#1
fweir@rex.iasnet.ru
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 1998 
For the Hindustan Times
From: Fred Weir in Moscow  

     MOSCOW (HT Oct 22) -- A controversy has erupted over food
assistance promised by the International Monetary Fund to feed
hungry Russians this winter, with many Moscow analysts charging
the aid will only fuel corruption and hasten the decline of
Russian agriculture.

     The IMF, which has been delaying a scheduled loan payment of
$2.5-billion because of economic turmoil in Russia, offered this
week to send subsidized food exports to Moscow from the European
Union's huge stockpiles.

     "We must take action so that hunger will not arrive in
Russia with the winter, so that serious social unrest will not
break out," said Michel Camdessus, the IMF's managing director.

     The Moscow press scoffed at the spectre of starvation in
Russia, suggesting Mr. Camdessus was more interested in throwing
a few dollars at Western farmers than helping Russians.

     "They offer pork and chicken instead of new loans," wrote
the daily Segodnya. "Food is a fine thing, but the Russian
government was hoping for some money."

     Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov has officially asked
for help to see the country through what is expected to be its
worst winter since the Second World War. The Red Cross has
launched an emergency $15-million campaign to deliver food to a
million needy Russians in the coming months.

     Economic meltdown and rouble devaluation last summer led to
a rapid growth in food prices and left millions of Russians in
vulnerable groups -- the poor, aged, displaced and disabled -- in
danger of starvation.

     According to the State Statistics Committee 44.3-million
Russians now live below the poverty line, defined as earning less
than 552 roubles ($32) per month.

     The social safety net has unravelled with the government's
near bankruptcy. Of particular concern, nearly 12 million
Russians living in the far north have not received adequate
winter supplies of food and fuel.

     But analysts warn that while the proposed food aid may be a
boon for European and American farmers, it will be a disaster for
their struggling Russian counterparts.

     "The IMF is refusing to provide new money to help the
Russian government cover its budget deficit, but it's willing to
pay foreign farmers to dump their produce on the Russian market,"
says Vilen Perlamotrov, an economist with the independent
Institute of Market Problems.

     "The danger of hunger in some parts of Russia is real, but
import dependency is not a solution. This country must start
mobilizing its own resources."

     Assistance sent to Russia in the past has frequently ended
up not in the hands of the needy but on the black market, where
it has the effect of driving domestic Russian products out of
competition.

     "The situation in the far north is dire, but foreign food
aid will be channelled through big cities like Moscow where there
is no food shortage," says Alexander Chepurenko, deputy director
of the Institute of Social and National Problems in Moscow. "The
liklihood is that it will be sold on wholesale markets and the
proceeds pocketed by corrupt officials."

     The solution for some threatened regions, such as the Baltic
enclave of Kaliningrad, the Arctic regions around Murmansk and
the Russian far east, is to make direct arrangements for
humanitarian aid with neighbouring countries, he says.

     "If regions deal directly with foreign donors, there is some
hope of aid reaching the people who need it," he says. "Under no
circumstances should the Moscow government be involved. That just
guarantees it will be stolen."

     Mr. Cherpurenko says the last wave of foreign food aid
to the former Soviet Union, in the early 1990's, provided little
relief to anybody and wreaked havoc in Russia's domestic markets.

     "Cheap imports of subsidized products from the West wrecked
Russia's beef, pork, poultry and dairy farming," he says. "This
country doesn't need more of the same, we need a government that
is interested in rebuilding Russian agriculture."

     Russian farming has languished since the demise of the USSR,
a victim of declining state subsidies, competition from cheap --
frequently subsidized -- foreign imports and a skewed price
structure that keeps manufactured goods far more expensive than
agricultural products.

     The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
reported recently that Russian agricultural production in 1997
was just 64 per cent of its 1990 level. Russia's State Statistics
Committee said this week that farm output fell in the first nine
months of 1998 by 9.4 per cent over the same period last year.

     Soviet-era livestock herds have been drastically trimmed,
leaving Russia almost completely dependent on outside supplies.
Analysts say 90 per cent of the meat consumed in big cities such
as Moscow is imported.

     "Russia can produce food, we have a lot of capacity," says
Mr. Perlamotrov. "This crisis is a warning to us to solve the
underlying problems with our agriculture, and not to repeat the
mistakes of the past."

     He notes that American chicken parts flooded into Russia in
the early post-Soviet years, and were gratefully accepted by
Russian consumers who nicknamed them "Bush's legs", after the
then U.S. president. The chicken came first in the form of aid
but quickly found its way -- often through corrupt channels --
onto the market, where the cheaper, better packaged and tastier
American product forced domestic Russian poulty off the shelves.

