
| ISSUE #74 | November 12, 1999 |
#1 Moscow Times November 12, 1999 Kremlin Hints at Talks to End War By Valeria Korchagina and Brian Whitmore Staff Writers A top Kremlin official announced Thursday that Moscow was ready for negotiations with Chechnya to end nearly seven weeks of war, provided Chechnya would renounce its claim to independence. Kremlin First Deputy Chief of Staff Igor Shabdurasulov also offered a formal apology - the first from any high-ranking Russian official - for the civilian casualties of the war. At the same time, he vowed the war would go on for now, and on Thursday Russian forces hammered Grozny with artillery and air strikes. Shabdurasulov's announcement was echoed by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov in Helsinki, who said Russia was "prepared to end military action even tomorrow," provided only that Chechen fighters surrender. "We are interested in quickly ending the anti-terrorist operations and starting the process for a political settlement," Ivanov said, in remarks reported by Reuters. "If they [the rebels] laid down arms and halted their actions, things could end quickly." As Ivanov and Shabdurasulov raised their voices, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin - the war's main architect - was silent. Putin was in the city of Izhvesk Thursday to celebrate the 80th birthday of Mikhail Kalashnikov, the inventor of the famous AK-47 assault rifle. He made no official pronouncements about Chechnya, and was only quoted as saying Russia would in future take "consecutive and persistent" steps toward improving its national defense readiness. Other ministers also spoke out. Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev said he expected the war might end before the year's end, though he did not say exactly how. Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo said he opposed talks and wanted military operations to continue until the "terrorists" were "eliminated." Putin's popularity has soared since the conflict in Chechnya and polls show him to be Russia's most popular politician. But international condemnation of the war has grown, and the Kremlin has at times seemed to be distancing itself from Putin. Boris Yeltsin was formally on vacation on Thursday at a residence outside Moscow. Cracks have also appeared in the domestic political consensus on the war. On Tuesday, Yabloko leader Grigory Yavlinsky became the first major politician to question the war. Citing mounting civilian casualties and a refugee crisis, he called for a 30-day bombing pause to let innocents escape the war zone. Exactly how many civilians have been killed remains unclear. But Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov told The Associated Press this week that Russian airstrikes have killed 4,126 civilians, and human rights groups have expressed alarm about civilian deaths. In sharp contrast to previous government statements, Shabdurasulov on Thursday acknowledged that Russian forces have made "mistakes" resulting in civilian casualties. "We bear moral responsibility for these mistakes," he said. Shabdurasulov held his press conference jointly with Dzhabrail Gakayev, a leader of the Moscow-based Chechen community. When Gakayev offered evidence that Russian forces had bombed schools and killed civilians, including women and elderly, Shabdurasulov did not disagree. "We have information that on Oct. 29, 29 civilians heading away from Chechnya were killed," Gakayev said. Shabdurasulov also apologized to the families of Russian soldiers, and expressed "empathy and compassion" for civilians in Chechnya. The plight of civilians in Chechnya and that of refugees fleeing the war is likely to be a major topic at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's summit meeting next month in Istanbul, Turkey. "We've seen alarming humanitarian conditions," Reuters quoted Norwegian diplomat Kim Traavik as saying Thursday. "There is a need for a major effort to avoid a further worsening of the situation." Traavik was speaking after leading an OSCE mission to Ingushetia, which is sheltering nearly 200,000 Chechen refugees. He said winter cold, cramped conditions and rising cases of tuberculosis and dysentery were all a threat to the estimated 25,000 refugees in camps there. Shabdurasulov said the Kremlin seeks talks not only with Maskhadov, but with all "respectable" members of the Chechen elite - but certainly not with rebel warlords Shamil Basayev or Khattab, who he described as "terrorists." Maskhadov on Thursday appealed to Yeltsin for negotiations. "Boris Nikolayevich, I again urge you to start a dialogue," Maskhadov said in an open letter to Yeltsin. "The problems ... can't be solved by war." But Shabdurasulov said, "There is no practical sense today in holding negotiations with Maskhadov alone because he does not control the situation in Chechnya." He added, however, that Russia still views Maskhadov as the "legitimate president of the Chechen republic." By contrast, Interior Minister Rushailo was quoted by Interfax Thursday as saying, "Maskhadov is now on a level with the bandits," and opposing talks with him. "We are talking about the consolidation of the Chechen people so that they are themselves able to define paths toward the unification of Chechen society and begin looking for a solution to the Chechen problem as a whole," Shabdurasulov said. "The federal authorities have always adhered to