CDI Russia Weekly

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Edited by David Johnson
ISSUE #76 November 26, 1999


The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization.


Contents


  1. AFP: Russia questions if Yeltsin's illness genuine.
  2. RFE/RL: Sophie Lambroschini, Russia: Putin On First 100 Days.
  3. Itar-Tass: Over 70% of Russians Support Use of Force in Chechnya Poll.
  4. Itar-Tass: Russia Minister Rules out Talks with Chechen Rebels.
  5. Moscow Times: Fyodor Gavrilov, It's Not Too Late for Talks On Chechnya.
  6. The Globe and Mail (Canada): Geoffrey York, Russia wages war without end in Chechnya. The czars sent the Cossacks, Lenin used modern artillery, Stalin tried to starve them out, but the mountain warriors fight on.
  7. Itar-Tass: 500,000 Observers to Monitor Duma Elections.
  8. RFE/RL Russian Election Report: Laura Belin, PARTY PROGRAMS INCREASINGLY MARKET ORIENTED.
  9. St Petersburg Times: Anna Badkhen, Military Probes Lives of Teens, Parents.
  10. The Russia Journal: Alexander Golts, Counting down to a new Cold War. East-West tensions mount.
  11. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, DEFENSE DOSSIER: Summit 'Success' a Sham.
  12. AFP: Albright Warns Against Remaking Russia A U.S. Enemy.
  13. AFP: Survival techniques in poverty-stricken Russia.

#1
Russia questions if Yeltsin's illness genuine
MOSCOW, Nov 26 (AFP) - 


Russia on Friday questioned whether President Boris Yeltsin's latest illness 
was genuine or if he had been ordered off the scene by hawkish generals bent 
on finishing off the Chechen war on their own terms.


"Has there been a military coup in Russia?" asked the liberal Sevodnya daily.


"Either the president really has health problems or Yeltsin was sent on sick 
leave by the defense and interior ministers ... with the silent approval of 
(Prime Minister Vladimir) Putin."


The Kremlin in a brief statement Friday said only that Yeltsin was 
recuperating from a flu and acute bronchitis at his suburban Moscow Gorky 9 
residence.


"He has not been prescribed with any special treatment or medical courses," 
spokesman Dmitry Yakushkin told Russian news agencies.


Yeltsin, who was last shown on television six days ago, according to the 
Kremlin suddenly fell ill Thursday during a meeting with Putin and Russia's 
defense, interior and foreign ministers, among others.


He was briefly taken to the Central Clinical Hospital, the Kremlin said, 
before checking out and going home to rest.


Yeltsin was expected to be out of commission for up to two weeks and has 
cancelled all meetings with foreign dignitaries through December 6.


Although Yeltsin frequently falls ill, the timing of his latest flare-up
came 
against the backdrop of Russia's intensifying offensive in Chechnya and the 
signing Friday of a union treaty with Belarus.


Both were widely mentioned by the press and parliament deputies as the true 
excuses for Yeltsin's disappearance from work.


Moscow is now ripe with speculation that generals, still smarting from the 
humiliation of Russia's disastrous 1994-96 Chechen war, have conducted a 
creeping Kremlin coup to make sure Yeltsin did not order a halt to the latest 
war until the rebels were completely wiped out.


A senior Russian general staged a press conference Friday to announce the 
launch of the third and, he said, decisive stage of the federal push into 
Chechnya.


The latest speculation says that generals have convinced Yeltsin to take a 
back seat while they wage war, allowing Putin -- a current favorite of the 
president -- to take either the public credit or blame for all the 
consequences.


"It is absolutely apparent that Yeltsin has found a trusted double in Putin," 
the Kommersant daily wrote.


Yet while this was the favored Kremlin conspiracy theory, others pointed to 
the Belarus thread.


Yeltsin's reported illness came on the eve of a visit here by Belarus 
President Alexander Lukashenko for the signature of a long-mooted union 
treaty between the two former Soviet states.


More liberal Russian forces question whether a union with economically 
ravaged and politically isolated Belarus is viable option.


They also point out that the authoritarian Lukashenko may be eyeing the top 
Kremlin job as he lobbies for unification.


Lukashenko's visit Friday has now been called off on account of the Russian 
president's ill health.


Many note that the treaty, if signed, will now not come for approval before 
the current Russian parliament, dominated by pro-union Communist and 
nationalist forces.


Instead it will be ratified by a State Duma elected on December 19, one which 
the Kremlin hopes is going to be more liberal. The union's approval would 
then come under great doubt.


"This was a political illness," remarked centrist Duma deputy Oleg Morozov. 
"The president began having doubts about the Belarus union."


The Vremya daily meanwhile cited one Kremlin source as saying: "Perhaps the 
two things coincide -- Yeltsin's feeling unwell and also having some 
questions" about the Belarus union.
Back to the top

#2
Russia: Putin On First 100 Days
By Sophie Lambroschini


Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin addressed the State Duma yesterday in 
an address marking his first 100 days in his post -- a period dominated by 
his conduct of the new war in Chechnya. But rather than dwelling on the North 
Caucasus, Putin largely focused on the state of the Russian economy. RFE/RL 
Moscow correspondent Sophie Lambroschini reports that coming just three weeks 
ahead of parliamentary elections, the speech had a pre-electoral ring.


Moscow, 24 November 1999 (RFE/RL) - There was a clear message the Russian 
prime minister was attempting to deliver in his speech to the State Duma, 
much of which was shown on nationwide television. The message was: Vladimir 


Putin knows how to run a war -- and also an economy. 


