
| ISSUE #68 | October 1, 1999 |
#1 Moscow Times October 1, 1999 Would Invasion Be a Disaster? By Brian Whitmore Staff Writer The Kremlin has reportedly given the ground war a green light. But while we still do not know the exact plan, military analysts say this could be a disaster in the making. For the past several days, media have been floating various ground war scenarios. The most common has Russian forces occupying northern Chechnya as far south as the Terek River, which flows only about 15 kilometers north of Grozny, the Chechen capital. The river is as far as 40 kilometers from the border in some spots. The daily newspaper Segodnya, however, reported Wednesday that the Russian military aims to eventually gain control over all of Chechnya. According to Segodnya, Russian forces will attempt to drive guerrilla forces into Chechnya's mountains by the winter, isolate them and hope they freeze to death. Whether that's the exact plan or not, an invasion of some sort is underway. Interfax, citing Defense Ministry sources, reported that plans for a ground operation are in their final stage. Airborne and infantry units will be the nucleus of the strike force, the agency reported, with some 20,000 servicemen from both the defense and interior ministries being transferred to Dagestan and North Ossetia as reinforcements. Military analysts say that Russia could be making a major mistake, especially with the cold weather and poor visibility that will be coming soon. "This is mass idiocy," said Pavel Felgenhauer, a Moscow-based defense analyst. "I don't understand Russia's military strategy. I am afraid that Russia is headed for a total military disaster." "Military strategy says that you should never, ever, initiate a ground operation with winter approaching," said Alexander Zhilin, a military analyst for the newspaper Moskovskiye Novosti. "This is absurd and ineffective. From a military point of view it makes no sense." Zhilin said that over the next month the weather will change and cloud cover will hinder Russia's ability to conduct airstrikes and give badly needed air cover to ground troops. He said that from 30,000 to 50,000 troops are necessary to occupy northern Chechnya to the Terek River, but that Russian forces have three weeks at the most to complete the operation before the weather starts working against them. "I am afraid that there are going to be massive casualties," Zhilin said, adding that while public opinion and media are more or less supporting the military right now, this will change as soon as heavy combat losses mount. Both Zhilin and Felgenhauer said that the lack of a unified command would also hinder coordination between troops under the command of the Interior Ministry and regular army units under the command of the Defense Ministry. Meanwhile, there is already some evidence that the public and the media are starting to question the wisdom of Russia's latest adventure in the Caucasus region. "Five years later, a tragedy repeats itself," wrote the newspaper Obshchaya Gazeta. "The cost, as it was then, is thousands of lives." A public opinion poll released Thursday showed that 57 percent of Moscow's residents oppose airstrikes against Chechnya - now in their eighth day. In 1994-96, a bloody attempt by Russian forces to prevent Chechnya's independence drive resulted in 80,000 deaths - mostly civilians and inexperienced conscripts. Ex-Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, one of the architects of Russia's disastrous 1994-96 war, warned against another ground war, saying it could lead to "political catastrophe." "Before making a decision on a possible ground operation in Chechnya, one should thoroughly analyze the military operations in Chechnya in 1994-96, even if this experience is bitter," Stepashin said in remarks carried by Interfax. "Today, a large part of the population of Chechnya is preparing for full-scale combat operations, which will naturally cause serious casualties, which, in turn, could completely change the public's attitude to developments in the North Caucasus." Interfax reported Igor Shabdurasulov, President Boris Yeltsin's deputy chief of staff, as saying that Russia's political leaders have approved a ground invasion - leaving it up to the military to set the date. Putin stopped just short of saying that Moscow was mounting or would mount a ground invasion, although he did claim that Russian forces were moving in and out of Chechnya with impunity. "Chechnya is Russian territory and troop movements can take place whenever this is necessary," Putin said in televised comments from St. Petersburg, where he was meeting with the security chiefs of other former Soviet states. "I can say that troops have entered Chechnya several times." By various estimates, from 20,000 to 30,000 federal troops are massed on Chechnya's border.
#2
STRATFOR.COM
Global Intelligence Update
October 1, 1999
Moscow Poised for Chechnya Invasion
Summary:
Russia is poised to launch a limited invasion of Chechnya
and Moscow is likely to accomplish its goals. Russian forces will
have little time and with winter approaching, they will be forced
to hurry to retake north central Chechnya by the end of November,
driving the rebels south into the mountains for the season. Right
now, the tide of political support for war runs strong in Russia,
though the international community and some politicians are
encouraging non-aggression. But Russian forces are not fully
prepared. As a result, the cost in resources, personnel and
finances will be severe.
