#1
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
October 21, 1999
Russians pull fast one on G8 ministers
Canada's McLellan among those used in Chechnya publicity war
GEOFFREY YORK
Moscow Bureau


Moscow -- Canadian and other Western politicians were the unwitting props 
yesterday in a Kremlin campaign to build support for Russia's military 
assault on Chechnya.


The officials, including Canadian Justice Minister Anne McLellan, were in 
Moscow for a conference on organized crime. But the Kremlin exploited the 
meeting to create the appearance of Western backing for its invasion of 
Chechnya.


Despite the absence of any mention of Chechnya in the agenda of the two-day 
meeting of justice ministers from the so-called Group of Eight (the Group of 
Seven industrialized nations plus Russia), the Russians persuaded the 
delegates to issue an unplanned statement on "terrorism" -- the standard 
Russian code word for the activities of the Chechen separatist guerrillas.


While the statement did not refer specifically to Chechnya, Russian media 
cited it as evidence of Western support for the invasion.


But Ms. McLellan took great pains to distance herself from the Chechnya 
conflict. 
She said it would be a mistake for the Russian media to suggest that the G8 
officials are supporting the war. "I'm not going to comment on the internal 
affairs of Russia," she told reporters at the end of the meeting of top 
law-enforcement officials. "Chechnya was not on the agenda for this meeting, 
and we stayed very much focused on the agenda, which is the challenge of 
transnational crime."


Nevertheless, the Russians gave a lengthy list of alleged Chechen terrorists 
to the G8 delegates, along with videotapes of "terrorist acts" of the Chechen 
separatists. Moscow has blamed the Chechens for bomb attacks that killed 
almost 300 people in Russian cities last month.


Ms. McLellan said she hadn't looked at the list of alleged criminals, but 
that the package of information would be passed on to Mr. Axworthy.


Russian officials insisted that the conference delegates were "united" with 
Moscow on the terrorism question. And they hinted that the Western delegates 
were equally worried by the Chechen threat.


"Once we have cleared our territory of bandits, those terrorists could 
penetrate other countries and commit terrorist acts in those countries," a 
Russian official told a press conference at the meeting's end. "Other 
countries could fall prey to those bandits."


Despite explanations from Ms. McLellan and other Western delegates that 
Chechnya was not on the conference agenda, the Kremlin's strategy seemed to 
be successful. The Russian media immediately claimed the G8 was endorsing 
Moscow's war against the Chechens.


"They indirectly supported it, or at least they didn't condemn it," a popular 
Russian television channel told viewers last night, showing pictures of the 
G8 officials at the conference.


One of Moscow's leading newspapers, Sevodnya, earlier proclaimed that the 
conference's approval of a terrorism statement would be a signal of Western 
support for the war. "If this document is adopted, Russia will get the moral 
right to take decisive actions on the territory of Chechnya," the paper said 
yesterday, referring to the statement issued at the end of the meeting.


"The statement on fighting terrorism is of great political importance," it 
said. "The support of the international community, and their recognition of 
armed groups in Chechnya as terrorists, would give Russia an advantage in 
solving the Chechnya problem without looking back at those Westerners who 
accuse Russia of genocide against the Chechens."


After the first day of the conference, the newspaper reported, Russian 
Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo told journalists that the G8 officials 
were supporting the Kremlin's efforts to "make order" on the territory of 
Chechnya.


The Russians have proven adroit at exploiting any sign of Western support for 
the Chechnya war. Last month they repeatedly quoted Canadian Foreign Minister 
Lloyd Axworthy, who had earlier defended the Kremlin's right to take action 
against Chechen extremists. One Moscow newspaper headline said Canada had 
reacted "with understanding" to the Russian assault on Chechnya. Distorting 
the minister's words, it claimed Mr. Axworthy was urging Moscow to continue 
taking "forceful" actions against the Chechens.


Russian troops were continuing to blast Chechen villages with artillery and 
bombing raids yesterday, but there was still no clear indication of whether 
the Russians will try to capture the Chechen capital, Grozny, where they 
would probably meet fierce house-to-house resistance.

Russian troops are poised on the outskirts of Grozny, the capital of the 
breakaway republic of Chechnya. Will the army stay at its present positions 
and try to establish a defensive perimeter surrounding rebel-controlled areas 
- the cordon sanitaire Prime Minster Vladimir Putin has been promising for 
several weeks? Or will Russian tanks move south into the Chechen heartland to 
pursue and destroy the rebels, eventually attacking Grozny itself? 


The military arguments for continuing an offensive are numerous. If the 
Russians simply stop, dig in north of Grozny and wait for spring, while 
continuing to bomb the Chechens, the strategic initiative will go to the 
enemy. 


Today, the Chechen resistance is mobilizing its forces. If the Russian troops 
take a long pause in operations, the Chechen militia will grow in numbers, 
improve its organization and turn into an effective, hard-nosed guerrilla 
army of up to 40,000 men - a force the present day Russian army is hardly 
capable of defeating. 


Aerial and artillery bombardments of rebel-controlled territory cannot stop 
the proliferation of anti-Russian forces. Even today, when the weather in the 
Caucasus is not as bad as it will be in the winter, eyewitnesses report that 
Russian bombs and shells are killing more civilians than Chechen fighters. 
When the coming winter fogs the sights of Russian warplanes the inaccuracy of 
the bombings will only increase. 