the position that this problem cannot be resolved by means of the use of force alone," Shabdurasulov said. "Chechnya is an integral part of the Russian Federation and of the Russian people. This position is not subject to discussion, not today, not in 2001, 2002 nor in any other year." That position was at odds with a May 1997 agreement signed by President Yeltsin and Aslan Maskhadov, who had just been elected as president of Chechnya. That agreement - based on the 1996 Khasavyurt Accords brokered by Maskhadov and then-Kremlin security chief Alexander Lebed to end the first war - put off deciding the issue Chechnya's independence until 2001. Yavlinsky has also proposed talks with Mashkadov - provided Maskhadov first frees all kidnapping victims and other hostages held across Chechnya, disarms all paramilitary groups and turns over all "terrorists." Nationalities Minister Ramazan Abdulatipov slammed Yavlinsky's proposal Wednesday, calling it "pure fiction, totally groundless and leading nowhere." Likewise, the newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta, owned by Kremlin-connected tycoon Boris Berezovsky, ran a front-page story Wednesday condemning Yavlinsky's 30-day bombing pause proposal as a piece of cheap electioneering and an attempt to undermine Putin's presidential aspirations. Nezavisimaya Gazeta suggested that Yavlinsky has a hidden agenda and made the proposal to "demonstrate his loyalty to Yabloko's foreign partners."
#4 The Russia Journal November 8-14, 1999 Chechen effort needs political goals Alexander Golts is a columnist for the weekly magazine Itogi. Russian troops enter their tent at a camp near Arshty, Ingushetia, some 60 km west of Grozny, early last week. It's alarming that Russian generals, euphoric over their claimed success in Chechnya, don't recall statements they made a half-year ago when they slammed NATO's operation in Yugoslavia. Air strikes and massive artillery shelling proved effective in the Chechen operation's first stage when the aim was to create a security zone around the breakaway republic. It's time for the top brass to acknowledge that the situation has changed radically since Russian troops crossed the Terek River and, meeting almost no resistance, began tightening the noose around the Chechen capital, Grozny. Russia's generals desperately need a victory in order to wipe out the shame of the previous war. "No cessation and no talks with the separatists!" has become a mantra for these men. In a bid to achieve their aim, they are continuing to keep direct contacts with the enemy to a minimum. However, in seeking to wipe out "terrorists," they have indiscriminately bombed all military formations in the republic -- whether Shamil Basayev's and Khattab's men, or Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov's national guards. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has reiterated that the Chechen problem can only be resolved through political means. The trouble is that federal authorities do not want to talk with anybody in Chechnya. The generals' decisiveness contrasts with the indecision of Russia's civilian authorities. The government appeared willing to speak with Chechnya's parliament deputies but soon abandoned the idea. It appointed Nikolai Koshman as Russia's empowered envoy to Chechnya but didn't give him any powers. The absence of a political strategy as explicit as the military one jeopardizes the entire undertaking. Although the military operation appears to be going successfully, the army has not yet defeated the Chechen force of 30,000-40,000 men. The federal force has only battled with the Chechen army's vanguard detachments and could well be heading toward a Chechen trap. It's unlikely that the federal force will manage to encircle Grozny and starve the Chechens out. As international pressure builds, the Kremlin will pressure the military to speed the operation by using the same tactics of massive air strikes and shelling. However, the destruction of Chechen apartment blocks will bring public protests, and the military will have to resort to street fighting and inevitable heavy losses. The worst scenario would come if Chechen militants leave Grozny in order to deliver a blow from behind. It would be difficult to repel rebel forces moving in from Ingushetia or Dagestan. The 90,000-strong federal army group deployed in the North Caucasus is the largest the country can amass. There are no reserves ready to combat a sudden incursion into Russia. Russia obviously needs military dialogue with the Chechen leaders. At the least, Russia must try to get a section of Chechnya's armed forces taken out of the picture while federal troops destroy the Basayev and Khattab formations. At the current rate, even if federal troops manage to crush organized Chechen resistance and kill Basayev and Khattab, peace won't be established in the breakaway republic. Moscow needs an understanding with the Chechens. Air strikes and bombing are not the path toward building up confidence. With this in mind, Russian authorities are trying to foster relatively normal living conditions in areas controlled by federal troops - they reopen schools and hospitals, restore infrastructure, and pay wages and pensions. Nonetheless, these efforts will bring about nothing unless Moscow adopts a sound approach toward Chechnya. No military strategy, however successful, can substitute for rational policy.