Putin's speech marked his first 100 days in office, and he reported to the 
Duma on the achievements of the Russian economy and the government's goals. 
According to Putin, economic trends have never been so heartening as now. 
Putin implied that the present government's record was the best since 
President Boris Yeltsin came to power. 


"We all know there are some positive changes in the economic and financial 
sectors. They started soon after the 1998 August crisis. For the first time 
since the beginning of reforms, this trend has been holding out for 14 
months." 


To defend his case, Putin listed several positive indicators. He pointed out 
that inflation is at 31.5 percent, while economists had forecast 60 percent. 
He also said that the production levels of Russian companies have increased 
significantly, not only in export sectors but also in those sectors that rely 
on domestic demand. He said that by making imported goods too expensive, last 
year's ruble devaluation gave a decisive boost to consumption of domestically 
produced goods. 


Putin admitted that the rise of world oil prices has also boosted the economy 
by securing extra state revenue from oil exports. 


Western economists have also noted the positive effect of these factors on 
the Russian economy. 


But Putin gave himself and the two previous governments credit for 
implementing a "sensible and consistent" economic policy. 


Duma Deputy Oleg Morozov told RFE/RL that Putin's assessment of the Russian 
economy has a pre-electoral ring. And it coincides with Putin's announcement 
of his choice for the December parliamentary elections. Putin said he will 
vote for Unity, an electoral bloc headed by Emergency Situations Minister 
Sergei Shoigu. The bloc was created only in September and is said to be the 
Kremlin's desperate last attempt to achieve some leverage in the elections. 


Image-maker Igor Bunin said two weeks ago that, in his words, "The Kremlin's 
idea is that some of Putin's popularity may rub off on Unity and get it into 
the Duma as the new party of power." Putin's statement comes as the first 
official support for a contender in the parliamentary elections. 


While offering an optimistic assessment of the economy, Putin also provided a 
list of the problems that the government has not yet managed to solve. 


"The government is not inclined to overplay the positive trends. We are 
careful, while being optimistic. Because we realize that so far we haven't 
managed [to find a way] of solidifying [the trends] and making them last for 
the long term. Let me tell you what these problems are. There is no deep 
movement in investment, nonpayment is still widespread, as well as the use of 
barter and other non-monetary means of payment." 


Putin said capital flight and insufficient restructuring of the banking 
sector are also among Russia's woes. 


While saying he would continue reforms, Putin agreed that the past months 
have shown that the state must retain a role as a regulator in the economy 
and cannot just, in his words, "dump problems on the labor collectives." He 


said that the government must adopt a long-term strategy instead of 
improvising solutions to problems as they appear. 


"We need a long-term development strategy for the next 10 to 15 years. It 
should spell out how we choose to continue reforms. It should also give a 
clear perspective of the goals and limits wanted by the majority of people. 
There is still no such strategy in the country and that has a negative effect 
on the situation, on the work of the government. For the past 10 years it 
spent a significant part of its time closing holes and extinguishing fires, 
also social ones. [If we] go on in this manner, we will just be running in 
place" 

These statements come as Putin faces still isolated but growing criticism 
that his focus on the situation in Chechnya is coming at the expense of due 
attention to other issues. Putin's focus in the speech on key economic issues 
may have been a response to these critics.
 
Back to the top

#3
Over 70% of Russians Support Use of Force in Chechnya Poll.


MOSCOW, November 26 (Itar-Tass) - More than 70 percent of Russians support 
the use of force in Chechnya for the destruction of gangs and over 50 percent 
are sure that the federal troops are preventing a split of Russia, judging by 
the results of a nation- wide opinion poll held in November. Itar-Tass has 
received the poll results from the ROMIR independent research center. 


As compared to the ROMIR poll results circulated by Itar-Tass on November 18, 
the number of Russians supporting the use of force in Chechnya has grown by 
almost 5 percent. 


A total of 39.8 percent of Russians are sure that the hostilities underway in 
Chechnya are targeted against the illegal gangs. Another 33.3 percent of the 
polled are inclined to believe that opinion is correct. Some 8.4 percent find 
it difficult to answer. A total of 6.8 percent of the polled feel like 
disagreeing with the opinion, and 3.9 percent feel absolutely negative about 
the idea. 


Some 18.2 percent of the respondents fully agree that the hostilities in 
Chechnya aim to prevent a split of the Russian Federation. A total of 34.9 
percent are inclined to believe that. Some 13.7 percent of the polled can't 
say "yes" or "no" to the question. Some 13 percent of the respondents are 
inclined to disagree with the idea, and 7.4 percent of the polled feel 
absolutely negative. Some 12.8 percent of the polled find it difficult to 
answer. 


About 30 percent of the polled think that the combat operations in Chechnya 
are a way of achieving political goals, and the same number of the polled 
think the opposite. Over 1/3 of the polled have no opinion about that. 


The poll took place in 41 regions of the Russian Federation. yer/ 
Back to the top

#4
Russia Minister Rules out Talks with Chechen Rebels.


MOSCOW, November 26 (Itar-Tass) - Nationalities Minister Vyacheslav Mikhailov 
said on Friday talks were only possible with those who help Russia destroy 
Chechen guerrillas. 


Moscow can negotiate only with those "who help fight terrorists ousted from 
settlements" and "restore normal life" in Chechnya, Mikhailov told reporters. 



A meeting with Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov can be held only "if he takes 
sides with people and starts destroying and driving away bandits, but 
Maskhadov is now fighting his people," he said. 