The Israelis have been bombing and shelling southern Lebanon for decades. The 
Israeli army is much better trained and equipped for anti-guerrilla warfare 
than its Russian counterpart. Their bombs have mostly killed civilians, and 
the shellings never did actually "wipe out" the Moslem extremists or 
seriously undermine their capability to attack the Israelis and their allies. 


Information leaking out of the Defense Ministry suggests a growing conflict 
between the hawks, who want to go on into the Chechen heartland to wipe out 
the Moslem extremists, and the doves, who want to stop north of Grozny. The 
hawkish faction of Russian generals is, reportedly, headed by the No. 2 in 
the military hierarchy - the chief of general staff, Anatoly Kvashnin - while 
the doves are headed by Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev. 


Dove-minded officers point out that any further advance into Chechen 
territory will result in thousands of soldiers being killed, and that even 
their deaths will not assure victory because the Russian force in Chechnya is 
not strong enough to occupy and control effectively all of the rebellious 
province. Even now, when only a fraction of Chechen lands are occupied, the 
Russians do not have enough troops to form a solid front line. Russian 
military authorities say that Chechen guerrillas easily penetrate deep into 
Russian-controlled territory to ambush and attack Russian troops. In the 
future, such attacks may become more persistent and effective. 


Last week, President Boris Yeltsin signed an ukaz, or decree, that orders 
conscripts in their first year of service to be withdrawn from the front in 
Chechnya. This ukaz, though keeping young soldiers out of harm's way, has put 
the lives of others at risk. Russian military authorities are forced to begin 
an untimely rotation of troops at the front, breaking unit cohesion. What is 
even worse - this ukaz has effectively left the Russian troops in Chechnya 
without any readily-available reserves. 


If during the coming winter campaign the Chechen rebels mount any serious 
counteroffensive, not a single Russian army battalion can be rushed to the 
front, since there are no army battalions without first-year conscripts. 


The position of the Russian troops in Chechnya is precarious. If they stay in 
defensive positions north of Grozny, they will increasingly become targets of 
Chechen hit-and-run attacks. If the Russian troops go further south, they 
will get embroiled in bloody battles with resolute rebel forces. 


The best course of action for Russia at this point would be to find some 
face-saving formula and withdraw their troops from Chechnya before the coming 
winter campaign brings heavy casualties and further humiliation. 


Instead, the authorities are behaving as if victory has already been 
achieved. Last Sunday, Putin said that he would enter negotiations with 
Chechen authorities only after all the fighters have surrendered. 


Apparently, Putin and his generals do not understand at all what lies ahead: 
The main force of Chechen rebels has not even entered the fray. 


Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent Moscow-based defense analyst.  

#4
The Russia Journal
October 18-24, 1999
Against a familiar enemy
Russia gears up for Cold Peace
By ALEXANDER GOLTS 
 
Nearly a decade since the end of the Cold War, Russia's new military doctrine 
again views the West as an enemy. 


Peace, the cynics say, is but a brief respite from war. The phrase could turn 
out to be an all too accurate description of the peace that followed the end 
of the Cold War.


Almost seven years ago, the presidents of Russia and the United States 
solemnly declared that their countries were no longer adversaries. Then, in 
1997, came the Russia-NATO Founding Act, which intended to usher in a new era 
of security cooperation between Russia and the West.


But since then, the global military and political circumstances have changed 
significantly, prompting Kremlin strategists to re-examine their security 
policies and establish a new military doctrine for the country. 


Two weeks ago, the Security Council adopted a draft national security 
program, and the Defense Ministry submitted a draft military doctrine to the 
Kremlin.


The current national security policy was approved by the president in 
December 1997, and the Main Provisions of the Military Doctrine were 
published in 1993.


So what events in particular have shaped Russia's new security outlook? 


Deputy Secretary of the Security Council and head of the team that drafted 
the new national security blueprint, General Sherstyuk cited NATO military 
operations in Yugoslavia and the worsening situation in and around Chechnya 
as key factors underlying the review of Russia's national security. 


The new military doctrine is presented in language designed to clarify the 
perceived threats Russia faces today. Its authors write of a "conflict 
between two trends." They mean, on the one hand, a world dominated by a 
single superpower relying on military superiority to resolve key global 
policy issues, and on the other hand, the concept of a multipolar world. 
Clearly a reference to the United States and to the countries that would 
oppose its dominance. 


Among principal threats to Russia's security, the authors of the new military 
doctrine name "military buildup around Russia's borders, the borders of its 
allies and adjacent seas." Expansion of military blocs and alliances is 
considered another potential threat - a reference to NATO's recent 
enlargement eastwards. Even events in Chechnya are interpreted in a 
geostrategic context, the perceived threat being not so much Chechen 
separatism as international terrorism. 


Russia's previous security doctrine interpreted potential threats as being of 
a nonmilitary nature - the social and economic hardships of the transition 
period appeared more menacing at that time. But the new doctrine anticipates 
the country facing primarily a military threat and suggests military 
solutions in response. This all smacks of Cold War-era thinking.


