#1
Moscow Times
October 29, 1999 
EDITORIAL: October '99: Democracy Fading Fast 

October is often a tragic watershed for Russia. October 1917 was the 
Bolshevik Revolution. October 1991 was when Boris Yeltsin made his historic 
speech appealing to the West for economic advice, and specifically to the IMF 
- an organization intellectually hobbled by its own smug dogmatism. October 
1993 was when Yeltsin's conflict with parliament spilled over into street 
violence, leading to Yeltsin's ascendancy as Russia's new super-president. 


And October 1999? It is possible that in this month of frantic activity, we 
are missing the forest for the trees; that the nation's political fate has 
already been settled; that October 1999 will be remembered as the tragic 
month when it became clear that the institutions of democracy had already 
slipped away. 


We have become inured to the idea that Russia commits horrors in Chechnya; 
that the media in Russia serve not the public but the agendas of this or that 
intrigue or cabal; that the Russian presidency is vested with enormous powers 
for a single man; that the Kremlin will, from time to time, "backslide" on 
democratic principles or values; that the nation is ruled by a corrupt 
nomenklatura. 


None of this bothers us as much as it might, or should. We are simply used to 
these ideas. 


But there are degrees of war horrors, of intrigue, of corruption and of 
backsliding - and in all of these areas, Russia is rapidly sinking. 


Not since the Soviet era have the media been so cripplingly politicized - not 
even in 1996, when the media were unified against the Communists. The sheer 
ugly thuggishness on television and in political discourse is almost 
unprecedented. Corruption, Kremlin intrigue and Chechnya have all long been 
threats to national security, but never have all three looked so out of 
control. And when the elections commission chief recently announced he feared 
for his life, it was barely even news. 


Stunned and sullen, we again watch civilians being killed with a casual air 
in Chechnya; we watch the government lie and the media follow; evenings we 
watch the worst sort of media smear campaigns, pitting clans against clans 
while ordinary people watch in confusion; and we wonder: Is there anyone out 
there who believes that we will soon have free and fair elections? 


As Jonas Bernstein reminds us on this page, Russia has often flirted with the 
idea of establishing some sort of junta of the elites - and that was even 
amid the relative political calm of 1996 and 1997. 


Today, in October 1999, there is no political calm. Only mutually shrill 
accusations - of treason, of theft, of murder - and a clock ticking down to 
elections. 

#2
FATHERLAND-ALL RUSSIA LEADERS URGE YELTSIN TO EMERGE FROM POLITICAL
ISOLATION


     MOSCOW. Oct  28 (Interfax)  - Fatherland-All  Russia  leaders  have
urged Russian  President Boris  Yeltsin to  come out  of  his  political
isolation.

     In a  letter to Yeltsin made public on Thursday, the leaders called
on  Yeltsin  "to  exercise  will  power,  break  out  of  his  political
isolation" and  dismiss his  staff who  "have  compromised  themselves."
Former Prime  Minister and  current leader  of the Fatherland-All Russia
election alliance  Yevgeny Primakov,  Moscow Mayor  Yuri Luzhkov and St.
Petersburg Governor Vladimir Yakovlev signed the letter.

     "Our address  is triggered  by serious  concern over  the situation
which emerged  in Russia  ahead of  the parliamentary  and  presidential
elections," the letter reads.

     Yeltsin's "staff  openly interfere  with the  State Duma  electoral
campaign. This  is inconsistent  with the  law  and  general  democratic
norms.  A   narrow  group   of  people  abuse  their  office  and  exert
unprecedented pressure on the electoral process," the letter said. "Your
circle is  openly biased  toward a victory of political forces which are
loyal  to  them.  [They  hope  for]  a  defeat  for  all  the  rest.  An
unacceptable situation  has emerged. State authorities violate electoral
laws and divide society instead of consolidating it," the letter said.

     "Authorities put pressure on both private and government mass media
outlets. Freedom  of expression came under real threat after eight years
of democratic  changes. Political  censorship  which  your  subordinates
introduce on  your behalf  has become  more  obvious,"  the  address  to
Yeltsin says.

     "The country's  governance has  in effect  been transferred  to the
presidential administration  and those close to it. The state has become
a  hostage   to  their   interests  and   actions.  Your  political  and
informational isolation from the people who elected you is growing.  The
institution of  the presidency has been turned into a small coin in your
inner circle's political games," the message reads.

     "We strongly  urge you  to exercise will power and break out of the
political isolation.  The dismissal  of compromised  representatives  of
your administration  should become  the first and most important step in
this direction,"  the address  reads. The  letter encourages Yeltsin "to
meet with representatives of the mass media, political organizations and
the public. It's time you heard unbiased and unedited opinions about the
situation in the country."