Analysis:
The momentum for launching a war in Chechnya is at a crescendo in
Moscow and cannot be ignored by the Kremlin or the Defense
Ministry. The Russian population is feverish for retaliation
against terrorist attacks. Chechen rebels are being blamed for
bombing civilian apartment buildings throughout Russia, killing 292
people. The extent of public outrage has caused center-left parties
and politicians to join the witch-hunt. To make matters worse,
Russia's NTV aired videotapes this week of Chechen rebels
mutilating Russian POWs during the first Chechen war.
These sentiments are already starting to ebb, however, and invasion
plans may be threatened if not carried out soon. Opposition to war
is building in the West, but has not reached critical mass,
certainly not to the point of sending observer missions into
Chechnya. Though Russian media support the war effort, it is
skeptical of the capabilities of Russian forces. If momentum flags,
the Defense Ministry may be unable to use the harsh winter climate
against the guerrillas. Due to weather conditions, Russian forces
cannot sustain a massive campaign into December and January.
Accordingly, a second Chechen war will come to a screeching halt if
the Russians delay a ground invasion.
Russia's window of opportunity for a successful ground invasion is
60 days, starting now, according to Segodnya, a Moscow daily.
Russian officials at the Kremlin, Federal Security Bureau and the
Defense and Interior Ministries have done more than just cultivate
an appetite for war at home. They have also guarded against dissent
among the ranks, having learned some strong lessons from the first
Chechen war.
The bombing campaign in Chechnya over the last seven days
demonstrates that the Russian commanders have learned from the
debacle in Chechnya in 1994 to1996. This time, air forces will
likely ferret out guerrilla hideouts ahead of ground forces moving
in. This will allow more aircraft to fly close air support and
evacuation. It also reduces the risk of friendly fire from the air,
which was arguably the most lethal threat to Russian troops in the
first war. More Su-34s are likely to appear in combat as well,
placing ground forces under cover of Russia's most advanced
fighters.
The decimation of Chechnya's infrastructure before the ground
offensive was a poorly coordinated but effective measure. More than
1,500 sorties were flown over Dagestan and Chechnya in the past two
weeks, with a sustained campaign over Chechnya since Sept. 23. The
government loosely defined "military targets" as homes, bridges,
hospitals, TV stations, broadcast towers and radar.
Targets were chosen for two reasons: to clear the territory of
civilians and to limit damaging information from coming out of
Chechnya. The high incidence of civilian casualties in Chechnya
last time turned the international community - and Russians -
against the war. Barring any stable communications relay from
Chechnya to the outside world, Russia can preclude any substantial
information war by the guerrillas and establish an information
blockade.
This will change once Russian troops encounter rebel forces in the
field. First, the tight schedule for a ground invasion will hamper
a sweeping success in Chechnya. Since an invasion must begin and
end within 60 days, planning is likely to be rushed and the
capabilities of Russian forces may be over estimated. Institutional
support, consent of the people and morale within the armed forces
may sell this war at home and abroad. These factors are so
compelling that the Kremlin and the Ministry of Defense are likely
to hastily commit forces to a war they cannot lose - nor easily
win.
Russian planners have also not field-tested most lessons from the
previous Chechen war. If Dagestan is a guide, Russian forces will
have command and control problems. A major problem in Dagestan was
the disparity of skills among combined units, particularly
paratroopers working closely with regular infantry and Dagestani
volunteers. The breakdown of discipline and poor combat skills
among regulars endangered paratroopers, putting the two groups at
odds during combat.
Some elements of air support will also act as a liability. The
weapons and on-board systems of the army's Mi-8 and Mi-24 combat
helicopters are technically obsolete. They are also more prone to
anti-aircraft weapons and sniper-fire and easily damaged. The Ka-50
Black Shark would be a better attack helicopter, but some reports
indicate this and other precision weapons will not be used. Rebels,
on the other hand, will use dated technology to their advantage,
including ZU-23-2 mobile anti-aircraft launchers, Shilka ZSU-23/4
anti-aircraft guns, Stinger missiles and RPG-7 grenade launchers.
This capability will raise the flight ceiling of support aircraft,
leaving ground forces vulnerable to ambush.
The planning for the ground campaign this time has certainly been
better. But Russian forces have not learned as much as rebel forces
over the past five years, despite the advantages of preempting a
rebel information war and encouraging the flight of the civilian
population. Rebel forces essentially participated in a war gaming
exercise with their enemy in Dagestan. What little Russian forces
may have rehearsed since the previous war is unlikely to apply
here. The rebels are quick to accommodate changes in battle tactics
and are superior in mobile warfare. To add to the burden, Russia's
weaknesses are embedded in the organizational structure of the
armed forces and cannot be overcome with planning.
