History is Not Bunk
The West's defence of Russian crime in the name of the free market.
by Anatol Lieven

Anatol Lieven's latest book, "Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power", on
which this article is based, was published by Yale University Press in
April. It analyses the collapse of the Russian state under Boris Yeltsin as
an example of some fundamental flaws in both capitalist history and western
analysis.

  "I always read the Financial Times, because capitalists cannot afford to
lie", a Chinese communist diplomat once remarked. If the ambassador later
had the mischance to invest in Russian bonds, he may be feeling a bit less
complimentary today. It is not  that Western reporters or commentators have
consciously lied about Russia's liberal capitalist revolution. It is not
even that they have believed Russian lies, though many have. The most
striking, and depressing aspect of much optimistic Western analysis over
the past seven years is rather that many of the commentators have seen and
reported the evil of what was happening and yet have been prepared to find
justifications for it in terms of their general free market ideology. 
In some cases, their narrow dogmatism and moral ruthlessness have brought
them uncomfortably close to the spirit of the Communism which they hate.
Above all, the American press in general, and the Economist and Wall Street
Journal in particular (with occasional lapses by the Financial Times) have
suffered from an underlying teleology which has coloured everything that
they have written: either  the development of a successful western-style
free market economy or  "reversion to Communism". This simplistic view has
led them to ignore the reality not just of the greater part of the world
today, but of the pattern of liberal capitalismÕs frequent failures over
the past 200 years, a history into which contemporary Russia fits all too
well......

Broken Signposts on the Capitalist Path

  The key faults of doctrinaire free market reporting and analysis of Russia

have been the following, and they resemble the old faults of
Marxist-Leninist analysis very closely indeed:

* An aridly monolinear view of the development of human societies,
excluding the great majority of possibilities; 

* an attitude to history which combines indifference, simplification and
demonisation;

* a tendency to speak in slogans and cliches ("Russia's Bold Young
Reformers"); 

*  a concentration on decisions, programmes and laws at the expense of
political context and the realities of political power; 

*  a romanticisation and adulation of particular ideologically sympathetic
leaders (one leading Western economist and former adviser to the Russian
government said to me, in tones of deep emotion, ÒI simply cannot believe 
that Anatoly Chubais could take a bribeÓ - a rare case of a Scandinavian
protestant agnostic believing in a form of Immaculate Conception).

*  a willingness to take the success of particular economic showcases (like
Moscow with its international hotels and western businesses) as
representative of the economy as a whole. 

*  a profound contempt for ordinary people lacking in the characteristics
(or in the capitalist case, ÒskillsÓ) required by the new order, and linked
to this,

*  a complete indifference to individual psychology or human needs and
behaviour outside the confines of the ideological paradigm....

Conclusion

  So wide has been the gap over Russia between reality and some western
reporting that on occasions it has suggested not so much smug arrogance as
a deep if unconscious anxiety. The reason for this is that it is not enough
for these people to say that free market democracy is the best system
available. No, it has to be the only  system, universally and eternally
valid. Just like the Communists in their heyday, too many Western analysts
have in fact come half-consciously to believe that their system represents
"the end of history", in Fukuyama's misused phrase. And Russia challenges
this Faith.

  At heart they seriously believe that the universal application of a set of
relatively simple economic and political formulas will in effect suspend
historical time; that humanity will achieve a permanent Òvirtuous circleÓ,
a gently revolving nirvana of stability and prosperity, with only the
occasional mild financial crisis to save us all from terminal boredom and
give the financial journalists something to do; and that in the end a giant
hamburger, walkman clamped to its ears, will sail out into eternity, beyond
the stars.

  Anyone who doubts that some such notion is really lurking in a good many
heads only needs to re-read some of the analysis published in the recent
past about the USA having established a "new economic paradigm". A few
years of rising share prices and low unemployment in one country with five
per cent of the world's population and half the financial analysts in the
western world started believing that the Messiah has descended from heaven
carrying the Philosopher's Stone.