#3
Christian Science Monitor
October 28, 1999
US toughens Chechnya talk but has little leverage
As strains grow between the US and Russia, American officials worry that 
Russian hard-liners will gain most. 
By Justin Brown, Special to The Christian Science Monitor


Relations between the White House and the Kremlin are becoming more tenuous 
with each Russian military advance into the lawless republic of Chechnya. 


US officials were relatively silent a month ago at the start of the 
operation, which is aimed at crushing Islamic rebels. But since fighting 
drove more than 170,000 residents from their homes, and a rocket attack on a 
market killed more than 100 people, US officials have labeled the offensive 
"deplorable and ominous." 


President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright have at least 10 
times directly urged Russian officials to stop fighting and start peace talks 
with the Chechens, an administration official says. 


The rift in relations threatens to isolate Russia internationally while it 
faces parliamentary elections, economic turmoil, and uncertainty about its 
nuclear defenses. 


US officials worry that a total meltdown of relations could strengthen Moscow 
hard-liners, especially if today's conflict becomes a repeat of the 1994-96 
Chechen war - a humiliation for the Russian Army in which about 100,000, 
mostly civilians, died. 


The current conflict is not on that scale yet, but appears headed in that 
direction. The Russian Army, with strong public support, is strangling the 
Chechen capital of Grozny and blocking civilians from fleeing the region. 
Yesterday, Russian bombers swooped into the capital, killing 38 and injuring 
100, Chechen officials said. 


"This will certainly hurt our relations with [Russia]," says Marshall 
Goldman, a Russia expert at Wellesley College. 


The conflict comes as US-Russia relations are already strained. 


High levels of corruption in Moscow, exposed by the Bank of New York 
money-laundering scandal, have forced some here to question whether the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) should continue to prop up the Russian 
economy. Also, Russia objects to US plans to build a missile-defense system 
and has threatened to counter by deploying more atomic warheads. 


"We urge Russia not to repeat the mistakes of the past in Chechnya," Dr. 
Albright said this week, "and instead to open a dialogue toward a peaceful 
resolution with legitimate Chechen partners." 


Russian officials justify their attack as a crackdown on rebels who in August 
launched an offensive into neighboring Dagestan and whom investigators blame 
for the September apartment bombings in Moscow that killed nearly 300 people. 


Further, the US may have little clout, with Russians still upset about NATO's 
expansion to include former East bloc states and its bombing of their Slavic 
brethren, the Serbs, in Kosovo. The Speaker of Russia's lower house of 
parliament recently said the US has "no moral right to tell Russians how to 
settle the acute conflict." 


Other than making harsh statements and repeated phone calls, America has few 
options to stem the offensive - which is likely to get more violent as 
Russian troops move closer to rebel strongholds. 


"The policy of intervening to stop a humanitarian crisis cannot work with a 
nuclear power," says Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation, a conservative 
think tank here. 


A US administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity, says it 
would be too risky to implement economic sanctions. A collapse of the Russian 
economy could lead to far greater problems. 


"The truth is that we have limited options and leverage," says Tara 
Sonenshine, a former National Security Council official who is now a senior 
adviser to the Washington-based US Institute of Peace. "There are other 
countries and organizations that could have greater credibility." 


The Operation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is scheduled to 
hold a summit in November, and the topic could be taken up there. 


Some analysts say the OSCE could be the best organization to broker a deal 
between Moscow and Chechnya. It was involved in settling the earlier war, in 
which Chechnya won independence in all but name. 


Human rights officials say the OSCE has a mixed record in the region. Of 
primary concern are some 170,000 displaced people, some of whom are being 
blocked from leaving Chechnya. 


The US tactic with Moscow in this conflict sharply differs from the first 
war, when US-Russia relations were significantly better. Then, the State 
Department did not condemn the campaign until the invasion of Grozny at the 
end of 1994. Despite mounting civilian deaths, the IMF approved a $6.8 
billion loan in 1995. And in 1996 Clinton likened the conflict to America's 
Civil War. 


This time around, there is greater support for Russia, given the rebel 
incursion into Dagestan. Yet the Clinton administration has been quicker to 
condemn. One reason may be an attempt by the administration to deflect 
criticism for being too forgiving of Russia, analysts say. Vice President Al 
Gore, the leading candidate to be the Democratic nominee, has been deeply 
involved with Clinton's Russia policies. 


Texas Gov. George W. Bush, the likely GOP candidate for president, has 
criticized the Clinton administration for not being tough enough on Russia. 