Maneuvers up to this point have been preventive and will permit
Russia an eventual military victory over Chechnya. But Russia is
not fully prepared for this war, and will struggle, simply because
political motives will supercede military ability. As Russian
forces tighten a cordon around central Chechnya over the next two
months, they will suffer. The false confidence of Moscow's
politicians will be proven. Russia's campaign to seize 75 percent
of Chechnya by November will succeed in print and broadcast media,
though the war may ultimately have to rage through the winter, off-
camera. Russia will meet its objective to reclaim Chechnya, at
whatever cost.
#4 The Russia Journal www.russiajournal.com September 27-October 3, 1999 Troops battle for crops on home front By LYUBA PRONINA While some Russian soldiers fulfill their military duty fighting a war in Dagestan, thousands of other conscripts are being sent to the Russian countryside to prevent a catastrophe on the home front. To avoid losing hectares of harvest-ready crops, the government has sent military forces to help villagers collect their stocks before the first frosts bite. The Moscow region alone has commissioned around 15,000 conscripts, police and security forces for this year's autumn rush. "There is absolutely no way we would have managed without the army this year," said Alexander Sarbash, director of a state collective farm in the Dmitrov region, more than 100 kilometers north of Moscow. Despite a record three-and-a-half-month drought this year, the farm grew enough potatoes, carrots and beets on its 550 hectares of land to busy 1,200 pairs of hands from late August until early October. Without 600 soldiers and 300 contract workers from around Russia, the farm's own 300-man workforce would have struggled to finish on time, said the farm's financial director Raisa Chernyakova. On the threshold of the third millennium, while farmers everywhere in the West use advanced machinery, Russian peasants are still stuck using the plow. When it comes to harvesting crops, vegetables tend to be handpicked. But hands, as well as machinery, are in short supply. People leave, unable to survive on meager salaries. "During the three months of the harvest, tractor drivers and machine operators earn 2,000 to 3,000 rubles a month. During the rest of the year, they are lucky if they get a thousand," Chernyakova said. Pickers only get paid 25 rubles a day (just under a dollar) for filling twenty sacks, 20kg each. "In the 40 years that we've existed, we've always welcomed outside help," Chernyakova added. In the Soviet Union, when harvest seasons loomed, the state encouraged city residents, students and the army to extend a helping hand in what became known as "the battle for crops." Taken from their workplaces, people were hurled into the fields to combat the elements, for free. But lack of calculation by the authorities and limited enthusiasm left farms tallying up their losses after aid parties departed. The practice was abandoned by the 1990s, with more responsibility in harvest campaigns falling on the army. "One soldier is worth five students," said Viktor Zavyalov, the Moscow region's deputy agriculture minister. "They are a lot more disciplined." Oleg Degtyaryov, in charge of the soldiers' work in the fields, laments the fact that they are pulled away from their military training. "We didn't take them away from their parents to teach them to pick potatoes, but in a time of emergency, who else is there to help? If the agriculture sector had advanced technology, we wouldn't be here," he said. But the teenage soldiers-turned-farmers don't seem to mind the maneuver. Although crouching from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. plucking vegetables is tedious, working on a farm provides them with a chance to break away from the routine of military drills. It also livens up their daily menu, and allows them to stock up on vegetables for the winter and earn a bit of money. Instead of the 20 rubles the state issues each soldier per month, working in the field they each earn 25 rubles a day. Officers get 45 rubles. After the working day, soldiers relax with a game of volleyball, and occasionally locals organize a concert for them. "We are not miffed. It doesn't make any difference now that we've learned to shoot. It's fun being here - the accommodation is good and the food is excellent," said Roman Matrosov from Nizhny Novgorod. "I only stretched my back a little," complained Sergei Miltsin.
