#1
OSCE: Summit Hears Clinton, Yeltsin Comment On Chechnya
By Breffni O'Rourke


Russia's military campaign in Chechnya dominated today's first session of the 
summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 
Istanbul. U.S. President Bill Clinton and other Western leaders criticized 
Russia's military campaign and called for immediate negotiations. Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin put up a forceful defense of Russia's actions. 


Istanbul, 18 November 1999 -- The OSCE summit in Istanbul today anchored the 
Chechen conflict firmly at the center of international political attention.


At the summit's first session, held in the splendor of a former sultan's 
palace by the Bosphorus, a series of Western speakers rose to express concern 
at civilian suffering in the conflict, and for an immediate end to the 
fighting.


But the discussion was led off by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who 
strongly defended the campaign against Western criticism:


"You [the West] have no right to criticize Russia over Chechnya. We are 
standing up to a wave of terrorist acts which have swept through Moscow and 
other cities and villages of our country. 1,580 people -- peaceful citizens 
-- have suffered. The pain of this tragedy is now being felt by thousands of 
families in all corners of Russia."


He rejected the idea of early peace talks and told Western leaders that 
instead of criticizing, they should understand Russia's position:


"There will be no peace talks with bandits and killers! We are for peace and 
a political resolution to the situation in Chechnya. And for this, the 
complete liquidation of bandit formations and the elimination of terrorists 
is necessary. Russia has the right to count on the understanding and support 
of Europe and the OSCE."


Yeltsin was followed by European Union Commission President Romano Prodi, who 
did not cloak his comments in diplomatic language.


Addressing his remarks directly to Yeltsin, Prodi said: "We condemn the use 
of force in Chechnya. Stop the military campaign and launch dialogue 
immediately."


U.S. President Bill Clinton, speaking later, chose to ignore Yeltsin's 
forceful tone. Clinton said Americans want Russia to overcome the "scourge" 
of terrorism, and he said Americans understand Russia has a right to its own 
territorial integrity. He also said the United States wants to see a strong 
and democratic Russia.


But Clinton questioned the path Russia has chosen in Chechnya:


"Russia has faced rebellion within and related violence beyond the borders of 
Chechnya. It has responded with a military strategy designed to break the 
resistance and end the terror, [But] the strategy has led to substantial 
civilian casualties and very large flows of refugees."


Clinton said most of Russia's critics deplore extremism in Chechnya and 
support the objectives of Russia to preserve its territorial integrity and 
end the violence. But, he said, they question the means:


"What they fear is that the means Russia has chosen [will] undermine its 
ends, that if attacks on civilians continue, the extremism Russia is trying 
to combat will only intensify, and the sovereignty that Russia is rightly 
defending will be more and more rejected by ordinary Chechens."


Finland currently holds the presidency of the European Union and speaking on 
its behalf, Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari also criticized Russia's 
military campaign in Chechnya.


"The European Union condemns the excessive use of force in Chechnya, which 
has given rise to severe hardship in the civilian population. The EU urges 
Russia to observe its commitments under international humanitarian law, and 
the OSCE code of conduct. Unhindered delivery of international humanitarian 
assistance should be assured. It is the EU's view that the military solution 
to a basically political problem is neither acceptable nor attainable. We 
strongly underline the need of a dialogue between the Russian government and 
the elected leaders of the North Caucasus, including Chechnya, to seek a 
political settlement. They should seriously consider using the good offices 
of the OSCE."


Today's addresses also included an exchange between Clinton and Yeltsin over 
Kosovo. Yeltsin had said in his speech that he rejected the new concept of 
what he called "humanitarian interference" in other countries' affairs. He 
said everyone knew the consequences of that. He referred directly to what he 
called "the aggression against Yugoslavia led by the United States."


In addressing that issue, Clinton said he respectfully wished to disagree. He 
said Yeltsin must consider what happened in Bosnia, where many thousands of 
lives were lost because the international community had not acted quickly 
enough. Clinton said that in Kosovo, by contrast, most of the people are back 
in their homes today.


Clinton and Yeltsin were to meet after the summit plenary session for 
bilateral talks which were also expected to dwell on the Chechnya issue.

