines were still scattered across 2 percent of the Afghan land in 1992, and the millions that remain today are a serious peril to Afghans, as well as to any foreign ground troops that may enter the country in the months to come.⁴  

Moreover, the Afghan people have endured four years of severe drought, which has thrust a quarter of the population into a state of chronic food shortage.⁵   UN humanitarian agencies did much to alleviate the situation, wrestling with the Taliban who attempted to block foreign aid from flowing into the country. On Sept. 12, however, the UN World Food Program (WFP), as well as a score of non-governmental organizations &$8212; all of which served as a lifeline for millions of Afghans &$8212; withdrew from Afghanistan in light of anticipated U.S. retaliation, leaving behind 5.5 million hungry people. According to the WFP, about 15,000 tons of stockpiled food remained in the country at the time of the group's departure, enough to last only two weeks. Those two weeks have already come and gone since the announcement, and the clock is ticking.

The mass exodus of Afghans since Sept. 11 has alarmed Afghanistan's neighbors. Pakistan and Iran, expecting over one million people to flood into their territories, promptly sealed their borders with barbed wire in the days following the attack. Hundreds of thousands of Afghans who reached the borders have been forced to turn back. Those with visas can enter Pakistan, but Pakistani authorities have stopped issuing visas to Afghans altogether. Though neighboring states have obligations under international law to allow refugees into their territories,⁶   neither the United Nations nor the international community has yet pressed Afghanistan's neighbors to reopen their borders. Combined, the above circumstances presage a humanitarian disaster. And the United States has yet to launch its first strike in the war against terrorism.

 
Conclusion

The United States and the international anti-terrorist coalition are determined to do all they can to track down the perpetrators of the Sept. 11 attacks and bring them to justice. As Bush explores his many diplomatic, economic and military options, however, he must keep in mind that his decisions today, as did those of Reagan in 1985, will have long-lasting repercussions. Keeping the lessons from recent Afghanistan history, Bush and his team need to aim not only for justice in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, but also for a wider solution to the question of Afghanistan as a failed state.

The Bush administration has thus far displayed its determination not to repeat the policy failures of the past. Reiterating that this is a war against terrorism and not against Afghanistan, Bush has offered $320 million in humanitarian assistance to the country &$8212; an amount surpassing the expectation of U.S. relief agencies. Furthermore, the administration indicated that it will introduce a substantial reconstruction program in Afghanistan when a new Afghan government replaces the Taliban regime. The key will be to ensure that the necessary effort to eliminate terrorism and its support structures does not sow the seeds for further warfare and hardship in that country. The broader goal must be to lay out the foundation for a better future for all those affected, be they Americans in New York or Afghans behind wires.

¹  Steve Coll, "Anatomy of a Victory: CIA's Covert Afghan War," Washington Post, July 19, 1992.

²  Ibid.

³  For details, see Paula R. Newberg, "Politics at the Heart: The Architecture of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Papers Number 2, July 1999.

⁴  http://www.encyclopedia.com/articles/51877.html.

⁵  Barry Bearak, "Misery Hangs Over Afghanistan After Years of War and Drought," Washington Post, Sept. 24, 2001.

⁶  The principle of non refoulement prohibits states from returning anyone against their will, directly or indirectly, to another country where they risk abuses of human rights.

 

By Reyko Huang CDI Research Assistant

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