  From this point of view, the failure of the liberal capitalist revolution
in Russia would not only deprive the doctrinaire free marketeers of the
greatest trophy on their wall - the head of their former greatest enemy -
it would raise questions about the future of liberal capitalism in general.
If it turns out that this is in fact unlikely to work well across most of
the globe, and that in many countries it creates a new problem for every
old one it solves, then this has grave implications not only for belief in
liberal capitalism as a universal model, but for the future of the
developed capitalist democracies as well. How long can we insulate our
economies and societies from a world in which most economies and societies
resemble that of Russia much more closely than they do those of the West?
And even if we do recognise in time the threat from the failure of
capitalism and democracy along our borders, may the effort to deal with the
resulting dangers not bring our own era of unprecedented personal comfort
and freedom to an end? 

#6
PBS NewsHour
COLLAPSING ECONOMY  
October 27, 1998 
Special Correspondent Jennifer Griffin reports from Southern Siberia on how
ordinary Russians are dealing with an unstable economy.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Now, how ordinary Russians are coping in a collapsing
economy. Special Correspondent Jennifer Griffin reports from Southern Siberia.

JENNIFER GRIFFIN, Gorno-Altaisk, Russia: Yelena Efimova, like most Russians,
hasn't received her salary since April. She teaches Russian in the Siberian
town of Gorno-Altaisk. Now inside classrooms like Efimova's, an experiment
born out of economic desperation is taking place. The local government has
started paying its wage arrears through barter. It now lets teachers go to
local stores choose the products they need and deduct them from their
salaries. Store owners keep track of what the teachers buy, checking their
names off lists given by the school. Under the new system little money ever
changes hands, but the teachers get what they need - flower, pasta, and, of
course, vodka. In the state-owned dormitories where the teachers live, Alexei
Zorkin pulls from his cupboard the goods he bartered for this month. Many
teachers traded their salaries for vodka, which Zorkin says has long been an
alternative currency. 

ALEXEI ZORKIN, Teacher: (speaking through interpreter) During the Soviet Union
vodka was highly valued. When someone came to fix your electricity, you
offered to pay them in vodka, which seemed more decent than offering money.

JENNIFER GRIFFIN: Now, everyone gets something out of the barter system.
Stores that owe taxes can deduct the value of the goods chosen by the teachers
from what the shops owe the government. Rather than wait for the tax police to
confiscate their goods, the shopkeepers happily comply. In a land where bills
are still figured on an abacus, it's not that strange to return to such an old
way of doing business. Efimova and her colleagues say it isn't a perfect
solution; it is a desperate measure. 

YELENA EFIMOVA: (speaking through interpreter) We didn't have money before,
and we don't have money now. The prices have grown, but what do we care
whether something is thirty or forty-five rubles? We don't have either. 

JENNIFER GRIFFIN: So Efimova is preparing for what is always a long winter in
Siberia, storing food she grows in her garden and pickling anything fresh so
that she and her daughter have something to eat. In kitchens across Russia, a
similar ritual is taking place, because people don't know how long food
supplies will last. Nearly half of all consumer goods Russians buy are
imported. With hard currency reserves dwindling, those imports are slowly
disappearing. In remote parts of Russia, like here in the Republic of Altai
near Russia's Mongolian border, it's not necessary to rely on imports. People
from here have always lived off the land. Rich in natural resources like
lumber, the republic has stopped depending on Moscow to subsidize its local
industries. Now, it trades its lumber for coal and other necessities from
neighboring republics. What strikes people most about the Russians is their
patience, especially under difficult circumstances. In this Siberian town most
of the winter it is 30 degrees below zero. When asked how they deal with such
brutal winters, the people of Altai said, "You get used to it." But the
government is worried not everyone will remain patient. One man grew so
desperate about not being paid that he fell to his death as he tried to hang
himself from the Lenin statue in downtown Gorno-Altaisk. Local officials say
more suicides or violence could result if the national government in Moscow
doesn't find a quick solution to the economic crisis, which grew dramatically
worse in August, when the government defaulted on its debt. 