The West, however, has also done its bit to convince Moscow that today, as in 
decades past, force alone rules the world. Their approach to negotiations has 
all too often suggested that diplomatic agreements are good only when backed 
by vast numbers of warheads and tanks. The West, after all, was far more 
considerate toward the hostile Soviet Union than toward the more loyal 
Russia. 


It is enough to recall how NATO ignored Russia's repeated statements against 
the use of force in Yugoslavia, thus violating the NATO-Russia Founding Act 
that calls for consultations between the two parties in the event of a crisis 
situation in Europe. 


Then followed the blunt interview given by U.S. Defense Secretary William 
Cohen to The Washington Post, saying the United States would abandon the 1972 
Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty unless Russia agrees to "modify it." The 
"modification" in question would allow the United States to deploy a 
missile-defense system covering its entire territory. In other words, Russia 
is being asked to accept U.S. nuclear superiority.


But however justified these concerns, Russia should remember that fighting on 
two fronts is a great strain. It should not allow disputes with the West to 
interfere while it's in the midst of fighting a real, not just potential, 
adversary at home. The Chechens, though not named directly in the new 
doctrine, are designated Russia's No. 1 security threat. 


The experience in Chechnya clearly demonstrates the need for a mobile army of 
volunteers. Already, contract soldiers are replacing conscripts in the 
Caucasus. But financial constraints will remain an obstacle to building up 
military strength where it's needed. 


Stepping up military competition with the West would require even greater 
numbers of soldiers. For the top brass, this would be a welcome strategy, 
enabling them to retain their jobs and effectively kill all talk of army 
reform. 


Implementing the new doctrine would also have the effect of splitting and 
rendering ineffective the extra funds allocated for purchasing new weapons. 
The Defense Ministry has been arguing for numerous years that the state 
should not waste money on producing piecework, but should focus on mass 
production. 


In turn, arms producers have displayed nothing but patriotic rhetoric with 
which to oppose the cost-efficiency logic. The new military doctrine, 
however, will provide them with plenty of arguments in favor of producing a 
full range of military hardware.


But experience reveals that draft documents should not always be taken too 
seriously. They serve as little more than references for citation by various 
lobby groups and have more in common with Soviet-era Communist Party Congress 
resolutions. 


Nonetheless, that documents of this nature can emerge at all indicates a 
changing wind in Moscow. The Russian leadership is perhaps not yet preparing 
for another Cold War, but psychologically, it certainly looks ready for a 
Cold Peace. 


(Alexander Golts is a writer for Itogi magazine.)

#5
Russia: International Study Finds Military Preparedness Low
By Ben Partridge


The International Institute for Strategic Studies, an independent London 
think-tank, today published its annual "Military Balance," an assessment of 
the military capabilities of some 170 countries worldwide. For Russia, the 
report finds that Russian military capabilities are overstrained in Chechnya. 


London, 21 October 1999 (RFE/RL) -- The report says the Russian armed forces' 
lack of trained professional troops will limit their ability to sustain an 
effective ground campaign in Chechnya.


The report says that the situation in the north Caucasus -- the most serious 
challenge facing the Russian armed forces -- threatens to become "chaotic," 
with an "unpredictable outcome." But Moscow's ability to respond is limited, 
because many of its best troops are being used on peacekeeping missions 
abroad.


The report notes that conflict flared in late summer when a number of 
Dagestani villages were seized by armed Islamic groups based in Chechnya. 
These groups, while not supported directly by the Chechen leadership, claim 
to be seeking to establish an independent Islamic republic in Dagestan.


But the diverse ethnic composition of Dagestan's population makes the 
situation now more complex than it was in the 1994-96 Chechen conflict. The 
Islamic militants will find it as difficult to garner support for their cause 
in Dagestan as it will be for the Russian forces to attract local sympathies 
for their operations.


The report says Russian military developments over the past year were also 
influenced by the profound financial crisis of August, 1998, and the NATO 
military action in Kosovo.


The economic difficulties put a brake on military reform, but after Kosovo, 
the armed forces gained some increased resources for conducting military 
exercises and improving operational readiness. Still, the reports says Russia 
continues to lack resources for training, maintenance and new equipment. 
Except for the nuclear forces, the overall state of operational readiness of 
Russian forces remains low. At the same time, the military faces increasing 
demands in Chechnya and Dagestan.


John Chipman, director of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 
which released the report, told a news conference in London today that the 
renewed conflict in the north Caucasus shows up Russian military weakness:


"Heavy use of artillery and air strikes in the north Caucasus, however, still 
shows that combat efficiency in ground forces is low."


The report adds, however, that despite the problems, major Russian exercises 
in 1999 demonstrated that the country has a much better capability to deploy 
large combined armed forces than might be expected. 


The Defense Ministry says that the first phase of military reform was 
completed by the end of 1998. Military personnel was cut from about 420,000 
to about 350,000 troops. And the armed forces completed their transition to a 
four-service structure -- army, navy, air force and strategic forces. 
Divisions in the Leningrad, Moscow, North Caucasus and Siberian military 
districts were designated as "permanent readiness units." 


But the report says the personnel cuts were not accompanied by the 
implementation of plans to make the armed forces fully professional rather 
than partly conscripted. That plan had been set out in a 1996 presidential 
decree. Yet in December 1998, another presidential decree allowed the armed 
forces could call on conscripts for armed conflicts. The decree said the plan 
for professional armed forces would be implemented once the economy improves. 
The report says that stipulation makes the transition to a professional army 
"a distant prospect."