#4
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
19 November 1999

CONTROVERSY OVER ALLEGED YELTSIN (AND ASSOCIATES) SWISS BANK ACCOUNTS NOT
DEAD YET. While international attention is focused on the war in Chechnya
and the controversy it has generated at the Istanbul summit, the scandal
surrounding alleged Kremlin corruption has erupted once again. The newspaper
Versiya claimed this week that it had documents from Switzerland's Banca del
Gottardo proving that Yeltsin, his daughter and adviser Tatyana Dyachenko,
and Kremlin property manager Pavel Borodin held accounts in the bank. Some
of those documents were published, including what was said to be a 1995
agreement to open an account in Banca del Gottardo, bearing Yeltsin's
signature. Reportedly, sources at Banca del Gottardo said that at least
US$11 million passed through the accounts of Yeltsin, Dyachenko and Borodin
(Versiya, November 16). Officials with Banca del Gottardo, however,
denounced the Versiya report as a "blatant forgery" and said that such
accounts have never existed (Moscow Times, November 18).


The controversy began earlier this year, after then Prosecutor General Yuri
Skuratov launched an investigation into kickbacks allegedly paid by the
Swiss construction firm Mabetex to high-level Russian officials in return
for lucrative contracts to refurbish Russian government buildings, including
the Kremlin. Skuratov asked Carla Del Ponte, then Switzerland's top
prosecutor, for help in the investigation, and Swiss media reported that
Swiss investigators were focusing on bank accounts belonging to more than
twenty Russian officials, including Borodin, a long-time associate of
Yeltsin. Versiya earlier this year published what it said were facsimiles of
documents showing that Borodin had accounts in Banca del Gottardo. Borodin
has repeatedly denied having any foreign bank accounts. Last August, Milan's
Corriere della Sera reported that Mabetex chief Bedgjet Pacolli had told
Swiss investigators he had transferred more than US$1 million to Yeltsin and
his two daughters (Dyachenko and Yelena Okulova), and that Mabetex had
provided the Yeltsins with credit cards. Pacolli has denied all the
allegations, and the Kremlin has repeatedly said that neither Yeltsin nor
any member of his family have held foreign bank accounts. On November 17,
the Kremlin issued the denial once again.


The same day, Ruslan Tamayev, a top investigator in Russia's Prosecutor
General's Office said that his office would question everyone involved in
the Mabetex case, including Yeltsin, if need be. Yesterday, Tamayev
questioned Oleg Lurye, the Versiya reporter who wrote the story published
this week. Afterwards, Lurye said he told prosecutors that he is "99
percent" sure the documents published in Versiya were genuine. He also said
he gave the Russian investigators documents obtained in Switzerland, and
that Versiya was planning to publish new material involving Mabetex (Russian
agencies, November 18).


A newspaper reported today that Russian investigators have already seized
documents from the Ministry of Finance and state's Vneshtorgbank in
connection with the Mabetex probe (Moskovsky komsomolets, November 19).

#5
Moscow Times
November 18, 1999 
DEFENSE DOSSIER: Cold War's Bloody Ending 
By Pavel Felgenhauer 


The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe summit in Turkey this 
week was planned first of all to approve changes to the 1990 Conventional 
Forces in Europe treaty. 


The CFE treaty finalized two decades of talks on troop reductions between 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, the collapse of communism made the treaty 
obsolete almost at the time of signing. Russia believed it was especially 
handicapped by this obsolete treaty: CFE not only limited the amount of 
military equipment Russia could keep west of the Urals, but also additionally 
severely curtailed the number of tanks and guns Moscow could deploy in the 
volatile North Caucasian region. 


Since 1993, Russian generals and diplomats have pressed the West to relax 
these so-called "flank limitations" to allow Moscow to shift armor more 
easily from one region to another. 


Years passed in horse trading. Major NATO countries did not care much about 
where Russia actually deployed its obsolete tanks. But smaller states like 
Poland, Norway and Turkey were fighting to get the best possible deal. 
Finally, the CFE amendments that required the approval of almost all European 
states was tentatively initiated. 


Then the latest Russian "anti-terrorist" campaign in Chechnya began. The 
Russian army has deployed hundreds of tanks and other armor in the North 
Caucasus in violation of CFE "flank quotas." The signing of the amended CFE 
is in jeopardy, especially since the West is using Russia's CFE violations as 
a legal argument to scold Moscow for its actions in Chechnya. 


But Western protestations against the killings in Chechnya sound hollow to 
most Russian ears. During the latest war in the Balkans the West violated 
many international agreements: The UN Charter, the NATO Charter, the OSCE 
Final Act as well as the CFE treaty by concentrating more than a thousand 
warplanes in Italy to attack Yugoslavia. 


