Afghanistan Disintegrates:
Implications for Counter-Terrorism

Under international law, a de jure sovereign state must have four attributes: 1. it must have a government; 2. that government must be in control of people; 3. the state must be located in a territory; and, 4. it be recognized by other states.

 
A government

Taliban authorities currently occupy roughly 90 percent of Afghanistan, including the capital, Kabul, and the major cities of Jalalabad, Herat, and Kandahar.

The Taliban had humble beginnings. After Soviet forces departed Afghanistan in 1989 and the government Moscow previously installed collapsed three years later, a coalition of tribal-based mujahidin assumed control of the country. The coalition quickly fell apart and its factions began a civil war that ravaged the land. Into this chaos stepped the Taliban, consisting largely of young students from the madrassahs (religious schools) in neighboring Pakistan and led by Islamic teachers headed by Mullah Mohammed Omar. Rooted in the southern Pashtun tribe (about 40 percent of the population), the Taliban in 1994 moved northward, determined to bring order to Afghanistan and created a pure Islamic state based on an extremely strict reading of the Koran. It captured Kabul on Sept. 26, 1996.

The non-Pashtun forces quickly re-allied as the Northern Alliance, organizing loosely under ousted ethnic Tajik president Burhanuddin Rabanni. The alliance then was composed of commander Ahmed Shah Massoud's Jamiat-I-Islami (Islamic Society) of largely Tajik forces and Gen. Addul Rashid Dostum's ethnic Uzbek Junbish-I-Milli-yi Islami (National Islamic Movement). (Abdullah recently took over from Massoud after his Sept. 9, 2001 assassination, most likely perpetrated by al Qaeda agents.) The forces of the Shi'a Hazara tribe, which maintains close relations with Iran, and those of the Turkmen tribe also joined the Northern Alliance. Currently, the Northern Alliance controls the strategic Panjshir Valley northeast of Kabul in territory along the Tajikistan border.

The third set of governing authorities in Afghanistan, of course, consists of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization. Although deferential to the Taliban — some U.S. counter-terrorism officials see it as a partner of the Taliban — al Qaeda consists almost exclusively of Arabs.

A country with three functioning 'governments' is a country far from being an integrated unit. It is a country at war with itself.

 
In control of people

Afghanistan is a tribal society. And a major victim of inter-tribal warfare is nationalism. Not only do the three governments control different people, but within their jurisdictions disaffection and defections are common. Some Pashtuns, suffering under the incompetence and religious repression of the Taliban, look to the former Pashtun king, Zahir Shah, now in exile in Rome, as a person who could lead the effort to create political unity in the country. Other Pashtuns just want the Taliban to go away.

Scott Baldauf reported on Sept. 20, 2001, the following conversation for The Christian Science Monitor:

"When the Taliban came in, the fighting stopped," says Ubaidullah, head of a food-for-work program that is rebuilding homes in a destroyed section of Kabul. "Now, it is OK, there is no fighting, no thieves, no rapists. There is also no work and no money, therefore there are a lot of poor people." As fellow workers gather, he pauses. "We have a lot of feelings about the Taliban that I can't tell you."

In addition, many Persian-speaking residents of Kabul take a dim view of the Pashtu-speaking Taliban's ability to govern the country and repair its infrastructure. After five years of Taliban rule, one-third of Kabul still remains in rubble.

The Taliban's difficulty in controlling the people is exacerbated by the fact that so many residents of Afghanistan are on the move. After the terrorist attacks in the United States and the anticipated military response on the Taliban-controlled area of Afghanistan, tens of thousands of Afghans are fleeing their homes and heading toward the Pakistani and Iranian borders. Many also fear forced military mobilization of Afghan youths by the Taliban. Kabul is reported to be half empty. Already, Pakistan shelters 2.5 million refugees and Iran more than 1.5 million. Both countries have recently sealed their borders. This sets the stage for the humanitarian catastrophe of mass starvation among the trapped refugees. Even before foreign aid workers were ordered out of the country just days ago, approximately 6 million of Afghanistan's 25 million population were totally dependent on foreign food donations. Aid workers left only a two-week food supply, mainly wheat, for distribution by their local employees.

 
In a territory

The Taliban claims to control 90 percent of Afghanistan, but fighting continues in 17 out of 32 Afghan provinces. Promises of American support have emboldened the Northern Alliance, and its recent offensive has taken more ground as Taliban's fighters re-deploy in preparation to battle the insertion of American and British special forces.

