Concluding chapter in the book "Contemporary Russian Military Journalism: Achievements, Problems, Perspectives"

The development of military journalism in Russia in the period after 1992 reflected all of the contradictions between the development of civil society and independent media. It is important to remember that military problems were at the top of the list of criticisms against the Soviet Union in the era of glasnost and perestroika.

In Russia, criticism of the armed forces and military policy is a traditional element of criticism of the government system and the authorities. Historically, criticism of the Tsarist army and military policy held an important place in the Russian opposition press of the 19th century. Furthermore, there is an uncanny similarity in the issues raised by 19th century and by present-day authors: censorship and lack of information on the armed forces, embezzlement and corruption in the military sphere, the ineffectiveness of the Russian military compared to leading Western militaries, repudiation of militaristic thinking and arms races, revision of the conscription system, priority of internal problems (now termed "challenges") over external problems, the need to reduce the armed forces (based on international experience), the burden of the unreformed army on the economy, the excessiveness of the military budget. The only topic needed to make this a summary of current problems is "military cooperation with foreign countries." And yet, these words come from the pages of "Golosa Rossii" (Voices from Russia), a collection of works published in the second half of 19th century in London by Alexander Herzen and Nikolai Ogarev. ¹  

At the risk of digressing and tiring the reader with a long quotation, more of which will appear in this text, the author cannot resist the temptation to cite the following excerpt from N.A. Melnikov's "Rossiya v voine i mire" (Russia in War and in Peace): "To occupy the armed forces, we get involved in wars we could avoid; and the success made us so overly confident that we got involved in a real war. Our military became a ruinous toy. The best of our men were sacrificed to it, it was fed by blood and hundreds of millions of rubles of the people's money were wasted on it — almost half of all state income. This armed forces, this toy and threat in one, finally turned Europe against us, and still did not keep us safe from a foreign invasion." ²   These words were actually written in 1855 about the early 19th century.

The hidden pages of history, the perusal of which served as the foundation for the free press, contain many military secrets. The general public has been interested in issues such as the Second World War, the participation of the armed forces in local conflicts (above all Afghanistan) and the effectiveness of the Soviet military-industrial complex. Coverage of these issues became part of the democratic process in the second half of the 1980s.

 
Civil society against the armed forces: what happened?

The role the Soviet Army played in the bloody events of the late 1980s and early1990s, such as the clashes in Tbilisi and Vilnius, had a long-term negative effect on relations with the civil society, which can be felt to this day. The military was dragged into political conflicts. The Armed Forces were associated with the Soviet leadership, which, in turn, was associated with all of the country's woes. Criticism of the military became one of the most important weapons against the Soviet government — and there was no shortage of reasons for criticism. Despite the propaganda about the 'people's army,' the politically and economically active segments of the population were very critical of the Armed Forces. Now, many say that the military was 'set up.' Whether it was, in fact, set up, or whether it set itself up once it became a tool for solving political conflicts, the military came under fire from the opposition, and discrediting it became an important element of internal political battles.

The failure of the 1991 coup and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union should have decreased the intensity of the clashes and arguments concerning the military, but this did not happen. The creation of the Russian Armed Forces in May of 1992 was largely for show. The Armed Forces today differ little from the way they were before May 1992. The new flag, commander in chief, minister of defense and generals did not have a real effect on the military. If anything, they intensified certain internal processes of its moral decomposition.

The government of the new Russia did not understand the internal processes within the military when it allowed some generals into its inner circles. If it did not fear the military, it was at least apprehensive about it. Perhaps that's why none of the politicians were particularly interested in conducting a reform of the Armed Forces. The special service troops who broke bricks at military shows don't count — this was a spectacle for the authorities. A strong military, and especially a military popular with the general public, was of no interest to the nation's new government — unlike the numerous, well-equipped and well-financed internal forces, guards and police forces.

Politicians who came to power as a result of mass disturbances — a coup d'état in fact — could not but fear a new coup. Attitudes within the Armed Forces in the early and mid-1990s encouraged those fears. Regardless of where the line lay between the real and perceived chances of a military coup, this was an important factor in the government's attitude towards the Armed Forces in the early and mid-1990s.

