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Missile Defense and ABM:The Critical Effects of a Misplaced Priority
Missile defense has been one of the top priorities of President George W. Bush and his administration from its inception. Although Sept. 11 forced a change in the administration's perception of national security threats, along with a realignment of national security priorities, the administration's policy towards missile defense remains little affected. Bush's announcement of his intention to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) last week solidifies the policy he has long pursued. Nevertheless, the tragedy of Sept. 11 led many to realize that American perception of the many threats to U.S. national security, along with overall policy to protect against them is faulted. This reevaluation of threats and policy approach has led many to question the primacy of missile defense in the administration's national security strategy. Last week's announcement on the ABM treaty has yielded debate over what effects the withdrawal will have on U.S. national security. More specifically, concern abounds over the potential consequences of the U.S. withdrawal on bilateral and multilateral non-proliferation efforts. It now seems apparent that many of these efforts — dedicated to protecting against what many would consider the more likely threats to U.S. national security — are in jeopardy as the administration forges ahead with missile defense.
Although now considered the standard rhetoric of those opposed to missile defense, it is true that not only would missile defense have failed to prevent the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, it would be of no use against a variety of other possible terrorist attacks. Threats, both old and new, have been thrust into the spotlight as a result of inevitable paranoia that resulted from Sept. 11. The vast majority of these threats are those that existed before the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and almost all stem from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), WMD materials, or the knowledge to create or utilize such materials. It has becoming increasingly clear that the largest threat to the United States these days is not an ICBM with a return address, but those unconventional — suitcase bombs, radiological or 'dirty' bombs and biological agents. Since the Sept. 11 attacks, the alleged lack of security of the WMD arsenal of the former Soviet Union has become an issue. The possibility that terrorists may already have acquired or are currently seeking out such materials, devices or even scientific know-how has been the cause of much concern and debate. However, the threat stemming from the weapons arsenal of Russia and the former Soviet union and potential 'brain drain' of its many former weapons scientists was a huge concern for policy-makers long before September. The Baker-Cutler special task force created late in the Clinton administration concluded that unsecured Russian weapons, materials and scientific knowledge encompass "the most urgent unmet national security threat" to the United States. 1 Just recently, the Bush administration took measures attempting to find out if nuclear material, used to create 'dirty' bombs — conventional explosives paired with radiological material — may have gotten into the hands of terrorists connected to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network. With just a few kilograms of radioactive material, for example, a terrorist could assemble a crude device and deliver it by such simple means as truck or boat. As these and other threats are considered, the programs and policies that seek to negate them require greater attention.
The threats thrust into the spotlight after Sept. 11 are those that non-proliferation efforts can effectively counter. One of the most successful examples is the web of U.S.-Russia non-proliferation programs created over the past decade. These bilateral programs, known as Nunn-Lugar or Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), are the result of legislation passed in 1991 by Sens. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., and Richard Lugar, R-Ind. The 1991 Nunn-Lugar Act came as a reaction to the fall of the Soviet Union and was designed to increase the security of its Cold War weapons arsenal. Under CTR, funds were made available for the identification, disposal and destruction of Soviet weapons. Equally as important, CTR gave former Soviet weapon scientists the opportunity to work with American scientists in hopes of preventing the transfer of their weapons-making expertise to so-called rogue states or non-state actors. The Nunn-Lugar Act has led to a number of further successful initiatives in this area. 2 Nunn-Lugar addresses many of the very real threats that could easily materialize tomorrow. The multi-faceted problem of terrorism is complex and requires a multi-layered strategy containing non-proliferation measures such as Nunn-Lugar. For less than three-tenths of one percent of U.S. military expenditures, Nunn-Lugar has deactivated more than 5,000 Soviet warheads, and destroyed 384 ICBM's and 365 ICBM silos. 3 The demonstrated success and inexpensiveness of these programs, especially in cost-benefit terms, as well as the overriding need for them should serve as momentum for their funding and expansion. However, this has not been the case under the Bush administration. Despite praise and promise for Nunn-Lugar in his presidential campaign, Bush has failed to see many early promises through. The administration's fiscal year 2002 (FY 02) budget request cut more than $100 million in funds from these programs. The fact remains that these and other non-proliferation programs, some of which work to counter the same threats as missile defense, remain on the lower end of the Bush administration's priority scale.