#5 Russian Premier Reiterates Sovereignty Over Chechnya BUDAPEST (Nov. 11) XINHUA - Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said Chechnya is an inalienable part of Russia and that the Russian government will not negotiate with Chechen terrorists. The Hungarian newspaper People's Voice carried his statement Thursday. Putin was quoted as saying Chechnya had actually been in a state of independence, but the terrorists were not satisfied. They launched aggression against other republics, attempting to occupy more territory. Their terrorist explosions have killed about 1,500 civilians. If the bases of Chechen terrorists were not smashed Russia would never have tranquillity, he was quoted as saying. The Russian government will not hold talks with the terrorists, he said. The Russian Prime Minister also slashed out at foreign forces' interference in Russia's action in Chechnya. He said these political forces do not want to see a powerful Russia. They offered their immense financial resources to those opponents of the Russian government to undermine and weaken the country.
#6 Russia needs to scrap 107 nuclear-powered subs - minister. ST. PETERSBURG, November 9 (Itar-Tass) - Russia needs to scrap 107 decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines of its Northern and Pacific fleets, Deputy Nuclear Energy Minister Valery Lebedev said. He said speaking at a conference of northern territories in Saint Petersburg on Tuesday that nuclear sector experts hoped to unload fuel from at least 18 submarines and dispose of them next year. "Seriousness of the problem finds an understanding in the government, and this gives us hope that our programme will be implemented," Lebedev said. However, Russia lacks a single technological cycle of treatment of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, he said. Such a "through" technology is being developed these days by specialists of the Nuclear Energy Ministry and the Russian Academy of Sciences. Part of this technology is to set up several storage sites for spent fuel near locations of nuclear submarines. Storage tanks are being designed at Saint Petersburg's Izhora plants. Part of fuel will be transported to Mayak chemical factory in the Urals. Lebedev said a plant for liquid radioactive waste treatment would be launched by the end of this year at Murmansk's service and maintenance enterprise Atomflot, which is a base of civilian nuclear-propelled ice-breakers. The enterprise will meet demand of the whole northern region for disposal of the nuclear sector's waste. Russia will use funds of foreign countries and organisations in the fuel and waste treatment programme, Lebedev said. He said the environmental situation at anchorage sites of nuclear submarines in the northern Murmansk anbd Arkhangelsk regions is not alarming. Lebedev said the environmental situation was close to dangerous only at a submarine base in the Kola Peninsula's Andreyeva Bay, but it is under control.