What Chechnya needs now is "concrete deeds, new jobs, the opening of schools, 
treatment of children for tuberculosis," he said. 


Which is why Moscow is interested in mending fences with locals and avoid 
committing the mistakes of the 1994-96 campaign, "when not knowing customs 
and traditions led to serious clashes." 


Federal troops should enjoy the appearance of "liberators, the appearance of 
people who are liberating from marasmus, violence, and pseudo-religion," he 
said. 


Asked about the future of Grozny, he said that was "a very big question" but 
that the Chechen capital will have to be restored. 


In terms of the humanitarian situation in the breakaway region, he said a 
catastrophe is under way in guerrilla- controlled areas. 


"The Wahhabites have set up so bad living conditions that nothing can be 
worse," he said. 


The minister said they carry out mass executions of civilians who do not obey 
their orders, are trying to recruit 12- and 13- olds, and keep old people, 
women and children from leaving Grozny. 
Back to the top

#5
Moscow Times
November 26, 1999 
NOTES OF AN IDLER: It's Not Too Late for Talks On Chechnya 
By Fyodor Gavrilov 


There is some confirmation that despite the harsh statements made about 
Chechen independence, responsible Moscow functionaries have begun to think 
seriously about talks with the Chechens. It almost doesn't matter who will be 
representing them at the table, as long as it is someone who could represent 
the Chechens as a national whole. The problem is not who will represent the 
separatists, but how and on what basis the talks will be held. 


It's interesting that in 1993 and 1994 Chechen President Dzhokar Dudayev 
wanted very little for his people - the right to live according to Sharia 
law, the right to carry weapons, and - impossible though it may sound - the 
right to serve in the Russian army. In exchange for these rights, the 
Chechens were prepared to remain a subject of the Russian Federation. In 
1996, it's true, there was no talk of remaining as a part of Russia. Of 
course, the mindset in Russia at the time made this proposal impossible. Thus 
an armed conflict became unavoidable. Since then, there has been a noticeable 
increase in common sense on both sides - neither Russian generals nor Chechen 
field commanders can allow themselves to sacrifice their soldiers like they 
used to. But all the same, the North Caucasus' ferocity is so great that it 
is impossible to imagine a clear and final victory for either side. Talks are 
the only option, and their success would require a new approach requiring a 
certain sleight of hand. 


An interesting way to solve the Chechen problem may be found in the 
development of an "integrative process" with CIS countries and Belarus. 
Experiences gained with "multi-speed integration" scenarios - to borrow CIS 
Minister Leonid Drachevsky's expression - could also applied in reverse for a 
mild disintegration scenario. 


No one denies that every nation has a right to self-determination. Equally, 
no one should deny that every nation must determine its destiny within the 
boundaries of recognized laws of civilization, as happened in post-war India. 
We understand that Chechnya did not have the same foundation for 
self-determination as the "real" republics of the former U.S.S.R., which, as 
we remember, left without wars. Chechens, who'd had enough of rules, didn't 
want to make thing more difficult for themselves by agreeing to play by them. 
One need only look at their situation to see the results of this approach. 


Talks are unavoidable. Maybe Chechnya should be given "secession" status to 
join the Commonwealth of Independent States as a union state by 2003 and thus 
facilitate a gentle exclusion or - and this is more unfathomable - a gentle 
inclusion into the former empire. But that means the breakup of the country, 
cries the Russian patriot. I think that such an approach is no more dangerous 
than "integration" with Belarus - which will bring about judicial chaos in 
the structure of the Russian Federation. Last of all: If I were a true 
patriot, I wouldn't think about the right to possess a piece of the Caucasus 
Mountain chain, but rather, for example, about the situation in the Far East, 
a huge territory rich in resources. In my opinion, the administration of 
Governor Yevgeny Nazdratenko and its disregard for Moscow is no less - and 
perhaps more - dangerous for the unity of Russia than the activities of 
Chechen separatists. 


Fyodor Gavrilov is the editor of Kariera-Kapital, a business weekly in St. 
Petersburg.
Back to the top

#6
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
26 November 1999
Russia wages war without end in Chechnya
The czars sent the Cossacks, Lenin used modern artillery,
Stalin tried to starve them out, but the mountain warriors fight on
GEOFFREY YORK
Moscow Bureau


Moscow -- More than 150 years ago, Russian soldiers began dragging heavy 
cannons up and down the steep forested trails of the Caucasus Mountains.


They were locked in a ceaseless war against a fearless mountain people who 
fought one of the longest guerrilla campaigns in history. It took 40 years 
and a massive army of 250,000 men before Russia could defeat the horse-riding 
tribesmen.


The mountaineers were led by the legendary Shamil, a black-bearded religious 
and military commander who united the Caucasus tribes in an Islamic 
ministate. At the core of his army were the fiercest fighters of the region: 
the warriors known as the Chechens.


Since the 18th century, Russian and Soviet regimes have fought dozens of 
unsuccessful campaigns to subdue the Chechens. Today, as the snow descends on 
the Caucasus Mountains for another winter, Moscow is once again mobilizing 
its latest military technology for a new effort to finish the job.


Every generation of Russian rulers has attempted the task. The czars sent 
thousands of Cossacks to sack the Chechen villages and destroy the forests. 
Lenin deployed modern artillery and airplanes in attacks against the 
warriors. Joseph Stalin ordered the slaughter of thousands of Chechens, 
deported the rest of them to the steppes of Central Asia and adjusted his 


maps to eliminate any trace of them.


