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Formed in Greece in the 1970s, the Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N) was named after a 1973 uprising of students and workers. The group's doctrine represents a more traditional form of terrorism. Rather than applying coercive pressure on governments through indiscriminate violence, 17N's strategy has been to target symbolic elements of government, foreign, and business interests in an attempt at promoting a climate of insurrection.
Added to the U.S. State Department's official list of foreign terrorist organizations in the mid 1980s, the group first launched its Marxist campaign in 1975 with the assassination of Richard Welch, the CIA's station chief in Athens. Its leaders blamed America, and especially the CIA, for supporting the Greek junta that had collapsed only a year earlier. Subsequent killings in the next half-decade, directed at members of the former dictatorial regime, endeavored to endear the group and its ideals to the population.
A 17N manifesto released in 1977 blasted the post-junta regime as oppressive, authoritarian, and complicitous in the transformation of Greece into a pawn for foreign interests. Fiercely nationalistic, the organization's efforts aim to counter NATO, the European Union, Turkey, and U.S. stances. Its objectives include the expulsion of U.S. military bases from Greek soil, the removal of Turkish forces from Cyprus, and the withdrawal of Greece from all supranational institutions. 17N also dedicated half of the 1977 manifesto to denouncing what it perceived as revisionism of the two mainstream Communist parties.
These strong ideological convictions combined with 17N's selection of symbolic targets resulted in a pattern of violent behavior that was highly reactive to political developments and public opinion. After the Welch assassination, the group continued sporadic waves of targeted violence in urban Athens over the next couple of decades, and over time employed increasingly sophisticated tactics. These included car bombings, rocket attacks, and IRA-style improvised mortar bombardments against government and military assets. In total, 17N is believed to have been responsible for over 100 attacks and 23 fatalities between 1975 and 2000.
Throughout this time, 17N targeted Greek parliamentarians, officials, industrialists, and conservative newspaper publishers, as well as foreign diplomats and military personnel. Most recently two gunmen shot British Military Attaché Brig. Stephen Saunders. The group often followed up each major action with academically-styled communiqués that attempted to manipulate political discourse by justifying their choices of victims and linking their actions with their broader principles.
Despite a relatively high level of activity — during its peak in 1991, it perpetrated 22 terrorist acts — 17N completely evaded authorities for over 26 years. This is partly attributable to the group's tight organizational structure. Largely self-taught and thought to rarely consult with other groups, 17N also never recruited extensively. Until recently, Greek authorities estimated the group's active membership at less than 20, backed by a support network of no more than 100. Furthermore, most of the active members were linked by personal or familial ties, which made investigative leads scarce and infiltration difficult.
Much analysis attributes 17N's shadowy nature to elements and conditions within Greek society. Until efforts by Saunders' widow and relatives of other victims to publicize the victims of the group's actions, 17N enjoyed a 15 percent approval rating within Greece, according to 1990s opinion polls. Media outlets, instead of engaging in balanced investigative reporting, simply published 17N communiqués in full, vilifying victims. And within government, left-wing politicians and members of the ruling Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) have been suspected of having ties to the organization, and members of the CIA have long suspected that the government possessed more information on the group than it publicly admitted. Such factors were compounded by the disturbing lack of investigative savvy or political will within the Greek police. Until 2000, no coherent collection of evidence existed on the group, and crime scenes were not properly managed.
International pressure, however, proved to be a decisive factor in formenting a crackdown on the group in summer 2002. After the Saunders incident, the Greek government reintroduced a previously nullified anti-terrorism law that allowed DNA testing, witness protection, and other institutional changes. Meanwhile, Britain's Scotland Yard and the FBI established permanent stations in Athens, lending their scientific expertise to the investigation. Greek police efforts themselves also increased amid mounting demands for greater security during the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens.
These efforts paid off when plans for a 17N attack went awry and a bomb detonated prematurely. Interrogation of injured bomber Savas Xiros and examination of a revolver found near the scene linked him to several assassinations by 17N. Shortly thereafter, the same close-knit makeup that allowed the group to keep a low profile for 26 years led to a series of swift arrests. Police captured 14 suspected 17N members within the month, and may have foiled an attack on a NATO convoy destined for Kosovo and Macedonia.
Perhaps the most striking characteristic shared by most of the alleged members was their seeming ordinary nature. Among them were a schoolteacher, shopkeeper, telephone operator, and other visible members of mainstream society. The only member who readily fits the ideological profile of 17N is Dimitris Giotopoulos, a French-born academic and son of a well-known Trotskyite of the 1930s. Other suspects have already implicated Giotopoulos as the gunman in the Welch killing.
Despite the trumpeting of Greek authorities about their effective dismantlement of the group, 17N issued yet another communiqué claiming that it was "still alive" and hinting at the possibility of taking hostages to bargain for the release of its members. Meanwhile, one confessed member of 17N informed authorities that the group's leaders were part of another greek terrorist faction, the Revolutionary Popular Struggle (ELA), that was highly active until 1995 and may have been an umbrella organization for several militant groups. Evidence also shows that 17N provided weapons and training facilities to foreign Marxist movements, particularly the Turkish Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C). As such, future developments in the ongoing 17N investigation may allow Greece and other contries to combat terrorism on a larger scale.
References
"The 'brain' behind November 17," BBC Online, July 18, 2002.
Becatoros, Elena. "Suspected Terrorist Admits CIA Killing," The Associated Press, July 26, 2002.
Buhayer, C. "Europe - Greece finally takes on 17N," Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, July 1, 2002.
"The end for 17 November?" Jane's Intelligence Digest, July 25, 2002.
"Greece exults in terror group arrests," BBC Online, July 19, 2002.
"Greek terror suspect claims links," The Associated Press, July 28, 2002.
Kassimeris, George. "Europe, 17N: Greece's secret socialist spectre," Jane's Intelligence Review, Sept. 1, 1999.
Lesser, I., F. Larrabee, M. Zanini, and K. Vlachos. Greece's New Geopolitics. RAND, 2001.
Murphy, Brian. "Greek terror group: 'still alive," The Associated Press, July 31, 2002.
"November 17 and the climate of fear," Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, July 1, 2000.
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001. United States Department of State, May 2001.
"Security and foreign forces," Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern Mediterranean - July 12, 23, 2002.
Williams, Daniel. "Greece catches up to elusive terrorists," Washington Post, July 19, 2002.
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