It's unclear whether the following was an intended policy or — as often happens in Russia — whether it happened on its own (and turned out to be useful): an unpopular military is the best remedy against a military coup. The Armed Forces are not popular with the public, despite the phenomenon of politician-generals (none of whom have had a really successfully political career). One cannot help thinking that, even if Boris Yeltsin did not initially plan this system, at some point he realized all of the advantages of maintaining the status quo — an unpopular military. The confrontation between civil society and the military remained, and the government made no real efforts to ease the tension.

Said simply and bluntly, under the cover of discussions about civilian control over the military and other pretty rhetoric, the media and the military were played off against each other. At the very least, nothing was done to help the media and the military overcome the paradigm of relations, founded on antagonism during perestroika, a paradigm which encourages the development of the horrible tendencies toward moral decomposition in the Russian Armed Forces.

Such was the state of military journalism in the late 1990s. Driven by increasing patriotism (the main ingredient of which was anti-Western sentiments) and the growing role of the power ministries in the government (against the background of the Second Chechen Campaign, intensified after Vladimir Putin's arrival to power) the advantage in relations between the media and the power organs returned to the latter.

 
The Military and the Media

Russian commanders are currently becoming more aware of their own faults in relations with the media, in particular with regard to the First Chechen Campaign. There are two primary ways in which they admit their mistakes in work with the media.

First of all, whether they want to or not, the commanders tend to confess misinformation in order to clear themselves of the responsibility for purely military and military-political mistakes. A point of view clearly formulated in Gen. Gennady Troshev's book, "My War. The Chechen Diary of a Trench General" is becoming more and more popular: "The inoperative, low-quality, often hectic informing of the public in the first Chechen campaign has basically been made a textbook example of the power organs' poor work with the press. Whatever anyone says about the 1994-1996 War, I am sure: it was not lost by the generals in the trenches fighting the bandits, but by the politicians responsible for the providing information on the operation "to restore constitutional order." ³  

Second, also reflected in the quotation cited, the commanders are less concerned with the problem of coexistence and cooperation between the military and the media, than with the problem of the lack of "effective work with the press," i.e., the securing of propaganda about the Ministry of Defense in general and the Chechen campaigns (especially the first one) in particular. In other words, military commanders are still unhappy with what the journalists write, and how, but they no longer just blame the media, they also think that their "work" with the media was poor.

To a certain extent, the critical attitude towards the spin doctors within the administration is probably a reflection of contradictions and clashes between various groupings within the Russian Ministry of Defense itself. The generals criticize their own propaganda workers as well as "bad" journalists: "Seeing certain "talking heads" comment on various events, one gets the feeling that the point is not informing the public, but protecting the interests of the relevant departments, protecting the interest of the big bosses." ⁴  

There are several ways to interpret this metamorphosis in the military's attitude towards the press. From one side, the "poor work with the press" postulate leads generals — in the trenches and in command centers — to understand that they have to find different ways of dealing with the press: They cannot restrict information to the bare minimum, forcing journalists to rely on questionable sources, they cannot hide from the press, they must be more open. Troshev's book clearly reflects this line of thought: "Almost all military men were afraid of journalists (I know from my own experience). (...) I was often accused for appearing on television too often — it was supposedly unbecoming for a commander of a military district to comment events that are not in the limelight — isn't that what press secretaries and analysts are for? Let me repeat, I used to think so myself. But the information wars that accompanied events near Arshta made me reconsider the way I saw the problem and appreciate the important role of the press. I know from my own experience how difficult it is to publicly discuss tactical mistakes and battle losses — but we cannot keep silent about problems. Otherwise, the public will simply stop trusting official sources. Unfortunately, certain power organ directors either don't understand this or don't want to understand it. Their position is reminiscent of an ostrich that hides its head in the sand..." ⁵  

Troshev describes the personal unwillingness of trench generals like himself to work with journalists. Mostly it is not based on fear, lack of concern for public opinion or condescension to it (although those sentiments are often present). The main problems are the inability and the unwillingness to make mistakes (which will not bring praise from superior officers).