YURI ANTARADONOV, Governor, Altai Republic Russia: (speaking through
interpreter) Barter will continue, but it can't go on forever. A person needs
more than just food to exist. He should also educate his children, be well
dressed, and pursue a cultural life. In "Das Kapital" Karl Marx wrote that
barter worked under feudalism until the peasant exchanged their wheat for
axes. 

JENNIFER GRIFFIN: Among those ready to trade their wheat, their axes are these
mothers, who are demanding child support from the government. They are
unemployed and have nothing to barter. 

NADEZHDA SURKASHEVA, Unemployed Teacher: (speaking through interpreter) We are
not getting any help from the federal government. Our people are on the verge
of extinction we have nothing to feed our children. They can't go to school
because they don't have clothes or boots to wear. There is a high suicide rate
among our youth. Kids don't just want to live. In the villages it's even
worse. That is why we are here protesting. 

JENNIFER GRIFFIN: But many don't have the energy to protest and, instead, show
up at work each day, hoping that someday the crisis will ease. At the town's
children's hospital workers haven't seen wages in five months, and now that
winter has arrived, there is no heat. 

LUDMILA PONOMAREVA, Nurse: (speaking through interpreter) We have no drugs or
medicine and no bandages. Our clinic is technically closed. We only take kids
in critical condition. 

JENNIFER GRIFFIN: Even the children who are admitted are crowded into wards
like this, waiting to get well. Their mothers share their beds and bring them
food from home because the hospital can't afford to feed them. There are no
quick remedies to these children's ailments, nor for the Russian economy. And
so all across Russia people are doing what they always have done to scrape
buy. Thousands of miles from Siberia in this potato field near the town of
Korolyov outside Moscow, potatoes are like gold and people fight over what
they find. Soldiers who haven't been paid either search the government's
collective fields looking for potatoes in exchange for their wages. When they
finish, they let pensioners like Galina Varvarcheva scrounge for leftovers. 

GALINA VARVARCHEVA: (speaking through interpreter) This is a sick one. This
one is sick too. But this year we'll even eat the sick ones. 

JENNIFER GRIFFIN: Mikhail Maxov says he and his mother found enough potatoes
to survive the winter.

MIKHAIL MAXOV, Security Guard: (speaking through interpreter) I have a small
salary, so my only hope was in these potatoes. I don't know what will happen
further down the line with my work. They could fire me, so I have to put my
faith in the harvest this year. 

JENNIFER GRIFFIN: Elsewhere, in towns like Yaroslavl, about 150 miles East of
Moscow, the situation is even more desperate. People line up each day to sell
their blood to the government. They are paid $3 a pint. Most donors say they
wish they could come more often, but the blood bank officials limit them to
once a month. 

DR. ANATOLY VERONIN, Director, Yaroslavl Blood Bank: (speaking through
interpreter) So many people are showing up here and not only in Yaroslavl but
across Russia I am hearing connected, of course, with the financial crisis,
unpaid wages, unpaid pensions, a general delay in all payments. Due to this,
people are desperate for any way to make money. Here they can make a bit of
money that will at least get through another week.

JENNIFER GRIFFIN: But in Siberia, unlike Yaroslavl, things aren't that bad.
People like Yelena Efimova still have food in their gardens, and Alexei Zorkin
is rationing his bartered salary to make it through the winter - a winter in
which many fear the worst. At least for some of the people living in towns
like Gorno-Altaisk, they have something to barter and to eat. 

#7
Russia: Foreign Minister Rules Out Membership In NATO And EU
By Jan de Weydenthal

Prague, 29 October 1998 (RFE/RL) -- Russia's Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov
has ruled out any prospects that his country will be joining NATO or the
European Union.
  