     "They may call it humanitarian aid, but it acts in many
cases as the agent of destruction," says Mr. Chepurenko.

     "We need to be very discriminating about accepting such aid
this time around. Perhaps we must accept imports of meat and
dairy products for some time, because those things are hard to
replace from domestic sources. But the Russian poultry industry
could be revived quickly if only the government would protect it
from subsidized foreign competition."  

#2
Russia seen to remove missile subs from Pacific by 2003

LONDON, Oct. 22 (Kyodo) -- Russia is expected to withdraw its ballistic
missile submarines currently deployed in the Pacific Ocean Fleet and
concentrate them in its Northern Fleet by 2003, according to the latest
edition of the Military Balance issued Thursday. 

  The annual global survey, published by the London-based International
Institute for Strategic Studies, said the changes are a result of a reform
program for the Russian armed forces that has now become more difficult for
lack of funds and firm political leadership. 

  ''At present levels of expenditure, maintenance and production capabilities,
it will be difficult for Russia to maintain its overall strategic nuclear
forces at Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I levels for much longer,''
states the Military Balance 1998-99. 

  START I, which entered into force in December 1994, commits the United States
and former Soviet republics, including Russia, to equal reductions over seven
years of nuclear warheads, including submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 

  The removal of the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) from
the Pacific Fleet will signify the complete withdrawal of nuclear missiles
from the Far East, given that strategic nuclear missiles have already been
removed from the region. 

  The withdrawal would also signal the diminishing strategic importance of the
Russian-held Kuril Islands, which in turn could affect the stance of Russia
and Japan in negotiating a solution to their territorial dispute over the
southern part of the island chain. 

  Japan has been seeking the return of the disputed Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan
islands and the Habomai group of islets, which lie east of Japan's main
northern island of Hokkaido and were seized by Soviet troops at the end of
World War II. 

  The strategic importance of the Kurils, which have the Pacific Ocean on one
side and the Okhotsk Sea on the other, have been one of the main reasons
against returning the islands to Japan. 

  According to the survey, Russia deploys 18 SSBNs in its Northern Fleet and
seven in its Pacific Fleet. With a new Borey-class submarine expected to enter
service in 2003, SSBNs are expected to be concentrated in the Northern Fleet. 

  The Pacific Fleet is based in Vladivostok while the Northern Fleet operates
around the Barents Sea in the Arctic. 

  The survey pointed out the difficulties Russia is experiencing with SSBNs,
saying it had no operational ballistic missile subs at sea for almost three
months from early May this year -- the longest such stretch since the SSBN
force became operational in 1960. 

  Another example of problems facing the Russian armed forces is the difficulty
in attracting or retaining young officers due to such problems as failure to
provide salaries on time. 

  The Defense Ministry had to discharge 15,000 new graduates from military
colleges this year while the army is expected to be short of approximately
19,000 officers next year, with motor-rifle, tank, artillery and mortar
platoon commanders accounting for 70% of the shortage, the survey said. 

#3
Russia: Environmentalist Goes On Trial
By John Varoli

St. Petersburg, 21 October 1998 (RFE/RL) -- After almost three years of
criminal investigation racked by controversy and international criticism,
the case of environmentalist and former Russian Navy captain Aleksander
Nikitin went to court yesterday in St. Petersburg. 

  Nikitin is being charged with high treason and passing alleged military
secrets about the Northern Fleet's nuclear waste disposal practices to
activists from the Norwegian environmental organization, Bellona. 

  Genri Reznik, one of three lawyers representing Nikitin, says, "The Nikitin
case is one by which our children will judge the state of Russia's legal
system at the end of the 20th century." 

  If convicted, Nikitin, who co-authored a 1995 environmental report for
Bellona, may face up to 20 years in jail. Nikitin's accuser, the Federal
Security Service (FSB), which is the successor to the KGB, arrested him in
February 1996. 

  Most major Western and Russian media were in attendance at the opening of
the trial. Also present were some 20 independent observers from various
legal and human rights organizations, as well as the U.S. Consul in St.
Petersburg, Thomas Lynch. 

  After procedural formalities, the trial produced its first sensation when
presiding judge Sergei Golets ruled that the hearing will be closed to the
public in order to protect Russian state secrets. 

  Reznik told RFE/RL, "I doubt that state secrets will be discussed in this
courtroom. We are law-abiding citizens, but the defense is still going to
continue to inform the media about what has taken place in court." 

  Reznik added that there is no reason for pessimism and, in his words, "We
will use all our knowledge and ability so that an innocent man walks free." 

  Over the past three years, prosecutors have charged Nikitin with treason
seven times. He was imprisoned under the latest charges for 10 months in
appalling conditions and says he has since been subject to almost constant
harassment from people he alleges are FSB officials. 

