The report that the Saudi government is getting ready to ask the United States to withdraw its forces that have been stationed there since 1991, if true, will initiate a new phase in the relations between the old friends.
The ties between the two countries were established when the founder of the Saudi dynasty, King Abdul Aziz, was at the helm and President Franklin D. Roosevelt was in the White House. It was FDR who, in 1943, declared that the defense of Saudi Arabia was in the vital interest of the United States. But Saudi Arabia emerged as a major Arab state during the heady era of oil diplomacy of the 1970s, which pitted OPEC against the industrial, consuming nations. The Saudi rulers established their conservative credentials by consistently taking the side of moderate increases in international oil prices, while the former Shah of Iran and Muammar Qaddafi of Libya were championing radical escalations. The enormous petrodollar surpluses of the "oil decade" enabled Saudi Arabia to bankroll a welfare state, thereby coopting its people into putting up with the authoritarian regime, which operated on the basis of orthodox Muahid Islamic creed, pejoratively referred to as "Wahhabism."
When the Islamic revolution in Iran ended the rule of America's bad boy, the former Shah Reza Pahlavi, the U.S. "twin pillar" policy of relying on Iran and Saudi Arabia was replaced by a policy of heavy reliance on the latter. The petrodollars also enabled the Saudi monarchy to build a large defense infrastructure and make huge purchases of military wherewithal largely from the United States, but also from European countries.
The misguided and wasteful defense expenditures were initiated under King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz. The purpose was to make Saudi Arabia a major military power in the region. No attention was paid to the fact that a regional power must also have indigenous technical expertise, not only to operate high-tech weapons, but also to maintain them on a full operational level. Saudi Arabia was seriously deficient in both realms. Despite making large investments in defense, the Saudi armed forces barely acquired the status of a "trip wire" force, one that could respond if attacked by the neighboring Iraq or Iran.
But the Persian Gulf security environment was deteriorating in the late 1970s, because of the Iranian revolution. Then came the Iran-Iraq war - started in 1981 and ending in 1989 - which further justified in the mind of the Saudi rulers the necessity of maintaining high levels of defense expenditures. Soon after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied Kuwait in 1990. He also appeared too menacing to the security of Saudi Arabia. It was to vacate the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait that the Saudi monarch invited the United States into his country. Once there, the Americans kept finding ample justification to stay, largely to keep Saddam in his "box," first through Operation Provide Comfort, then through "Northern" and "Southern" Watch. But the U.S. reason for staying put in Saudi Arabia had no "end state" or "exit strategy," since Saddam was still ruling Iraq.
The Saudi dollar surpluses vanished in 1986, with the collapse of oil prices that year. In the wake of approximately $36 billion that Saudi Arabia (along with Kuwait and other Gulf States) paid to the United States as the cost of the Gulf War of 1991 while maintaining high levels of defense purchases, budget deficits became a regular feature of the Saudi economy, forcing the government to slash its national budget by 20 percent from 1991 through 1995.1
The continued presence of American forces in that country became a permanent source of increasing resentment toward the Saudi regime. Osama bin Laden made his name by condemning the Saudi government for the "sacrilegious" policy of allowing the presence of the "infidel" forces in the birthplace of Islam, and, in turn, was stripped of Saudi citizenship and exiled.
When the Sept. 11 incidents took place, relations between Washington and Riyadh were bound to deteriorate for a variety of reasons.
First, a majority of the highjackers of the four planes involved in the terrorist attacks were Saudis. That underscored the fact that anti-Americanism in Saudi Arabia was considerably more pervasive and acute than had been previously imagined.
Second, bin Laden, through a number of videotaped messages - especially during the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan - continued to harp on the presence of American forces as a "blasphemous act" against Islam, thereby putting pressure on the regime to take corrective actions.
Third, a number of Saudi religious scholars labeled the U.S. military campaign against the Taliban regime as "war against Islam," a theme that also resonated within the Islamist circles of Pakistan.
Fourth, the various U.S. actions against Muslim and Arab groups within its own borders - dragnet arrests, detention of Muslims and Arabs without charge, the declaration that the accused terrorists of the Sept. 11 attacks will be tried in military tribunals, interviewing of thousands of young Muslim and Arab residents in the United States to gain information on al Qaeda - only reinforced the argument of the Islamist groups in various Muslim countries that the Bush administration was indeed on a warpath against Islam.
Finally, the American media continued its insistence that the Saudi government was not cooperating with the United States in its "war" on terrorism. The fact that Riyadh did not allow the use of its military bases to carry out the U.S. bombing campaign in Afghanistan only reinforced that perception.
The most significant reality of the post-Sept. 11 aspect of U.S.-Saudi relations is that the former wants the latter to assign high significance to the "war" on terrorism. If the Saudi regime were to satisfy the United States, it would have to follow the kind of policies that Pakistan has followed since Sept. 11 by massively cracking down on the Islamist groups. However, the Islamists form only a tiny part of the Pakistani population, while the Islamist causes have widespread support in Saudi Arabia, requiring draconian meas-ures that the Saudi rulers are unwilling to take.
The Saudi rulers have known for a while that their dependence on the United States has created an impression within their polity that they have become a supplicant of that country. Asking the American forces to depart country would "cleanse" that impression. Besides, the Saudi security apparatus is much too strong not to be able to crush any manifestations of domestic insurgency.
The rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran is evolving to the satisfaction of both neighboring states. In all likelihood, Iraq will not make any menacing moves toward Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, especially at a time when the United States seems to be looking for a reason to try to overthrow Saddam's rule. Thus, Saudi Arabia envisions no regional threats to its security.
As King Fahd's health continues to deteriorate, the governing style of Crown Prince Abdullah is focused on enhancing the stability of the Saudi rule. Apparently, Abdullah perceives the departure of American forces from Saudi soil as a major step in that direction. So, the impending parting of the ways between Saudi Arabia and the United States may turn out to be an important tactical maneuver. If the Bush administration also reads it as such and graciously redeploys American troops from that country, there are not likely to be any long-lasting deleterious effects on Saudi-American ties.
End Note:
1 The cost of the Gulf war of 1991 is from "The Gulf War Facts," and the figure on the Saudi budget deficit is from Richard H. Curtiss, "Four Years After Massive War Expenses Saudi Arabia Gets Its Second Wind," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, electronic version,
BACK TO THE TOP  TERRORISM PROJECT HOME LINKS CDI HOME
|