#4
IntellectualCapital.com
October 28, 1999
Russian Outrages in Chechnya
by Richard Pipes                                                


I had intended to devote this month's column to the new military doctrine
announced recently in Moscow, but it seems to me that this theoretical
subject should take back seat to the appalling barbarisms Russians are
perpetrating in Chechnya.


The horror


First, as concerns Russia's justification for the Chechen campaign: The
official reason for the operation is that Chechens are responsible for
several terrorist attacks against the civilian Russian population in which
more than 300 people lost their lives. Yet to this day authorities have
produced not one shred of evidence that the culprits were Chechens. The
suspicion is that these terrorist bombings are a pretext to bring to heel a
region that four years ago inflicted a humiliating defeat on the Russian
army and to bolster the prestige of President Boris Yeltsin's unpopular
regime.


Moscow has some grounds for dealing sternly with Chechnya and its Islamic
fundamentalists. The region has been a hotbed of criminal activity, of
kidnappings and drug smuggling the weak government of President Aslan
Maskhadov has been unable to halt. More broadly, Russia is genuinely afraid
of the spread of Muslim fundamentalism to its southern borders. Just two
months ago, hundreds of armed fundamentalists invaded the republic of
Kyrgyzstan, raising fears that their movement would spread to the rest of
central Asia.


But even if this point is conceded, the question arises whether a brutal
campaign, such as the Russian army is presently waging in Chechnya, is the
proper way to address the threat. The Russian army, having learned from its
past mistakes and NATO's operation in Kosovo, and anxious to minimize its
causalities, is proceeding more cautiously than in 1994-95. But in so doing
it is inflicting horrible losses on the Chechen civilian population with
its tactic of indiscriminate bombing.


Ostensibly, these bombings are meant to root out "terrorists." But bombs
and rockets do not discriminate between terrorists and peaceful civilians.
People are killed; housing and industrial facilities are destroyed;
harvests rot in the fields. The net effect is for the terrorists to gain
new recruits from among the desperate population, especially now that the
Russian army has sealed the one road leading to neighboring Ingushetia that
had enabled some 160,000 Chechen refugees to escape the fighting.


So far, the Russian army has accomplished the easy part of its task --
namely, seizing the flat northern third of the region. As it pushes into
Groznyi, the capital, and then into the mountainous territory to the south,
it is certain to face fanatical resistance. The fighting will give a hollow
ring to Yeltsin's Wednesday remarks that the Russian army "will return
peace and calm to the long-suffering Chechen territory."


Where's the anger?


Two broader aspects of the Chechen war call for comment.


One is the vicious nationalism displayed by the Russian generals who are
today the main heirs of Soviet-style thinking and who act with increasing
arrogance while their country is mired in a persistent political and
economic crisis. The Yeltsin government, unable to solve its problems, is
relying on them to give the Russian people a false sense of national pride
and Great Power status. Russia is now threatened with becoming, like a
number of non-Western countries, a regime in which a civilian government
provides the façade for military rule.


Secondly, it is disturbing to see how gently the Western powers are
reacting to the Russian terror campaign. European leaders gave Russian
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin a verbal scolding when he recently met with
them. But the U.S. administration has been noticeably muted in its
reaction, expressing "concern" but displaying no outrage at these barbarities.


It is part of a mistaken policy of the Clinton administration to pretend
that, by and large, all is well in Russia. Then it does not have to get
involved with one more foreign-policy problem and to confess that its
policies toward that country may not have been as successful as claimed. 


Richard Pipes is Research Professor of History at Harvard University. In
1981-82 he served as Director of East European and Soviet Affairs in the
National Security Council. He is a contributing editor of
IntellectualCapital.com. 

#5
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
28 October 1999


RUSSIA FOUND TO BE TRANSPARENTLY CORRUPT. Transparency International, the
Berlin-based corruption monitoring group, has released its 1999 Corruption
Perceptions Index. That index uses various polls of businessmen, experts
and the general public, to rank countries according to their perceived
degree of bribe-taking. Russia shared the eighty-second and eighty-third
spots--out of ninety-nine countries--with Ecuador. Denmark was number
one--the world's least corrupt country--while the United States was in
eighteenth place. Cameroon was deemed the world's most corrupt country,
followed by Nigeria, Indonesia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Honduras, Tanzania,
Yugoslavia, Paraguay, Kenya, Uganda, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan,
Georgia, Albania, and then Russia. China, Belarus, Latvia, Mexico and
Senegal jointly held the fifty-eighth through the sixty-second positions.


Transparency International gave Russia a raw quantitative score of 2.4.
According to its methodology, a rating lower than 3 points means that a
country is "extremely corrupt." Russia also received a score of 2.4 last
year, when it came in 76th out of 85 countries (Russian agencies, October
26; www.transparency.de).