The ability to control the rugged terrain of Afghanistan has historically eluded both domestic rulers and foreign invaders. From the 19th century "Great Game" between the Russian and British empires for control of Central Asia to the 20th century Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, all struggles have ended with great grief from all sides. In not the least irony, the very mujahidin the United States supported to bleed the Soviet Union in the 1979-89 war has now bled America in the Sept. 11 attack, as bin Laden himself was a mujahidin leader.

 
And be recognized by other states

Prior to Sept. 11, only three states — Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates — extended recognition to the Taliban. Most states still recognize the government of former President Rabanni, who also retains Afghanistan's UN seat after the General Assembly, under intense pressure from all five permanent Security Council members, refused to consider Taliban's credentials.

The Taliban's meager diplomatic status virtually collapsed after Sept. 11. First, the United Arab Emirates severed relations. Then on Sept. 25, Saudi Arabia released a statement including the following diplomatic position: "Because the Taliban government did not pay attention to all the contacts and attempts made by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to persuade it to stop harboring criminals and terrorists . . . the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia announces cutting off all its relations with the Taliban government."

Pakistan, alone, maintains relations, but even Islamabad recalled all 12 of its diplomats on orders from the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, "in view of the abnormal situation and security of our personnel." According to President Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan will "maintain contact, at least there should be one country who ought to be able to have access to them, to engage them." Musharraf has also informed the United States that using the India-backed Northern Alliance to replace the Taliban would be strongly opposed by Pakistan. Such a move would create an ally of its India rival on Pakistan's border. In response, Bush has assured Pakistan that it wants Pashtuns in any new regime and that Washington is not interested in "nation building."

The Taliban's diplomatic isolation is virtually complete; it can only speak through its embassy in Islamabad. Afghanistan is surrounded by hostile governments, most of whom have pledged to cooperate with U.S-led counter-terrorism operations. The Taliban's perilous diplomatic condition internationally raises the question of its legitimacy to rule.

 
Conclusion

Even before the advent of any U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan, that country's unity, power, international status, and functional survival capabilities have been disintegrating steadily.

That disintegration has already helped shape U.S. policy. Statements and actions by Bush administration officials suggest the following:

	Time is working in Washington's favor in weakening the Taliban. President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and other U.S. officials now emphasize patience, stating that the counter-terrorism operation will be long-term. "We are waging a different kind of war," said Bush on Sept. 24. "It is a war that is going to take a while." The Taliban's growing disintegration can be exploited, U.S. officials suggest, and the plight of the people used to wean Afghans away from the Taliban.
	Non-governmental humanitarian relief organizations now call for the United States and the United Nations to promise to provide economic reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan once foreign aid workers are able to return. Although designed to prevent a human disaster, the effects of such a promise could serve to undermine the unilateral militancy of an isolated Taliban by weakening its popular base of support. A post-Taliban era can be imagined, one far brighter than the present misery. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, at a Sept. 25 Pentagon briefing, emphasized this point. "There are many Afghan people who are being starved, who are fleeing for their lives, and it's just a terrible shame, and we have to do everything possible we can from a humanitarian standpoint to see that their lives are made better than they currently are by the Taliban government and by the circumstance they're living in. They don't support the Taliban. They don't support the al Qaeda network."
	Afghanistan's disintegration makes more urgent the assembly of a multi-ethnic coalition to bring peace to the war-torn land. The United States, while working with friendly regimes, is already encouraging ethnic reconciliation, including contacts with Pashtun leaders, as the basis for a new Afghan regime. The fight against bin Laden can thus not appear to be a fight against the Afghans or Islam.
	Powell has so far prevailed in directing military preparations primarily at bin Laden and al Qaeda. In effect, he has (apparently) convinced Bush to avoid making martyrs of Taliban officials and to avoid killing Afghan civilians, thereby forcing them to rally around Taliban for protection. In confirmation of Powell's position regarding the Afghans, Bush has emphasized that "we have no issue and no anger toward the citizens of Afghanistan."
	The more the Taliban's incompetence and complicity in terrorism becomes apparent over time, the greater international support will develop for multilateral financial, diplomatic, intelligence, judicial, and military efforts to punish terrorists and states that harbor terrorists. Bush has already begun the financial prong of this strategy by freezing assets of 26 known contributors and front organizations. Bush said he intends "to starve the terrorists of funding." Powell — albeit over CIA and Pentagon opposition — has called for the release of unclassified evidence of al Qaeda (and Taliban) responsibility for the Sept. 11 terrorist acts. Evidence of wrongdoing could tip the balance in the effort to win public opinion in the Islamic world, thereby insulating coalition regimes — mainly Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan — from a domestic backlash.

As the disintegration of the Taliban regime progresses, U.S. policy-makers appear determined to keep this favorable trend steadily on track when developing their strategies.

By Dr. Nicholas Berry

 
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