#5 PBS The Newshour with Jim Lehrer RUSSIA'S QUAGMIRE September 29, 1999 An Islamic insurgency from Chechnya is threatening Russia's control of Dagestan. After a background report, a panel discusses the latest unrest in the Caucasus. ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: And with me to talk about the fighting in Chechnya are Dimitri Simes, president of the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom and author of After the Collapse: Russia Seeks its Place as a Great Power. He returned from Moscow Saturday. Yo'Av Karny, a journalist whose book about the Caucasus, Highlanders, is to be published soon. And Stephen Cohen, Professor of Russian Studies at New York University and author of Rethinking the Soviet Experience. All out war? Dimitri Simes, please expand a little bit on what we just heard about Russian strategy in Chechnya right now. Is Russia headed toward another all-out war there? DIMITRI SIMES: It's an interesting and difficult question. I wish I knew whether the Russian leadership had a strategy. Certainly, if their strategy is a ground invasion, full-scale ground invasion, they're asking for a lot of trouble. They don't have enough forces around Chechnya. Their forces are not well equipped; the morale is rather poor. Most Russians want to teach the Chechens to listen, but they are not prepared to pay for this lesson with a lot of blood and treasure, so my hope is that the Russians are posturing, that they're using their air force, that they may want to occupy a couple of fields to position themselves better and to establish some kind of a buffer zone. But if they're trying to start a full-scale invasion, we make a lot of escalation and dangerous miscalculation. ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: And, Mr. Cohen, your view of Russian strategy at this point in relation to what Mr. Simes just said, Russia's Interfax News Agency did report today that Russian troops moved into Chechnya, occupying "peaks" overlooking two villages. There is no confirmation of that at all? STEPHEN COHEN: Well, strategy may be too grand a word for it, but militarily the Russian government, the Yeltsin regime, to be specific, is viewing Chechnya as a kind of cancer in the Russian Federation -- as a plague -- and it's attempting either to destroy it with military force or to utterly quarantine it from the rest of Russia by some sort of military buffer between the rest of the Russian Federation and Chechnya. Politically, the strategy would appear to be on the part of this very desperate Yeltsin regime, which is loathed by the Russian people, to do something in Chechnya that would gain itself some measure of popularity with the Russian people, or at least gain it a sense among the Russian people that it's a needed regime, that it can protect the people, it's not clear that they'll succeed in either strategy, but I think that's what the strategy is. ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: And, Mr. Karny, the bombing is of Chechen villages, Chechen infrastructure. What's the relationship between official Chechnya, the government, and the rebels? YO'AV KARNY: Well, in Russian mind the government is the rebels and has been so since November of 1991, when exactly eight years ago when Chechnya declared independence. If I were a knowledgeable Russian tonight, I would be close to despair, because there isn't a way out. There might have been a considerable way out four, five, six years ago if only Russia had let Chechnya go at the time, before the bad blood, before 80,000-odd casualties, which incidentally, proportionately speaking, is more than Britain and France suffered during the entire period of World War II. What happened between 1994 and 1996 is probably irreversible, and that is, the radicalization of the Chechen population. And the fact that the cause has been to a large extent surrendered to a militant, to some extent alien ideology that had never existed in the Caucasus before this war... A history of resistance ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Okay. Before you go on, expand on that. Are you talking about the Islamic ideology and religion that's being put forth by the rebels? What do you mean? YO'AV KARNY: I do, indeed. The Northeast Caucasus, of which we are talking, is of course historically Muslim. But the Islam that prevailed in the Caucasus before 1994 had been largely eclectic, idiosyncratic, full of indigenous habits, customs and heritage. It was essentially tolerant. It was laid back, relaxed, steeped in Islamic mysticism, close to what Muslims call Suf-ism. What we are seeing now, the rise of fundamentalism, what is attributed to Wa hab-ism, which is basically Saudi Arabia militant school of Islam is entirely new, should have never happened. The Russians have developed expertise in opening cans of worms in Islamic countries. ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: And Mr. Karny, very briefly. I interrupted you before you got to answer the question whether there is a tight relationship between the Chechen official government and the rebels. YO'AV KARNY: That's doubtful. The president of Chechnya, Aslan Maskhadov, who is a former Soviet army colonel, wanted presumably to reach some sort of agreement with the Russians over de facto independence, perhaps an attempted state and nation-building. The warlords, as they are known, fighters have nothing to do with that. Shamil Basayev who is the warlord who invaded Dagestan last month was offered the prime ministership in 1996. That was a clear attempt at allowing him to show his hand in construction. He turned it down. ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: All right. Mr. Simes, is there consensus right now among the political leadership in Russian about how to deal with the rebels in Chechnya, and if so, if there is consensus about the bombing, why, given the terrible consequences of the last time that Russia was involved there? DIMITRI SIMES: I think there is consensus in Russia now that Chechen rebels are pretty terrible people. Shamil Basayev, I have to say, is not just a rebel commander; he's a bandit, he's a terrorist, he has a record of hostage-taking. I think that anything the Russians can do against him is justified, not just strategically but morally. I also have to say that most Russians agree that President Maskhadov doesn't control the situation, but that is besides the point because the same dilemma as the Israelis in Lebanon. If the government cannot control the situation, then you are being subjected to terrorist attacks, you have to do something. The trouble is, the trouble is that the Russians do not have good options. They know what they are against. They have consensus that something has to be done, but they have no strategy. They have no forces which could implement an effective military strategy. And I think that they are trying to do whatever they can do to hold the situation, to manage the situation, but they don't have any real solutions. And the danger is that their attempts to intimidate the Chechens, these attempts may backfire and lead to a full-scale war. The conflict's affect on Russian politics ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: And Stephen Cohen, you touched on this, but how do you see the politics of this action and the effects on the politics of Russia? STEPHEN COHEN: Well, let me dissent from Dimitri just a bit. I don't know that we really disagree, but in fact the consensus among the Russian political class that he had mentioned existed until about 48 hours ago when a number of prominent members of parliament have called upon the government to stop the bombing of Chechnya because they're afraid it's going to preclude the possibility of any talks with the Chechens. The Kremlin responds, there are no possibility of talks with the Chechens, and that may be so. As for the political dynamic here, I believe that the basic dynamic is, from the Russian point of view, the desperate fear of the Yeltsin regime that the day will come, sooner rather than late other, when it will have to leave power, and that it will be held responsible inside Russia for what's happened inside Russia during the last seven or eight years. And this war gives it a chance, if that's the right formulation-- I'm not sure it's going to be a possible chance-- but a chance to do something that might win some of the allegiance of some of the people. I agree with Dimitri, the government does not have many possibilities. But this fear of retribution has led many very sensible people in Russia, people who are absolutely normal to ask the question of whether it was the Kremlin itself that set off those bombs inside Moscow. I mean what kind of government would be suspected of such a thing? And the answer is a government that has virtually no legitimacy with its own people. And that's the political context in which this terrible war is unfolding. ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Mr. Simes, before I move on to Mr. Karny, do you want to respond to that? DIMITRI SIMES: Well, I think it's pretty clear that the government in Moscow is very unpopular. It is pretty clear that Steve Cohen is absolutely right, people suspect this government of all kinds of possible things and indeed presidential contender Governor Lebed today said in an interview that he thinks the Kremlin is responsible for all these terrorist acts. I have to say, however, that if they had a different government, a more popular government, a more legitimate government, they would still have to deal with the Chechen terrorism. There is no option of ignoring this. The invasion of Dagestan was totally unprovoked, and it came from Chechnya. So the Russians have a dilemma: To let Chechnya go, or to continue this bloody nonsense. ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Go ahead. Sorry. DIMITRI SIMES: And I think that hopefully the Russians will come to a conclusion soon that full independence for Chechnya is the best possible alternative. ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: Mr. Karny, what about the effects on all this on the Chechens themselves? Are they able to resist this sort much bombing? YO'AV KARNY: That's a good question because for a couple of moments, one might have thought that we are talking about domestic Russian politics. We are talking about a historical confrontation between an imperial Russia and the indigenous nations of the Caucasus, something that goes back to the 18th century. The Chechens, you see, are a rare phenomenon in a Russian contest. There isn't a single ethnic group in Russia which has been as persistent and as determined in resisting Russian occupation since the 1780's. The Russians have just bombed the Grozny airport named after a fellow by the name of Sheck mon suer [ph?]. He was the first resistance leader executed by the Russians in the 1790's. Now, we must understand what happened here. The Chechens performed heroically in 1994 to 1996, but then their cause has started degenerating. It has been abducted. They forgot what they were fighting for. They were fighting for their own independence. Now it seems no longer to be the case. They are talking about, or some of them, are talking about an all-encompassing Islamic union of Dagestan and Chechnya. There fare-- therefore I disagree with Mr. Simes, in the sense that letting Chechnya go right now will no longer solve the problem. It's too late. ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH: And Mr. Cohen, we have a very little amount of time left. How is this all likely to affect U.S.-Russian relations? STEPHEN COHEN: Well, it isn't going to do it any good. They're already at a low, but the thing that worries me is ---- and I may be alone in this - nobody seems to mention it -- but this terrible war, this civil war, the systematic terrorism is unfolding for the first time in history in a nuclearized country and none of us know what that means. I think the bell is tolling. I mean we've crossed from an era of reasonable predictability about nuclear weapons to utter unpredictability. I mean we can't be certain, God forbid, that a terrorist would launch a rocket at a nuclear reactor, for example. We are in new territory. We have crossed some kind of Rubicund, and the implications are enormous.