Bush's decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty marks a milestone. In doing so, Bush has given rise to a shift in U.S. strategic weapons policy and international security as a whole. Apart from the pro and con arguments of the president's decision, though, is a consideration of the potential long-term effects. While the administration argues that it is now time to 'move on' — to focus on building a new set of understandings on nuclear weapons and missile defense, the situation at hand is not as simple or easy as it may appear. A U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty is likely to have serious consequences for both non-proliferation efforts and the spread of WMD. Non-proliferation efforts The effects on national and multilateral efforts to contain the spread of WMD of the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty could be devastating. A significant concern stemming from this is how the withdrawal would affect progress on programs such as Nunn-Lugar. Other questions abound — how the decision to withdraw would undermine the credibility of international non-proliferation policies, along with U.S. leadership in persuading other nations to abide by these commitments. Russian cooperation in the Nunn-Lugar programs is the crux of its success. In the past, Russia has withheld cooperation for a number of reasons: not wanting to let foreigners into their nuclear facilities being one example. This trend has only recently started to reverse. Despite recent pledges from President Vladimir Putin regarding the need to preserve and strengthen cooperation and the overall relationship between the two states, the potential for the Bush's ABM decision to have adverse effects on Russia's non-proliferation cooperation exists. In this vein, the possibility of Russian proliferation activities undermining U.S. congressional support for the Nunn-Lugar programs is another risk. Russian assistance to Iran's nuclear program has been a serious bone of contention between the United States and Russia for years, and the prospects for improving this situation become all the more difficult with ABM treaty's demise. In the grand scheme, the fate of the multilateral web on non-proliferation regimes is an uncertainty attached to U.S. ABM withdrawal. The U.S. move has the potential to harm adherence to agreements such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). While the United States itself has been less than fully supportive of the BWC and the CTBT, it remains the fact that these regimes have played a significant role in curtailing — although obviously not preventing — the spread of WMD. International support and the cooperation of key states such as Russia, China, India, Pakistan and North Korea in these and other nonproliferation efforts is requisite to their success. The U.S. ABM withdrawal will serve as an example to other states whose cooperation is difficult to ensure in the best of circumstances. In the past, Pakistan, North Korea and Iraq have been more than vocal about their right to develop and possess nuclear weapons capabilities. U.S. efforts to stifle these attempts and increase non-proliferation cooperation will only be undermined by an ABM withdrawal. Proliferation and Arms Races U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty thus could have serious consequences by actually encouraging weapons proliferation. As mentioned, Russian proliferation activities, not only to Iran, but to other countries such as North Korea and even Iraq, is a continuing concern. However, many argue that Russia may be the easier part of the equation, as the greater challenges are likely to lie with China and the rest of Asia. China is a long-time proliferator, and has been on the receiving end of U.S. sanctions many a time for its assistance to states such as Pakistan, North Korea and Iraq. Although China responded with soft criticism to Bush's ABM announcement, its fear of missile defense as threatening its position over Taiwan, along with concerns of American hegemony, will only make curbing its proliferation activities all the more difficult. China has warned that it would accelerate the modernization of its nuclear forces as a response to U.S. missile defense plans. The pressure placed first on India and then Pakistan as a result of such an action would threaten a new Asian arms race. This would only further destabilize an already volatile region — making the stakes of war even more severe. An increasingly nuclear capable Pakistan would not only add to the security concerns of the region, but the United States and its allies, as the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons arsenal has become a significant issue of concern. Missile defense proponents argue that the United States cannot hold its national security interests captive to how Russia, China and other states may or may not react. This would be true if the consequences of each's actions were of no concern to U.S. security, but they are. Proliferation is how so-called rogue states (and terrorist groups for that matter) are able to obtain WMD and the delivery means — the very reason the administration cites as making missile defense necessary in the first place. Furthermore, the challenge presented by having to deal diplomatically, and perhaps militarily, with states such as North Korea, Iran or Iraq that may possess the ability to supply or launch nuclear weapons before an operationally effective U.S. missile defense system is ready is another serious consideration to be made.
One of the most important things to remember in this ongoing debate is that the lack of inflammatory response to the ABM announcement on the part of Russia, China or the NATO allies should in no way be construed as acceptance or accommodation. Deep-seated criticisms and concerns over the decision were muted by, amongst a number of complicated factors, the timing of its announcement. In no way is the situation as simple or easy as the administration might like it to appear. Many of the consequences and considerations outlined above are those of the long-term. Political analysts contend that Russia and China's subdued response to the U.S. ABM announcement illustrated the realization of both that they had little power to prevent it, along with the intention of each to maintain good relations with the United States. The administration has offered to negotiate a codified nuclear arms reduction agreement with the Russians, and strategic talks with the Chinese, in hopes of softening the blow. However, the United States now will be hard pressed to convince Russia and China to forgo the consideration of some of their most important security priorities. All in all, the ABM issue is sure to have lasting and long-term repercussions. Although the administration is quick to cite the new "mutual assured cooperation" between the United States and Russia, it is important to consider that this pattern is indeed, new and still fragile. Questions of whether it will increase or decrease in strength, as well as issues of the difficulty in restructuring the architecture of the U.S.-Russia bilateral strategic relationship overnight, need be assessed.
Although the Bush administration is unlikely to reconsider its decision to withdraw from ABM, the actions it takes to lessen the negative impact are hugely important. The need to focus on the policies and programs that protect against both old threats and those likely to be created as a result of U.S. ABM withdrawal is now all the more necessary. It is, and will continue to be, of the highest importance to ensure that non-proliferation efforts, in particular the Nunn-Lugar program, are not adversely affected. Overall, it is of the utmost importance that the focus on, and budgetary requirements of, missile defense not preclude these and other necessary efforts to counter national security threats. A strategy that prioritizes missile defense and places non-proliferation and like policies on the periphery would be lop-sided, and incapable of protecting against the myriad threats now at hand. Although the administration and its supporters continue to argue that missile defense and nonproliferation are not mutually exclusive, their actions illustrate that they unarguably attach much lower priority to the latter. As the Bush administration works to make missile defense a reality, Congress' oversight and budgetary role will likely prove pivotal. Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, argues, "Now it's a program that's going to be looked at like other systems." The congressional debate "may become more focused on the workability of the system and some of the practical considerations." Removing what has become the ideology and political elements from the debate, and focusing on the technical, budgetary and overall security concerns, is the best approach. The issue at hand is not one of political compromises or appropriations battles, but rather the determination and implementation of the most suitable and appropriate balance of policy options conducive to countering the threats to national security. These are the questions and the issues that the Congress and the administration need to better examine.
1 The task force was headed by former Senate majority leader Howard Baker, R-Tenn., and former Clinton White House counsel Lloyd Cutler. 2 Jessica Reaves, "The Nunn-Lugar Act: Old Fears, New Era," Time, Oct. 1, 2001, time.com. 3 Ibid.
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