In the Kremlin's latest campaign, President Boris Yeltsin is ordering his 
troops to blast the Chechens with helicopter gunships, fighter jets, battle 
tanks and tactical missiles. But history suggests that the new campaign will 
meet the same doomed fate as all the earlier ones.


The Chechens, according to British strategic analyst Anatol Lieven, are "one 
of the great martial peoples of modern history." Without any formal training, 
without any military hierarchy or tactical doctrine, without any airplanes or 
heavy armour, the Chechens still maintain a "formidable capacity for national 
armed resistance," Mr. Lieven wrote in a book on the 1994-96 Chechnya war.


"The entire period from 1785 to the present in the Eastern Caucasus has been 
essentially one long struggle by the Chechens against Russian domination, 
interspersed with unstable truces and periods of sullen and unwilling 
submission. . . . Regularly suppressed, the Chechens just as regularly rose 
up again, whenever Russian or Soviet power faltered or oppression became too 
acute to bear."


It was Peter the Great who first sent Russia's armies into the Caucasus 
region in 1722. Within a few years, the Cossacks were helping build a chain 
of forts along the Terek River (in the northern half of what is now 
Chechnya), and by 1785 the Chechens were counterattacking in their first 
"holy war" against the Russian invaders.


The Chechens, under the command of a Sufi religious chief known as Sheik 
Mansur, trapped a Russian military force in a dense forest and killed more 
than 600 soldiers. It was one of the worst military disasters suffered by 
Russia in the era of Catherine the Great.


The Russians eventually captured Sheik Mansur, and in 1817 they launched a 
new campaign against the Chechens -- a campaign that continued for more than 
40 years. It had some remarkable similarities to today's campaign.


Afraid to engage the Chechens directly in close-range fighting, the czarist 
armies used their superior artillery weaponry to bombard the Chechens from a 
distance -- just as the Russian army is doing with its warplanes and tank 
shelling today. The Russians also exploited their overpowering advantage in 
troop numbers.


Back then, like today, the Russians were denouncing the Chechens as bandits 
and kidnappers. The Chechens were notorious for their bold and daring raids, 
in which a group of horsemen would swoop into a village, kill soldiers, loot 
as much booty as they could carry, seize hostages and disappear back into the 
mountains as suddenly as they had arrived.


The Chechens have used the same tactic of ambushes and raids to demoralize 
their Russian enemies in the wars of the 1990s.


"This is the centuries-old tactic of the mountain people," the former Chechen 
president, Dzhokhar Dudayev, boasted in 1994. "Strike and withdraw, strike 
and withdraw . . . to exhaust them until they die of fear and horror."


In the 19th century, the Chechens became legendary for their passion for 
fighting. One Russian officer, General Tornau, praised them as a "ferocious, 
tireless enemy." Russian writers such as Leo Tolstoy and Mikhail Lermontov 


waxed eloquent about the courage of the Chechens and the other Caucasus 
tribesmen. "They don't seem to know when they ought to die -- indeed these 
villains can hardly ever be killed," Lermontov wrote.


The Russians finally crushed the revolt and captured Shamil in 1859. (Karl 
Marx later described Shamil as a "great democrat" and an inspiration to the 
oppressed people of Europe.)


But the Chechen rebellions continued for the rest of the 19th century and 
most of the 20th century. Every few years, another mutiny erupted, including 
several during the Russian Revolution.


In 1937, Stalin ordered the arrest of 14,000 Chechens and their ethnic 
cousins, the Ingush. They were executed and their bodies were dumped in a 
mass grave.


Despite this slaughter, the Chechens continued to resist Soviet rule, 
fighting back again in rebellions in 1940 and 1942. Two years later, Stalin 
decided to impose a final solution. He ordered the roundup and exile of the 
entire Chechen and Ingush population -- more than 600,000 people. Arrested at 
gunpoint, they were crammed into railway boxcars and sent to Kazakstan in 
Central Asia. Thousands died in the railway cars on the way, and another 
100,000 died of sickness and hunger in their first two years in the empty 
steppes of Kazakstan.


After the deportation, Stalin fiddled with the ethnic boundaries to wipe out 
the Chechen-Ingush region. Only in 1957, four years after Stalin's death, 
were the Chechens finally allowed to return to their homeland in Chechnya.


Russia's leaders have sometimes acknowledged that their tough military 
tactics have never succeeded in crushing the Chechens -- and are unlikely to 
succeed in the future. "If we use force in Chechnya, it would spark an 
uprising in the Caucasus and lead to such turmoil, so much bloodshed, that no 
one would forgive us afterwards," Mr. Yeltsin warned in the summer of 1994.


Four months later, despite his earlier warning, Mr. Yeltsin authorized his 
troops to invade Chechnya.


Mr. Yeltsin declared victory in the war in early 1995. But within two years, 
as Russia suffered mounting losses in the war, the President had changed his 
tune again and signed a peace agreement.


The peace treaty was clear. Both sides renounced the use of military force in 
Chechnya.


By this summer, however, Mr. Yeltsin had apparently forgotten that he had 
signed the treaty. The latest war is highly popular, and nobody is looking 
too closely at whether it violates a Kremlin treaty.


A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHECHNYA


A tiny republic has a tumultuous history of defying whichever power tried to 
impose its rule on the region - the Turks in the 16th century, Czar Nicholas 
I in the 19th, the Soviet Union and, in the second of two standoffs this 
decade, a Russian army desperate for a victory to boost its credibility. 