	Interviewed by the Moscow daily Izvestiya (Oct. 28), Ivanov said that if
Russia were to join, those two Western organizations "would cease to be
what they are." Russia is "too big," Ivanov said, adding that "the Russian
scale of things is too expansive."

  Russia's relations with NATO are conducted on the basis of the so-called
Founding Act, signed last year (May, 1997) in Paris, that created the
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. The council meets periodically to
discuss current issues, such as Kosovo, proliferation of weapons, and
terrorism.

  Ivanov appeared reluctant to assess the importance of the Founding Act.
"The process of giving it practical content is going only slowly," he said.
But he also admitted that Russia's "limited financial potential" may be a
factor in determining the scope of the relationship. Russia simply cannot
afford to participate fully in various aspects of the Alliance's activities.

  Ivanov was quick to assert, however, that Russia continues to regard the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) rather than NATO
as providing the focus for its security policies. "NATO provides collective
security for only a group of states -- 16 today, 19 tomorrow," he said,
referring to the upcoming inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic. 

  He then went on to reiterate the long-standing Russian theme, initially
formulated in the Soviet era, that "NATO is still a military machine aimed
in a very specific direction." He did not name that direction, but seemed
to be suggesting it was against Russia. Ivanov admitted that NATO's
attitude toward Moscow might have changed "in spirit" during recent years,
but he also insisted that "the spirit is one thing and documents are another."

  The NATO charter defined the Alliance as a basically defensive voluntary
organization of democratic states. There is no mention of Russia or any
other states in the charter.

  Would Russia continue to oppose further eastward expansion of NATO,
particularly its admitting the Baltic states?

  Ivanov was cautious, saying, "When Russia says that there is some kind of
red line, it should not be thought that tomorrow it will be putting an
ultimatum to somebody." But he also said that if "a threat to national
security" emerges, the new situation would have to be assessed "through a
different prism."

  In general, Ivanov insisted on continuity in Russia's foreign policy. "I
don't think any radical changes are foreseen," he said, adding that "the
strategic goals that Russia is pursuing on the eve of the 21st century are
not short-term but long-term." 

  Ivanov described Russia's main task as that of playing an active role "in
the creation of a democratic multipolar world order." This, he emphasized,
"required that there be no dictate by any one state or group of states" and
that "mechanisms be developed for collaboration and a collective response"
to international events.

  The very concept of multipolarity, which has commonly been taken as a
thinly disguised criticism of the United States' global influence, was put
at the heart of Moscow's strategy in international activities with the
arrival of Yevgeny Primakov in Russia's Foreign Ministry in late 1995.
Primakov's strategy is certain to be continued by Igor Ivanov.

#8
BBC 
October 29, 1998 
Yeltsin on Net support machine 
President's vital signs are looking good on the Web 
By Internet Correspondent Chris Nuttall

  President Yeltsin may be recovering from extreme exhaustion at a sanatorium
near Moscow, but a virtual version of the Russian leader is currently in
rude health on a special hospital Website. 

  In a craze similar to the Tamagotchi toys, Russians and visitors from
abroad are coming to the site in their thousands to prescribe health care
for the president. 

  Messages suggesting medicine and light exercise lead to an improvement in
the president's vital signs, displayed on dynamic graphs constantly being
updated showing blood pressure, pulse rate and temperature. 

  The twist is that opponents of the president can prescribe treatment to
make his condition worse. 

  Rival suggestions include morphine, viagra, electric shock therapy, vodka,
vodka and more vodka. 

  More imaginative suggestions are a course of laughing gas, a chat with
President Clinton, a night with Monica Lewinsky or an injection of $20
billion in aid from the International Monetary Fund. 

  If Mr Yeltsin dissolves the Russian parliament, his health improves. 

  Struggling to get the Duma to accept a new prime minister can put him back
in intensive care. 

