CONTENTS IN ENGLISH

Introduction by the Editors

Part One. The Development and Present State of Military Journalism

Vadim Soloviev. The Development of an Independent Military Press in Russia: NVO as a case study. Yulia Zheglova. The "Commandeered" Journalism Phenomenon. Ivan Konovalov. Military Television Journalism: Challenges of the genre.

Part Two. The Press and the Power Organs: Both trapped by incompetence, vested interests and censorship

Vitaly Shlykov. Hits and Misses in the Coverage of Military Reform. Vladimir Yermolin. The Press and the Power Organs: Co-tolerance as a means of cooperation. Vyacheslav Sedov. The Press Service of the Defense Ministry: Between the hammer and the anvil. Victor Litovkin. Censorship in Theory and in Practice.

Part Three. From Information to Propaganda, from PR to Cash-for-Editorial

Mikhail Pogorelyi. Editorial Policy of Military Journalism. Mikhail Lukin. "Information Wars" in Military Journalism. Ruslan Pukhov. "Information Wars" in the Defense-Industrial Complex.

Instead of a Conclusion

Ivan Safranchuk. Military Journalism at the Crossroads of a Developing Civil Society and an Immature Media Business.

Appendices

This book is the result of a joint project by the Center for Defense Information and Center of War and Peace Journalism on the history and problems of Russian military journalism.

Vadim SOLOVIEV (Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Nezavisimaya Gazeta and Managing Editor of "Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie") reviews the development of the independent military press in Russia. The author reminds us that an independent military journalism never really existed in Russia. The Soviet military press was well developed it involved several thousand military servicemen at numerous newspapers at 20 district and fleet newspapers. Almost every division of the ground forces, strategic missile troops, Navy, Air Force and Air Defense forces had its own newspaper, plus the Defense Ministry published a couple dozen monthly journals. In 2001, there remained only nine central newspapers and journals, 11 district and fleet newspapers, and 29 newspapers belonging to units and formations.

Military publications free from the influence of power organs and government structures first appeared in the 1990s, when the demand for objective military media sources arose.

The appearance of NVO as a socio-political phenomenon was made possible because the developing market economy and freedom of speech prevented the military command from manipulating the work of administrative military media sources. Increasingly independent from the Defense Ministry, the nascent commercial military press began unwittingly performing the function of civil (political) control over the power organs.

The informative, reliable, objective, and operative methods of commercial military journalism attracted readership and contributed to the search for adequate solutions for crucial political, technical, social, and industrial problems in the military sphere.

Yulia ZHEGLOVA (Reserve Colonel, formerly an officer of the informational structures of the Defense Ministry and currently an editor of a section published jointly with Business Week in the Profile journal) presents a unique and comprehensive analysis of the "commandeering" phenomenon in journalism. This term was used in Soviet times to describe the practice of posting military journalists to leading print and electronic media to ensure "correct" coverage of military questions, and improve the foreign and domestic image of the Armed Forces.

These military journalists found themselves between a rock and a hard place in the civilian media — by writing the whole truth about "military reform" and "reformers," they ran the risk of angering their military administration, but "loyal" materials would never see the light of day in the civilian press. Later, some of the "commandeered" officers quit the military service and became full-fledged members of publications they had been working at.

"Commandeered" journalism as a phenomenon ceased to exist after the mid-1990s, when certain changes took hold in the society, the Armed Forces, and the media itself. Media sources increasingly switched to commercial principles and a new legislative foundation. In such conditions, "commandeered" journalism was neither useful nor demanded. And yet, the materials of military journalists in the civilian media made the Armed Forces and its problems a little closer and more understandable to the average reader or listener.

Ivan KONOVALOV (military correspondent on the TVS televisions channel, previously a military correspondent for ORT and TV6 responsible for covering "hot spots" like Chechnya, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Abkhazia, Somali and Tajikistan) analyzes the challenges of military television journalism. He notes that there is no single definition of the terms "military journalism" and "military journalist." Many think the terms refer to coverage of "hot spots, military reform in the Russian Army, the military-industrial complex, and even military history. Others consider materials "military" only when they directly concern the Russian Army — whether these are stories from combat zones in Chechnya or accounts of electricity shortages in parts of the Far Eastern military district. Television journalists are usually considered "military journalists" if they spend most of their time in hot spots (whether in Chechnya, Yugoslavia or Afghanistan) and, in some function, work on military topics in general.