Meanwhile, a three-month study carried out by various media and human
rights groups in Russia has found that not one of the country's eighty-nine
regions "promotes a climate favorable to a free and pluralistic press." The
study, dubbed the Public Expertise project, was led by the Russian Union of
Journalists. According to a press release by Internews, whose Russian
branch also took part in the study, the project brought together
journalists, media managers, lawyers, professors and others, who formed
regional commissions, which collected and analyzed thousands of pages of
data. The results will be represented on a map of Russia, color-coded to
show levels of press freedom. The map was originally supposed to use three
colors, representing three rankings--favorable, mixed and unfavorable. No
region, however, was found to have an environment favorable to press
freedom, so two colors were used for the map.


Among the factors taken into consideration in the study were (1) local laws
and regulations affecting the media and whether these complied with the
Russian Constitution, (2) the responses of local officials to journalists
requests for public information; the use of journalistic accreditation and
(3) local conditions affecting the printing and distribution of newspapers
and television and radio broadcasting. Moscow received the highest
press-freedom rating--sixty-three out of 100 points--while Bashkortostan
came in last, with a rating of ten out of 100.


The Russian Union of Journalists is also planning to create an Index of
Corruption, using a similar methodology (Internews' main website can be
found at www.internews.org; the web address for Internews Russia is
www.internews.ru).  

#6
Date: Thu, 28 Oct 1999 11:20:32 -0400
From: "Mikhail A. Alexseev"

(alexseevma@appstate.edu)
Subject: Posting a piece on Chechnya/Dagestan


The Seattle Times
October 10, 1999
The distant sounds of war  
by Mikhail A. Alexseev 
Special to The Times
A native of the former Soviet Union, Mikhail Alexseev worked as the Kremlin
correspondent. He is professor of political science at the Appalachian
State University in North Carolina and the editor of "Center-Periphery
Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia: A Federation Imperiled" (St. Martin's
Press, 1999).


TWO years ago, when I visited Dagestan's capital, Makhachkala, I saw that
the economy was at a standstill, but ethnic and religious forces were on
the move. Despite widespread poverty, new mosques dotted the landscape, and
even a new gas station on the road from the airport to the city looked like
a miniature mosque. Ethnic popular movements, representing most of
Dagestan's 14 major ethnic  groups, had built impressive "palaces of
culture" in Makhachkala.  


I recall thinking that if the situation deteriorated, these movements could
quickly recruit activists and fighters from the ubiquitous gangs of
unemployed young people all over the city. A popular form of "music" was
amateur tapes of fighters in neighboring Chechnya blasting Russian tanks to
smithereens.  


The war music is on again in the North Caucasus, this time for real. First,
about 2,000 rebels crossed from Chechnya into Dagestan in an attempt to set
up an independent Islamic state. The rebels met with stiff opposition from
most Dagestanis and were driven out, but they also provoked the Russian
military into pounding tons of metal into the mountain slopes and treating
the local residents with arrogance and suspicion.  


Claiming that the Chechen terrorists blew up three apartment buildings in
Moscow and Volgodonsk in August and September, the Kremlin amassed an
estimated 200,000 troops around Chechnya, canceled peace talks, and
launched air strikes on the Chechen capital, Grozny. Fleeing death and
destruction, close to 90,000 people have made for the neighboring republic
of Ingushetia. In Moscow, police rounded up and deported 10,000 people with
darker skin, typical of ethnic groups in the Caucasus. An estimated 80,000
non-Russians and people of mixed ethnicity fled Moscow fearing ethnic
cleansing.  


Reversing a 1997 peace treaty, in which President Boris Yeltsin recognized
the current Chechen government of popularly elected Aslan Maskhadov,
Russia's prime minister, Vladimir Putin, now states that Maskhadov is
illegitimate and that Chechnya, once again, is nothing but "a bandit
enclave." Yeltsin only praised Putin for resolute action. 


The stakes are high. Russia faces its worst security crisis since a
humiliating defeat in Chechnya three years ago, and the Kremlin fears it
will not be regarded as a great power if it loses Chechnya and Dagestan.  


This is a fatal misperception, unless one subscribes to a popular
conspiracy theory that the current crisis had been orchestrated by Yeltsin
to cancel the elections next year. At the heart of this misperception is a
"domino theory" rooted in the traumatic collapse of the Soviet Union: If
one republic goes, the Kremlin fears, others also will break away. Russia
then would consist of just a handful of ethnically Russian regions around
Moscow.  


But the Kremlin's indulgence in this domino theory, along with its arrogant
determination to be seen as a "great power," poses a much more serious -
albeit a different - threat to Russia than regional separatism. For
starters, the domino theory is wrong. 