  The site lists messages from visitors ranging from get well soon to wishing
him dead. 

  It is based in Saint Petersburg but visitors come from all over Russia and
abroad. E-mails have arrived from as far afield as Latvia, Japan and Italy. 

http://hol.da.ru

#9
IntellectualCapital.com

http://www.intellectualcapital.com
Russia's Presidency in the Balance
by Richard Pipes
October 29, 1998 

  By now Boris Yeltsin must be the only person who still believes he is
capable of carrying out the duties of president of the Russian Federation. 
  
  The problem is more than Yeltsin's physical condition: his constant bouts
with bronchitis and high blood pressure and whatever else that ails him and
his physicians conceal. The main trouble is his mental condition. His mind
seems to have deteriorated recently to the point where he resembles Leonid
Brezhnev in the last year of his rule. On a recent trip to Sweden he
thought he was in Finland. Similarly, while visiting Central Asia he was
not always clear he was not in Moscow. Reading a speech in Kazakhstan he
proceeded from the beginning to the end and then read the middle part. 

  The cancellation of Yeltsin's projected trips to Vienna and Malaysia merely
underscores his incompetence. His popularity several weeks ago plunged to
2%; today it is probably a fraction of that. 

The new favorite 

  This is understood in Russia where the race for the presidency is entering
into high gear. Russia has no vice president to take over when the chief
executive dies or can no longer carry out his responsibilities. The
Constitution provides for the prime minister in such an eventuality to
assume caretaker functions and to arrange within 90 days for new
presidential elections. This may happen any day now. 

  Political careers in contemporary Russian resemble meteors rather than
fixed stars: They cross the firmament with startling rapidity because the
absence of political structures make the constituencies extremely fluid. In
my previous columns in IC I called attention to Victor Chernomyrdin, Boris
Nemtsov and Alexander Lebed as leading contenders for the presidency. The
first two have faded. 

  The most prominent candidate for the presidency today is the popular mayor
of Moscow, Iury Luzhkov. Luzhkov is something of a novelty in Russia, a
pragmatic politician who avoids ideology and programs, following the
classical dictum of Tip O'Neill that "all politics is local." He has
managed to build a powerful political base in the capital city by
attracting business and spending lavishly to beautify it. His apparent aim
is to create a government of national unity. To this end, he has secured
the support of the Communists, who control nearly one-third of the
electorate: a powerful bloc but not enough to propel their candidate into
the presidency. But he is also trying to win over Grigori Yavlinsky, the
leading liberal reformer. 

  An all-party government would not be a bad thing for Russia whose efforts
to stabilize the economy have been hampered by party bickering. However,
certain aspects of Luzhkov's politics are troubling. He is an ardent
nationalist who insists that the Ukraine "return" the Crimean peninsula to
Russia. Recently, in an overt appeal to those who feel nostalgia for the
past he has organized "Pioneers" on the model of the Communist youth
organization of the same name. The impression his pronouncements and
actions give is that he is seeking to combine nostalgia for the Communist
past widespread among the older generation with forward policy responsive
to the mood of the young. It is a potent combination. 

A lot at stake 

  Of the other potential candidates, Lebed cannot be counted out for with his
image of a "strong man"; he attracts many Russians prepared to surrender
their democratic rights to a leader who promises to solve their problems.
But serving as governor in distant Siberia he seems at present to be
outside the mainstream. The Communist leader, Gennady Zyuganov, has
apparently decided that he cannot possibly win because his constituency,
though large, cannot rise above 30%; hence, he is backing Luzhkov. As for
Yavlinsky, the polls do not indicate that he enjoys the kind of support
that he needs to become a serious contender. The current prime minister,
Evgenii Primakov, has repeatedly denied any presidential ambitions. 

  The Russian Constitution vests great powers in the president, and an
ambitious politician can translate these powers into nearly dictatorial
authority. We can be reasonably certain that whoever wins the contest will
exercise his prerogative in a much more authoritarian fashion than his
counterparts in Western democracies. How responsibly he will do so remains
to be seen. 

