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Edited by David Johnson
| ISSUE #50 | May 28, 1999 |
| ISSUE #50 | May 28, 1999 |
#1 Moscow Times May 27, 1999 DEFENSE DOSSIER: Back to a Nuclear Future By Pavel Felgenhauer Pavel Felgenhauer is chief defense correspondent for Segodnya. Last week, Nuclear Power Minister Yevgeny Adamov publicly unveiled his ideas on the future of the nuclear industry. Adamov believes that Russia and the whole world should be awash in power plants and nuclear reactors and that the present scale-down will be reversed. Nuclear power development has been stagnating worldwide since the disaster in Chernobyl in 1986. When the Cold War ended soon after Chernobyl, this, too, diminished investment in military nuclear programs in Russia and the United States. As a result, there is a world glut of cheap natural uranium, as producers were developing capabilities to meet a much bigger demand. In the 1960s and 1970s, fast nuclear "breeder" reactors were internationally considered the best energy source for the future. Such reactors produce energy and increasing amounts of plutonium. The plutonium produced by the "breeders" has an energy potential that is bigger than that of the original uranium. Today, Adamov acknowledges, breeder reactors have become irrelevant. It is much cheaper to use existing stockpiles of uranium to extract plutonium than to reprocess highly radioactive used reactor fuel. According to the Fuel and Energy Ministry, more than 160,000 tons of spent fuel have been produced worldwide since the beginning of the nuclear age. Less than 10 percent of it has been reprocessed. Each year, 10,000 tons of spent radioactive fuel pile up and only 3,000 tons of it is reprocessed to extract uranium and plutonium. This discrepancy between production and reprocessing is growing. The German government recently said it will stop sending spent fuel from German reactors for reprocessing in France. This means more and more spent fuel needs to be stored. Adamov sees the growing international demand for nuclear storing facilities as a golden opportunity for Russia and for his ministry. Russia could take highly radioactive waste from other countries and keep it for future reprocessing, earning billions of dollars in the meantime. Adamov says that spent fuel collection and storage is a "$150 billion business." France and Britain are already taking in foreign nuclear waste, so "Russia should fight for its share of the market." The Nuclear Power Ministry has already figured out how to spend this future windfall. Adamov believes that in 30 to 40 years the demand for nuclear energy will again begin to grow dramatically. Chernobyl will be forgotten. Anyway, Adamov says, "after Chernobyl we have modified our reactors in a way that makes such a disaster impossible." In the West and in Russia, nuclear power production is stagnating. Russian nuclear plants are producing electricity at 56 percent of capacity. The rest simply goes into steam, since large parts of industry are not producing anything. However China, India, Iran and other Third World countries are today increasingly interested in developing nuclear power. Adamov believesthat as potential hydroelectric power sources are used up and consumption of fossil fuel is restricted to control greenhouse gas emissions, other countries will also consider the nuclear option. The current glut of uranium will be soon spent and all the previously accumulated nuclear waste will be needed for recycling. In the meantime, Russia will use the money it gets for storing foreign nuclear waste to produce a new generation of fast breeder reactors and a "closed" nuclear fuel cycle, in which plutonium is produced, extracted and reused. "One would need only 5 tons of uranium to start such a reactor and afterward it will be producing its own fuel," Adamov says. Of course, Russian ecologists are adamantly opposed to Adamov's plans. Current law also forbids the storage of foreign nuclear waste. But Adamov has a powerful weapon to pressure Russian authorities - the military nuclear program. Last month the Security Council ordered the development of a new generation of nuclear warheads. Last week Adamov complained that "they told us to accelerate military nuclear programs, but said we should do that using our own sources of revenue." The Nuclear Power Ministry clearly says that without money coming from the West as payment for nuclear storage, Russia cannot manage a new generation of nuclear weapons. Six deputies in the State Duma have sponsored legislation that will allow Russia to take foreign spent fuel. Of course, such legislation will hardly be approved soon. But the nuclear lobby can wait. As relations with the West deteriorate, development of new nukes may become more important than ecological purity.
#4 Russian Military Firms Joining To Make Consumer Goods MOSCOW, May 26 (Itar-Tass) - "A consortium of hi-tech enterprises of the military-industrial complex is being formed in Russia to manufacture consumer goods," Head of the Project and Chief of the Demand Formation Centre (DFC) Pyotr Vernik told reporters here. The project is called "Ladomir - Lunar City Technology". The name is quite symbolic and implies the use of high technologies to create living conditions for human beings in a Lunar City, as well as the satisfaction of all the earthy requirements of the Russian people. The consumer goods, which the consortium will produce, belong to the "household electric appliances" group. The merger of defence complex enterprises into a consortium is being done on voluntary lines. "The Russian high technologies, formerly intended exclusively for the solution of military and space tasks, will be used, at long last, to manufacture civilian goods," Vernik stated. All the commodities, which the enterprises of the consortium will turn out in accordance with this project will bear the Russian trade mark of "LADOMIR". Vernik told Itar-Tass that some enterprises, which DFC has merged into a consortium, had worked yet in the sixties on a project to settle human beings on the moon. Special technologies were developed for this purpose, which were classified secret for many long years. Russian scientists and designers have conceived and developed everything that should surround human beings on the moon, including household appliances. Today, these secret technologies are being declassified and will henceforth be used in civilian production. The consortium's enterprises shall work, and are already working, according to dual-purpose technologies. This means that they will continue to fill space and defence orders, while setting up, parallel with this, additional facilities for making household goods. It is worth noting that both these production sectors of the said enterprises will supplement each other.