From another side, the unhappiness with and fear of the press mentioned by Troshev drives some in the military establishment to close off from the media — to maximally limit the access military journalists have to military information and their ability to process, systematize and publish it. Unfortunately, this tendency currently prevails in Russia. Almost all of the participants of the "10 Years of Russian Military Reform in the Mirror of the Press" roundtables held on Feb. 27 and July 30, 2002, by the Russian office of the Center for Defense Information and the Center for War and Peace Journalism noted that it is becoming harder and harder for journalists to work. This is true for journalists in both, private and government, media organizations. Their field of activity is constantly decreased. One of the primary limitations on the work of military journalists is censorship and the secreting of information.

 
Censorship and Secrecy

The issues of censorship and secrecy are becoming so critical in recent years not because journalists have crossed the boundaries of common sense and revealed secrets. No one has revealed more secrets than the generals and officials themselves — sometimes they get too comfortable at international conferences and sometimes they say more than they should...

Everything military journalists know was said by someone — at open rather than closed meetings. What it comes down to is that only those who know secrets can "leak" them. Journalists do not generally belong to this category. Of course a journalist can see or hear more than he should when in a region of an ongoing military operation or military deployment. However, the military usually has the right to control access to such regions. Thus, such problems do not occur when a journalist works under regular circumstances.

The real question concerns something else. During the wild democratization of the first half of the 1990s, various information, including secret information was opened up. Here, too, the initiative came from the keepers of the secrets themselves. Much of the information could be freely accessed — though not always officially. Legislature lagged behind reality. Of course, one could restrict within Russia information made available by the government to international organizations — but what would be the point?

Modern-day Russian censors would surely approve of the following definition of the role the press should play: "making known the true nature of events and the real purport of the acts and commands of the government, in order to prevent misunderstanding and forestall uninformed criticism." This was the way the Takvim-I Vekayi (the Ottoman Monitor) presented its goals in an editorial of the first issue, dated May 14, 1832. ⁶   And, in fact, domestic pre-revolutionary censors did follow this tradition. In the 19th century, not only the top generals and their commands, but the Tsarist Army as a whole, was released from public control. An 1892 order forbade the publication of "articles insulting to the honor of the Russian Armed Forces and capable of jeopardizing respect of the public for the military profession." ⁷  

We have come a long way since those days. Total secrecy is impossible. For example, the plans of the Russian Ministry of Defense — declared in the summer of 2002 — to completely restrict information on Russian-Chinese military-technical cooperation are doomed to failure.

After all, Russian journalists and experts are not the only ones who cover defense and military-industrial issues — so do foreign media organizations and research institutes, and they are not affected by the prohibitions published by Russian officials. And one cannot forbid the Russian media to reprint Western articles and reports. As a result, coverage of military issues will continue under conditions of secrecy — but it will be based primarily on Western sources. Considering that it is mainly Western commentaries that really aggravate Russian power organs, the conclusion is quite obvious under conditions of total secrecy, military subject matter will not disappear from the Russian press, but rather, it will be presented in an even less palatable form for the power organs, since it will consist of reprints from the Western press or at least be presented as such.

A very strange thing happens: Whether censored or not, pertinent military themes will appear in the media. Even if the press service of the Russian Ministry of Defense keeps silent, information will leak into the Russian information sphere through Western briefings and media sources. And those are the situations that put the Russian power organs in the most ridiculous position: Going too far with secrecy generates the least flattering commentaries and interpretations, and makes it impossible to influence the perception and analysis of events. And in the end, the power organs will still have to justify, revise and refute. But they will lose the initiative and will not be very convincing.