  His lawyers have not been allowed to see the Defense Ministry decrees on
which charges against him are based. They are said to be secret and were
enacted only after Nikitin was accused. 

  Diederik Lohman, the Moscow director of the international group Human
Rights Watch, says, "In no Western country could law enforcement officials
get away with the number of mistakes made. When you read the indictments,
they are so badly written it seems that the officials are legally
illiterate." Lohman added that Nikitin presented material in his report
that can be found in public sources. 

  Nikitin told RFE/RL last Thursday, "For the past three years, I have been
asking them (the FSB) to tell me precisely what secrets have been revealed,
but they have never told me." 

  According to Nikitin, his acquittal would not just mean his freedom but
would weaken the power of Russian security officials. He said an acquittal
would be "yet another small victory for democratic forces in Russia. It
would be a big blow against the Russian secret service and against its
system and methods." 

  Nikitin added that the FSB targeted him because it wanted to put an end to
the work on Russian soil of a foreign organization that was looking into
areas, such as the defense sector, that the FSB considers its own. 

  "But," Nikitin added, "they also wanted to make an example out of me,
someone who held a secret clearance previously, in order to send a message
that if you are an ex-officer you should not work with foreigners." 

  Bellona's research into the Northern Fleet's nuclear waste disposal began
in 1990. For many years it enjoyed cooperation from the Russian Navy and
the government of the Murmansk region, which borders Norway and the Arctic
Ocean. 

  The Russian Navy's nuclear waste storage practices in that region have been
described by Bellona as "a Chornobyl in slow motion." 

  Bellona says that the Murmansk region contains 274 nuclear reactors,
perhaps the world's greatest concentration of reactors, many of which are
on submarines. It also says that the region contains some 11 nuclear dump
sites. 

  Nikitin joined the Norwegian group in early 1995. In the early 1990s, the
46-year-old Nikitin worked as a chief inspector in nuclear safety for the
Ministry of Defense, where he had top secret clearance. 

  Relations between Bellona and Russian authorities took a turn for the worse
in October 1995, when the Murmansk offices of Bellona were raided by the
FSB, and their documents confiscated. 

  Nikitin said, "I never thought it would come to all this. Nor do I not
compare myself to a dissident." Nevertheless, he has been named Amnesty
International's first "prisoner of conscience" in Russia since the collapse
of the USSR. 

  Human rights advocates have cast Nikitin's trial as a potentially
influential landmark case in Russia's struggle to shake off its
totalitarian past and develop into a society based on the rule of law. 

  Stephen Kass, an environmental lawyer from New York who is also a board
member of Human Rights Watch, says that the Nikitin case "will be the
single most important indicator of whether Russia is a society approaching
the rule of law, or whether the successor to the KGB is calling the shots." 

  The trial may last one to two months. The court can make one of three
decisions--- acquittal, conviction, or sending the case back for further
investigation. 

  The defense is worried that Judge Golets is being subjected to FSB
pressure. Golets denied that pressure is being exerted on him, and a
spokesman for the FSB, who would only identify himself as Igor, said that
his agency is not trying to influence the court. 

  Others disagree, however. Yuri Nestorov, a State Duma deputy from the
liberal party Yabloko says, "The FSB is certainly applying pressure on the
court...This case is very important for the FSB and one they do not want to
lose." 

  Despite the possibility of punishment, Nikitin and his colleagues from
Bellona remain steadfast in their effort to prove his innocence. Nikitin
said, "I do not want to take a guess at what might be the outcome of the
case. But if the court obeys the law, there will be an acquittal." 

  Nikitin also said that he is determined to fight to the end. If he loses in
St. Petersburg, he added, he will appeal the verdict to the Constitutional
Court in Moscow and, if necessary, to the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg. 

  Frederic Hauge, Bellona's director, said during a press conference
yesterday in Saint Petersburg that because of Nikitin's trial some people
are now afraid to work on environmental issues in Russia. 

  Hauge added, "This case is important not just for Nikitin but for all of
Russian society. This case is about human rights, the environment and free
speech." 

  (John Varoli is a St. Petersburg-based journalist who contributes regularly)

#4
Moscow Times
October 22, 1998 
DEFENSE DOSSIER: Taking Georgia's Grim Lead 
By Pavel Felgenhauer
Special to The Moscow Times 

  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia has been a bad example for
Russia of everything that can possibly go wrong. At the beginning of 1992 the
legally elected government of Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia and the
Supreme Soviet that supported him were dislodged after fierce artillery and
gun battles in the center of Tbilisi. Russia, of course, followed suite in
1993, when fighters loyal to the Russian parliament attempted to capture the
Ostankino television center but were eventually smothered by tanks. 