Russia cannot collapse as the Soviet Union did eight years ago, even if
both Chechnya and Dagestan secede, for several reasons: 


First, the nearly 90 regions that make up Russia have never had the
trappings of sovereignty enjoyed by the 15 republics of the former Soviet
Union.  


The Russian federation is carved up into  administrative units mainly on
the basis of ethnicity.  These units have not had politburos, flags,
anthems or seats at the United Nations  -  attributes that helped the
former Soviet republics be recognized as independent nations with relative
ease. The republics of Russia would have a long way to go to establish any
kind of real sovereignty that would threaten Russia as a whole. 


Second, Russia has no state ideology like the communism that cemented the
Soviet Union. Any breakaway movement would have to draw exclusively on
ethnic anti-Russian sentiment. 


Thus, despite being an ethnic Russian, I voted for Ukrainian independence
in the 1991 referendum. 


Mine was an anti-Soviet, not an anti-Russian, vote. 


Millions of Russians in the Soviet republics similarly supported
independence for the same reason.  


In post-Soviet Russia, by contrast, any separatist movement can only be
anti-Russian. But ethnic  Russians make up more than 80 percent of Russia's
 population, and broad public support for anti-Russian separatists is
unlikely even among non-Russians. 


In Dagestan, the Avars  -  the largest ethnic group who think of themselves
as the Chechens' ethnic brethren  -  have come out against the guerrillas. 


Third, Russian regions today have no popular movements such as existed in
the former Soviet  Union: the Sajudis in Lithuania, or the Round Table in
Georgia, or the Rukh in Ukraine that in the late 1980s sparked off Soviet
disintegration. Chechnya is the sole exception within Russia.  


Russia's other provinces also lack a charismatic  secessionist
leader such as Chechnya's Dzhokar  Dudayev. Dagestan's leaders are, in essence, Soviet
apparatchiks seeking a quiet life. They back the  Kremlin in the current
battle, even setting up a Web site  (http://www.kavkaz.com) to counter the Web site run
by guerrilla supporters (http://www.kavkaz.org).  


The leaders of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Sakha, Tyva and the Maritime
Territory raised the specter of  separatism at one time or another, but
they quickly backed down when offered lower taxes and higher  federal
subsidies. 


Fourth, no regional leader in post-Soviet Russia could, even remotely, play
the role that Yeltsin played as Russia's leader in the breakup of the
Soviet Union in 1990-'91. In those days, Yeltsin urged secessionist Soviet
republics to take as much sovereignty as they could swallow.  


In 1994, other republics did not join Chechnya in  seeking independence.
The leader of oil-producing  Tatarstan, all his declarations of sovereignty
 notwithstanding, did not threaten Yeltsin with an  energy embargo. The
powerful and popular Moscow  mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, did not cut off
electricity to the Kremlin. Instead, Luzhkov ordered Moscow police to
patrol the streets and to question anyone resembling a Chechen. (My brown
eyes, mustache, black eyebrows  and a forest green L.L. Bean hat  -
vaguely resembling Dudayev's  -  made me an inevitable target of these spot
checks as late as 1997 and 1998.) 


Fifth, the secessionist leaders in the Soviet republics knew their
movements would enjoy strong  support of large anti-Soviet constituencies
in the West, including sizable ethnic diasporas. No such sympathy exists
for the separatists in Chechnya and Tatarstan, or in the Urals and in the
Far East. When Russian tanks attacked Grozny in late 1994, President
Clinton  asserted that Chechnya was Russia's internal affair and sided
squarely with Yeltsin.  


Finally, President Yeltsin has done a better job negotiating with regional
leaders than Gorbachev did with the Soviet republics. With the stunning
exception of Chechnya, Yeltsin has hammered out mutually  acceptable
power-sharing deals. He wisely ignored  sovereignty declarations and
foreign policy programs as long as they did not undermine Russia's federal
agencies.  


In 1996, Yeltsin even gave up appointing regional  governors, allowing the
regions to have their governors elected. And some Russian regions acted as
free-market laboratories, privatizing land and inviting in foreign
businesses. Hopes for a strong, dynamic federation in Russia emerged.  


But the Kremlin's imperial arrogance toward the  Caucasus has undermined
those hopes.  


New Prime Minister Vladimir Putin pledged to defend Russian territorial
integrity and "solve the Dagestan crisis" in as little as a week and a half
 -  a promise that was broken. Russia's military commanders now promise to
destroy all "terrorists" in Chechnya in another two weeks or so. While in
Moscow two weeks ago, I saw Putin on the evening news resort to gangland
slang when reporters asked him about his plans to fight the Chechen rebels.
"We'll blast them anywhere. If we find them in the john, we'll stick their
head in the bowl. Any more questions?" Putin eyed the audience with a hint
to triumphant disdain. 