The freedom of access journalists have to military information and the boundaries and methods of their work are discussed in Western democracies as well. Just like in Russia, confrontations between various power groups often result in clashes concerning secrecy or information leaks (of confidential documents in their entirety or in parts)... Western politicians also rant and rave. And yet, they don't take their anger out on journalists. "It's inexcusable, and they ought to be in jail," resolutely declared U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in July of 2002, after information on the plans for a military operation against Iraq was leaked into the press. But he was not talking about journalists and media organizations he had in mind those who allowed information leaks, or even facilitated them: "I think that anyone who has a position where they touch a war plan has an obligation to not leak it to the press or anybody else because it kills people." ⁸  

Russian special services are still learning to be effective in an open society. It is estimated that up to half of the information processed by the intelligence services of various countries comes from open sources — research papers, conferences, official declarations and, of course, the media. And yet, if a foreign spy reads a newspaper and finds something useful in it, this does not mean that the newspaper should be closed and its editor in chief, or the specific journalist, should be accused of treason. Soviet counterintelligence officers had an advantage over their colleagues in democratic countries: It is easier for the special services to work in a closed society and totalitarian state, where the media is controlled entirely by the government. But those days are gone.

This dilemma makes even the way the question is posed incorrect — the effectiveness of special services at the expense of limiting the freedom of the press, and suffocating military journalism in particular. Special services responsible for protecting state secrets will have to carry out their work — which is difficult and vital to the nation — in a society with a free press. Military journalists have professional obligations — informing the public about important defense problems and presenting diverse points of view. What it comes down to is that the existing antagonism between military journalists and special services benefits no one.

 
The business of the social function

In an open society, information about military affairs (domestic- and foreign-policy aspects, state budget, military reform, etc.) serves both a social function and as an element of the media business. The independent media is a business for its publishers, so information on military affairs is part of business. One has to clearly understand this to avoid speculation on how "corrupt journalists sell the secrets of the Motherland for kopecks/millions" (both versions occur in Russia).

Furthermore, business and the social functions are directly connected. They cannot be separated. The very essence of the business practices of "quality publications" is earning money on the social function, on the fact that the civil society wants to know how effective the government it maintains is. In particular, it wants to know how effective the government is in ensuring national security and protecting its citizens and how effectively it spends the taxpayers' money. The public prefers to learn this information from sources independent of the government the media. It is ready to pay for such information, i.e., buy copies. A problem always exists, however the choice between writing what readers want to read and writing objectively. A sensible compromise is necessary. Proportion is key. This is largely an editorial choice for the particular media outlet, its position and its long-term development strategy. Artificial limitations are unlikely to work.

There are so many problems and ambiguities in Russia's military sphere that information on it is bound to be in demand by the public. Furthermore, "social demand" — the demand for high-quality information on the military in the media — should grow as the civil society develops. Therefore, one has to come to terms with the idea that the public will ask more, rather than fewer, questions about the Armed Forces, the military budget, defense policy and other issues. Potential local conflicts and the threat of terrorism will only stimulate demand for domestic military information.

In fact, the audience of military journalists is not limited to "the average reader" but also includes politicians, parliamentarians, scientists and, often, the generals themselves. Public policy presumes their interest in having reliable information and media commentary on military problems. Furthermore, for them, the media is not only a source of information, but also a platform for expressing their own views and molding public opinion. The media, together with specialized publications, create the expert community without which it is impossible to make government decisions.

At the same time, the media market has yet to develop in Russia, especially as far as "quality publications" go. This is true for the electronic media (and above all television) as well as for the print media. Unable to support itself with sales and advertisement, the media becomes an instrument of political trading and blackmail. While the press failed to actually become the fourth branch of power, it used its forth-branch privileges, and served as the PR departments of various interest groups.

The logical conclusion would be that this general tendency also manifested itself in the coverage of military issues, i.e., that "social demand" was replaced by the banal "cash-for-editorials." And yet, this did not really happen. Of course there are examples of "on demand" media wars around military and defense issues. But they are less heated and less far-reaching — and most importantly less regular and less prevalent — than those in the civilian sphere (such as struggles for political power or finances and the redistribution of property). The military-industrial complex and the arms trade sector serve as exceptions to this.