Early history 
There is evidence the Chechen people have been in the Caucasus region for at 
least 600 years. 
16th century 
Islam becomes the dominant religion when Moscow fails to counter its 
influence by sending missionaries to the region. 
18th century 


Ivan the Terrible first tries to subjugate the Caucasus region, using the 
Cossacks as allies. The campaign is carried on, with little success, by Peter 
the Great and, later, by Catherine the Great. 
1824-1859 
Imam Shamil, a Muslim resistance leader and Chechen folk hero, leads a "holy 
war" against the forces of Czar Nicholas I. He offers to negotiate with 
Moscow initially but, when his overtures are ignored, leads a resistance that 
withstands the Russians until 1864, seven years after Shamil's capture. The 
Russians begin mass deportations of Chechens. 
1917-1921 
Following the Russian Revolution, Chechnya proclaims its independence. 
Lenin's White army tries unsuccessfully to reclaim the territory. 
1921 
Chechnya agrees to Soviet rule in exchange for the acceptance of Muslim law 
as the law of the land. 
1936-1938 
Chechens are deported en masse during the Stalin purges. 
1945 
As German forces invade Russia, Stalin accuses the Chechens of collaborating 
with the Nazis. Stalin deports the entire Chechen population to Kazakstan and 
Siberia where they remained exiled until 1956. 
1991 
As the Soviet Union falls apart, retired Soviet military Major General 
Dzhokhar Dudayev convenes an executive meeting that declares Chechnya's 
independence. Its economy in shambles, Chechnya becomes a gateway for drug 
and weapons smuggling. 
1994-1996 
Moscow, attempting to bring the lawless state to heel, suffers embarrassing 
military losses in its assault on Grozny and is forced to the bargaining 
table. 
1999 
The latest Chechen offensive begins, with Moscow accusing Chechnya of 
exporting Islamic revolution into neighbouring Dagestan and sponsoring the 
terrorist bombings of apartment blocks in Moscow.
Back to the top

#7
500,000 Observers to Monitor Duma Elections.


MOSCOW, November 26 (Itar-Tass) - Around 500,000 Russian observers 
representing all political forces will monitor the elections to the State 
Duma on December 19, Chairman of the Central Election Board Alexander 
Veshnyakov told a press conference on Friday. 


He expects that as many as 1,000 foreign observers will monitor the 
elections. Around 200 foreign observers have already been accredited at the 
Central Election Commission, the number of observers from the OSCE alone is 
expected to reach 400-500, Veshnaykov said. 


Veshnyakov said that two kinds of ballot papers have been printed - to vote 
for candidates from single-member constituencies and for election blocs and 
movements, including the Russian Conservative party of entrepreneurs and SPAS 
bloc which was crossed out from ballot papers. 


A total of 93,000 election commission have been formed in constituencies 
which will begin vote counting at 8:00 PM December 19. "Our main goal is to 
conduct the elections in strict compliance with the law of fair elections," 
Veshnyakov declared. 
Back to the top

#8
Excerpt
RFE/RL Russian Election Report
No. 4, 26 November 1999


PARTY PROGRAMS INCREASINGLY MARKET ORIENTED. The economic
programs drafted by leading electoral blocs are noticeably
more oriented toward market economics this year than they
were in 1995, according to a study conducted by experts


affiliated with the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. Mikhail Dmitriev, a scholar-in-residence at the
Carnegie Moscow Center, summarized the results at a 22
November seminar in Moscow and in the November issue of the
center's monthly briefing paper. (The monthly is available
on the web at: http://www.carnegie.ru/)
        The study examined programs only of blocs that have a
good chance of clearing the 5 percent barrier, as suggested
by opinion polls taken in September and October. The
biggest shift occurred in the Communist Party of the
Russian Federation (KPRF). Dmitriev pointed out that KPRF
economic programs offered in 1995 and even in 1997 were far
more oriented toward building a planned economy with
extensive state interference.
        That transformation is not surprising, since the
KPRF's current economic program was written by the
economist Sergei Glazev, who only recently joined forces
with the Communists. (Glazev's own views on economic policy
have not changed much since he was a leading candidate for
the Congress of Russian Communities in 1995.) The KPRF
program can be found at the party's official web site:
http://www.kprf.ru/.
        Dmitriev also concluded that among leading political
groups there is a new "centrist" consensus on many economic
issues. For instance, all the major blocs running for the
Duma now agree on the need to reduce taxes and shift more
of the tax burden from producers to consumers. The programs
of the KPRF and Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (running
for the Duma as the Zhirinovsky Bloc) appear more sensitive
to the risk of high inflation. Zhirinovsky's economic
program advocates far less state planning now than in 1995.
Although the laws adopted by the next Duma will not be
shaped exclusively by proposals in party platforms, the
trend suggests that lawmakers will find common ground on
some economic issues.
        Consensus among politicians does not necessarily mean
that the laws passed by the next Duma will produce the
desired results. Speaking at the 22 November seminar,
Carnegie scholar-in-residence Tatyana Maleva noted that
several parties' economic programs seek to achieve economic
growth in part by increasing real wages and pensions.
Although politicians assume that rising incomes will
stimulate domestic industry by creating more demand for
domestic products, Maleva cited research suggesting that
many Russian citizens would likely spend extra disposable
income on foreign-made non-perishable goods. As a result, a
policy aimed at raising incomes might promote foreign
industry rather than Russian producers. LB
Back to the top

#9
St Petersburg Times
November 26, 1999
Military Probes Lives of Teens, Parents
By Anna Badkhen
STAFF WRITER


What is your family's monthly income? Is your son or any of your relatives a 
member of any religious sect? Do any of your relatives live abroad?