#6 Christian Science Monitor 30 September 1999 [for personal use only] Chechnya bombs threaten US-Russia 'engagement' Amid Kosovo-style civilian flight, US takes measured tone to Russia, not wanting to spoil larger policy efforts. By Jonathan S. Landay , Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor The Russian bombing blitz to crush Islamic rebels in Chechnya appears to be putting the United States in a new foreign-policy bind. The onslaught comes as Washington is striving to work with the Kremlin on issues critical to US security, such as arms control and nonproliferation. Anxious to advance those efforts and bolster Russia's stability, the US has also pledged to help it fight Muslim terrorists blamed for recent bombings of Moscow apartment blocks. But such cooperation could become more difficult to defend as reports mount of Russian planes killing Chechen civilians in the hundreds, smashing schools and hospitals, and driving some 60,000 refugees into nearby republics. US officials also worry the assault will sap Russia's badly strained finances, fuel Muslim extremism in the oil-rich Caucasus region, and trigger more destabilizing terrorism in Russia itself. Should the bloodshed escalate and Moscow send in ground troops in a repeat of its disastrous 1994-96 war in Chechnya, US officials say it will be hard to do business as usual. Hoping to avoid long conflict "There is no question that if they are back to general hostilities in Chechnya, that is going to be a major problem for us," says a senior US official. The crisis underscores the fine line Washington must walk in its "engagement" policy with Russia. That policy emphasizes cooperation on US security interests and helping the world's second-largest nuclear power through its traumatic transition from authoritarianism to free-market democracy. But that means abiding Russia's economic and political chaos, policies opposed to US interests, epidemic corruption, and misconduct - such as the humanitarian calamity in Chechnya. This difficult trade-off is reflected in the absence of any outright US condemnation of the week-old Russian bombing of civilian areas of Chechnya, a breakaway republic in the north Caucasus. Instead, Washington is cautioning against an escalation of fighting and urging the sides to "refrain from military actions" that could prevent a dialogue. The US position could be elaborated on by the administration's Russia point-man, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, in a speech he is to make tomorrow at Harvard University. The current stance angers human-rights advocates, who say the US is ignoring massive Russian human-rights violations just as it did in the 1994-96 war. "The Clinton administration is very laissez faire about what is happening in Russia," says Rachel Denber of New York-based Human Rights Watch. "It will take a strong interest only where human-rights violations have a major negative impact on US national security interests." Some experts say the week-old Russian onslaught could give majority Republicans in Congress new ammunition with which to attack President Clinton's Russia policies. GOP leaders are now using a series of hearings into those policies and Russian corruption to ask the question "who lost Russia," with the aim of tarring Vice President Al Gore's presidential quest. Is 'Clinton doctrine' for real? The US view that the conflict in Chechnya is an internal Russian affair also raises new questions about the so-called "Clinton doctrine." Declared by Mr. Clinton during the Kosovo crisis and repeated by him at the United Nations last week, it advocates international intervention in major humanitarian crises. The administration clearly worries about all this. "There has been a lot of violence in the North Caucasus in the last couple of months," says an administration official. "The danger we see is that the escalation could lead to the worsening of that violence." The Russian offensive was triggered by incursions into neighboring Dagestan in August and September by Islamic rebels based in Chechnya. Moscow also blames the rebels for the Moscow bombings that killed 300 people. The Russian offensive aims to force Chechen President Alsan Maskhadov to crack down on the rebels, who seek an Islamic state in the predominantly Muslim region. Russia says its aircraft and long-range artillery are targeting rebel bases and supply lines, but civilian areas of the capital, Grozny, and other towns have been hit. Russia has deployed thousands of troops on Chechnya's borders in what could be invasion preparations. US officials and other experts are deeply skeptical of Moscow's strategy, which Russian officials say they adopted from the US-led NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia earlier this year. But US officials and experts say Russia lacks the precision munitions that NATO used in Yugoslavia. The resulting destruction and civilian casualties, they say, will fuel anti-Russian hatreds lingering from the 1994-96 war that erupted over Chechnya's declaration of independence from the Russian Federation. Up to 80,000 people were killed, including as many as 29,000 civilians in Russian bombardments that leveled much of Grozny. Furthermore, they say, Mr. Maskhadov is too weak to take on the rebels. Finally, the underfunded Russian Army's equipment, troops, and morale are in far worse shape than they were when it failed to crush Chechen forces in the last war, forcing a settlement that left the republic's status undecided. Moscow can't afford the new conflict, they say.