Journalists generally remain objective in their coverage of military issues — or if they are subjective, they express their own opinions, rather than write purchased articles. Analysis of PR campaigns on military subjects in the media shows that no one pays for them, that they develop spontaneously. This contributed to the formation of a community of military journalists — reporters and columnists — who are generally independent-minded and prepared to adequately and correctly satisfy the "social demand" of the civil society for coverage of military issues.

The problem of military journalism has less to do with journalists than with the media itself, for which military subject matter remains compulsory, but becomes more standard. To a certain extent, this is because few editors in chief are willing to incur problems by publishing touchy and controversial information on military affairs, the Ministry of Defense or the FSB. "Why get involved?" an editor can say to himself. "There are plenty of other topics." And this has nothing to do with the reliability or accuracy of the articles. Vice versa: the more truthful the material, the more problems it can create.

And yet, the future of military journalism lies with high-quality, high-circulation publications. There is little opportunity in creating specialized publications aimed at wide audiences. The NVO (Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie) serves as an exception, but this phenomenon is unlikely to be replicated. Specialized publications exist and will exist. Their circulations are limited, but the issues are more expensive. This is no longer simply journalism. This is information for professionals: experts, researchers, politicians, entrepreneurs, etc.

Military journalism for the general reader should be published in publications with large circulations, national or regional, instead of in specialized editions. Therefore, the development of military journalism is inseparable from the development of the media business as a whole. By covering subjects that are important, or simply popular, military journalists can become a leading force in raising circulations and competing for the readers.

 
Conclusion

In the 1990s, and especially in the early 1990s, politicians were suspicious of military officers, who had pledged allegiance to the Soviet Union. Many officers remained loyal to the familiar system of moral and political values, if not to the Soviet Union itself (whether or not they made their loyalties public). The government feared them. At the same time, the government was also distrustful of those who were quick to side with the Russian reformers.

This foundation of military-civilian relations ruled out effective reform of the Armed Forces. At the same time, no one, except select professional officers was interested in reform. Politicians purchased the loyalty of the top brass with awards and titles (the number of generals grew steadily) and ignored questionable financial and economic decisions, which quickly led large-scale corruption. At the same time, the attention of the public and the press was directed to the Armed Forces. The military and all its problems came under criticism and attack. It was neither reformed nor protected. On the contrary, through their rhetoric on military reform, politicians washed their hands of the responsibility for the problems of the military, transferring the weight of the criticism to the men in epaulets as well.

Was this spontaneous and intuitive, or deliberate and planned? There is no simple answer. It was probably a combination of factors, with intuitive decisions prevailing. The government came to believe that an unpopular army was the best remedy against a military coup. This may be true for short-term political goals — but as far as long-term interests and national security go, it's a tragic mistake.

Everything possible must be done to protect Russia's policies from the vise of a similar dilemma in the future. Only then will the interest in a professional and modern military (modern in spirit as well as in equipment and training) go beyond rhetoric. The present-day attention of the political leadership to the country's military problem and the willingness to conduct reforms that are necessary, albeit unpopular with the Armed Forces, makes room for moderate optimism.

The optimism is moderate because there is a risk of falling into the other extreme. Russian power organs express serious interest in propaganda — now described as PR campaigns. This "new" phenomenon is, in part, the "well-forgotten old" phenomenon of Soviet propaganda. It is also the desire to exploit current public attitudes, above all, patriotism. But the primary drive — and here the first two factors also play a role — is the obvious success of PR campaigns in the political, economic and social spheres. If PR campaigns can be used to elect a president or distribute financial and natural resources, why can't they be used to raise the prestige of the Armed Forces? This is the logic used by the military staff.

The second Chechen campaign probably played a decisive role in the development of the attitude toward propaganda in military circles. In its first stage, the use of information and propaganda about military actions by professional civilian political analysts was so successful (in all aspects, including a certain increase in the prestige of the military), that the generals decided to keep PR in mind.