These statements echo ominously the pledge by Pavel Grachev,  Russia's
defense minister in 1994, to quash Chechnya's secessionist government with
one  paratrooper regiment in "a few hours." Two years and 80,000 violent
deaths later, Russian forces withdrew.  


While Moscow's desire to quash the rebels fast is  understandable, the
Kremlin's great power illusions keep backfiring. In June, despite having
missed  repaying billions of dollars of international debt, Russia put
scarce resources in its largest military exercise since the Soviet
collapse. Strategic bombers flew to Iceland. Elite paratroopers went to
Kosovo. These  symbolic acts let Moscow feel it remained a "great power,"
but diverted its attention and resources from preventive action in Dagestan
and from peace negotiations with the Chechen leaders.  


Now these illusions are pushing Moscow, belatedly, toward unwinnable
military solutions. A massive attack, now seemingly imminent, would trigger
another protracted Chechen war. (Already, the Chechen field commanders
pledged to forgo their feuds and join forces against the Russian military.)
A low-intensity campaign would foment a Viet Cong on  the Caspian. Sealing
all the mountain paths to isolate Chechnya and protect Dagestan is
unrealistic. 


Meanwhile, the Kremlin's pledge to defeat the rebels  at all costs means
Moscow will have fewer, if any, resources to turn around Chechnya's and
Dagestan's moribund economy. Ironically, this can only help advance the
long-term goals of the Islamic radicals, by creating further instability in
Dagestan. Getting out of this vicious circle will be more difficult as time
goes on - even the most popular of Russia's liberal parties, Yabloko,
called for tough military measures to stop the rebels. In this election
year of the Russian parliament, they and other parties seek to cash in on
the growing public xenophobia. In a recent poll of 1,030 Moscow residents,
more than half said they want the Kremlin to fight a war in the Caucasus.  


But instability in Chechnya and Dagestan will rob Moscow of its biggest
economic prize in the region, access to westward  routes for the Caspian
Sea oil. The pipeline taking the Azerbaijan oil to the Western markets can
bypass Chechnya, but it cannot bypass Dagestan.   Oil deposits and
refineries around the pipeline have been set ablaze. 


Great power illusions threaten Russia well beyond the Caucasus. Moscow is
neglecting massive work that  needs to be done to give ordinary Russians a
break from years of economic decline.  


This work requires a consensus among nearly 90  constituent units of the
Russian federation on the rules of their relations with Moscow. It requires
patience, engagement, compromise and new political  institutions. Ten years
after the collapse of  communism, Russia has nothing like the Great
Compromise between the states and the federal government that made the
United States possible more than two centuries ago.  


But Moscow's military campaign in the Caucasus casts doubt on its ability
to compromise, or even to use resources wisely. And it encourages regional
leaders to fend for themselves and be wary of the Kremlin.  Some have
already toyed with trade embargoes, quasi-currencies and regional security
forces. The republic of Tatarstan just passed a law forbidding Moscow to
send local residents to the North Caucasus. Other republics with large
non-Russian populations are likely to follow suit, setting the stage for a
broader center-periphery conflict. 


In other words, if the Kremlin chooses to remain on the warpath with the
Caucasus, it also will be choosing the path to a weaker economy, regional
fiefdoms and social unrest. 


The current upsurge of knee-jerk xenophobia notwithstanding, it is hardly
the path most Russians would want to take.  

#7
Kuchma favoured to hold presidency in Ukraine against fragmented left


KIEV, Oct 28 (AFP) - Helped by disarray among the country's fragmented
left, Ukrainian leader Leonid Kuchma looks certain to come out on top
Sunday when nearly 38 million voters go to the polls to elect a new president.


But after years of economic pain, an outside chance remains that Ukraine's
disenchanted electorate could deliver a surprise in a second round of the
ballot and rally around a left-wing challenger, observers say.


In total 13 contenders are in the race, which is expected to be decided in
a run-off between the two top candidates on November 14, as an absolute
majority is needed to win on the first count.


According to the latest polls, the centre-right president will obtain
between 31 and 43 percent of the vote, far ahead of his nearest rival,
Natalia Vitrenko of the Progressive Socialists, who is given 15 to 20 percent.


The Communist leader Petro Simonenko is forecast to pick up 10-15 percent
of votes, the Socialist party chief Alexander Moroz between five and eight
percent and Yevhen Marchuk, an independent left-winger, five percent.


On Tuesday, just days ahead of the presidential election, a left-wing
coalition challenge grouping Moroz, Marchuk and two other minor candidates
collapsed as a result of infighting.


It was an embarassing debacle which only succeeded in further discrediting
the moderate left in Ukraine, already struggling for a voice.