The think-tank's director, Chipman, says a new Russian defense doctrine 
finalized this month confirms that the creation of a fully-professional armed 
forces has proved more difficult than hoped.


"Unlike the previous doctrines, it notes that external threats to Russian 
security may still arise. It also confirms that conscripts will be used in 
military operations, thus delaying the previous aim of achieving full 
professionalism of the armed forces."


With regard to nuclear weapons, the vote on the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty, START-2, in the Russian State Duma was canceled in April, 1999, 
because of the NATO air campaign in Yugoslavia. But, after the Kosovo 
conflict was over, Moscow began talking with the United States on details of 
a START-3 treaty. 


The United States said full negotiations on START-3 could not begin before 
START-2 had been ratified, but agreed to begin the talks about its 
provisions, as well on the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, in the light 
of the limited US national missile defense program. 


According to the think-tank's report, Russia needs both START-2 and START-3 
to be implemented, because it will have difficulty maintaining its strategic 
forces at higher levels. But, it says, Russian domestic politics may still 
hinder progress on that front. 

#6
Voice of America
DATE=10/20/1999
TYPE=BACKGROUND REPORT
TITLE=RUSSIA'S FLAGGING REFORMS
BYLINE=BARRY WOOD
DATELINE=WASHINGTON


INTRO:  Despite eight years of trying, Russia has 
little success in its efforts to build a market 
economy. There has been no substantive growth in the 
economy and living standards are generally lower than 
they were before communism collapsed. In this 
background report V-O-A's economics correspondent 
Barry Wood has more on economic problem in Russia.



TEXT:  Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot 
defended the Clinton administration's Russia policy on 
Capitol Hill this week. Speaking (Oct 19th) to a 
Congressional Committee, Mr. Talbot said the goal of 
helping Russia build democracy in on track. On the 
economic side he conceded there are problems. But he 
said he does not know of a better way than having 
relied on the International Monetary Fund to provide 
Russia with loans and advice on the building blocks of 
a market economy.


            /// TALBOT ACT ///


      The work that the I-M-F did in Russia, going 
      back to the Bush administration in 1992, was 
      quite important in a positive way as well. It 
      helped to tide the Russians over the initial 
      phase of their transition. It helped keep 
      perhaps the most dangerous beast of all, 
      hyperinflation, at bay. And it basically bought 
      them some time to dismantle the old Soviet 
      economy.


            /// END ACT ///


Mr. Talbot said there are some things that the 
administration would have done differently. He said he 
wished he had counseled the Russians earlier and more 
vocally to implement a law against money laundering, 
the practice of using bank deposits to disguise the 
criminal origins of large sums of money.


There is a growing belief in Congress that because 
corruption and capital flight are so widespread in 
Russia, it would be a mistake for the I-M-F or other 
western creditors to provide Russia with additional 
money.  Russia has already borrowed nearly 20 billion 
dollars from the I-M-F, an organization owned by over 
180 member governments.  


For Jerry Hough (Huff), a Russia scholar at Duke 
University and the Brookings Institution, the West, 
and particularly the I-M-F, are culpable in what he 
calls President Boris Yeltsin's failed economic 
program.  Speaking at the Woodrow Wilson Center (Oct 
18th), Mr. Hough said Russia has utterly failed to 
build a market economy. He said the most basic 
elements of a market-property rights and commercial 
banking-are missing in Russia. For Mr. Hough the 
biggest failure in Russia is the theft of state 
assets, the absence of productive investment, and the 
flight of over 100 billion dollars out of Russia for 
safekeeping.


            /// HOUGH ACT ///


      There can be no solution that is worse than what 
      they have now, or worse than what they've had 
      for nine years, of distributing stuff off budget 
      for the purposes of consumption, and for the 
      control of the governors. I mean, the Federation 
      Council is just the old plenum of the central 
      committee where the governors are controlled by 
      these financial mechanisms, with Chubais (former 
      deputy prime minister and now head of the state 
      electricity monopoloy, Anatoly Chubais) being 
      the patronage man. I mean nothing can be worse 
      than this. But it is a system where the state 
      has the most intimate control of economic 
      resources. It decides you get this electricity 
      and you don't.


            /// END ACT ///


Mr. Hough believes western governments and the 
International Monetary Fund contributed to Russia's 
economic decline because they have steadfastly 
supported Boris Yeltsin and what Mr. Hough calls his 
shell game (tricky show) of reform. Mr. Yeltsin, he 
says, has skillfully adapted the old Soviet system to 
benefit the people closest to him.


Both Mr. Talbot and Mr. Hough agree that property 
rights need to be established and protected in Russia. 
They differ on the relative importance of foreign 
investment in promoting growth. For Mr. Talbot foreign 
investment is vital. For Mr. Hough domestic investment 
is far more important.


For 1999 the Russian economy is expected to register 
some growth, perhaps one percent. But the outlook for 
2000 is not promising with no real improvement in 
living standards expected.  

#7
Russia's New Military Doctrine Ready 'Within a Month'  


MOSCOW. Oct 20 (Interfax) - The drafting of a new 
Russian military doctrine will be brought to completion within a month, 
Col. Gen. Valery Manilov, fist deputy chief of the General Staff, told a 
news conference in Moscow on Wednesday [20 October]. 