In NATO's Balkan war - as today in Chechnya - the innocent suffered more than 
the fighters. NATO bombs actually killed more civilians than Serbs in 
uniform. There is evidence that NATO overestimated Serbian atrocities in 
Kosovo. In Pusto Selo, Albanian villagers said 106 civilians had been killed 
by the Serbs and NATO rushed out satellite photos of mass graves. It seems 
these photos were deliberately forged, since an on-sight inspection revealed 
no graves at that location after NATO troops occupied Kosovo. 


Western political and military leaders committed war crimes during the Balkan 
war by authorizing attacks against civilian targets like the television 
station in Belgrade or the bridges in Novi Sad in northern Serbia. 


NATO forces in Kosovo have presided over a massive ethnic cleansing of the 
Serbian and Gypsy population. Hundreds of thousands have been cleansed and 
the West has done virtually nothing to reverse this cleansing or to 
adequately protect the ethnic minorities. 


NATO's recent war in the Balkans has forced down overall standards of public 
morality in Europe to an all-time low. Privately, many Russian military 
officers acknowledge that innocent civilians are being killed today in 
Chechnya, but they also claim that "we are just doing what NATO was doing in 
the Balkans - no more, no - less." 


Of course, someone else's alleged crime is not a legal excuse to commit a 
felony. But in Russia such legalistic arguments are not convincing. Even the 
head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Alexy II, this week supported 
the war in Chechnya, and at the same time accused the West of "double 
standards." 


The Americans do it, the British do it, the French do it, even the "green" 
German pacifists do it. So let's also do it - say Russian officials - let's 
kill innocent civilians if it's politically expedient. 


Ten years ago the Berlin Wall fell and Germany was peacefully unified. The 
Cold War in Europe was decisively ended. Old evils were disappearing and the 
future seemed bright. The CFE treaty was signed several months after the fall 
of the Wall in an atmosphere of a growing political consensus on security 
matters between East and West. 


Today suspicion and hatred have again divided Europe. Instead of peace, 
Europe has experienced in this decade the bloodiest armed conflicts since the 
end of World War II. And there is a distinct possibility that these conflicts 
are only a prelude of future barbaric non-conventional regional wars 
facilitated by a simultaneous proliferation of extreme nationalism, political 
instability and weapons of mass destruction. 


Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent Moscow-based defense analyst. 

#7
The Russia Journal
November 15-21, 1999
Army poised to strike in Russia's elections
By Alexander Golts
Alexander Golts is a columnist for the weekly magazine Itogi.
 
On the eve of every Russian parliamentary election, questions arise about the 
influence of the armed forces on the political scene.


Col. Gen. Vasily Volkov, a member of the Central Election Committee, told 
Defense Ministry publication Krasnaya Zvezda that soldiers and their 
dependents number 10 million voters - a considerable portion of the 
electorate.


He said that military personnel are less susceptible to propaganda than other 
voters (by law, political propaganda is forbidden among active-duty soldiers 
and officers), and more influenced by their commanders.


Military people, he said, are disciplined and will definitely use the chance 
to vote.


All this makes the military a juicy morsel for political strategists. 
Predictably, the names of acclaimed military commanders appear in nearly all 
election slates. Boris Gromov, commander of the 40th Army (which fought in 
Afghanistan), adorns the slate of the Fatherland-All Russia bloc, and former 
Defense Minister Igor Rodionov decorates the list of the Communist Party.


Numerous senior officers are members of the radical and nationalistic 
Movement to Support the Army, and several, including Col. Gen. Vorobyev and 
retired Col. Yushenkov, have joined the ranks of the liberals. In all, 77 men 
in uniform are running for seats in the State Duma lower house of parliament.


The truth, however, is that the military doesn't necessarily vote for 
military candidates. It's worth recalling that the present Duma contains no 
more than 20 out of the 100 military candidates promoted in 1996 by then 
Defense Minister Pavel Grachev.


The military electorate is apparently not as consolidated as it may appear, 
and there is no reason to expect them to become more consolidated now.


The military is poised to play a key role in the upcoming State Duma and 
presidential elections, but not due to its voting preferences. It doesn't 
take much insight to see that the elections will largely depend on the 
outcome of the Chechen campaign. The popularity of pro-Kremlin figures, 
including Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, depends directly on the progress in 
subduing the breakaway republic with minimal casualties among Russian 
soldiers.