Military television journalism has been unable to find its place at any of the major Russian television programs ("Vremya," "Segodnya," "Vesti," "Seichas," etc), where ideas of creating military departments are forgotten as soon as the latest crisis in Chechnya, Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq cools down. According to the author, the uneven development of the genre is explained by the failure of television channels to realize that military topics are not limited to hot spots, but include military diplomacy, reforms, foreign military developments, the military-industrial complex and many others.

The genre really took off in late 1994-early 1995, when NTV, the young and well-financed television company, crushed its competitors with reports on the Chechen War and the most complete accounts of the war in Yugoslavia. At that point, television journalism became the object of a political game — most obvious in the coverage of the Chechen War. That time also initiated a certain mutual hostility between journalists and officials in the federal forces — journalists accused the military of violating the freedom of speech while the military declared that the journalists help the enemy by discrediting the Armed Forces.

Coverage of the raising of the Kursk nuclear submarine became another landmark in the history of relations between journalists and military press services. It was then that journalists were clearly divided into "insiders" — who worked for the state — and "outsiders" from all other media. The Kursk experience also demonstrated to large masses of television audiences how difficult it is for journalists to work with Army and Navy press services.

Now, all leading television channels have their own military programs. These programs lose out to entertainment programs in popularity, but have a very dedicated audience.

Ivan Konovalov concludes that the genre is still developing. It conquered a certain niche in analytical and news programs, had its ups and downs during the First and Second Chechen wars, and entered the stream of evolutionary development.

Vitaly SHLYKOV (Advisor to the General Director of the Open Joint-Stock Company "Joint machine-building factories (Uralmash-Izhora Group)", expert of the Interregional Foundation of Information Technologies, a former employee of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the USSR, and later the deputy chairman of the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Defense Issues) reviews articles on military reform in the contemporary Russian press. Vitaly Shlykov assesses the hits and misses of the coverage over the 10 years Russian politicians and the military leadership pretended to play the dreary and senseless game of "military reform." Politicians began the game in the early 1990s by demanding that Armed Forces commanders "bring the army in correspondence with the new political situation in the world and the diminished economic potential of the country." The Armed Forces responded with a request for an opponent to plan against and a new doctrine. Many observers, including journalists, see through this game, which is usually limited to throwing around the terms "compact" and "mobile" Armed Forces, which were conceived in the 1990s on the basis of numerous strategies, doctrines and conceptions. It is difficult, if not impossible to determine priorities in military reform on the basis of such documents.

Of course, the problems of the Russian Army are too serious to be handed over to journalists. And yet, the journalists could, presumes Vitaly Shlykov, pose important, albeit sometimes unpleasant, questions to the government, which would prompt the search for answers to move the issue of army reform out of the rut of endless discussion and towards real action.

Vladimir ERMOLIN (employee of the Grani.Ru internet publication, military journalist, Captain of the First Class in reserve, previously a journalist for Krasnaya Zvezda, Russkii Telegraf, and Izvestiya) considers relations between the press and the power organs, concentrating on the Defense Ministry. The author notes that journalists and administrative press services generally oppose each other instead of cooperating. Journalists demand information — press services refuse to provide it. The problem is that the administrative structures like the FSB or MVD, the Emergencies Ministry or the Border Troops Service, the General Prosecutor's office or the Defense Ministry, have a strict vertical hierarchy of subordination in which senior officials determine everything. The less a department depends on public opinion and the more official secrets it keeps, the greater is the tendency of its press service to take up a defensive, protective, and preventive position. Additionally, despite the law on the media, journalists are not equal in the eyes of administrative press services — journalists get rights not from laws, but from the personal preferences of press service employees.