Following the discussion of the draft by the Russian Security Council, the 
document will be sent to the country's president for approval, he said. 
The draft essentially "rejects the methods and tools of reaching 
political goals using a big stick such as the NATO military alliance," 
Manilov said. 


"We categarically reject and will tenaciously work to prevent making a 
habit of arbitrary use of military force in pursuance of purely national 
interests by NATO or the United States at the expense of sovereignty and 
interests of other countries," he said. 


The military strategic part of the draft outlines ways of countering 
military threats, Manilov said. 


"Russia will not use nuclear weapons against anybody but an aggressor. If a 
country or a group of countries attacks Russia and its allies, 
conventional weapons prove insufficient to curb the aggression and 
Russia's existence as a sovereign independent country is threatened, then 
the issue of using nuclear weapons may be raised," he said. Manilov did 
not say unambiguously whether Russia may use nuclear weapons first. 

#8
Risks at Soviet nuclear plants higher than normal due to Y2K: CIA


WASHINGTON, Oct 21 (AFP) - Soviet-made nuclear plants face a "higher than 
normal" risk from the so-called Y2K bug computer glitch at year's end, a top 
CIA official said Thursday.
"We are most concerned about the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear plants, 
including Chernobyl-type reactors in Russia and Ukraine, due both to inherent 
design problems of these plants ... and to the lack of detailed data on Y2K 
remediation plans and contingency plans," said the CIA official, Larry 
Gershwin.


Still, "we judge that the chance of a nuclear accident on the scale of 
Chernobyl is extremely low," Gershwin, national intelligence officer for 
Science and Technology for the Central Intelligence Agency, told a House 
panel.


Gershwin told the House International Relations Committee that officials 
believe the likelihook of a nuclear incident in Russia, Ukraine, or another 
state with Soviet-designed reactors during the Y2K rollover is "low."


"It is, however, higher than normal because of the likelihood that the power 
grid could experience failures ... in the worst case, this could cause a 
meltdown and in some cases, an accompanying release of radioactive fission 
gases causing localized contamination," he told lawmakers.


The Y2K "Millennium Bug" is a computer glitch stemming from the inability of 
some computers to distinguish between the years 2000 and 1900 because they 
read only the last two digits.


Gershwin also sought to allay fears of an atomic missile launch, saying the 
CIA was "highly confident that Y2K failures will not lead to the inadvertent 
or unauthorized launch of a ballistic missile by any country."


And the CIA official reiterated that Russia, Ukraine, China and Indonesia 
were among major countries most likely to experience "significant" Y2K 
problems, while Western Europe -- except Italy -- was "better prepared."


Germany and Japan were making "great strides ... but their late start and the 
magnitude of the effort suggest that even these countries are at risk of some 
failures," warned Gershwin.


Canada, Britain, Australia, Singapore and Hong Kong "are very well prepared" 
for the phenomenon.


"We are also concerned about possible Y2K-related disruptions in countries 
planning major tourist events -- for example, Italy, Egypt, Brazil, and the 
Caribbean -- should local infrastructures experience significant failures," 
the official said. 

#9
Excerpt
US Department of State
Foreign Media Reaction
October 20, 1999
RUSSIA'S CHECHEN OPERATION; WEST'S 'WEAK' REACTION CONTINUE TO DRAW EDITORIAL
FIRE
As Russia presses on with its nearly month-old military operation in Chechnya,
media voices outside of Russia continued to criticize the Kremlin's "dangerous
adventure," and particularly its "use of force to resolve a problem that can
only be settled politically." A number of analysts noted Prime Minister
Putin's "soaring popularity" among the Russian public as a result of his "iron-fisted"
approach to the Caucasian republic. "For the moment," mused a British paper,
"Russians identify Mr. Putin, and the harsh patriotism he projects, as their
future's brightest hope." Several observers also judged that Russia's "military
assault" serves the premier's political agenda, as did London's liberal
Guardian, which held that "he knows that his wish to succeed Yeltsin would be
boosted by a credible claim to have vanquished 'black' Chechen terrorists."
Said a Warsaw daily, "No one doubts that the current war in Chechnya...is in
fact a war for the Kremlin. If Putin is the winner, he can feel secure in his
chances for the presidency." Given the Russian army's current "position of
strength" as it fortifies its bases around Grozny, many editorialists stressed
that the Kremlin should now "take the Chechen issue from the battlefield to
the negotiating table." By doing so, argued a Frankfurt daily, "the Russian
leadership will free itself of the suspicion that it has been playing a
game in Chechnya whose purpose has been anything but the fight against terrorism." The
"so far weak reaction" from the West to Russia's offensive--"silence" was the
term used by many--also triggered criticism from papers in Europe and
elsewhere. From Russia, opinion on the military offensive ran the gamut--with
those viewing it as a just "fight against terrorism" outnumbering critics, who
maintained that "war and counter-terror do not get us anywhere." Regional
highlights follow:

RUSSIA: Support for the Chechen campaign was found in official as well as
reformist and opposition press, while criticism emanated mainly from reformist
papers. Speaking in favor, official Parlamentskaya Gazeta commended the
authorities' decision "to put things in order in Chechnya once and for all."
This view was seconded by a reformist weekly, which insisted, "What is
going on is not war but bringing constitutional order to our own land." Even supporters
of the military campaign worried, however, that Russia "may be dragged into a
no-win war." Such an eventuality, suggested reformist Kommersant Daily, would
demolish Mr. Putin's plans to "win this 'little war' so that it could gain him
the presidency." "If the campaign fails or causes heavy casualties," argued
another, Mr. Putin would be the obvious "fall guy."