In his own political camp, Kuchma is virtually unchallenged.


Among the eight candidates on the right only one apart from the president
himself is expected to pass the one percent barrier: Gennady Udovenko, head
of the nationalist Rukh party, who is given two percent in the polls.


Once the driving force of Ukrainian independence, Rukh is now racked by
inner splits and is rapidly haemorrhageing electoral support.


Since his election in 1994, the 61-year-old Kuchma has sought to implement
free-market economic reforms under the guidance of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).


He succeeded notably in curbing hyperinflation and introducing a new
currency in 1996 that has resisted the financial storm that erupted in
neighbouring Russia last year.


But, under his presidency, Ukraine's gross domestic product (GDP) has
continued to shrink slowly and the mountain of unpaid wages and pensions
reached two billion dollars in May.


Under these conditions, voters disenchanted with economic liberalism and
those nostalgic for the days of the Soviet Union could conceivably spring a
surprise and install a left-wing candidate in the presidency.


In the second round, Kuchma's adversary, according to political analysts,
could be any one of the three leading left-wingers: Vitrenko, Simonenko or
Moroz.


Moroz, far from being the most popular candidate according to the polls,
could, if he makes it to the second round, pose a serious threat to the
president, expert Volodimir Malenkovich said.


"As a socialist, he could pick up the votes of the moderate and extreme
left, as well as floating centrists, and snatch victory," commented
Malenkovich.


Simonenko, 47, has led the Communist Party since 1993. Although he does not
call for the restoration of the Soviet Union, he is in favour of closer
ties with Russia which is a major political and economic partner for Ukraine.


The fiery rhetoric of Vitrenko, 47, who accuses all politicians from the
left to the right of selling out to foreign capital, has touched a chord
among a population weary of painful economic reforms.


This charismatic woman, who inspires fear and fascination in equal measure,
has a radical agenda: halt economic reforms, break off ties with the IMF,
raise wages and pensions, re-nuclearise Ukraine and join a Russia-Belarus
union within "five or ten years."


But neither Simonenko or Vitrenko are likely to garner broad enough appeal
to unseat Kuchma, Malenkovich said.


"If Simonenko or Vitrenko make it to the second round, the majority of the
electorate will take fright at the last fence at the prospect of a 'Red
takeover' and will swing back to Kuchma," he commented. 

#8
RUSSIAN SECURITY SERVICE SEARCHES FLAT OF U.S. SCIENTIST


     MOSCOW. Oct  28 (Interfax)  - Russian  security  service  officials
searched the flat of a U.S. scientist last night, an associate member of
the Russian Academy of Sciences told Interfax on Thursday.

     The search  was held  in the  flat of  Joshua Handler  of Princeton
University, who  is on  a training  mission from  the  U.S.  and  Canada
Institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Alexei Yablokov said.

     Research materials,  manuscripts, notebooks,  and a  computer  were
confiscated from  handler, who  has written dozens of works on radiation
and nuclear safety, Yablokov said.

     According to  the Russian  scientist, the  search is "not the first
attempt" by  Russian secret  services to  exert pressure  on  scientists
preoccupied with environmental problems and nuclear safety.

     "The FSB  (Federal Security  Service) action  against a man who has
long and  widely been known as an advocate of nuclear disarmament should
be viewed against the backdrop of the continued persecution of Alexander
Nikitin, Grigory  Pasko, Vladimir  Soifer and  other  defenders  of  the
ecological rights of citizens," according to him.

     "Instead of efficiently fighting terrorism, fascism, corruption and
other crimes  that are  really threatening Russia's safety, the security
services are  spending their  time and  money on  the  struggle  against
environmentalists and pacifists," he said.

     Yablokov said  he expressed  concern over  this issue  on behalf of
Russian environmentalists and called on the country's leadership to take
immediate measures to stop the FSB's arbitrary actions.

#9
Moscow Times
Thursday, October 28, 1999 
DEFENSE DOSSIER: Nuclear Balance Collapsing 
By Pavel Felgenhauer 


The United States government has recently stepped up attempts to woo Moscow 
into accepting changes in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The 
amendments would allow Washington to deploy a limited national missile 
defense system, or NMD. But the latest consultations in Moscow between Deputy 
Foreign Minister Grigory Berdennikov and John Holum, the U.S. State 
Department's senior adviser on arms control and international security, have 
ended in disarray. 


The U.S. has offered to help complete a defense radar project in Russia near 
Irkutsk, Siberia, if Russia agrees to alter the ABM treaty. But Russian 
officials say that they have rejected the offer out of hand, calling it a 
"mousetrap." 