Occasionally, the power organs attempt to give a "human face" to their administrations. For example, the Defense Ministry cancelled the notorious Directive No. 21, which forbids servicemen to associate with the press without an order from a superior officer, and even created a sort of a press club under the Defense Ministry.

However, journalists obtain most of the important information from unofficial sources — people with ranks and positions who risk their jobs to help the media, anonymously, of course. Some have financial interests, some take the risk for ideological reasons, some out of principle — but it is thanks to them that the most interesting, absorbing and truthful things in Russian military journalism are written or taped.

Almost the only exception to the practice of limitations and prohibitions is the State Duma. The author asserts that — if it weren't for the Duma and its Defense Committee — Russians would not know a tenth of what they now know about the Armed Forces, its real problems and dramatic tribulations, and the fight over the military budget.

Vladimir Yermolin explains that legislators depend on their electorate, while the military depends on just one man — the supreme commander, the president. Public opinion is immeasurably more important to the deputies than to military commanders who are, by definition, not in the public eye, and depend solely on their superiors.

Colonel Vyacheslav SEDOV (head of the department for media relations of the press service of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation) reveals the peculiarities of the Defense Ministry's press service, which is located, in his words, "between the hammer and the anvil" of public interest in military problems and the closed nature of military administration. Although journalists are skeptical about this, according to Sedov, the Defense Ministry appreciates the role and significance of the media in the everyday life of the nation and seeks to build relations with the media based on maximal openness and involvement.

The author notes that, with every year, it becomes harder and harder to explain the nature of the changes in the Russian Armed Forces. The informational component of the nation's public life is growing and new magazines and newspapers are constantly appearing, while the staff of the Defense Ministry's information structure keeps shrinking. Today, the press service has only about 30 employees, a third of whom are civilians.

The work of military press services is complicated by the reluctance and inability of many military commanders to work with the press. Both the press service and journalists are hoping for help from Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. On Dec. 14, 2002, he approved the "Instruction on the organization of informing Russian and foreign journalists on the activity of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation," which states, in particular: "Officials of the Armed Forces must inform Russian and foreign journalists on the activity of the Armed Forces in proper order and to the extent of their competence. " The word is "must"! And further: "They are responsible for the operative and high-quality preparation of reliable data for the coverage of the activity of the Armed Forces in the media."

The press service of the Defense Ministry also provides practical assistance to journalists. For example, in 2001, military administrations organized over 400 trips into positions for Russian and foreign journalists. About 2,000 journalists visited the Joint Forces of the North Caucasus, the 201st Motor-Artillery Division in Tajikistan, and the Russian sections of peacekeepers in Abkhazia, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina alone.

Viktor LITOVKIN (Colonel in Reserve, columnist for RIA Novosti, member of the military press for 20 years, military columnist for Izvestia and Obshaya Gazeta in 1989-2002) reflects on the theory and practice of censorship in the contemporary Russian press. The author notes that even though the law "On the media" forbids censorship, the Soviet-era main military censorship department has not been disbanded, but simply transformed into the General Headquarters Department for the protection of secrets in the press and other media. In 1997, the Service for Information Security in the Media of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation was created.

The ideology and objectives of this service are essentially the same as they were before, although they are expressed in other words: "The organization and perfection of the information security system in the media of the Armed Forces of the RF; protection from the publication in the media of state secrets and confidential information about the Armed Forces of the RF; the coordination of the activity of the organs of military directorates, unions, military divisions, institutions, military-educational establishments, enterprises and organizations of the Defense Ministry on questions of information security in the media; the planning of events for transforming organs of information security from peacetime to wartime."

There is no mention of political or ideological control over the media, but there is a reference to "confidential information." Experience shows that the term "confidential" can be used to describe any information published in the press or gathered and analyzed by journalists or scientists. All of this indicates that military censorship in Russia is not dead, concludes Litovkin. The author also expresses concern about experts who claim to advocate improved national security, while, in reality, they are demanding the legal persecution of persons who gather and circulate information.

