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U.S. MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN AFGHANISTAN: YEAR IN REVIEW  FUTURE OF U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF ENDURING FREEDOM
Oct. 7, 2002, marked the one-year anniversary of the beginning of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began with a major air campaign. During the first five days of operations, more than 2,000 bombs were dropped, half of which were "dumb" bombs, and 60 cruise missiles launched in attacks against air defense assets, airfields, communications centers, and large concentrations of Taliban/al Qaeda troops and equipment. The air campaign gradually shifted to more precision strikes as the number of large, fixed targets dwindled and increasing numbers of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOFs) were able to enter the region and establish ties with local Afghani militias. Operations are likely to continue to evolve over the next year, and a number of factors in addition to the military situation in Afghanistan may help to shape this evolution.
Local Political Climate
While the tactical military situation is clearly the most important factor in determining the nature of future U.S. operations, the local political climate, and the success or failure to maintain stability in Afghanistan, is a critical issue. Should efforts to create a unified national government and train an Army continue to move forward, the likelihood of factional fighting amongst rival Afghani tribes will diminish, along with local support for Taliban/al Qaeda forces. Conversely, without widespread support for a recognized national authority, local disputes will likely spread, as will attacks on U.S. forces. Instability will permit the return of larger numbers of Taliban/al Qaeda forces, and improve their ability to conduct operations against U.S. forces.
Force Protection
While overseas deployments are potentially dangerous under any conditions, the U.S. military takes numerous precautions to reduce the risk of American casualties, including when forces deployed in war zones are not directly engaged in combat operations. Force protection has been, and continues to be, a central concern for U.S. commanders in Afghanistan and other areas where U.S. troops are stationed. For both tactical and political reasons, considerable resources are expended in personnel and material to ensure the safety of U.S. troops in the field, and tactics are employed to minimize their exposure in combat areas.
A resurgence of Taliban/al Qaeda forces or increased hostility directed against U.S. forces by other local Afghan warlords would likely raise concerns about troop safety still further, requiring an even greater allocation of resources and additional changes in tactics. Already attacks on U.S. troops in recent months — highlighted by the July 27 ambush of a joint Afghan-U.S. reconnaissance patrol outside the city of Khost in eastern Afghanistan in which five Americans were wounded and two allied Afghanis were killed — have elicited a response. For example, September marked the first deployment of U.S. artillery in Afghanistan after 11 months of combat. Six 105mm howitzers of the 82nd Airborne Division's field artillery were deployed at the main U.S. base at Kandahar. Equipped with counter-fire radar, the systems are able to identify the source of enemy mortar or rocket fire and respond with a barrage of artillery fire in situations where there is insufficient time to call in an air strike.
Forces Available
U.S. Forces: While there is a significant number of SOF troops in the U.S. military, the elite forces — Army's Delta Force and Navy Seals — are in limited supply. They are also not ideally suited for long deployments. Further, preparations for possible war against Iraq will mean that high priority forces, both elite units and special forces, will have to be withdrawn for re-equipping and reorganization. In the longer term, war against Iraq, or other as yet unforeseen deployments of U.S. forces around the world, particularly in efforts to combat terrorism, may force reductions in the types and numbers of forces available for OEF. While U.S. forces overall are sufficient to meet all current and likely contingencies, including a war against Iraq, certain types of "high demand/low density" forces may be in short supply.
There will likely be a shifting away from the use of "Special Forces" towards a greater use of "specialized forces;" those with a narrower, more specific skill set. For example, Air Force air traffic controllers are specially trained to coordinate air strikes with ground operations. Likewise, combat engineers are well suited to work with regular forces in revisiting cave complexes and rendering them unusable as future bases.
Afghani Forces: Utilization of allied Afghani troops have enhanced operations and have made numerous positive contributions to OEF. It has allowed the United States to limit the number of troops deployed to the region, reducing their exposure and minimizing the potentially negative impact on the local population of having large numbers of foreign troops deployed in the country. Afghani leaders have been able to recruit their countrymen or persuaded them to surrender, particularly during the initial campaigns and around the major cities, limiting both military and civilian casualties. Afghani troops have been a tremendous source of intelligence, and U.S. troops have benefited greatly by having friends familiar with the local population and geography. There are, however, certain limitations in relying on local troops to supplement U.S. forces. First, despite their obvious qualities as individual fighters, Afghani forces are not familiar with the way a modern armed force, particularly the U.S. military, operates in the field. Second, because of the complex relations and loyalties that exist in Afghanistan's tribal society, ensuring operational security when conducting joint operations with local forces is virtually impossible.
Other Nations: The United States will continue to call on allied nations to provide military assistance when appropriate forces are available. For example, the Italian government has pledged to supply between 600 and 1,000 troops by March, and British government officials announced in July that their troops would return to Afghanistan if needed.