"The unfinished Irkutsk radar was designed to face south," a high-ranking 
Russian official who asked not to be identified told me. "U.S officials say 
that such a radar could help defend Russia from a possible ballistic threat 
coming from North Korea. But the same radar would also cover China and so 
create tension between Moscow and Beijing. We believe the main goal of the 
U.S. offer was to worsen Chinese-Russian relations. Also, the Irkutsk radar 
would violate the terms of the ABM treaty. Washington is obviously conspiring 
to make Russia guilty of an ABM violation so that the U.S. would have an 
excuse to break the treaty in full." 


Russian officials say that Moscow and Beijing are in consultation on ABM 
issues and are coordinating their opposition to U.S. NMD plans. Russia and 
China have co-sponsored a draft UN resolution opposing the deployment of any 
ABM systems for national defense and warning that any violation of the ABM 
treaty would have "negative consequences for world peace." 


U.S. diplomats have specifically asked Russia to withdraw this UN draft 
resolution, since "its adaptation by the General Assembly would preclude any 
possible U.S.-Russian agreements to modify the ABM treaty." But the Russians 
say that they will not withdraw it. 


U.S. officials have also frankly told Moscow that President Bill Clinton's 
administration will make a decision this summer on deploying the NMD. If 
Russia refuses to amend the ABM treaty, the U.S. will be forced to abandon 
it. 


Russian officials say that they are aware of the threat but do not believe 
Moscow should help provide the U.S. with a face-saving formula that will 
allow NMD while continuing the pretense that the ABM treaty is still in 
force. 


Now that the U.S. Senate has killed the nuclear test ban treaty, the 
Americans want to kill the ABM treaty, too, said the Russian official who 
didn't want to be identified. "We believe that Russia should not be an 
accomplice in such crimes against humanity," he added. "The international 
community should clearly see that the U.S. is the villain, that America is 
undermining arms control and international stability." 


U.S.-Russian consultations on the shape of the follow-up START III arms 
control treaty occurred simultaneously with the ABM talks and also ended with 
both sides further apart than before. 


Russian officials say that Moscow wants more drastic cuts in nuclear 
armaments, with both sides allowed no more than 1,500 strategic warheads. The 
U.S. says it wants to keep at least 2,500. Russia also wants to count U.S. 
long-range sea-based cruise missiles as strategic - a notion the U.S. Navy 
rejects out of hand. 


For its part, the U.S. wants START III to open nuclear arsenals for 
inspection, but Russian officials say this is not a "transparency measure," 
but rather a ploy to enhance U.S. spying. 


It seems that the nuclear arms control process begun in the early '70s during 
the time of dÎtente and enhanced in the late '80s has now come to an end. 
Russian generals and diplomats still say they are pressing the State Duma to 
ratify the 1993 START II arms control agreement. But, in fact, Russian 
officials suggest to legislators: Ratify START II and give us a propaganda 
ploy to expose the evil Americans. They add that START II will never be 
implemented because the U.S. will abandon the ABM treaty or the U.S. Senate 
will not ratify already-signed START II and ABM amendments. 


It is obvious that the old U.S.-Russian nuclear balance is collapsing: New 
treaties are not ratified and existing ones are undermined. What is even 
worse: There does not exist any universally acceptable formula to create some 
new world balance. While U.S. and Russian officials bicker, weapons of mass 
destruction are proliferating with enhanced velocity and the possibility of 
regional nuclear wars is growing year by year. 


Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent Moscow-based defense analyst. 

#10
RUSSIAN ARMS EXPORTS ROSE 80% IN JAN-AUG -  TRADE MINISTER


     MOSCOW. Oct  28 (Interfax)  -  Russia's exports of arms and related
services in  January-August jumped  over 80%  as compared  to  the  same
period of  1998 and  accounted for  about 40% of all exports of  Russian
machinery, Trade Minister Mikhail Fradkov has said.

     Fradkov spoke  on Wednesday  in  Novosibirsk  at  the  coordinating
council for foreign economic relations affiliated to his ministry.

     Russia's foreign  trade turnover  in the  first eight months of the
year (excluding unofficial trade) shrank 22% compared to the same period
of 1998  to $64  billion with exports decreasing 8% and imports slumping
42%, according to Fradkov. The foreign trade balance was $24 billion.

     Fradkov said  that  foreign  trade  determines  many  macroeconomic
indicators. The  share of  net exports  of goods and  services of GDP in
January-August thus amounted to 24.3%, up from last year's 7.8%.

     Foreign trade  currently guarantees  the stability  of many Russian
companies, Fradkov  said. The share of export returns in overall returns
of some  metallurgical companies  reaches  40%,  in  the  production  of
ferrous alloys 50%, and 60-70% in the chemical industry.