According to Litovkin, the drive for stricter censorship is based less on concern for the protection of secret information that affects national security and military readiness than on the desire to regain the influence censorship, including military censorship, had until 1991. Often one can also trace the jealousy of information-security services towards creative persons and see their commercial interest in the division of profits from literary or scientific activity. The work of journalists is also made difficult by imperfections in the laws on the protection of state secrets.

Mikhail POGORELYI (director of the Russian NGO "Center for War and Peace Journalism" and editor of the "Problems of Global Security" bulletin, formerly a military journalist and an employee of the National Press Institute) analyzes the editorial policy of Russian military journalism. The Soviet press was an ideological weapon for the Communist Party, which was less concerned with reporting the news than with offering its own commentaries and evaluations. The new Russian press is not homogeneous. The content — subject, presentation and tone — of military materials depends not only on the profile and specialization of a publication but also on the practical interests of its owners. The 30,000 print publications officially registered in Russia can be divided into three major groups based on this criterion:

	Government publications, including official publications and many regional publications that are cosponsored by local administrations and most of the administrative publications of the Defense Ministry and other power structures;
	Publications belonging to the oligarchic media empires of individuals and financial or industrial structures and the print organs of political parties;
	Independent publications published by individuals, groups (including editorial groups) or corporations, foreign-owned media distributed in Russia.

The editorial policy of government and administrative media structures can be characterized in one word: propaganda. Oligarchic media empires aim to provide the owners and their commercial enterprises with influence over crucial political and economic decision-making processes, especially at times when the media plays the biggest role, including presidential and parliamentary elections, power transfers and important cadre changes (in the leading media sources, up to 80 percent of coverage is dedicated to various aspects of power struggles and only a minimum of materials concerns problems relevant to the lives of the overwhelming majority of Russians).

Only the third group of publications is adopting market-economy principles, under which information is not a propaganda tool, but becomes a product, an object of goods-for-money relations. Correspondingly, the editorial policy of such publications is based on consumer demand. A certain "yellow" and "tabloid" aspect helps independent publications to lead in popularity ratings among the mass readership — and, consequently, in circulation.

Military information in the independent media is popular, but demand is greatest for scandals — murders, desertions, theft, bribes, etc. In part, this is because today's consumer market for high-quality military information in the country is limited and often uses other sources instead of the open press. The creation and development of a readers' market is vital for publications planning to focus on military subjects.

Mikhail LUKIN (Deputy Director of the information center of the "Kommersant" publishing house, previously an editor at the "Postfactum" and "Natsionalnaya Sluzhba Novostei" agencies) offers his views on "information wars" in Russian military journalism. The author notes that the spontaneity of most information campaigns in military journalism sets them apart from the typical activity of public relations specialists. These "campaigns" are usually surges of interest in one problem or another initiated by various groups with vested interests.

Lukin identifies two basic types of media campaigns concerning military affairs that have appeared in the press over the last decade:

The campaigns concerning structural changes (for example, the abolition of the headquarters of the ground forces and the reduction of the paratroopers or strategic missile forces). Usually these are initiated by groups of military officials, who are unhappy with the character and scale of upcoming reforms. They can last for several years and are characterized by an absence of clear conceptions of priorities of military construction.

Campaigns against individuals (for example the mutual criticism of Igor Radionov and Aleksandr Lebed, the standoff between Igor Sergeev and Anatoly Kvashnin, the situation around the appointment of Gen. Viktor Chechevatov, the dismissal Ground Forces Commander Vladimir Semenov). Such campaigns are usually shorter in duration but more intense. The interested parties traditionally keep silent and contact the media only after the critical phase of the campaign is over. These campaigns are usually not very effective.

Motivations for journalists covering military subjects in general publications are interesting. Unlike business or politics, military affairs are least "saturated" with financial and careerist perspectives: it's unlikely that media columnists really hope to become employees of the Defense Ministry press service. More likely emotional factors are at work — to have prestigious friendships with military men, go to saunas with them and go shooting. Plus, a journalist can "make a name for himself" quickly on military subjects.