#7 Experts on 'Collapse' of ABM Treaty, Russian Response Rossiyskaya Gazeta 10 November 1999 [translation for personal use only] Article by Aleksandr Babakin under the "Fact and Commentary" rubric: "Where the Antimissile Missiles in Alaska Are Targeted" -- passages between slantlines are printed in boldface A Russian antimissile missile was launched into the skies at a remote testing range last Tuesday, 2 November. On Thursday US Defense Secretary William Cohen spoke about this in very negative terms. Such antimissile missiles, he said, are contrary to the basic provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty, and this supposedly gives the United States grounds to insist on its modification. Furthermore a missile threat to the United States has recently arisen, Cohen asserts, from countries like North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya. The Pentagon chief also claimed that a national antimissile defense system "does not constitute a threat to Russia." And, according to Cohen, the United States hopes to convince Moscow of "the need for amendments to or modification of the ABM Treaty." Here is the opinion of Russian experts on this point. /Under the existing treaty, as Vladimir Petrovskiy, member of the Academy of Military Sciences, explained, the sides are permitted up to 100 antimissile missiles./_ One of these, which was on alert status, was tested. So the fact of such a test should not be regarded as an attempt by Russia to make a show of strength, it is rather a reminder of our country's readiness to take the necessary measures at any moment. "Nobody," Vladimir Petrovskiy noted, "has hitherto proved sufficiently reliably and convincingly that North Korea really does possess missile potential and is capable of threatening the United States." All this is at the level of arguments and political commentaries, while in Vladimir Petrovskiy's view such questions should be discussed at an international level. /And here is the opinion of Major General Vladimir Dvorkin, chief of a Russian Federation Defense Ministry research institute, on what kind of threat the stationing of sophisticated US antimissile missiles in Alaska poses./ "This is just the start of the collapse of the 1972 ABM Treaty," the military scientist believes; "it marks the end of the fundamental START I Treaty and the subsequent START II and START III Treaties (START [SNV] stands for strategic offensive arms) and of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. All in all, this could lead to a new spiral in the arms race. In response to US missiles in Alaska, for instance, Russia could [install] an MRV (multiple reentry vehicle) instead of the single warhead on Topol missiles, use a single [yedinuyu] missile for the ground and naval strategic nuclear forces, retain mobile railroad missile systems but with a different missile, and take other weighty steps. But even the technical solutions that have been found do not answer the main political question: Do we have an interest in the total destruction of the security system?" -- the scientist asks, and answers his own question: "I am confident that that is not in Russia's interest." However, in his view the case is not so hopeless. Not all the diplomatic potential has been exhausted yet. For instance, the French president has also now declared his disagreement with breaking the ABM Treaty...
#8 Excerpt US State Deparetment Foreign Media Reaction November 10, 1999 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BERLIN WALL'S FALL: REASON TO 'CELEBRATE'? Yesterday's celebration of the tenth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall prompted a flurry of editorials and commentaries overseas, with pundits from Europe, Asia, Latin America and Canada ruminating about the destruction of "one of the most potent symbols of our time." Beyond acknowledging the Wall as the preeminent Cold War symbol, however, opinionmakers were divided on the ramifications of the Eastern bloc implosion and on its implications for world security in the intervening ten years. The outlook of a number of pundits in Europe and elsewhere was quite positive. Conceding that many problems remain and that this is "not the end of history, more a still incomplete chapter," these commentators stressed that there can be no doubt that--with the "victory of democracy over tyranny"--the world is a better place today than it was a decade ago. But a majority of other analysts was less sanguine. They contended that the "new world order" is "full of disorder," and that nations are no closer to "harmony" than they were during the Cold War. Many argued that, in fact, many "new walls" have been thrown up around the world--defined by the "resurgence of nationalism," "growth in social and economic inequality," and a "rampant" arms race. Criticism was aimed at the leading powers of the world--the U.S. superpower, as well as Europe--which were seen as only acting in their self-interests, and in danger of "losing the peace." Regarding a reunited Germany, German and Belgian papers found that the optimism of the early years has eroded. Writers pointed out that poverty is high in the East, and that "inner-unity" in Germany remains merely a "catch-phrase," not a reality. Following are commentary highlights: THE POSITIVES: A number of media voices agreed that, while problems remain, there is "more to celebrate than lament" on this tenth anniversary. Commentators stressed that first and foremost, with the fall of the Wall, came the fall of communism in Europe. They held that the world should rejoice that communism--a "doctrine...that willingly perverted the human longing for justice...