These questions may look as if they were copied from a visa application form. 
In fact, they are some of the questions the Russian military forces future 
conscripts and their parents to answer - years before the teenage boys are 
even eligible for service.


The questions appear in the "Lists of the Study of a Conscript," a series of 
questionnaires prepared by psychologists for the St. Petersburg Military 
Commission - the service responsible for drafting young men into compulsory 
military service.


The questionnaires, copies of which were obtained by the St. Petersburg 
Times, also ask: Have you ever travelled abroad? Have you ever changed your 
name? What kind of person is your son?


St. Petersburg military authorities say the questionnaires, which have been 
in use since 1995, are designed to help the commission "learn the conscripts 
better."


"We ask the boys, their teachers and parents to fill out these lists in order 
to know the conscript better and deeper," explained Lt. Col. Anatoly 
Platonov, the commission's chief psychologist, in a telephone interview 
earlier this month. "It is not mandatory to fill out these forms, but if the 
parents don't want to work with us, it means they don't care about their 
child."


Contrary to Platonov's assertion that it is not obligatory, teenagers and 
their parents say the military actually forces them to fill out the 
questionnaires.


Denis Nikitin, now 17, said that when he went to the military commission to 
register as a prospective draftee two years ago he found himself facing three 
women who were "firing questions at me and writing my answers down on some 
kind of form."


"They asked me where my parents work, and if I have any relatives abroad ... 
They told me I had to answer before I could leave. ... I didn't protest. I 
thought it was all legal," he said.


Olga Frolova, who serves as a volunteer with the Soldiers' Mothers 
organization, a St. Petersburg-based advocacy group which opposes the 
conscription, says the military tells teenagers and their parents that it is 
obligatory that they fill out the questionnaires.


Frolova said that after her son, Roman, now 19, registered as a prospective 
draftee with the commission in 1996, he returned home with a questionnaire 
for her.


"The [commission] told him that it was mandatory for me to fill it out," 
Frolova said. "There were questions about my income, my religious beliefs, 
whether we have relatives abroad."


"[Roman] said he had already filled out the questionnaire when he was at the 
military commission," she said. "He said they would not let him or any of the 
other boys leave the room until they answered all the questions."


"They [the military] also distribute these questionnaires through schools, 
and the teachers are instructed not to allow the children to leave the 
classroom until they fill them out," Frolova said.


Roman, who is currently in a hospital, could not be reached for comment.


Yury Vdovin, co-chairman of the St. Petersburg-based human rights group 
Citizens' Watch, said the military commission's actions are clearly a 
violation of the rights of the potential conscripts.


"They [the military] have a right to ask any question they want, but they 
don't have the right to force the boys to answer," Vdovin said Thursday. "It 
is a violation of human rights."



Vdovin said Citizens' Watch will send an official request to the
commission's 
draft board to investigate the matter.


Meanwhile, Yelena Vilenskaya, one of the leaders of Soldiers' Mothers, says 
the questionnaires can be used by the military to manipulate conscripts and 
their families and even extort money from them.


"These questionnaires ... will inevitably be used by the military against the 
families," Vilenskaya said. "When the conscripts desert [the army], for 
example, [the military] look for them at their relatives' homes and offices. 
And when the boys try to avoid the draft, the military, who know the 
financial situation of the family, may force the parents into paying a bribe."


Vilenskaya added, however, that her organization has yet to link an extortion 
case to the questionnaires.


Platonov agreed that "the question about the parents' salary may be 
considered improper," but added that it is intended to help the military 
"better understand" the financial situation of the family. "If the family is 
poor, we do our best to have the conscript serve close to St. Petersburg," he 
said. He refused to say what the minimum monthly income has to be for the 
military to consider the family poor, saying only that "we make our judgments 
from a human point of view."
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#10
The Russia Journal
November 22-28, 1999
Counting down to a new Cold War
East-West tensions mount

Alexander Golts is a columnist for the weekly magazine Itogi.

It seems the U.S. military may have acted prematurely in preparing to award 
medals to Cold War veterans. The war now looks set to break out anew. 


The heads of Russia's military and diplomatic departments have been making 
statements of unprecedented harshness, recalling the days of fierce standoffs 
between the U.S.S.R. and the West.


The friction between Russia and the West has been growing all year. It began 
with the NATO operation against Yugoslavia. Russia was indignant that its 
protests were ignored and went a stage further than breaking off contacts 
with the NATO "aggressor bloc." 


The Russian military asserted that Western nations might undertake an 
airborne campaign against Russia like that carried out against Yugoslavia. 
They initiated maneuvers whereby strategic bombers flew over the Atlantic 
within range of a nuclear strike and simulated the launch of winged missiles 
against American territory.


At the same time, the Russian State Duma (lower house of parliament) finally 
buried the START-II treaty, under which Russia and the United States were to 
have cut their nuclear arsenals by half. 


The U.S. Congress forced the country's administration to begin work on 
developing a national anti-missile defense system. The order undermined the 
ABM treaty, which was the basis of all agreements on strategic defense. This 
was yet another sign that Washington now intends to ensure security by means 
of force, rather than treaties.


Until recently, it seemed that it would be possible to stop the return to the 
Cold War. The slide to confrontation was reversible so long as the two sides 
were asserting their national interests rationally, albeit harshly. 


Cooperation in the military-political sphere prevented confrontation because 
it was beneficial to both sides. 