  Richard Pipes is a professor of history and has previously served as
director of Russian studies at Harvard University. He is a contributing
editor of IntellectualCapital.com. 

#10
Baltimore Sun
October 29, 1998
Editorial
A nuclear power on autopilot
Yeltsin illness: As president's absences become frequent, Russia tackles
money woes without a plan.

  THE PATTERN established under Soviet rule continues: Russia is once again
on autopilot, led by a doddering president. Surrogates insist everything is
normal and, indeed, day-to-day governing continues. But President Boris
Yeltsin has become a figurehead as his faltering health has forced frequent
absences from public life.

  Could this continue until the summer of 2000, when Mr. Yeltsin's term ends?
Judging from the marked deterioration of Mr. Yeltsin's condition, the
answer to that question is a source of concern. The brief glimpses of
edited videotape show a man who is frail, out of touch and hardly capable
of leading a nuclear power.

  So far, the Kremlin has refused to disclose what ails the president. This
is in keeping with an age-old Russian tradition maintaining that the
ruler's health is not a public concern. The Kremlin speaks only of
"unstable blood pressure and undue fatigue" as a result of an "asthenic
condition," or overall weakness.

  In the last decade of Soviet rule, Kremlin staffers became experts in
covering up for aged, ailing leaders from Leonid I. Brezhnev to Konstantin
U. Chernenko. Though some of the mystery surrounding the Russian ruler is
gone, secrecy shrouds many decisions, making it easier for the staff to
insist everything is in order.

  Mr. Yeltsin's visible exhaustion has renewed speculation about his
successor. Two leading contenders are Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and retired
Gen. Alexander Lebed. Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov also must be
considered. He would take over the president's office temporarily should
Mr. Yeltsin become incapable of handling his duties.

  During the summer's governmental crisis, Mr. Primakov, a diplomat and
spymaster, emerged as a compromise candidate for prime minister. He says he
is not interested in becoming president, and his first six weeks as prime
minister have been lackluster. All bets, however, would be off if something
were to happen to Mr. Yeltsin.

#11
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
October 29, 1998

FOREIGN RELATIONS SUFFER FROM YELTSIN'S INFIRMITIES. The recent
eleventh-hour decision to send Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov to Vienna in
place of Russian President Boris Yeltsin has cast a spotlight on the adverse
impact that the Russian leader's poor health is having on the country's
diplomatic efforts. Yeltsin had been scheduled to consult with European
Union leaders on a host of key economic and security issues. His infirmities
seem likely to complicate other high-level diplomatic exchanges scheduled to
take place between Russia and a host of other countries in the coming weeks.

The Kremlin has already decided, for example, that Primakov will stand in
for Yeltsin during an Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum scheduled to
start in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on November 17. Further, both Croatian
President Franjo Tudjman and Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien have
announced that they will postpone plans to visit Moscow. Tudjman was to
arrive in the Russian capital on November 2; Chretien's visit was scheduled
for January of next year (Russian agencies, October 28). A Canadian trade
mission to Russia which was to have been led by Chretien has also canceled
its plans to visit, though the reason it cited was Russia's economic
difficulties.

What is less clear is whether Yeltsin's poor health will also cause the
postponement or cancellation of two other major diplomatic events scheduled
for Moscow next month: summit talks between Yeltsin and Japanese Prime
Minister Keizo Obuchi on November 10-13 and between Yeltsin and Chinese
President Jiang Zemin sometime later in the month.