There is no doubt that power organs must support their work with relevant information and propaganda. But there is no reason to overestimate the power of propaganda. In the end, if reality is very different from the pretty words about a subject, outside of the short-term perspective (when it is possible to change perception with a powerful and expensive PR campaign), reality will triumph. While the PR campaigns can be necessary and useful for making genuine military reform more effective, attempts to substitute propaganda for military reform are worthless. But it is difficult to resist the temptation to use PR for "selling" the military to the public "as is," instead of conducting reforms. The only way to remove this temptation is to keep the power organs under the watchful but proper attention of national leaders, politicians and the media.

As the power organs begin to use modern PR techniques more and more skillfully, they will occasionally face the need or the temptation to manipulate the press and military journalists. There is nothing bad about the concept itself, as long as it is limited in scale and exists within the framework of the freedom of the press. The main goal is ensuring that this does not destroy professional and independent military journalism as a whole.

All of the preconditions exist, not only for military journalism as we know it in Russia, but also for its development: interest in national security and the state of the Armed Forces as well as the international environment and the problems with terrorists. A community of military journalists who can answer these questions professionally and accurately has been formed.

And yet all this might not be enough for the survival of Russian military journalism, for ensuring that it does not simply become a PR instrument for the power organs themselves. Military journalism has to find its place in the media business and the media business itself has to become stronger. In turn, the power structures must learn to not only disinform the enemy, but also to adequately inform their own countrymen.

At times, Western experts and politicians are also unhappy with the media and the way it presents complex issues. Here, for example is Henry Kissinger's opinion. He is talking about the media coverage of foreign policy, rather than military affairs, but the point is essentially the same: "Ubiquitous and clamorous media are transforming foreign policy into a subdivision of entertainment. The intense competition for ratings produces an obsession with the crisis of the moment, generally presented as a morality play between good and evil having a specific outcome and rarely in terms of the long-range challenges of history." ⁹  

What the former U.S. secretary of state meant is that the media is unable to fully appraise complex events. Additionally, the very essence of their work necessitates simplification that can make a qualitative difference. Thus, accessible presentation of complex events is replaced by profanation.

And yet, Russian authorities dislike military journalists not for a lack professionalism or inquisitiveness, not for simplifications that injure deep analysis, but, on the contrary, for excessive — in the opinion of military administrations and special services — professionalism, for the desire to understand the essence of the problem instead of stopping at superficial commentary. This is not surprising, considering the fact that almost all leading Russian military journalists are themselves former employees of the Ministry of Defense, who have deep insight into the subject matter.

End Notes

¹  See, for example, the following articles: N.A. Mel'gunov, "Mysli vslukh ob istekshem tridtsatiletii Rossii" (section "Marshiruyushchaya armiya"), Golosa iz Rossii, Part I (London: Trubner &Co., 1856); V.N. Chicheren, "O polkovykh komandirakh I ikh khozyaistvennykh rasporyazheniyakh," Golosa iz Rossii, First volume of Part II (London: Trubner &Co., 1856); N.A. Mel'gunov, "Rossiya v voine i v mire" Golosa iz Rossii, Volume 4 (London, Trubner &Co., 1857);

²  N.A. Mel'gunov, "Rossiya v voine i v mire" Golosa iz Rossii, Volume 4. (London: Trubner &Co., 1857); pp. 135-136.

³  Gennady Troshev. Moya Voina. Chechenskii dnevnik okopnogo generala. (Moscow: Vagrius, 2002) p. 114.

⁴  Gennady Troshev. p. 117.

⁵  Gennady Troshev. p. 115.

⁶  Bernard Lewis. What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle East Response. Oxford University Press, 2002. p. 51.

⁷   V. Myakotin. "Odna stranitsa iz noveishei istorii russkoi pechati," in V Zashchitu Slova, St. Petersburg, 1905, p. 92.

⁸  The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, July 25, 2002.

⁹  Henry Kissinger. Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century. Simon & Schuster, 2001, p. 27.

Dr. Ivan Safranchuk Director, CDI Moscow isafranchuk@cdi.org

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