The Nann-Lugar program, for example, provided improved security for Russian 
nuclear arsenals, and cooperation between Russian and NATO forces in Bosnia 
and Kosovo. The situation changed fundamentally when both Russia and the West 
began to behave irrationally, acting on inveterate suspicions and fears. The 
catalyst was the Russian anti-terrorist campaign in Chechnya. 


The West did not see this operation as Russia's only chance of putting an end 
to a rebellious republic. Rather, it felt that Russia remains an empire like 
the Soviet Union, which on the verge of the 21st century is ensuring the 
submission of its colonies by force of arms.


Moscow's answer was just as irrational. Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, 
speaking at a meeting of senior staff of the armed forces, said that, "The 
national interests of the U.S. correspond to a scenario in which an armed 
conflict is constantly smoldering in the North Caucasus." This is essentially 
a direct accusation that Washington is intentionally impeding Moscow in its 
fight with the rebels.


This comment was by no means an error. A few days later, speaking at an 
international conference organized by the Russian Diplomatic Academy, Deputy 
Foreign Minister Alexander Avdeyev stated that Russia is approaching a 
conflict with the United States. Anatoly Kvashnin, head of the General Staff, 
saw in the West a "growing readiness to use military force in its direct, 
most crude form at various levels." 


He told his amazed listeners: "The operations in Kosovo and Iraq only herald 
this readiness. We must assume that it may extend to other, including former 
Soviet, territories." 


Previously, one had the consoling thought that such statements were made by 
military officers brought up in the Communist Party's tradition of "a spirit 
of hatred of imperialism." An irrational and ideological interpretation of 
the West's actions is clearly becoming mainstream Russian policy. It is 
telling that its mouthpiece is Sergeyev, possibly the most rational member of 
Russia's military, who up to now had not been associated with confrontational 
statements. 


A television interview with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin dispelled all 
doubt: He himself demanded that the minister take up a clear position. If the 
first Cold War began with Churchill's words that an iron curtain was 
separating Eastern Europe from the rest of the world, the second one may 
begin with Putin's forceful statement that, "We don't need any sniveling 
generals."


Instead, we need generals, Putin is saying, to threaten the West. If this is 
so, it is a grave mistake: It is precisely in the area of military security 
that the West most values its links with Russia. The West can tolerate the 
nonsense written and spoken by Russian politicians, but when people in 
uniforms falsely interpret its actions, it gets nervous. 


A little more of this, and the United States and Western Europe will take 
these statements in earnest and begin arming themselves. Russia will then try 
to keep up, to retain its ability to seriously frighten the West. But if the 
country is militarized, it means the end of democracy.
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#11
Moscow Times
November 25, 1999 
DEFENSE DOSSIER: Summit 'Success' a Sham 
By Pavel Felgenhauer 


Last week's summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) in Istanbul, Turkey, has been heralded in the Russian media as an 
outstanding success. 


The mantra continuously repeated by Russian television is that President 
Boris Yeltsin challenged Western leaders in Istanbul and forced them into a 
humiliating retreat. It has also been reported in the Russian media that many 
Western leaders - first of all U.S. President Bill Clinton - even expressed 
support for the present Russian war in Chechnya after Yeltsin humbled them. 


Of course, such wildly exaggerated reports of the OSCE proceedings differ 
strongly from what the Western media reported from Istanbul. But such 
discrepancies are hardly surprising. In recent months most Russian media, 
especially the leading television channels, have become pro-war, 
pro-government propaganda outlets. It was often said that a genuinely free 
press is the main achievement of reforms in Russian. Today this "free press" 
has been revealed to be a sham - together with most other liberal reform 
successes under Yeltsin. 


But while the media fanfare alleges Russian victories in Istanbul, 
professional Russian diplomats and high-level military experts who worked 
through the documents signed at the OSCE summit are much more guarded in 
their assessments. These diplomats say that the end result was "the best 
possible in the current conditions." 


Moscow expected to be challenged about the war in Chechnya. In return, 
Russian diplomats prepared a resolution on the situation in Yugoslavia that 
mentioned "NATO aggression against a sovereign country." 


Of course, Moscow knew that such language would not be accepted by the West. 
But Russian diplomats say that they effectively managed to trade the Kosovo 
issue for Chechnya and produce in the end vague documents that any side can 
interpret as it wishes. 


The West apparently still believes that it has won a major concession from 
Russia in Istanbul giving the OSCE not only a humanitarian, but also a 
political role in Chechnya. 


The final declaration says: "We welcome the agreement of the Russian 
Federation to a visit by the [OSCE] chairman in office to the region." The 
OSCE chairman, Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek, said he expected to 
visit Chechnya "before Christmas" and would talk to Chechen representatives 
while there. But, after the summit, Russians are reminding the diplomats in 
the West to read the fine print. "The declaration does not say Vollebaek will 
visit Chechnya," the diplomats say. "It says the OSCE chairman in office 
will." On Jan. 1, 2000, Austria takes over the chairmanship of the OSCE from 
Norway, and Russian diplomats predict that "Vollebaek will hardly manage to 
organize a visit before his term expires." 


Privately, Russian officials say that before the present "anti-terrorist 
operation" in Chechnya is successfully finished, no OSCE mission will be 
welcome in Chechnya. High-ranking officials insist: "The OSCE has a 


humanitarian, but not a political, role to play in Chechnya." 