Kremlin sources yesterday denied press reports that the Yeltsin-Obuchi
meeting is likely to be canceled. That denial came a day after presidential
spokesman Dmitri Yakushkin referred specifically to the Japanese-Russian and
Chinese-Russian talks in telling reporters that no changes are planned in
Boris Yeltsin's schedule of meetings with heads of foreign states (Russian
agencies, October 27-28). On October 27, moreover, a top Japanese government
official said that Tokyo had been informed by the Kremlin that there are no
plans to reschedule Obuchi's talks in Moscow (Kyodo, October 27). The same
appeared to be true with regard to Jiang Zemin's planned visit. During a
recently concluded trip to Beijing by Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev,
the Chinese leader said he was looking forward to his upcoming talks with
Yeltsin.

#12
Date: Thu, 29 Oct 1998 
From: Human Rights Watch Moscow  
Subject: NIKITIN UPDATE - TRIAL ENDS

Dear All,
The trial is over, at least for now. We will continue to monitor the
Nikitin case closely and will inform you of any new developments. Thanks
to all of you who have followed the case and written about it.
Diederik

For further information, please call:
In Moscow: Diederik Lohman; mobile phone
	from Moscow: 8 2 903 3567
	from St. Petersburg: 8 096 903 3567
	from abroad: 7 096 903 3567
	or at: (095) 265 4448
In New York: Rachel Denber (212) 216 1266

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH UPDATE ON THE NIKITIN TRIAL
October 29, 1998
JUDGE SENDS CASE BACK TO SECURITY SERVICE FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION

   Judge Sergei Golets today ruled to send the criminal case against
Alexander Nikitin back to the Federal Security Service (FSB) for further
investigation. His decision severely criticized the way the FSB has
conducted its three-year long investigation. Nikitin remains under city
arrest.

   Nikitin was facing a twenty-year prison term on charges of espionage
and divulging state secrets, which stem from his work for the Norwegian
Bellona Foundation on a report exposing nuclear contamination caused by
Russia's Northern Fleet. The trial started on October 20 at the St.
Petersburg City Court after the FSB had investigated the case for almost
three years. Nikitin has always contested his innocence, claiming that
all information used in the report had been taken from open sources.

   The judge's ruling reflected the very critiques of the FSB's indictment
advanced by Nikitin's defense team. It called the indictment too vague,
and instructed the FSB to specify exactly what information in the
Bellona report was secret. It further described the expert assessments
as not based on law. The FSB has at least a month to implement the
judge's instructions.

   "It is unacceptable and baffling that after three years of unscrupulous
investigation, the FSB should get yet another chance to press these
outrageous charges against Alexander Nikitin," declared Holly Cartner,
executive director of the Europe and Cental Asia Division of Human
Rights Watch. "This judgment shows once again that in Russia the
interests of the state continue to prevail over the rights of citizens,"
said Ms. Cartner.

   According to Nikitin's lawyers, current criminal procedure law, which
dates to the 1960s, essentially prohibits Judge Golets from acquitting
Nikitin on grounds of an unclear indictment. In Western countries, the
prosecution's failure to issue a sufficiently specific indictment may
serve as a reason for acquittal. However, under Russian law formal
mistakes and procedural violations by the prosecutor cannot serve as
grounds for denying the prosecution to proceed with the case. This
frequently results in criminal cases being sent back and forth between
the courts and the prosecutor's office for years, while defendants are
often kept in pretrial detention.

  On two occasions in the past three years, the Procuracy General in
Moscow ordered the FSB to conduct the investigation against Nikitin in
accordance with the law. Both times, however, the FSB ignored the order,
and there is no guarantee that the FSB will follow Judge Golets'
instructions now. The judge will be forced to send the case back for
further investigation again if it goes to court again without the FSB
having implemented the judge's instructions, resulting in a vicious
circle.
-- 

Diederik Lohman, Director
Alexander Petrov, Deputy Director
Moscow Office
Europe and Central Asia Division
Human Rights Watch
Russian Federation
Moscow 103064  
A/Ya 409
7 095 265 4448 (tel/fax)
hwmosc@glasnet.ru
Website
English: http://www.hrw.org 
Russian: http://www.hrw.org/russian

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