#5 Experts View Yeltsin, Stepashin Prospects NTV 23 May 1999 [translation for personal use only] >From NTV program presented by Yevgeniy Kiselev -- live or recorded [Presenter Yevgeniy Kiselev] We shall discuss last week's major political topics with leading experts and politologists. Our guests are Liliya Shevtsova, the leading expert at the Moscow Carnegie Endowment; Georgiy Satarov, the Indem Foundation's president, and Leonid Radzikhovskiy, the Segodnya newspaper's political observer. Good afternoon. [Experts] Good afternoon. [Presenter] My first question is as follows. The left-wing forces were making threats to lead people out into the streets, in case [former First Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy] Maslyukov or [former First Deputy Prime Minister Gennadiy] Kulik are sacked, let alone [former Prime Minister Yevgeniy] Primakov. They were saying that they would organize mass civilian disturbances. However, when [Russian President Boris] Yeltsin sacked Primakov, there was a chorus of voices saying the impeachement would be supported and [Russian Prime Minister Sergey] Stepashin would never be confirmed as prime minister. What we are witnessing now is: impeachment has failed, Stepashin has been confirmed at the first voting. Why? What are the reasons? Liliya Fedorovna, please take the floor. [Shevtsova] All failed forecasts go to prove yet again that we know our ruling class and the mood in the society very little. [Omitted: Shevtsova saying the impeachment failure showed that the Duma is not ready to go against the president and thus has confirmed a short-term prime minister; she says that Stepashin is seen as a puppet prime minister and a lesser evil in contrast to other candidates] [Presenter] Same question to Georgiy Satarov: why has everything passed so smoothly? [Satarov] I think that the result of this destabilization, in other words, Primakov's dismissal, impeachment failure and Stepashin's confirmation, clearly shows that the opposition did not care much about [Primakov's] government, compared to their care of themselves. When the choice was between preserving and fighting for the government and preserving themselves, they have chosen themselves. [Omitted: deputies wanted to give Stepashin more freedom and independence by their smooth voting] [Presenter] Now I address the same question to Leonid Radzikhovskiy. What is your answer to the same question? [Radzikhovskiy] The whole impeachment saga has proved yet again that Yeltsin and his analysts are very good psychologists. They rely on the instinct of fear of the so-called opposition. They are hardly ever wrong. [Omitted: more in the same vein; Stepashin's smooth confirmation in the Duma was a message to the president implying Duma's support of the president as much as the president's] [Presenter] Now I would like to ask all our guests whether Stepashin's confirmation is the president's victory or defeat. Many people thought that Yeltsin aimed the government reshuffle at dissolving the Duma and calling early parliamentary elections in the long run. It so happened that there is no pretext to dissolve the Duma and the elections are planned for December 1999. What do you think, Liliya Fedorovna? [Shevtsova] I am unwilling to evaluate Stepashin's confirmation as the president's straight victory or his defeat. It has happened many times before that tactical victories of the president's team turned out as strategic failures for Yeltsin and the president's institute as a whole. [Omitted: Shevtsova thinks that we can speak of Yeltsin's victory only if Stepashin will strengthen Yeltsin's political foundation, an increased political rating of the president or prolong his political life after 2000. Another question is, says Shevtsova, whether Stepashin will want to do so and whether he is capable of doing it] In the long run, similar small successes and euphoria from alleged victories in the presidential administration may turn into a devaluation of the institute of the prime minister and the government as a whole, further humiliation of the parliament and possibly a degradation of presidency as an institute. [Presenter] Same question goes to Satarov. Do you think that Stepashin's easy confirmation as prime minister came as an unpleasant surprise for the president and those who had planned it? There is a theory, as you know, that they wanted the Duma to fail to confirm Stepashin thrice and as a result early elections would be called in September. [Satarov] First of all, when we begin counting points or talk about victories and defeats, it would be advisable to reckon with another important player, and that is the country's citizens. Out of our viewers approximately 80 percent may not have supported Primakov's dismissal. However, the same 80 percent should be very well aware that his government which had had no other precedent in terms of the large support of the population, was given away by the president and the Duma together. Second. It is a defeat fo Russia's political system because it was incapable of preserving something which is beneficial for the country and its people and not only for the polticial elite. Talking about victory, it is a joint victory of the president and the Duma. Their instinct of self-preservation has won. [Presenter] The floor goes to Radzikhovskiy. [Radzikhovskiy] These events may be described as both a victory and a defeat for the president. In terms of defeat, Yeltsin may have suffered yet another defeat, may be the last one in his political career, a most serious defeat in the eyes of the public opinion. [Omitted: Radzikhovskiy recalls the impeachment debate, when nobody could say a word of praise about the president] At the same time there is a certain victory. A relatively independent govenment has been destroyed. An attempt is made to