[and] sacrificed human compassion"--has been finally "consigned to the dumpster of history." Several observers also said that it is "worth remembering" that "we used to live in a world where the main framework for peace was a nuclear stand-off based on the threat of mutually assured destruction." Analysts spoke of the "lesson" that the fall of the Wall teaches: that "change is possible, even in the most unpropitious circumstances." Others pointed out that today, Eastern European societies offer "infinitely more opportunities for social and individual development than the contorted dictatorship[s]" of the past. THE NEGATIVES: Many more analysts believed that the collapse of the East Bloc "did not yield a safer and more stable world." Critics found that, among other things: there are "more conflicts" in the world; nationalism is fueling instability; "justice" is meted out unequally; the leading powers are self-serving; relations among the former Cold War antagonists remain tense; the arms race is still alive; and crime and corruption have taken root ahead of democracy in the former communist states. An Italian daily ventured to say that "we did not understand that the fall of an empire would remove one of the pillars from the world that, for good or bad, had been maintaining the international order for 50 years." "Chaos prevails in the new world order that emerged from the ashes of socialist nations," one Mexican daily glumly concluded.
#9 The Globe and Mail (Canada) November 10, 1999 Study finds Russian police use torture routinely GEOFFREY YORK Moscow Bureau Moscow -- Russian police routinely torture or abuse as many as half of their suspects, often using electroshock and asphyxiation techniques, a new study says. A two-year investigation by Human Rights Watch, an independent New York-based group, found disturbing evidence that Russian police are torturing suspects with almost complete impunity while prosecutors are closing their eyes to the widespread practice. There is overwhelming evidence that "torture has become an integral part of police practice," the group says in a 200-page report to be released in Moscow today. The group reached this conclusion after interviewing more than 50 victims in five regions of Russia. It also interviewed dozens of judges, lawyers, prosecutors, former police officers, and relatives of the torture victims. Some experts cited in the report say the use of torture techniques has increased dramatically in the past 10 years. "The courts commonly accept forced confessions at face value, and use them as a basis for convictions," the report says. "Some former police officers said they believe it is impossible to solve crimes without torture." The prolonged beating of suspects is the most common form of police torture in Russia. But police also use several other elaborate torture techniques, the report notes. In one technique, a suspect is handcuffed to a chair while a gas mask or plastic bag is placed over his head and his oxygen supply is cut off. The technique is known as "the elephant" because the gas mask's hose resembles an elephant's trunk. One detainee in the town of Saransk died as a result of this torture. In the electroshock technique, police use a hand-cranked machine that resembles an old-fashioned field telephone. An electric current is transmitted by electrodes clamped to the suspect's ears. In another position, known as the "envelope," the detainee is forced to sit with his head between his bent knees, with his hands tied to his feet. A suspect in the city of Nizhni Novgorod died after being held in this position and subjected to sustained beatings, the report says. A forensic examination found 40 bruises from nightsticks on his body. In the "swallow" position, the victim's hands are handcuffed behind him and attached to an iron pipe, so that he is suspended above the ground, while the police beat him. The police also routinely use intense psychological pressure, threats of violence and threats to the suspect's family, the report says. They usually refuse to allow suspects to have access to a lawyer. Some of the tortured suspects are as young as 14 or 15. In many cases, the report says, police put a suspect into the same cell as a trusted prisoner, who serves as a police enforcer by beating or raping the suspect in exchange for special privileges. The investigation found four cases in which a suspect leaped or fell from police windows, usually to escape torture. One died and two were crippled for life. Most torture victims are unable to get access to doctors or forensic experts to document their injuries. Many doctors, afraid of the police, are reluctant to examine torture victims. "As a result, medical evidence of torture is almost always lost," the report notes. Even when a suspect is able to present evidence of torture, most courts and prosecutors ignore this evidence, the report says. Convictions are often based on coerced testimony, it says, and confessions based on coercion are rarely excluded from a trial's evidence. One of the most shocking cases recounted is that of Sergei Mikhailov, a 26-year-old in northern Russia who was arrested in 1994 and accused of the murder of a young girl. He said he was beaten for 10 days and threatened with rape until he signed a confession. Although he withdrew the confession after he gained access to a lawyer, he was convicted and sentenced to death. A year later, another man confessed to the murder. A special state investigator concluded in 1997 that Mr. Mikhailov was wrongly convicted, but the state prosecutor has not yet taken steps to overturn the conviction. Mr. Mikhailov, who spent more than four years in a death-row cell and has tried to commit suicide several times, is still in prison. Most Russians appear to be fully aware of the risk of torture or abuse at the hands of the police. About 60 per cent of crime victims do not report the crimes.