EUROPE: A wide spectrum of papers--including many in France, Germany, Italy
and Spain--admonished the West for its "embarrassed silence" or "only mild
protests" on Chechnya. Fearing "a new humanitarian disaster" in the region, a
Madrid writer spoke for many in asserting, "None of this seems to matter much
to the West.... Whatever happened to the obligation to intervene for
humanitarian purposes?" Citing damage from Russian air attacks, a Paris paper
contended, "For less than this, Indonesia was accused of torturing the
population of East Timor...for similar war-like actions in Kosovo, the West
united against Serbia."

ELSEWHERE: Commentary from the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Latin America and
Canada mirrored European reaction, with pundits urging Russia to "stop the
bloodshed," and chiding the West for its perceived "indifference" to the
plightof Chechen refugees. 

EDITOR: Katherine L. Starr
EDITOR'S NOTE: This survey is based on 59 reports from 29 countries,
October 7- 
20. Editorial excerpts are grouped by region; editorials from each country are
listed from the most recent date.


EUROPE
RUSSIA: "Washington Jealous" 
Vadim Markushin opined in centrist army Krasnaya Zvezda (10/20): "Chechnya may
become another factor for Washington to go by as it adjusts its line of
behavior with regard to Moscow. The IMF and the United States are putting
pressure on Russia to make it not 'strain itself' too much in the North
Caucasus. Evidently, the idea is that Moscow should act in a way which, while
looking like fighting against terrorists, would not give Russia a full victory
showing its increased moral and military potential." 


"War Costs Less Than Peace"
Andrei Bagrov contended in reformist weekly Vlast (10/19): "The Khasavyurt
agreement, signed by Aleksandr Lebed in 1996, has proved too expensive. In the
three years that have passed since then, the war never ended.... After
Khasavyurt, Chechnya became a generator of crime in Russia.... The current
campaign in Chechnya costs Russia much less than its losses there in all three
years. Inaction will cost even more, since what's going on is not war but
bringing constitutional order to our own land. Chechnya is a gangland, a kind
of remake of Algeria of the early 19th century. Holding it is as costly as it
is deadly. Who needs a country which can't handle bandits in its own house?"


"West To Follow Public Opinion"
Aleksandr Davydov said on page one of reformist Vremya-MN (10/18): "The West
assures Moscow that it is not going to link a new (aid) tranche to the
Chechnya war. But as the war goes on and the West hears more about refugees and
casualties, Western governments are more likely again to follow public
opinion."


"Generals To Ruin Putin"
Reformist Segodnya (10/16) front-paged a commentary by Natalia Kalashnikova
and Oleg Odnokolenko: "With the federal forces in the second stage of their
campaign, ready to fight terrorists in all of Chechnya, Premier Putin may be
dragged into a no-win war. The generals have their reasons, of course--they
have to fight, ex officio. Besides, they are eager to have their revenge. The
Kremlin's reasons are even stronger. It needs exciting war reports to eclipse
news stories about the (financial) scandal. Also, it will need a fall guy if
the campaign fails or causes heavy casualties. Putin fits that bill nicely."


"Only Army Guarantees Security"
Vitaly Denisov contended in centrist army Krasnaya Zvezda (10/16): "A nation's
prestige is not measured by its solvency alone. A nation must be able to
ensure its own security. Only its army can guarantee it. Events in Dagestan and
Chechnya bear that out."


"Putin May Not Know What's Coming" 
Ilya Bulavinov remarked in reformist business-oriented Kommersant Daily
(10/16):
"Putin hardly knows that we are in for an entirely different kind of war in
Chechnya now. But he is out to win this 'little war' so that it could gain him 
the presidency. He forgets,though, that this is exactly what Yeltsin wanted in 1994." 


"What Better Way To Deal With Terrorism?" 
Nina Maksakova noted on page one of official parliamentary Parlamentskaya
Gazeta
(10/16): "The world knows of no way to fight terrorism that would be gentle
and effective at the same time. You have to use violence. But violence spells a
tragedy. You have to accept it, for there is no telling what may happen if you
don't use force. Russia must protect its citizens, territory and regions that
border on Chechnya."


"Chechnya Is Ulster" 
Aleksandr Koretsky of reformist Segodnya (10/14) quoted a leading Russian
expert on the Caucasus Sergei Arutyunov: "The chief reason why a military victory is
impossible is that we may get mired for decades in a terrorist war, as in
Ulster. We can prevent that by gradually getting Chechnya back into Russia." 


"War Benefits West" 
Vyacheslav Tetekin argued on page one of nationalist opposition Sovetskaya
Rossiya (10/14): "The war in the Caucasus benefits the Kremlin. But the West
stands to gain the most. The West's concern for ethnic minorities' rights is
downright hypocritical. It would do better to remember the wrongs it
wreaked in Yugoslavia. Knowing that we are being drawn into another war does not mean
that we should get out of Chechnya. It is essential that the Muslim world should
realize that the war in the North Caucasus is about geopolitics, not religion,
that the main confrontation is between the East and the West, not between the
North (Russia) and the South." 