In the first stage, as Russian troops advanced into Chechnya's northern 
plains while meeting little resistance, military and political aims appeared 
to coincide. Now, as the campaign acquires a protracted character and it 
becomes clear that Chechen resistance cannot be crushed solely by force of 
arms, contradictions have emerged between the top brass and political 
officials. Seeking the victory that would boost their careers, the generals 
don't want talks with the Chechens.


Expressing support for Putin and his course, the military is hinting that its 
support could fade away should the prime minister cancel its carte blanche in 
Chechnya. In an interview with TV program Zerkalo, Maj. Gen. Vladimir 
Shamanov said, "Putin is a man whom many people would support, including 
myself." However, asked what the military would do should orders be issued to 
back off and begin negotiations, Shamanov replied: "I would tear my shoulder 
straps off and look for a civilian job. I would not serve in such an army."


"I am firmly convinced there will be no order to back off," Deputy head of 
the General Headquarters Valery Manilov said.


Meanwhile, disagreement is obviously gaining momentum between generals from 
General Headquarters chief Anatoly Kvashnin's camp and Defense Minister Igor 
Sergeyev, whose stance is much less radical. The recent, unprecedented joint 
statement of Sergeyev and Kvashnin denying rumors about the existence of such 
disagreements only indicates the seriousness of the situation.


For the first time in Russia's democratic history, the military has dared 
advise the president and prime minister on what to do. Moreover, the 
political leadership appears compliant. In his most recent statements, Putin 
admitted the possibility of storming the Chechen capital, Grozny. It's worth 
recalling that, only two weeks ago, the prime minister dismissed such a 
scenario as totally unacceptable.


The top brass doesn't even need to win Duma seats. With their direct 
connection to the country's leaders, all they have to do is lobby.

#8
BBC
November 18, 1999 
Analysis: Economic uncertainty over pipeline 
By regional analyst Pam O'Toole 


The United States and Turkey have spent years lobbying for the Baku-Ceyhan 
pipeline, linking oil fields in the Caspian Sea with the Mediterranean. 


If it is built, it would provide Turkey with lucrative transit fees and aid 
the United States in its bid to prevent Iran from becoming a major export 
route for Caspian oil. 


Now an agreement to build the pipeline has been signed at the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe summit in Istanbul. 


But disappointing oil finds in the Caspian mean that international oil 
companies who would be expected to foot the bill for the new route maintain 
that it is not yet economically viable. 


"Somebody has to find enough oil to make sure that this pipeline will run at 
capacity, " says Julian Lee, senior oil analyst at the Centre for Global 
Energy Studies in London. 


"Until that oil is found I don't think the pipeline will be built," he says. 


For the time being, Baku-Ceyhan will continue to exist on paper only, with 
international oil companies preferring to ship their Caspian exports out via 
an existing pipeline through Georgia. 


Conflict of interests 


There is some uncertainty, too, over a second agreement on a proposed gas 
pipeline to carry Turkmen gas across the Caspian to Turkey. 


In this case, while the economics of the deal appear relatively sound, but 
the project could be dogged by political differences. 


The line will pass through Azerbaijan, which has significant gas reserves of 
its own, and it may well want to have access to the pipeline so that it can 
sell its own gas, rather than being a trans-shipment route for Turkmenistan's 
exports. 


Russian concerns 


After years of political manoeuvring, Russia has continued to try to ensure 
that Caspian oil is exported via its territory. 


At the last minute, it proposed a bypass pipeline which would ensure that any 
Caspian oil exported through Russia would not have to travel through the 
troubled territory of Chechnya. 


Russia has been accusing the US recently of attempting to exclude Russian 
influence from the Caspian. 


It has also been accusing the US of attempting to block Russia's plans to 
build a gas pipeline beneath the Black Sea to serve Turkey. 


Azerbaijan has successfully argued that the Russian proposal for a bypass 
pipeline has come too late. 


However, analysts point out that even if it had been made several years ago, 
Baku would still have been keen to prevent Moscow having a monopoly on Azeri 
oil export routes. 


At least Moscow may take some comfort from the fact that it appears unlikely 
that the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline will be built for some time to come.

#9
St. Petersburg Times
November 16, 1999 
EDITORIAL
Turning Back Cold Clock Is a Disgrace 


TEN years since the beginning of the end of the Cold War, and it has come
to this - Moscow telling NATO to lay off the Caucasus, and threatening
nuclear-capable bomber flights to and from two of the Cold War's most
notorious theaters, Vietnam and Cuba. Hello, 1999 - same as 1959. 