#7 Jamestown Foundation Monitor 1 October 1999 RUSSIAN MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROVERSY DELAYS DISBURSAL OF IMF CREDIT. Finance Minister Mikhail Kasyanov said today that Russia could receive the next US$640 million installment from a multibillion dollar International Monetary Fund loan at the end of this month or the beginning of November. Kasyanov's comments followed a meeting he had with President Boris Yeltsin, whom Kasyanov described as being worried about the fate of the IMF tranche (Russian agencies, October 1). The IMF credit was supposed to have been disbursed this month, but was delayed as a result of the controversy surrounding alleged Russian money laundering through the Bank of New York. According to press reports in August, U.S. law enforcement investigators believe that US$200 million or more from IMF credits were laundered through the Bank of New York. U.S. officials, including Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, have noted repeatedly that no evidence has been presented showing that IMF funds were misappropriated. But during U.S. congressional hearings into the Bank of New York scandal, Summers emphasized that Washington will back no further credits to Moscow until there is a proper accounting of how previous credits were used. The international auditing firm PriceWaterhouse Coopers has been commissioned to carry out that audit. The company was hired earlier this year by Russia's Central Bank (CBR), to audit the activities carried out by FIMACO, an obscure Channel Islands' asset management company into which the CBR had placed billions of dollars from Russia's hard-currency reserves. PriceWaterhouse Coopers' auditors found new illegalities concerning FIMACO, but noted that they were given insufficient information by the CBR to do a proper audit. Finance ministers from the G-7 leading industrial nations, meeting in Washington, issued a statement last weekend demanding that Russia clean up its Central Bank, audit its hard currency reserves every three months, take measures to strengthen its control over budgetary expenditures and submit an anti-moneylaundering law to the State Duma. The ministers said that the quarterly audit should be a condition for further loan disbursals (Vremya-MN, Moscow Times, September 28). These demands were poorly received by Russian officials, including Central Bank Chairman Viktor Gerashchenko, who called them "nonsense." One paper this week even stated that U.S. Treasury Secretary Summers has suddenly become a "hawk" on the issue of loans to Russia because, in the wake of the money laundering scandal, his close ties with Russian officials such as Anatoly Chubais has made him politically vulnerable. The paper implied that last year Summers used his Russian contacts to help a former employer, Goldman Sachs, avoid disaster on the GKO market, Russia's now-defunct short-term treasury bills. "The latest scandal does not leave any doubt that his friendship with Russian officials may cost his career too much," the paper wrote (Kommersant, September 29). For his part, Finance Minister Kasyanov predicted that the money laundering scandal was being "fed by political sources" in the United States and predicted that it would soon "die away" (Russian agencies, October 1). Earlier this week, USA Today reported that Russia's Federal Security Service had rejected a U.S. Justice Department request to Russia's Central Bank and Prosecutor General's Office for bank statements and other documents related to the money laundering investigation (USA Today, September 28). While putting tougher requirements on credits to Russia, Michel Camdessus has denounced the press reports that IMF funds were laundered through the Bank of New York. He also said that it would be the "height of irresponsibility" for the IMF to turn its back on Russia, and that Russia had "overperformed" in fulfilling the commitments it had made to the fund in July (Reuters, September 28, 30).
#8 Lugar: Fix Russian Y2K By David McGuire, Newsbytes. September 29, 1999 The United States would be well-served to earmark a few million dollars to aid Russia in its ongoing Y2K remediation efforts, because Russian Y2K failures could endanger US national security, Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Ind., said today. "In my opinion, an 'insurance policy' in this area is a good investment," Lugar said, speaking before the Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem. "The cost of efforts to address potential threats today will be miniscule in comparison to the costs of responding to a tragedy should an incident occur." Today's hearing featured testimony from a slew of national security and foreign affairs experts - many of whom raised concerns about the Y2K risks facing Russia and other former Eastern Bloc countries. "Russia is likely to experience disruptions in its electrical grid and telecommunications infrastructure, with subsequent effects on financial, industrial and government sector," US State Department representative John Beyrle said at the hearing. Even more frightening, Lugar said, are the Y2K threats facing Russia's nuclear reactors, missile stockpiles and early warning systems. "Russian early-warning capabilities continue to deteriorate and this deterioration will be compounded by the transition to the Year 2000," Lugar said. "Russian early warning operators may not be able to tell the difference between a peaceful rocket and a military rocket from their computer screens." To address that concern, Russian and US defense authorities have established the Center for Y2K Strategic Stability in Colorado Springs Colo. Staffed by Russian and US personnel, the Center will watch for false alarms. But the threat to Soviet-constructed Russian nuclear power plants remains significant, Lugar contended. Built without many of the failsafe and safety devices that are common in Western and US-built plants, Russian reactors are still susceptible to potentially serious Y2K glitches. "I would urge my colleagues to once again look to the future and to examine the benefits of cooperating with Russia on Y2K versus the potential risks of inaction," he said. Lugar has long been active in US-Russian relations.