  In 1992 Georgia's President Eduard Shevardnadze, who was installed after the
overthrow of Gamsakhurdia, sent his undisciplined and unprepared army into
Abkhazia to quell a secessionist rebellion. A 14-month war followed that ended
with the Georgian troops defeated and withdrawn in humiliation. Today,
Abkhazia is a self-declared independent state not recognized by anyone, and is
a source of tension and lawlessness in the region. 

  In 1994 Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his government, apparently
trigger-happy after successfully dislodging the Supreme Soviet by force, sent
an unprepared army into Chechnya to quell a secessionist rebellion. A 21-month
war followed that ended with the Russian troops defeated and withdrawn in
humiliation. Today, Chechnya is a self-declared independent state not
recognized by anyone, and a source of tension and lawlessness in the region. 

  Georgia experienced the worst runaway inflation of all post-Soviet states, its
currency falling until it was valued at 2 million coupons for $1. The Georgian
economy is now totally bankrupt, and the country continues to survive only
with the help of foreign donations. Georgia has a quarrelsome and unruly
parliament. Shevardnadze has, of course, many influential foreign friends, but
is a beleaguered and ineffective leader at home. Russia increasingly seems to
be heading down the same disastrous trail. 

  Now Georgia has provided Russia with a new bad example f a wildcat military
revolt by disgruntled solders. This week Georgian rebels captured the town of
Senaki and blocked two roads leading west to the main Black Sea port city of
Poti. From Senaki the rebels moved east, capturing the town of Samtredia and
marching on to the outskirts of Kutaisi f the second largest city in Georgia f
before they were defeated by troops loyal to the government. The Russian
equivalent would have been a rebellion by military units that would cut links
between Moscow and St. Petersburg and almost capture the latter before being
defeated. 

  Could such a thing happen in Russia? The answer is definitely yes, and not
merely because Russia has in recent years tended to copy Georgian upheavals
and disasters. Wildcat military mutinies are almost inevitable if the Russian
army continues to decay and disintegrate. Like their Georgian counterparts,
Russian soldiers go unpaid. Military training funds have fallen 90 percent
since 1991. Instead of training, officers and solders spend most of their time
trying to find a way to earn, steal or beg extra money or food. 

  An increasing number of fatal shootings of soldiers and officers by fellow
servicemen in the Russian armed forces shows what an unruly mob the once great
Red Army has become. Centralized money and food supplies no longer come from
Moscow, so solders and officers increasingly depend on local commanders who
arrange or barter food and create moonlight job opportunities for the
servicemen and women. 

  Shevardnadze is obviously disliked by many officers and men in his army.
Yeltsin seems to enjoy even less support within the armed services.
Shevardnadze managed this week to gather some loyal troops ready to fight the
rebels. In today's Russia, Yeltsin can hardly expect to find people ready to
shoot at their comrades to keep him in the Kremlin until 2000. 

  Of course, Russia is a much bigger country than Georgia. From Kutaisi it is
only a 200-kilometer march to Tbilisi. In Russia, a rebellion by troops in the
Far East is hardly likely to cause much immediate concern in the Kremlin. It
would take the rebels two years to reach Moscow and their last tank would most
likely break down before Khabarovsk. But if a local military commander based a
few hundred kilometers from Moscow were to rebel and demand Yeltsin's
resignation, he would gain support from other units, from the local population
and also the Russian parliament. Such a wildcat military rebellion in Russia
could easily trigger a successful coup. 

  Pavel Felgenhauer is the defense and national security affairs editor of
Segodnya. 

#5
Statistics Show Russian Poverty Increasing

MOSCOW, Oct 19 (Interfax) -- Over 30% (30.1%) or 44.4 million of the
Russian population had incomes below the poverty line in September,
compared to 32.8 million or 22.3% in August, and 32.1 million (21.8%) inJuly.

  According to the State Committee for Statistics, 31.6 million or 21.4%
of Russians had incomes below the subsistence minimum in September of
lastyear.

  This minimum in Russia averaged 552 rubles per person a month in
September against 450 rubles in August.  For those able to work it amounted
to 621 rubles (506 rubles in August), for pensioners 389 rubles (317), and
558 rubles (454) for children.

  Russians' average cash incomes in September exceeded the poverty line
only by  70.3% compared to a  more than doubled prevalence (120%) in
September of last year.

  The subsistence minimum in Russia is calculated by  1992 methods. A
new calculation methodology is being developed.

#6
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 1998 
From: helmer@glas.apc.org  (John Helmer)

The Moscow Tribune, October 23, 1998
NO WAY TO TURN
BY John Helmer

  The Vikings who plundered their way through the medieval Russian
territories had a saying that can be roughly translated as: "No matter
which way you turn, your arse is always behind you."