The recent fiery rhetoric from Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Defense
Minister Igor Sergeyev may be just so much hot air, but it nevertheless
represents a deepening distrust between Moscow and the West that began in
earnest with NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe - possibly the most
unnecessary and provocative act of the so-called New World Order - and got
worse with the Kosovo crisis. 


Or they could be telling the truth, which means that another stand-off
Kennedy-Khrushchev style is in the offing, which in turn means the world
will have to hold its breath as it did with the Cuban missile crisis in
1962, and pray that sanity will prevail. 


Moscow is rattling its sabre, while politicians in the United States are
calling for a halt on aid to Russia. Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze
- one of the more mature and level-headed Cold Warriors - has been agreeing
with the analysis that Russia is planning a new confrontation. 


It seems that Russia and the West are capable only of two extremes. The
first consists of handing over vast sums in aid and burying the head in the
sand when billions of dollars are siphoned off, as pensions and salaries
remain at pathetic levels. This is called engagement. 


The second consists of the world's two largest nuclear powers snarling at
each other and vying for influence in oil-rich regions or those areas that
surround them, or battling for the upper hand in places that would be
strategically important in the event of a war. 


What is most outrageous is that the point of both relationships is to
attract votes home. There is a valid school of thought that Russia would do
much better in the long term without IMF money - but the pros and cons of
this are rarely discussed in terms of how the Russian economy and people
might benefit. 


Instead, U.S. Republicans highlight Russian corruption to bash Al Gore's
presidential run, while politicians in Moscow have found that the more
hawkish the stance, the better the consensus in the Duma and on the street. 


The people in both East and West are having the wool pulled over their
eyes. Any return to defense as a priority issue in the Kremlin and the
White House would be vile. Have we not grown up enough this century to work
out where that leads? Or are we doomed, as we always have been, to sit with
fingers crossed as the world's superpowers play geopolitics? 

#10
Voice of America
DATE=11/18/1999
TITLE=RUSSIA / Y-2-K (L-O)
BYLINE=PETER HEINLEIN
DATELINE=MOSCOW


INTRO:  Several western embassies in Moscow are urging 
their citizens to make preparations for the so-called 
"millennium bug" and to leave Russia if possible for 
the New Year's holiday.  But as Moscow Correspondent 
Peter Heinlein reports, the likelihood of serious 
calamity with computers is considered small.


TEXT:  Embassies of the United States, Britain, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are setting up an 
emergency contacts network in Moscow next month, just 
in case. 


Embassy officials briefing reporters stressed there is 
little chance of anything going seriously wrong when 
the clock strikes midnight December, 31st.  But the 
diplomats, who asked to remain anonymous, say Russia 
is one of the countries least prepared to handle 
potential Y-two-K computer breakdowns, if they should 
occur. 


Other countries in the region considered to have a 
higher risk of "millennium bug" troubles are Belarus, 
Ukraine, and Moldova.


/// OPT ///  The U-S embassy is offering to pay for 
non-essential employees and their dependents to fly 
out of Russia over the New Year's weekend, and is 
urging all other U-S citizens to leave, too.  An 
official estimates there are 10-thousand Americans 
living in Russia.  /// END OPT ///


For those who stay, a network of letterboxes and 
billboards will be set up in Moscow hotels and 
offices, in case communications systems fail.  
Citizens are being advised to stock up on cooking gas 
canisters, water, matches, candles, and other survival 
items.


One of the most worrisome potential problems is the 
failure of heating systems.  Average daytime 
temperatures can drop below minus 15-degrees Celsius 
for extended periods at that time of year.


But Ron Lewin, a Y-2-K consultant helping Russian 
firms identify potential "millennium bug" glitches, 
says in a low-tech society such as Russia, there is 
little cause for alarm.


            /// LEWIN ACT ///


      Personally, I do not think that there is a big 
      risk being in Russia around the Y-2-K period.  
      People who are living in Russia should be use 
      to, already, to the environment, which is less 
      comfortable in many ways than what we are used 
      to in the west.


            /// END ACT ///


Western diplomats were also quick to downplay the 
potential risks.  One commented -- there is nothing 
apocalyptic about this.


But a U-S embassy consular officer said it is still 
important to make sure everyone is prepared for the 
worst case, even if the probability is low.  She 
expressed special concern for the estimated two-
thousand or three-thousand American students in 
Russia, many of whom may not be in contact with the 
embassy.