#10 Russian Senators Send Address to US Senate. MOSCOW, November 11 (Itar-Tass) -- The Federation Council, the Russian parliament's upper house, on Thursday passed an address to the U.S Senate. The Russian senators "are worried and concerned with the news that the U.S Senate has not ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This fact is posing a threat both to the Treaty's entry in force and to the world process of nuclear non-proliferation," the senators wrote. The Federation Council urged the U.S colleagues to manifest state wisdom and high sense of responsibility for the fate of the world, to re-consider their stance towards the treaty's ratification and to thwart any attempts to disrupt the ABM Treaty. "The fate of humanity, including the American citizens" largely depends on the future of this treaty. "A law on the creation of the national ABM system that was passed by the U.S Congress, intensified efforts to build the ABM strategic system on the U.S territory and attempts by some U.S politicians to cross out the agreements reached in the field of defense and mutual security are serious destabilizing factors which contradict the spirit of the ABM Treaty signed by the United States and Russia on May 26, 1972, " the Russian senators stressed. They also recalled that for more than a quarter of the century the ABM Treaty had been a major condition for the reduction of the strategic offensive weapons, the guarantor of peace and stability on our planet. "It is exactly today, when fresh armed conflicts are flaring up in different parts of the world, that the peaceful dialogue between Russia and America is undergoing a serious test for cohesion," the Russian senators went on to say. The Federation Council members believe that revising the basic provisions of the ABM Treaty "will, inevitably, bring back the Cold War times and will threaten the entire system of international nuclear arms control agreements." The Russian senators hope the address will meet the support and understanding of their U.S counterparts. The upper house of the Russian parliament is ready to coordinate efforts with the U.S Senate and to work for the benefit of the two peoples and all humanity, for the sake of peace and tranquility on earth.
#11 Excerpt RFE/RL Russian Election Report 5 November 1999 To subscribe: Send an email to electionreport-request@list.rferl.org with the word "subscribe" as the subject or body of the message. Why Is The Ballot So Crowded? by Laura Belin (BelinL@rferl.org) That more than two dozen electoral blocs are running for the Duma this year is surprising in light of the December 1995 debacle. In that election, just four of the 43 blocs on the ballot cleared the 5-percent threshold. Roughly half of the votes cast for party lists were wasted on groups that received none of the 225 Duma seats allocated according to proportional representation. Many analysts expected politicians to learn from experience and form larger alliances during this election cycle. Some have done so, but many others have rejected potential coalition partners despite having little to no chance of winning 5 percent of the vote on their own. The abundance of choice on the ballot cannot be attributed solely to ideological differences and personality conflicts, although those have contributed to the splintering. Nor can the plethora of electoral blocs be chalked up to some immutable feature of Russian political culture. The crowded ballot stems primarily from electoral rules that provide mixed incentives for leaders of small parties, leaving many unwilling to make the compromises needed to form broad coalitions. The main features of Russia's electoral system have remained constant since the December 1993 election. Of the 450 seats in the lower house of the parliament, half are distributed proportionally among all groups that gain more than 5 percent of the vote. The other half are filled by candidates who win a plurality of the vote in each of Russia's 225 single-member districts. In systems of proportional representation, electoral thresholds are designed to produce less fractured