  As the Vikings specialized in kidnapping and extortion, this had an
obvious meaning for the river-bank folk to whom the idea was often expressed.
No matter how hard the Russians twisted or turned to escape, there was no 
chance of protecting their most vulnerable part.

  Russia's leading commercial bankers -- you might also say Russia's leading
bankrupts -- can't make up their minds whether they want to play the Viking
role, or the Russian. Either way, they are doing a lot of wriggling in
public to convince themselves their arse isn't embarrassingly exposed to the
rest of us.

  Take Alexander Smolensky, for example -- until recently a respected, 
apparently religious, apparently philanthropic, leader of SBS-Agro, Russia's 
largest commercial bank for savings. He has defaulted on about $1 billion of
foreign debts, and about $3 billion of obligations to Russian depositors.

  This week, one of his branch managers explained, Smolensky is offering
to repay depositors with a car; or if the deposit is too large to
be satisfied by that, an apartment at Butovo, on the outskirts of Moscow.

  Smolensky hardly looks like Riurik the Viking, but his offer is about as
generous. In the first place, most SBS depositors don't know about
it, because it hasn't been officially announced. Documents posted in SBS
branches offer only to repay money to special categories of people, such
as certified invalids or military heroes. The bank also recommends
that depositors renew contracts for their dollar accounts for up to five
years. That's about as attractive as the old Viking offer to sign up as a 
rower on one of their pirate ships.

  If a depositor is sufficiently remonstrative, and also well-versed in the law,
he can oblige Smolensky's subordinates to accept a letter of payment demand. 
But they won't sign a document of refusal to pay. They are extremely 
reluctant to sign even a proof that the demand for payment has been lodged.

   Calling Smolensky and his manager thieves in a loud voice is helpful
in getting the manager to explain, sotto voce, the special car and apartment
offers. He will hasten to point out that the car is not one of Smolensky's
German sedans, and the apartment can't be provided from SBS-financed 
constructions in the centre of Moscow. Smolensky has already arranged for the
demolition of all public notice-boards around the city recording SBS 
financing for luxury apartment units.

  The depositor, who, having bullied Smolensky's men this far, judges that
swapping his money for a Zhiguli or a box at Butovo is a too good a deal for
the bank, has two alternatives left. He can go to court, in which case
his arse will be exposed to lawyers with contracts demanding up-front 
payments of hundreds of dollars, plus percentage commissions on final 
recovery. Or he can wait, doing nothing but read announcements from the 
Central Bank.

  That boatload of Vikings are just as intent on reminding Russians that
they are still naked to attack. For years, the Central Bankers have been 
earning profits for themselves and for their crew in every transaction 
they have made with the state property, cash or precious metals they could 
get their hands on. They were protected by the International Monetary Fund's 
Moscow representative, who defended the plunder in the name of the 
"independence" of the Bank from "political interference." When the genuinely 
independent Accounting Chamber asked to see Central Bank transaction records 
which the IMF was shown, they were refused.

  Now, the Central Bank has told parliament, it will protect SBS, by holding
its shares, sitting on its board, and in time deciding how the bank should 
be managed. Maybe the foreign creditors and recalcitrant depositors will be 
offered bank shares to replace their debts. But that would still leave 
Smolensky in charge of the ship, or allow him to jump clear, and launch new 
privateering ventures with SBS assets he's managed to bury offshore. 

  That would still leave the Vikings of the Central Bank at the tiller. 
Some of them -- at the prompting of their commercial banking friends --
have even drafted a recent plan to mint coins out of the gold and silver they
have been hoarding, and trade them to the depositors Smolensky has beached.
The discount these new coins will have to the cash that was once
in SBS's accounts could provide a nice profit for the Central
Bank and SBS, if the government goes along with the scheme.

  Riurik and his relatives had a famous appetite for gleaming metal, and the
first Russian state they created was based on their ability to extract 
tribute that could be converted down river into bullion, without having to 
steal it. This was always a sore point in Russian history. At the arse-end
of another millenium, it's still the sore point.

#7
Boston Globe
October 22, 1998
[for personal use only]
Not starry-eyed about space 
Ex-cosmonaut savors thrill but rues waste
By David Filipov

MOSCOW - Few men alive today can relate to John Glenn, America's once and
future space pioneer, the way Konstantin Feoktistov can. 

  Did someone say, ''Space pioneer?'' Not only did Feoktistov (pronounced ''fee-
awk-TEE-stuff'') fly on one of the first Soviet missions in orbit, he played a
leading role in designing the spacecraft. 

  Are we talking celebrity status? There was a time Feoktistov and other
cosmonauts had to wear dark glasses and avoid public places to keep from being
mobbed by well-wishers, autograph-seekers, and ordinary Ivans who wanted to
know what it was like up there. 