"Chechnya Is No Kosovo; NATO Won't Help" 
Official government Rossiyskaya Gazeta (10/13) front-paged this commentary by
Nikolai Paklin: "Chechen President Maskhadov has asked NATO for help.... He
said that intervention in the conflict between Moscow and Grozny should be in
line with 'the norms of the new world order NATO is out to set up.' Those
norms were first tried in Yugoslavia. But the West realizes that Russia is no
Yugoslavia. You can't talk to Russia using ultimatums, even less so
force--this would be asking for a rebuff, including a nuclear one.... The West is using
the issue of Chechen refugees. It did the same with regard to Kosovo refugees
recently. Reports say that the terrorists force civilians to leave their homes
to make Chechnya look like a 'humanitarian catastrophe zone.' Of course,
peaceful Chechens are fleeing the war as Kosovars did NATO bombs. But the
terrorists only need a 'humanitarian catastrophe' as an excuse for outside
forces to intervene in Russia's internal conflict. The European
Commission...urges the international community to mount a large-scale campaign
to give humanitarian aid to Chechen refugees. Russia, basically, does not mind
such assistance. But it objects to unknown 'humanitarian' NGOs giving it in
the conflict area, the way the West wants this to be done. Anyhow, Chechen
terrorists won't see the West intercede for them in any effective way. Western
governments are unanimous that Chechnya was and remains part of Russia." 


"We May End Up Fighting Against Chechnya" 
Andrei Kolesnikov and Yevgeny Krutikov noted in reformist Izvestiya (10/13):
"With the leaders of the Chechnya operation rejecting political means,
shunting Maskhadov, and banking on other centers of political power not very
influential in Chechnya or constitutionally legitimate, the war against the terrorists may
turn into a war against Chechnya, as happened in 1994-1996." 


"There's No Destroying Terrorism By Force" 
Vasily Safronchuk argued on page one of nationalist opposition Sovetskaya
Rossiya (10/12): "There is no destroying terrorism by force, since it has
social and economic roots. To do away with terrorism in Chechnya and all of the North
Caucasus takes a viable economy and jobs for the population, especially young
people. The current bandit-type regime in Chechnya makes that impossible. The
hostilities and air raids don't contribute to economic activity either. To
break that vicious circle, barring new people in the Kremlin, we need a new
policy . Putin's palliatives and time-serving decisions are unlikely to
help--the war in Chechnya may drag on for decades." 


"Off With The Terrorist Scum"
Boris Alekseyev argued in official, government Rossiyskaya Gazeta (10/12):
Obviously, Chechnya is a split entity in terms of government and society. A
bunch of ringleaders are playing games, drawing the criminal scum from around
the world, controlled by no one. So any [peace] initiative or plan makes no
sense. To wipe the terrorist rabble off the face of the earth and rid life of
fear and violence seems like the only solution."


"No One Wants To Risk His Popularity"
Fyodor Olegov judged on page one of centrist Nezavisimaya Gazeta (10/12): "The
current action in Chechnya would have been less painful but for a lack of
cooperation between Moscow and Grozny.... Mashkadov thinks that for starters,
the feds would do well to stop the bombing and pull out. But with an elections
campaign on, no sober-minded politician in Russia would risk his popularity
rating by doing that." 


"Not A Step Backward; Not A Step Forward?" 
Alexei Bogaturov judged in centrist weekly Vek (10/8): "An expedition
across the Terek makes no sense militarily or politically. Based on the left bank and
having the support of the local population, the armed forces can easily
control and, if necessary, adjust the situation south of the river by air force and
artillery. Meanwhile, the politicians and negotiators, by building up economic
pressure, will influence the authorities in Grozny to induce them to fight the
bandits in the mountains. This is a...more reliable and viable scheme than
attempts to remove Maskhadov and simultaneously saddle the federal government
with a host of problems connected with managing a 'rebel territory.' Why do we
have to go for military theatrics if they are suicidal?" 


"Peace In Chechnya Is Only Possible After A War" 
Andrei Danko stressed in official Parlamentskaya Gazeta (10/8): "Developments
vindicate the theory that the Russian authorities have decided to put
things in order in Chechnya once and for all. And, against all the odds, to do it by
military methods. An early end of the operation is not on the cards. It is
unlikely to be completed before the spring and summer of next year. All this
time the terrorists who have dug in on the republic's territory will be
pounded from the air and from the ground to the accompaniment of talk about possible
talks. Negotiations will, of course, be held but not until the exhausted and
enfeebled field commanders are prepared to agree to any terms, fantastic as
they may seem today." 


"We May Face A Blockade" 
Galina Polozhevets judged in centrist weekly Vek (10/8): "The cat-and-mouse
game that IMF officials are playing with Russia may indicate a dramatic change in
the West's attitude toward our country. 
"For various reasons and in many ways through our own fault, foreign investors
won't have any truck with Russia in the next few years at least.... Everybody
is waiting for the dust to settle in Russia after the electoral battles and
the military actions in Chechnya. Until such time the economic relations between
the West and our country may be put on hold no matter how sweet the smiles of
diplomats and the promises of IMF officials." 