parliaments. They generally reduce the number of political parties, as leaders of unsuccessful ones form larger alliances in the next election cycle. In addition, citizens who waste their votes on small parties one year are believed to become more discerning the next time around, which promotes the consolidation of a few large political parties. The 1995 election revealed that fear of falling below the 5-percent threshold was not enough to deter groups with virtually no public support from running for the Duma. The revised electoral law, adopted in June of this year, imposes new consequences on the smallest blocs. As before, all registered blocs and candidates will receive some state funding for campaign expenses and a certain amount of free exposure in the print and electronic media. But after this year's election, blocs that gain less than 2 percent of the vote (as well as candidates who receive less than 3 percent in single-member districts) will be forced to return all funds they received from the state. Even more potentially damaging, they will have to compensate newspapers, radio, and television stations for the free column space and air time they received. Had such sanctions been in effect during the last election cycle, 32 of the 43 blocs that appeared on the ballot would have had enormous bills to pay. Some politicians who led unsuccessful groups in 1995 have formed larger alliances this year. For instance, Agrarian Party leaders either stayed with the Communist Party or joined Fatherland-All Russia. Irina Khakamada and Konstantin Borovoi (who led Common Cause and the Party of Economic Freedom in 1995) have united with Boris Nemtsov, Anatolii Chubais, and Yegor Gaidar in the Union of Right Forces. Retired Colonel-General Boris Gromov, who led My Fatherland in 1995, is now on the party list of Fatherland-All Russia. Perhaps some of the smaller blocs currently registered for the ballot will drop out of the race in the coming weeks; if they do so, the law does not require them to compensate the state or media companies for election-related expenses. But what can explain the behavior of those who have little hope of gaining 5 percent yet have turned down offers to form an alliance? The main culprit is Article 39 of the electoral law, which allows candidates to run for the Duma both on a party list and in a single-member district. In the last election, 65 candidates won Duma seats even though the party lists on which they appeared fell below the 5-percent barrier. Politicians may create electoral blocs to use purely as personal vehicles, knowing that even a very poor showing on the party-list ballot will not necessarily keep them out of the parliament. They can concentrate their time and money on the district in which they are campaigning. This strategy worked for many politicians in 1995: more than two dozen candidates won single-member districts while appearing at or near the top of party lists that gained less than 2 percent of the vote nationwide. Letting politicians have it both ways severely inhibits coalition-building. After all, why should Our Home Is Russia leader Viktor Chernomyrdin join the Union of Right Forces or the Kremlin's new favorite, Unity, when he can lead his own party list and run for a safe Duma seat in Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug? (The gas monopoly Gazprom, which Chernomyrdin founded, is the dominant employer in Yamal-Nenets.) If Chernomyrdin had been forced to choose between the seat in Yamal-Nenets and the chance to appear on the party-list ballot, he might have been more willing to commit Our Home Is Russia to a larger alliance. The same principle applies to many other political organizations. Perhaps the financial burden placed on the biggest losers after this election will give would-be leaders of small blocs pause when the next Duma campaign comes around. But as long as Russian legislation does not force candidates on party lists to stake their political careers on their blocs' ability to win 5 percent of the vote, the ballots for future parliamentary elections are likely to remain long.