  And if the topic is septuagenarian former astronauts who would drop everything
to experience space travel one more time, as Glenn will at the Oct. 29 liftoff
of the shuttle Discovery, Feoktistov, 72, knows a bit about that, too. 

  ''To fly into the cosmos is fascinating,'' Feoktistov said. ''I understand
Glenn for wanting to be there again. If I had a chance, I'd go again without a
moment's doubt. If I had the money, I'd pay what it costs.''

  But if you want to talk about the hope, nostalgia, and heroism inspired by
Glenn, count Feoktistov out. 

  Feoktistov believes that the Russian and US programs have been a big waste of
time and money, a battle of egos between two adversaries. 

  ''Being first became the only goal,'' Feoktistov said in an interview in his
roomy, three-story condominium in a secluded compound the Soviet government
built in northern Moscow for veteran cosmonauts. ''I don't think we have done
enough productive work in space to justify what either country has spent on
it. For nearly 40 years, astronauts young and old have been going into space,
but what do ordinary people on Earth have to show for it? Very little.''

  It is a remarkable stance for the man who headed the engineers who designed
the Vostok spacecraft, which launched Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin into orbit
in 1961, setting off the race that led to Glenn's maiden voyage 10 months
later. 

  But in Feoktistov's view, his country's efforts to compete in space were an
expensive luxury that the former Soviet Union could afford, but that are
disastrous for Russia today. 

  At a time when Russia's economy is in freefall and many regions are threatened
by hunger, Moscow has committed itself to be a major partner in the ambitious
$60 billion International Space Station project. 

  Cosmonauts who once panicked Americans are now mocked openly in films such as
''Armageddon,'' which depicts a Russian cosmonaut as frenzied, unshaven,
wearing a fur hat and fixing glitches by pounding on machinery with a wrench. 

  These are different times from the heady days when Feoktistov lobbied Sergei
Korolyov, the father of the Russian space program, to let him be the first
engineer to fly in space. It took two years; the Soviet military thought only
fighter pilots like Gagarin and Glenn had the right stuff. But after
Feoktistov agreed to convert Vostok into a three-man module, Korolyov
grudgingly agreed to let him fly. 

  Like Glenn's voyage on Freedom-7, Feoktistov's flight in October 1964 was a
rough-hewn affair. Cramped quarters aboard Voskhod-1 forced him and his two
crewmates to wear woolen suits rather than the pressurized suits usually worn
by astronauts as a precaution against depressurization. They carried knives in
case they had to fend off wolves in the Siberian taiga after touchdown. Unlike
Glenn, Feoktistov was not sure until liftoff that his country wanted to send
him into space. 

  ''I had many enemies who did not want me to make that flight,'' Feoktistov
said. ''Once we took off, I remember thinking, `That's it; no one can get me
off this spaceship now!'''

  That first thought soon subsided as he felt the 10 million horsepower thrust
of Voskhod's booster rocket. 

  ''I guess we all have a bit of our ancestors' nomad instincts in us,''
Feoktistov said. ''For me, it was a thrill to ride that beast.''

  Now, 34 years later, he vividly remembers the sights of that single day in
orbit: the northern lights; the way the sun rises over the atmosphere; the way
lakes on Earth have their own, unique color; the way mountains look like sand
dunes. 

  Feoktistov never flew again, but he dedicated his next years to the space race
with the Americans. 

  ''As Russians, we wanted to prove we had the know-how to be the first,'' he
said. ''And we did it, time and again. We were the first to send a satellite
and the first to send man into space. We had the first in-space hookup ... and
the first space station.''

  But the competition caused both Russia and the United States to make costly
mistakes. The Soviet Union tried to beat the United States to the moon and
lost. It tried to develop a shuttle, Buran, the prototype of which is now a
$35-a-ride attraction among the amusements in Gorky Park. 

  Feoktistov, who left the Russian space program in 1989, now teaches at a
Moscow technical institute. He is no longer recognized on the street, but he
has no regrets. 

  ''Even 20 years ago, people were telling me, `What are you doing? People go
up; they eat; they produce garbage; and nothing changes. It's a waste of
time,''' Feoktistov recalled. ''I don't see anything heroic.''

  As for Glenn, Feoktistov wishes him the best but is preparing for the worst. 

  ''The Vikings used to believe that a warrior should die with his sword in
hand,'' he said. ''Glenn is a warrior, and if he dies in space, it will be
like the Vikings, and maybe that's what he is thinking. That's great for him,
but not so much for the people who are sending him up.''