Weather
In the short term, weather will likely play a significant role in shaping the size and type of operations. Winter conditions degrade the ability of forces to conduct operations, and Afghanistan is notorious for the severity of its winters, particularly in the mountainous regions of Tora Bora and along the Pakistani border. While Afghan and allied forces continued to conduct operations last winter (operations in the Tora Bora region occurred in early December, while Operation Anaconda began the first week in March) this was during the initial phases of OEF when enthusiasm was high. It is possible that during the coming months as the weather worsens and after a year of combat, Afghani forces will cut back activities, limiting U.S. capability to conduct larger operations. Yet the same conditions that will tend to curtail allied activity will likely have a similar impact on Taliban/al Qaeda forces, and also reduce clashes between rival Afghan groups.
There is, however, a distinct possibility that Taliban/al Qaeda forces, operating in very small groups, will continue to launch limited surprise or harassing attacks on U.S. forces and installations. While U.S. forces will continue to conduct operations in response to solid pieces of intelligence regarding the whereabouts of Taliban/al Qaeda forces, bases or supplies, it is likely that, without the likelihood of direct confrontation with enemy troops, U.S. forces will "hunker down."
It is also possible that Taliban/al Qaeda forces will use this period to reorganize and resupply, both at locations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an eye towards either launching larger operations in the spring, or preparing to meet renewed operations by U.S. and allied forces as the weather improves.
Options
Currently, U.S. and allied forces are engaged in what has been described as a low-intensity, counter-insurgency operation, highlighted by periodic short-term large unit operations comprised of SOFs and allied units in locations where intelligence has indicated concentrations of Taliban/al Qaeda forces or support infrastructure are located. In addition to providing close air support for these operations, air assets continue to strike targets of opportunity.
Most likely future operations in Afghanistan will continue in a similar manner, with the tempo and size of the operations dictated by the quality of intelligence available. The need to obtain timely and accurate intelligence will remain critical. One possibly significant change, however, would by the utilization of greater numbers of conventional U.S. forces to temporarily control access in and out of combat areas - a function now widely fulfilled by allied forces. For example, Operation Allied Sweep, which took place during the first week of October in eastern Afghanistan, utilized 2,000 members of the 82nd Airborne Division.
The United States could also adopt a more guerilla-style of operations on its own, either by necessity, or as a way to compliment the current types of engagement. Small units operating autonomously might have better success against similar units of Taliban/al Qaeda, particularly given the existing overwhelming air support made possible by the continued efforts to digitize the battlefield and improve coordination between sensor platforms, spotters and strike aircraft.
A resumption of large-scale air operations similar to those of the initial air campaign is only a remote possibility. Few fixed targets remain, and locating large concentrations of Taliban/al Qaeda forces is also unlikely — even if attrition in the numbers of Taliban/al Qaeda fighters can be made up through recruitment, it is unlikely that for strategic reasons they will choose to operate in large units which pose tempting targets to U.S. aircraft. The only other possibility which could lead to this type of escalation would be a dramatic change in the local political/strategic climate resulting in an alliance of Afghani forces — with or without Taliban/al Qaeda participation — opposed to the continued presence of foreign forces in the country. This would require a transition from the current situation where U.S. forces are viewed as a positive influence by the majority of Afghanis, to one in which they become viewed as the most recent army of occupation. While this would constitute a nightmare scenario for U.S. leaders and military planners, it seems an unrealistic outcome at this time.
Concurrently, it is increasingly likely that there will be greater U.S. involvement in supporting the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, either directly or indirectly. For a fuller discussion of the future of ISAF, see "Afghanistan: Fulfilling the Promise of Enduring Freedom," by CDI Analyst Mark Burgess. http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/afghanistan-promise.cfm
Sources:
"Action Update," The Center for Defense Information, compiled from various sources (http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/actionupdate.cfm).
Megan K. Stack and Norman Kempster, "Al Qaeda Uses Bait and Switch," Los Angeles Times, December 14, 2001.
Nathan Hodge, "Anaconda Commanders: Sensors No Substitute for 'Humint'," Defense Week, April 1, 2002.
Grau, Lester (editor), "The Bear Went Over the Mountain," Frank Cass Publishers, Portland, Oregon, 1998.
"British forces may return to Afghanistan," BBC News online (http://news.bbc.co.uk/), July 2, 2002.
Peter Baker and Kamran Khan, "Deal-Making Let Many Leaders of Taliban Escape," The Washington Post, December 17, 2001.
Thom Shanker, "Guerrilla Attacks May Rise in Warmer Days, U.S. Says," The New York Times, March 27, 2002.
Pamela Constable, "Multi-Ethnic Military Takes Shape in Kabul," The Washington Post, April 4, 2002.
"On Uncertain Ground," The London Financial Times, March 20, 2002.
Barton Gellman and Thomas E. Ricks, "U.S. Concludes Bin Laden Escaped at Tora Bora Fight," The Washington Post, April 17, 2002.
Vernon Loeb, "U.S. Deploys Artillery To Afghanistan For 1st Time, The Washington Post, September 10, 2002.
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