Unlike the information wars of the last decade in the business and political life, military campaigns did not become a very effective tool for pressuring opponents (rivals) and achieving objectives. One of the reasons for this is that the intended audiences of military-theme media campaigns are government structures and individuals — both military (Defense Ministry, General Headquarters) and political (presidential administration, government, parliament). They are the decision-makers, and influencing them is the primary goal of the publications. At the same time, the specific characteristic of information wars in the "military sphere" is that its subjects are often interconnected by administrative or personal relations. These levers of influence are often used in parallel with propaganda or as a response to it. The primary goal of information wars is considered to be the formulation of a clear conception about a given question. However the impact of media publications on the military decision-making process is not great, which means that information wars in this sphere generally fail.

Ruslan PUKHOV (Director of the Russian NGO "Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies", publisher of the "Export Vooruzhenii" journal) analyzes information wars of the past decade related to the military-industrial complex. The author notes that the development of a community of journalists who write about military-technical cooperation and the military industrial complex depends on transparency in these subjects.

In recent years, there has been an obvious tendency towards maximal secrecy of any information concerning military-technical cooperation with foreign countries. In addition — and perhaps as a result of this tendency — there is an obvious creative stagnation at many respectable publications; some of the most talented journalists are leaving the once-attractive sphere.

Pukhov provides several case studies for various types of information wars in the Russian military-industrial complex:

	The "kompromat" wars between "Severnaya Verf" and "Baltiiskii Zavod," rivals for the Chinese contract for the building of torpedo-boat destroyers (December 2001-April 2002).
	Campaigns to discredit Rosvooruzhenie directors Aleksandr Kotelkin (summer-fall 1996) and Yevgenii Ananiev (fall 1997-spring 1998), and Promexport General Director Sergei Chemezov (September-October 2000).

Information wars in the sphere of weapons production and sales have done colossal damage to Russia's already-poor image abroad and to its high-tech production. They portrayed the Russian economy as a chaotic system without rules and the system of arms export as an extremely corrupted sector of state administration. At the same time, such battles have "winners": By participating in information wars, the heads of press services increase their influence within a company and gain access to directors and to off-the-record funds, while journalists gain access to exclusive information.

Pukhov links the perspectives of military journalism to the state of the military-industrial complex itself: either their mutual development or their mutual demise will follow.

Ivan SAFRANCHUK (Director of the Russian office of the Center for Defense Information) reviews the challenges facing Russian military journalism in the context of two factors — the development of civil society and the Russian media business.

During glasnost and perestroika, military issues were the primary means to criticize and undermine the Soviet and Communist leadership. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia new political leadership was afraid of the military, and the result of fears was quite interesting. Instead of conducting intensive military reform, the government chose to maintain the status quo: weak and publicly unpopular Armed Forces became the best remedy against a military coup. After Vladimir Putin came to power, the Defense Ministry and other power organs began to take revenge on the media. Unhappy with the media coverage of military affairs, the power organs increase efforts to keep information secret from journalists and even to revive — if not the entire system, then at least separate elements of — censorship.

This, however, poses problems for the development of civil society and the Russian media business. The nation has many troubles in the military sphere and the public obviously wants to be informed about them. With the development of civil society, the demand for high-quality information about the Armed Forces should grow.

The other question is that the Russian media market has not yet developed. The problem lies not with the military journalists, but with the media itself, for which, under current Russian conditions, the military question as somewhat dangerous. Therefore, the development of military journalism is inseparable from the development of the media business as a whole. Military journalists can lead the quest for higher circulation by developing themes that are of interest to the "average reader."

Russia's officials are not fond of military journalists — not because journalists lack professionalism or curiosity, not because they make simplifications that impair deep analysis, but rather because they show excessive professionalism and seek to understand the essence of the problem instead of limiting themselves to superficial commentary. This is not surprising, since Russia's leading military journalists are often themselves former Defense Ministry employees, who have deep insight into defense problems.

BACK TO THE TOP    MOSCOW VIEWS    CDI RUSSIA WEEKLY

JOHNSON'S RUSSIA LIST    WASHINGTON PROFILE    CDI HOME