#8
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
22 October 1998

IS YAVLINSKY THE REAL RISING STAR? While Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov seems to
be the one to beat in the race to succeed President Boris Yeltsin, one
recent poll indicated that Grigory Yavlinsky, head of the liberal Yabloko
movement, is the real comer among the likely candidates. The poll, which was
carried out by the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion
(VTsIOM) to assess the level of support for various potential presidential
candidates, found Yavlinsky tied for first place with Communist leader
Gennady Zyuganov. Each received the support of 17 percent of the
respondents. Krasnoyarsk Governor Aleksandr Lebed came in second, at 16
percent, while Luzhkov placed third, with 14 percent. Next came Prime
Minister Yevgeny Primakov, who was named by 11 percent of the respondents.
Incumbent President Boris Yeltsin was supported by only 2 percent of those
polled.

As the newspaper "Nezavisimaya gazeta" noted, the VTsIOM poll sampled 2,400
people across Russia. The polls carried out each week by the Public Opinion
Fund and presented on "Itogi," NTV television's weekly news analysis
program, queried only 1,400. These polls show Yavlinsky with a rating
hovering around 10 percent (Nezavisimaya gazeta, October 21).

Yavlinsky recently returned from abroad, where he was receiving medical
treatment after suffering a heart attack last month, and reasserted his
intention to run for president. He also said he would submit himself to a
medical examination before the next presidential election, and that all
other candidates should do the same. Yavlinsky has been, and continues to
be, a stalwart opponent of President Boris Yeltsin. Earlier this week,
however, he lashed out at those calling on Yeltsin to resign for health
reasons. Yavlinsky called such "political persecution" of Yeltsin
"disgusting," particularly when it is being done by those who helped Yeltsin
retain power in 1996 ("Ekho Moskvy" radio, October 19).

Yuri Luzhkov, apparently recognizing that Yavlinsky's popularity could grow,
has been courting the young economist, perhaps with an eye to making him his
prime ministerial choice in a "centrist" coalition. In an interview
published last week in "Obshchaya gazeta," the Moscow mayor said he liked
Yavlinsky's "ability to reason, his hardworking nature and his stand on the
matters in general." While Yavlinsky is more of an economic liberal than
Luzhkov, both men have been consistent critics of privatization and other
economic policies carried out by the Yeltsin government over the last six
years (Obshchaya gazeta, October 15-21).

FAR RIGHT ACTIVE IN RUSSIA'S SOUTH. A conference was held in Saratov on
October 17 under the auspices of the local branch of the extreme-right
Russian National Party (RNP). Entitled "Nationalism and regional policy,"
the gathering included RNP chairman Aleksandr Fedorov, along with RNP
representatives from Moscow and Moscow Oblast, St. Petersburg, Volgograd,
Tambov, Tver and other regions. Local government officials also took part,
along with the heads of firms and factories which have linked up with the
RNP in Saratov. Fedorov told delegates that RNP branches have already been
established in thirty-three regions, and that by December, when the party
holds its founding congress, there will be forty-six regional affiliates. He
said the party plans to register as an "all-Russian" party.

Fedorov defined a nationalist as a person who "loves his nation," adding
that the RNP's brand of nationalism has nothing in common with German
national-socialism. He also denied charges that the group is "fascist." He
said the moment had come when all layers of Russian society were prepared to
accept nationalism as the only way to save Russia. He said one of the RNP's
tasks is to aid Serbia, and that units of volunteers wanting to go to Kosovo
had already been formed.

Regional RNP representatives discussed the economic and political situations
in their oblasts, the work of party organizations and coordinated activities
with the legislative and executive authorities. Their comments suggested the
party is forging mutually beneficial contacts with local authorities nearly
everywhere. Eldar Klochkov, head of the RNP's Saratov branch, said that
nationalism is capturing the minds of sensible citizens and that it is the
only idea which can unite the Russian people to save the country from
becoming a raw-materials appendage of the West (Monitor's regional
correspondent, October 19).

Meanwhile, an increasing number of Russian servicemen in Rostov have
reportedly been applying for membership in the local branch of Russian
National Unity (RNU), another far-right organization. According to
"Nezavisimaya gazeta," this growth in RNU membership has been spurred by the
failure of the government's program to provide servicemen with housing,
along with cuts in the Interior Ministry's forces. The newspaper quoted an
Interior Ministry colonel as saying that "everybody"--from special forces
personnel to policemen--were joining the RNU (Nezavisimaya gazeta, October 16).

#9
Excerpt
Current History
October 1998
Russia's Summer of Discontent
By Michael McFaul

Michael McFaul, an assistant professor of political science and a Hoover
fellow at Stanford University, is also a senior associate at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. His books include Russia's 1996
Presidential Election: The End of Polarized Politics (Stanford, Calif.:
Hoover Institution Press, 1997) and Privatization, Conversion, and
Enterprise Reform in Russia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995).