Diplomatic sources say that Vollebaek has contacted the Russian Foreign 
Ministry and asked for a meeting with his Russian counterpart, Igor Ivanov, 
early next week in Moscow to figure out the protocol of a visit to Chechnya. 
But the Russian Foreign Ministry replied that Ivanov has a very tight 
schedule and can meet Vollebaek on Dec. 2 at the earliest. Russian diplomats 
say that the Norwegians are still debating whether to come. The true message 
from Moscow is: "Do not come at all." Russia does not want any foreigners 
intervening while it bombs Chechnya to pulp. 


And Moscow is ready to do more than play the traditional bureaucratic game of 
not saying yes or no to Vollebaek. They may even be considering concessions 
on anti-ballistic missile defense to ensure the U.S. administration is soft 
on Chechnya. 


Russian generals are not truly against the United States developing a 
national missile defense, or NMD. In fact, NMD could help the Russian 
military lobby for the development of new "anti-NMD" arms systems of their 
own. 


Today, Russian officials are mostly stonewalling on renegotiating the ABM 
treaty to expose the United States as an aggressive power that breaks 
arms-control agreements. But if the Russians get tacit support for the 
Chechen war from the United States in exchange for major concessions on the 
ABM issue, this trade-off may be in itself a major propaganda coup and worth 
the bargain. 


Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent, Moscow-based defense analyst.   
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#12
Albright Warns Against Remaking Russia A U.S. Enemy


WASHINGTON, Nov 25, 1999 -- (Agence France Presse) US Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright on Wednesday warned against allowing Russia to become an 
American enemy once again as relations between the former Cold War foes 
worsen over the crisis in Chechnya.


"The last thing I think that we should be doing is trying to turn Russia back 
into an enemy," Albright said after returning from a European security summit 
in Turkey where western leaders, including US President Bill Clinton, roundly 
criticized Moscow for its offensive in Chechnya.


"We spent 50 years in that mode and on the 10th anniversary of the fall of 
the Berlin Wall ... it made it apparent to me one more time how much time was 
lost during the Cold War.


"Being enemies with Russia is not the right approach," she said, adding that 
"it is essential to have a functioning relationship with Russia." 
Nevertheless, Albright reiterated US concerns about the offensive in Chechnya 
and said a political solution was the only way to resolve the situation there.


She said she believed Russian officials had gotten that message as they have 
agreed to allow the chairman of the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE), Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek to travel to the 
breakaway republic to assess various options.


"It's important that Knut Vollebaek ... go to Chechnya in order to try to 
assist in terms of finding some kind of a political solution," Albright said.


Her comments came as Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin offered a 
conditional amnesty to Chechen rebels who lay down their arms, the first 
apparent concession Moscow has made in its drive to rid Chechnya of 
"terrorists." 
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#13
Survival techniques in poverty-stricken Russia
MOSCOW, Nov 26 (AFP) - 


The millions of Russians who officially have to survive on less than a dollar 
a day get by on survival techniques specific to Russia -- odd jobs, wangling 
perks and with help from friends or relations.


Some 52 million Russians, or 35.3 percent, live below the poverty line, 
according to the Russian social development ministry. However, the informal 
economy has become "an element of survival for many," said the 1999 report of 
the United Nations on Human Development in Russia.


Maya Nikolayevna, a retired 65-year-old, has a revenue of less that 25 
dollars a month, but gives Russian lessons to foreigners in Moscow, earning 
far more than her official income and enabling her to "live a dignified life."


She is also able to help her sister and brother-in-law to make ends meet at 
Klimovsk, 100 kilometers (65 miles) south of Moscow, who have only 30 dollars 
a month to live on.


In this small provincial town, sister Margarita Polyanskaya, a former 
engineer, tried to find work as a cleaner, but failed. "There are thousands 
of women with qualifications equal to mine, queuing up for this kind of 
work," she said.


Her husband sometimes gets a driving job, but does not always get paid.


"I buy them soap, washing powder, socks and tights," said Maya.


Mother-of-two Natasha Stanina, a doctor, earns only 15 dollars a month and 
her husband 25 dollars. "My patients give me bars of chocolate at feast days. 
I feel like telling them 'Bring me a kilo of meat'," she said.


Natasha said she dreamed of learning English and working in the private 
sector to end her poverty. But she was recently able to buy a refrigerator 
with 400 dollars sent by a friend living in the United States.


Russians have worked out little tricks to save money.


Liza, 48, who works in a state public relations firm, said she usually starts 
her weekends by sorting out her tights, depending on the holes in them. She 
can wear the least-damaged with a short skirt, others with a long skirt and 
others with trousers or high boots.


Olga, 44, an unemployed mother of one child, makes herself up with the 
remains of a lipstick she is poking out with a match.


In the provinces, life has its pros and cons. Unemployment is higher, but 
prices are lower than in Moscow and in some areas one can grow potatoes.


Nadezhda and Fiodor work in a textile mill at Ivatino, 300 kilometres (180 
miles) east of Moscow, earning 25 dollars a month, but they get by thanks to 
their vegetable garden and the nearby forest where they pick mushrooms and 
berries.


Their parents, from Moscow, give them old clothes and furniture and sometimes 
luxuries like herrings and sausages.


But many Russians, in Russia or the provinces, are reduced to rummaging 
through dustbins or scavenging for empty bottles to collect the deposit.



The Russian Red Cross announced at the beginning of the month that it was 
doubling its aid programmes in expectation of a hard winter. The organisation 
will provide 31 million dollars to assist 770,000 people over 10 months.


Food and warm clothes will be sent as a priority to Siberia and the Russian 
Far East where the climate is particularly hard. 
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