#9 USIA 29 September 1999 Warner Cites Y2K Problems with U.S.-Russian Hotlines (Cites establishment of joint Y2K center) The United States and Russia have identified Y2K problems that would prevent the full operation of all but one of the seven direct communications links, or "hotlines," that guarantee immediate communications between U.S. and Russian leaders. Edward Warner, assistant secretary of defense for strategy and threat reduction, told a Senate Special Committee on Y2K Sept. 28 that U.S. and Russian communications experts are working to correct the problem. "Assured communications between U.S. and Russian leaders is a priority at all times, and of particular concern over the millennium date change," Warner said. To help remedy the problem, the United States has agreed to provide Russia with Y2K compliant software and computer workstations "to correct program deficiencies in outage reporting, monitoring and channel reroute operations," Warner said. "Procurement actions for this equipment have been initiated, and while the schedule is tight, we are confident that the fixes will be installed and tested by December," he added. The U.S.-Russia hotlines provide direct links between the two presidents; a link between the secretary of state and the foreign minister; and links connecting the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers on both sides. The hotlines were installed during the early 1960s, at the height of the Cold War, to guarantee immediate communication when needed. To avoid possible misunderstandings during the date change, Warner said that the United States and Russia have agreed to set up a joint Center for Year 2000 Strategic Stability at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado. U.S. and Russian military personnel will sit side-by-side at the center during the millennium transition period to continuously monitor missile and space launches by both countries. "In addition...the center will provide a direct means for consultations regarding other defense-related problems that emerge over the Y2K transition period," Warner said.
#10 Russia: Delegation On The Defensive In U.S. By Robert Lyle With Italian prosectors saying they have found links between Russian organized crime gangs and the movement of some huge amounts of money through bank accounts in New York discovered recently, Russian financial officials felt on the defensive as they met with World Bank and International Monetary Fund officials in Washington. RFE/RL's Robert Lyle reports. Washington, 29 September 1999 (RFE/RL) - Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko and Central Bank governor Viktor Gerashchenko led a senior level delegation to three days of intensive discussions with IMF and World Bank leaders ahead of Tuesday's formal opening of the IMF/World Bank annual meetings. After the G-7 group of major industrial nation's finance ministers on the weekend said Russia would need to meet some additional reform requirements before any further disbursement of IMF loans, Gerashchenko responded that Russia was being treated unfairly. In fact, however, as U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers explained, the demands for implementing certain reforms and safeguards on the Russian loan were not new. They had already been made conditions by the IMF when it approved the latest $4.5 Billion loan program this summer. Still, Russian officials said their discussions with IMF officials had been difficult, although they remained hopeful the next drawing of the loan would be made available by the end of October. All of the loan disbursements are being kept within the IMF to repay previous Russian loans as they become due. Khristenko, who led the delegation, flew home to Moscow Sunday night, as did several other senior officials. Gerashchenko remained in Washington, but cancelled his scheduled address before the annual meetings. Sources on the Russian delegation said the cancellation was for technical reasons only and that the text of his speech would be released at some time. RFE/RL obtained a copy of the draft speech -- in the Russian language -- which did not appear to contain any direct references to the controversies. The speech said those who had fears about Russia after the 1998 crisis had been proved overly concerned and that time has proven the decision to devalue the ruble was the right thing to have done. The speech, originally written for Khristenko, went on to say that Russia will achieve its budgetary targets this year and that it will successfully fulfill the current IMF loan program. IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus strongly defended the fund's work with Russia, saying that the loan program is "on track" and that Moscow will advance in both structural reforms and improving its governance: "Amidst all the recent controversy, we should not lose sight of the real progress that has been achieved during seven years of endless efforts to assist Russia in its journey toward a market economy. Nor should we ignore the fundamental decision, on which Russia has not wavered, to seek to develop a modern market economy and integrate itself into the international community." Camdessus used his opening speech to the meetings to say that the fund could not, in good conscience, simply cut Russia off: "It would be the height of irresponsibility to turn our backs on this great nation. We will not do that." Part of that continued work with Russia, IMF officials emphasize, is the program of stepped up audits and more frequent monitoring of central bank handling of funds. So far, the IMF says, there has been no evidence that any of its loans were misappropriated, although investigations, in cooperation with U.S., Swiss and British authorities are continuing.