The United States and Russia

  Russia's latest crisis will deliver another blow to United States-Russian
relations. Over the last several years, the Start II arms 
reduction treaty, nato expansion, trade with Iran and Iraq, and Russia's
new draconian law sanctioning only certain religions have dominated
relations between the two countries. To historians of Soviet-American
relations, this agenda should sound familiar: arms control, European
security, regional conflicts, and human rights were the main components of
most summit talks between the two superpowers  during the cold war. This
old agenda suggests that the promise of a new postcommunist strategic
partnership between the United States and Russia has yet to emerge. Some
now argue that, given the balance of power in the international system, the
United States and Russia are simply destined to be adversaries. This camp
believes that Russia's latest economic crisis will propel to power Russian
leaders hostile to the West, compelling the Western world to contain the
Russian threat to markets and democracy once again.

  This is a premature conclusion. The Soviet communist system-not Russia as a
country or Russians as a people-threatened America's national interests
during the cold war. As long as Russia continues on the path of
democratization and marketization, Russian-American relations hold the
promise of moving beyond these old issues of division and confrontation. It
was the collapse of communism, not skilled diplomacy, that brought the
greatest progress on all these issues earlier this decade. Consequently,
United States strategic interests in the post-cold war era are tied
intimately to the fate of Russia's new political and economic system.

  The heightened domestic turmoil Russia has suffered during the last several
months suggests that American foreign policymakers must make renewed
efforts to promote liberal democracy and a liberal market economy in
Russia. If democracy and capitalism collapse there, then the issues of
contention between Russia and the United States will multiply and new
threats to American security will emerge. 

  President Bill Clinton's administration demonstrated leadership in
responding aggressively to Russia's latest financial crisis by urging the
imf to negotiate a new set of loans to Russia, but the rescue mission
failed. Until Russia forms a government and outlines a genuine anticrisis
program, it is premature for the imf, the Group of Seven, or the United
States to provide additional funds to the Russian state (although
assistance to nongovernmental actors and institutions can and should
continue). Once the new Russian government devises a plan to end the
crisis, however, it will need Western help to succeed. 

  In addition to assistance for achieving macroeconomic stabilization
provided through the imf, the United States should focus on facilitating
the development of important market institutions such as laws governing
property rights, financial disclosure, bankruptcy, pension funds, taxes,
and securities markets to promote enterprise restructuring. Especially as
American funds for assistance to Russia continue to decrease, a focus on
institutions rather than individual projects or technical assistance for
specific economic actors should remain a top priority. 

  The West must rethink basic assumptions about political reform in Russia.
Russian reformers wrongly believed that economic reform had to precede
political reform. American assistance programs also adopted this logic and
channeled the lion's share of American aid to Russia into economic reform
while only a fraction went to promoting democratic institutions. The record
of reform in the postcommunist world, however, has demonstrated that the
fastest democratizers also have conducted the most successful economic
reforms.

  Programs that provide expertise on the development of the basic
institutions that constitute a liberal democracy-that is, programs that
promote parties, federalism, the rule of law, independent media, and civil
society-should be expanded, not curtailed. The United States also can do
more to foster basic democratic values in Russia by providing civics
textbooks, funding public policy programs, developing higher education
courses on democracy, and continuing student exchanges. While the market
creates incentives for Russians to learn how to become entrepreneurs,
Russians today have few incentives to learn how to be good democrats. 

  Finally, at the highest levels, American officials must send clear signals
to Russian elites about the negative consequences of circumventing the
democratic process. For instance, Clinton should urge Yeltsin to establish
a precedent for the peaceful transfer of political power through the
electoral process. Because such a transfer would be a first in Russian
history, no single event is more important for the consolidation of
Russia's democracy than the upcoming presidential election. The Clinton
administration also must send an unequivocal message to the Russian
government that the West will not condone any extraconstitutional seizures
of power, be they radical plots to overthrow the current regime or plans by
the Yeltsin group to institute martial law. 

  Many Americans have grown weary of Russia; achievements have been few and
headaches many. Now is not the time to give up on it. Only seven years
since the Soviet collapse, Russia's revolution has by no means ended. The
country's current leaders remain committed to developing a market economy
and a democratic polity, and to joining rather than threatening the
community of democratic states; it is in the vital national interest of the
United States to ensure that this trajectory remains in place. Continued
engagement with Russia's reformers, sustained promotion of Russian liberal
market and democratic institutions, and gradual integration of Russia into
the world capitalist system and the international community of democratic
states: these are the policies that will prevent Russia's transition from
turning belligerent. Containment, isolation, and neglect of institutional
development in Russia are policies that will help transform Russia's
revolution into a security threat, both to democratic states in the West
and to democratizing states closer to Russia.