"Russia As Israel; Chechens As Palestinians" 
Dmitry Furman wrote in reformist weekly Obshchaya Gazeta (10/7): "If we
want to be healed (we and the Chechens) we have to understand what the Israelis have
understood, namely, that war...[and] counter-terror do not get us anywhere.
That driving the Chechens further into a corner is not only immoral but
dangerous, that it is necessary to talk to Maskhadov, that a normal and viable
Chechen state is something that we need as much as the Chechens, and that
eventual recognition of Chechen independence is inevitable. But to become
aware of it and admit it, Russian leaders need much more courage than to start a new
Chechen war.... But by saying or doing something that runs counter to public
opinion or the opinion of the 'elite' they may ruin their careers. People like
Rabin or Barak...have shown that they are ready to give their lives for their
country have proved to be able to do so. But neither our president, nor our
premier...never had to risk their lives for their country.... And it is
unlikely that they have the courage to embark on a real search for peace." 


"New Tactics; Old Strategy" 
Pyotr Golovin said in reformist weekly Itogi (# 40, 10/7): "While trying to
avoid old mistakes in tactics, Moscow has not changed its strategy. Its final
goal is unclear, as before--it is either destroying the terrorists or solving
the Chechnya problem. If it is the former, why do the bombing? It is hard to
hit a terrorist from a flying plane. If Chechnya is a rebel territory and the
rebels' resistance needs to be crushed by all means, we have to brace
ourselves for more terrorist acts, in which case the slogan of fighting terrorism seems
irrelevant." 


"After Kosovo, It's Okay To Bomb Chechnya" 
Leonid Velekhov contended in reformist weekly Itogi (# 40, 10/7): "After
Kosovo, anything goes. You can't try to bomb Milosevic into a compromise and, at the
same time, urge others not to do the same to Maskhadov. After Kosovo, anything
is possible, with the ban on the use of force without approval by the UN all
but disavowed. Conflicts like Kosovo and Chechnya may reduce the UN's role to
offering humanitarian aid to displaced people." 


"Info Blackout Is Bad For Campaign" 
Reformist, business-oriented Kommersant Daily (10/7) intoned editorially on
page one: "War, of course, presupposes censorship. But with the army's General
Staff insisting on a total information blackout, public attitude toward the current
events in Chechnya may quickly [turn against the campaign]. You can't win a
war these days without public support. It took the Pentagon the Vietnam war to
realize that. With the Russians, the two previous campaigns in Afghanistan and
Chechnya are not enough." 


"We Caution The Government And The World" 
Nationalist/opposition Sovetskaya Rossiya (10/7) front-paged this piece signed
by its editor-in-chief Valentin Chikin, his counterpart Aleksandr Prokhanov of
nationalist/opposition Zavtra and the Communist Party leader, Gennady
Zyuganov: "We caution the government against ferocious violent actions that might add to
people's suffering, as well as against the hypocrisy and treachery which,
lurking in political circles. "This may turn into a campaign against the Russian army, causing a halt in its
offensive, the eventual signing of a second Khasavyurt accord, and a
subsequent chain reaction-like disintegration of this country. This being an internal
conflict, we categorically object to the foreign intervention we can
discern in statements by German, French and American politicians who are still hot from
the abominable bombing of Yugoslavia." 

#10
RUSSIA'S Priority Is to Continue Reforms, Integration -Putin.


HELSINKI, October 21 (Itar-Tass) - Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said 
the priority tasks of Russia's foreign and domestic policy remain unchanged 
as they were determined by President Boris Yeltsin. 


Russia will continue the "policy towards market and democratic reforms and 
its integration into the world economic and political community", Putin said 
in an interview with Turun Sanomat newspaper on Thursday. 


The prime minister stressed that Yeltsin "was and remains the real and 
incumbent head of state" and a new president will be elected in compliance 
with the constitution. 


Commenting on the domestic situation in Russia, Putin explained that there 
are no political forces in the country, which will be able to "turn Russia to 
the past and the state does not permit to do it". 


"There is no concern about the outcome of the parliamentary and presidential 
elections," the prime minister said. 


Speaking on Chechnya, Putin said the political settlement in the republic 
will begin only after terrorists and guerrillas are eliminated. 


"Our final aim is certainly political settlement in Chechnya. We will get 
down to it as soon as the rule of bandits and terrorists is eliminated," he 
said. 


"Any political settlement is out of the question" until guerrillas are in 
power, Putin said. Civilised countries do not hold negotiations with 
criminals, and there is no other capable authority in Chechnya, he stressed. 


Russia does not wage a war against the Chechen people, Putin continued. It is 
taking necessary and legitimate actions aimed at re-establishing law and 
order in a part of its territory, he said. Russia's activities in Chechnya 
is, without doubt, its interior affair, he added. 


If there is an international aspect of developments in the North Caucasus, it 
can only be seen in the involvement of international terrorist groups in the 
invasion into Dagestan, the prime minister said. He qualified the guerrilla 
attack as an aggression against Russia effected in the territory of Dagestan. 


According to Putin, there is no humanitarian catastrophe in the North 
Caucasus. "We have enough power and resources to prevent such scenario," he 
stressed.