She closed the briefing by saying -- deep down inside, 
I hope a lot of people go home for the holidays.    

#12
CIA declassifies documents tracing Soviet Union's fall
WASHINGTON, Nov 18 (AFP) - 

Declassified US intelligence documents that traced the collapse of the Soviet 
Union show US analysts believed Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms 
were doomed to failure but were unsure whether they would end in a return to 
hardline rule or something short of anarchy.


The Central Intelligence Agency on Thursday released 24 intelligence 
estimates dating from 1988 to 1991 at a conference co-sponsored by the spy 
agency at Texas A and M University on "US Intelligence and the End of the 
Cold War."


No US intelligence documents of such recent vintage have ever been 
declassified before by the CIA, a backhanded testament to the dramatic 
decline in Moscow's standing as a perceived security threat to the United 
States.


The documents are a window on the US intelligence community's frantic efforts 
to keep ahead of the curve as the Soviet empire went into its final dive.


They show that the US intelligence community believed that Gorbachev needed 
peace with the West to pursue his reforms, which opened the way for dramatic 
agreements on nuclear arms cuts and Soviet disengagement from Eastern Europe 
following the collapse of communism there.


But they are shot through with pessimism about Gorbachev's chances of success 
as he tried to reform the Soviet system from within, accurately predicting 
that the forces unleashed would ultimately bring him down.


In December 1988 at the peak of the Soviet leader's popularity abroad, a 
national intelligence estimate concluded that Gorbachev's effort to revive 
the Soviet economy "will produce no substantial improvement over the next 
five years."


By September 1989 the intelligence community was reporting Soviet concerns of 
a "serious breakdown of public order in the USSR," and predicting "continuing 
crises and instability on an even larger scale."


Gorbachev "has brought Soviet internal policy to a fateful crossroads, 
seriously reducing the chances that his rule -- if it survives -- will take 
the path toward long-term stability," concluded the estimate, titled 
"Gorbachev's Domestic Gambles and Instability in the USSR."


A month later, the intelligence community wrote that the crisis precipitated 
by Gorbachev's "perestroika" policies "will continue over the next two years 
and beyond and could threaten the system's viability."


"Gorbachev appears to believe that the new order must be built on foundations 
of political and social legitimacy if it is to succeed," it said. "But reform 
is often more difficult than revolution, and the genies he has released will 
defy the boundaries the system tries to place around them."


The November 1989 estimate judged a repressive crackdown to be a "less likely 
scenario" because of the high degree of politicization of Soviet society.


The CIA, in an alternative view in the same estimate, predicted an even 
higher degree of political instability, social upheaval and inter-ethnic 
conflict in the two-year period ahead.


"In these circumstances, we believe there is a significant chance that 
Gorbachev will progressively lose control of the situation," the CIA's entry 
said.


A year later, the intelligence community flatly declared: "The USSR is in the 
midst of a historic transformation that threatens to tear the country apart. 
The old Communist order is in its death throes."


Deterioration short of anarchy was the most likely scenario, the November 
1990 national intelligence estimate said. "There is, however, a significant 
potential for dramatic departures along the lines of the 'anarchy' or 
'military intervention' scenarios," it added.


"The Soviet Union as we have known it is finished," it said. "The USSR is, at 
a minimum. headed toward a smaller and looser union."


In April 1991, four months ahead of the abortive August coup against 
Gorbachev, a CIA analysis entitled "The Soviet Caldron" warned that 
"explosive events have become increasingly possible."


"Unfortunately preparations for dictatorial rule have begun," the paper said. 
Gorbachev had alienated reformers, increasing his reliance on hardliners, it 
noted.


"More ominously, military, MVD, and KGB leaders are making preparations for a 
broad use of force in the political process," it said.


However, it added, "The long-term prospects of such an enterprise are poor, 
and even short-term success is far from assured."


By June 1991, the intelligence community was looking for the first time at 
the implications of a "revolution that probably will sweep the Communist 
Party from power and reshape the country within the five-year time frame of 
this estimate."


It posed concerns that the fragmentation of the Soviet Union would place 
nuclear weapons in the hands of various rival factions or republics, and it 
forecast an increased likelihood of civil wars, famine and accidental nuclear 
launches.


The last National Intelligence Estimate before the Soviet Union's formal 
dissolution on December 31, 1991, predicted that the winter would bring "the 
most significant civil disorder in the former USSR since the Bolsheviks 
consolidated power."


By then, though, the tide had turned.