#12 USA, Russia Should Cooperate on Antimissile Defence-Velikhov. MOSCOW, November 12 (Itar-Tass) -- President of the Russian Kurchatov Institute research centre Academician Yevgeni Velikhov on Thursday told here a press conference that "joint practical work on antimissile defence may lay a cornerstone in the new, mature relations between the USA and Russia into the 21st century." Velikhov pointed out that "it was important that the two countries should move from the mutual assured destruction to mutual assured safety." In this connection, Velikhov said it was much more advantageous to the interests of Russia's national security "to pursue a line to consultations and constructive cooperation with the USA in what concerned creation of non- strategic antimissile defence systems." The Russian Academician noted that "such a step would place the antimissile defence systems under mutual control and would save both sides suspicions about this or some other system's threat." "It would be extremely expedient on the part of the USA to invite Russia as an equal partner to create antimissile defence systems meeting the needs of both countries, and the more so as it is Russia that can now boast of the most advanced technology in the sphere," Velikhov emphasized.
#13 Moscow Times November 12, 1999 MEDIA WATCH: Study: Free Press Still Myth By Robert Coalson Robert Coalson is a program director for the National Press Institute. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of NPI. "There is no freedom of speech in Russia" - readers of this column will not be surprised to read these words, but they may be interested to learn that this conclusion has now been endorsed by the Russian Union of Journalists and other media-rights organizations working here. At the Pressa-2000 exhibition in Moscow last month, the Union issued the preliminary results of its Herculean effort to quantify the level of freedom of speech in all of the territories of the Russian Federation. This study, although far from perfect and complete, is a much-needed and belated effort to shine light into the darkness that covers most of this vast country. The study - which was conducted by the Glasnost Defense Foundation, the Moscow Media Law and Policy Institute and the non-commercial organization Internews, under the direction of the Union of Journalists - analyzed local media-related legislation, conditions for access to official information and restrictions on the distribution of information (both printed and electronic) in 81 of Russia's subject territories. As for the other eight, either the information received was too fragmented to be useful (which, I guess, already says something about the state of free speech there) or conditions were deemed too dangerous to even attempt to gather the needed data (as in Chechnya, for instance). The authors intended to produce results that would separate out the regions where a free press exists from those where it is absent. Instead, they were "surprised" to learn that they were merely measuring degrees of non-freedom. Every region, including the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, was characterized by arbitrary rule that constantly threatens to stamp out whatever foothold a free press manages to attain. As an illustration, consider the Western Siberian region of Omsk, which ranks near the middle on Russia's scale of non-freedom - occupying 41st place. The Union sent 10 official requests for information to various local officials there using procedures outlined in Russia's national law on access to information. Four requests were ignored, one received a non-responsive reply, one received a formal denial and just four were answered completely and promptly. However, as is the case in many regions, the matter of who responded, or didn't, tells more than just the raw numbers. The regional governor, the speaker of the regional legislature, the chair of the finance committee and the regional prosecutor all responded with silence. Among those who did answer were some municipal officials in the city of Omsk, the head of the regional Health Department and the chair of a regional committee on the environment. If you want to open a newspaper kiosk in Omsk, incidentally, you need permission from no less than 34 local offices and agencies. Good luck. Important as it is, the Union's study adopts a crucial assumption that may limit its usefulness. The investigators believe - as do many Russians who study the media - that state-controlled and non-state media can peacefully coexist if the right legislative environment can be maintained. I think that this is an extremely questionable assumption that, at the very least, deserves serious analysis and explanation. I would argue that the mere presence of state-subsidized media undermines public confidence in journalism generally, consumes a significant portion of the country's minimal stock of qualified journalists, encourages the natural tendency of many politicians to see the media in terms of "us" and "them," etc. Furthermore, the study's scope (and it should be noted that the material released so far is just the beginning of what will hopefully be a permanent project) will need to be widened in order to really give an accurate picture. It should analyze the degree of government interference in advertising markets, since this is one of the primary ways that local officials keep independent newspapers from achieving financial independence. Also, the study should include data on libel suits and other legal actions taken by local officials and their private-sector surrogates against the mass media. Nonetheless, the Union's study is an invaluable contribution to our understanding of the press in Russia today. We can only hope that they will be able to repeat the study regularly in order to highlight the emerging trends. Anyone interested in obtaining the study - and every one who cares about human rights in Russia should be -- can contact the Union at 201-4466.