Beyond the core pursuit of al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere, the U.S. war on terrorism has raised almost as many questions on U.S. policy as it has answered. The Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) or Free Aceh Movement in Aceh, northern Sumatra, certainly presents a conundrum. It has attacked U.S. companies in Indonesia, and committed what might be termed terrorist acts. It is not on the State Department's Foreign Terrorist Organization list, however, and its attacks are aimed at independence for the province of Aceh.
On balance, the GAM is not a terrorist organization as most U.S. citizens would recognize the term. It is rather an insurgent movement that is threatening the territorial integrity of Indonesia, which sits astride sea-lanes vital for both U.S. commerce and military operations. GAM could even be seen in the Contra mould as freedom fighters seeking self-determination, which might merit U.S. support.
Aceh is the western-most part of Sumatra and the part of Indonesia where the Islamic character of the population is the most pronounced. The Acehnese never fully accepted the Dutch occupation of their isle and intermittently resisted the Dutch occupation from 1873 to 1942. Post-World War II, the Acehnese demand for autonomy, expressed by support for a Javanese Islamic rebellion in the 1950s, was partially met by the central government's acceptance of a "special region" status for the province in 1959. This allowed a higher-than-usual official Indonesian respect for Islamic law and custom, though it did not change central government and foreign control of natural resources.
The Free Aceh Movement was formally established in December 1976. It aimed to force Indonesia to accept an independent Islamic state, but was suppressed brutally for a time until it reemerged during the 1980s. By the late 1980s, with GAM having secured a good deal of popular support, the government responded by declaring the province a Military Operations Area and launching Operation Red Net, a counter-insurgency campaign. This led to the deaths of up to 5,000 people up to 1998, when the Area designation was removed and operations subsided.
However, despite the removal of the DOM status, military operations have continued. A recent report by the U.K.-based TAPOL Human Rights Campaign noted that since the DOM designation was removed, security forces have engaged in "intimidation, overt massacres, [a] war of attrition... and targeting of civilian activists."
The Indonesian government refused an East Timor-style referendum on the status of the province in late 1999, which resulted in new outbursts of fighting. A cease-fire was implemented in June 2000 that did not stop sustained, low-level violence continuing.
In April 2001, Indonesia launched a further military offensive against GAM, but the damage government forces have inflicted upon GAM since that date does not appear sufficient to defeat the movement.
Both sides are thought to have committed atrocities, including mass murder, and both have a bad public reputation. The International Institute for Strategic Studies currently estimates GAM's armed strength at 2,000-5,000.
The security forces deployed for the offensive, which the International Crisis Group has estimated to be between 25-30,000, have shrunk GAM's control over the province - according to GAM sources themselves - to 30-40 percent continuously, compared to 60-70 percent a year earlier.
Intermittent discussions between GAM and the Indonesian government have not led to lasting agreements before this year. A meeting was held between the two sides in Geneva on Feb. 2-3, 2002, and they agreed to discuss a political solution. However, for Indonesia, military action is still the predominant tool, though "special autonomy", which is intended to assuage Acehnese grievances, is slowly being put in place. Unlike East Timor, international support for self-determination is not sufficient for Aceh to see independence. Thus some kind of internal autonomy seems the best hope for a final political solution. Yet such autonomy will hardly be practical without reforms to the Indonesian bureaucracy and military that are currently incapable of administering such a sensitive province adequately.