form a government which will be wholly under the presidential administration's control. [Presenter] What kind of government is Stepashin forming? Is it a technical government aimed at leading the country to the elections quietly? Or is there further political life ahead of the government? The constitution does not compel the president to sack a government because of the new parliamentary elections and this or that party winning in them, does it? The floor is given to Shevtsova. [Shevtsova] Stepashin has already been invited to run a government whose function is quite definite. This function is rather limited and that is to control [parliamentary] elections so that they will be won by forces loyal to Yeltsin. Another mission is to control the post-Yeltsin period in the interests of Yeltsin and the current ruling team. The third aim, and I cannot exclude this, is to put off the end of Yeltsin's presidency. That is why Stepashin has a limited ground for his manouevring. Much depends on whether he will agree to the role of a puppet prime minister, a driving gear of a kind, or he will manage to eel his way out of the choking embrace of the presidential administration and some oligarchs. I think that we'd better not speak too soon. Stepashin may have a lot more of political will, stamina and possibly manouevring skills. It is not incidental that he has survived so long in the whirlpool of Russian politics for so long. He may have more of these fighting qualities than we supposed. I do not exclude that he may lead the govenment to a logical ending, to the presidential elections and will help organizes the elections. [Presenter] Same question goes to Satarov. Do you think that Stepashin is there to stay or is he to last until the elections? [Satarov] I think that both election will take place as planned. After that everything depends on Stepashin himself, on his ability to pass between the Scilla of the presidential team's influence and the Haribda of the Duma's lobbying. It depends on his consistency and independence. [Presenter] [Omitted: presenter comparing the present-day government with that of former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's] What will happen to Stepashin? Let us assume that he will stay as prime minister until December this year. Will he stay in his post afterwards? [Radzikhovskiy] Stepashin's fate depends exclusively on the will and intentions of Yelsin and his immediate environment. Does Yeltsin intend to resign on 12th June 2000 or not? If he does, is he ready to make Stepashin his successor? The latter depends on Stepashin's behaviour during this one year's test? [Presenter] The same question - and this is the last question we are debating - goes to Satarov. Georgiy Aleksandrovich, you know the president well, you used to be his aide for many years, you used to work with him. Knowing Yeltsin's nature... [pauses] Do you believe that Yeltsin will be sitting with his arms folded and will not come up with more surprises in the next weeks or months? [Satarov] I will start by saying that there is a myth about Yeltsin the quarrelsome fellow. Well, he is not. He is a rather indecisive man. Normally, after he explodes, after he breaks a certain situation and wins, he calms down and is quiet. Recall 1991, for example. What happened after the coup's failure? Instead of pursuing the attack, Yeltsin went on holiday. The same is happeneing now. It is not incidental. If you wish, it is a psychophysiological law. It is his psychotype in essence. I do not think that we are to expect some other crises in the near future. [Presenter] The same question goes to Shevtsova. [Shevtsova] My colleagues have been talking about the psuchological nature of Yeltsin's leadership and Yeltsin's acivities as a political leader. I would point out the structural trap or the structural conflict whose hostage our president is. This regime cannot develop normally at an even, stagnating momentum. In order to survive this regime needs constant shaking, constant crisis provoking situations. [Omitted: Shevtsova says that Yeltsin cannot have a strong successor, as he would receive control over post-Yeltsin period.] [Presenter] I would like to thank our experts, Shevtsova, Satarov and Radzikhovskiy.
#6 Christian Science Monitor MAY 26, 1999 OPINION Rewarding Russia for what? Loans from West flow in spite of political antagonism and corruption Frank Cilluffo and Todd Nelson Frank J. Cilluffo is a senior policy analyst and director of the Russian organized crime task force at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington, D.C. Todd Nelson is a research analyst for the task force. When the dust settles after the latest Russian political crisis - the ouster of Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov - the issue of International Monetary Fund loans will once again become the focus in the Russian economy. While officials on both sides of the pond are uneasy - especially given the slim chance the Duma will pass IMF-friendly legislation - they will, eventually, come back to the table and are likely to agree to release the next scheduled $4.5 billion loan disbursement. But there are compelling reasons for caution about international loans to Russia. Repeated threats to withdraw from the peace-brokering process in Kosovo are only the latest Russian measures aimed at frustrating Western foreign policy. Russia has been an irritant to NATO at every stage of the crisis, yet it howls in protest when it is ignored. Still, a new IMF loan disbursement to Russia is imminent and for a very bad reason: to assuage Russian hurt feelings. If the IMF follows through, it will make two grave mistakes: rewarding Russia's antagonism of the West, and addressing political rather than economic considerations. The abysmal track record of Russian economic reform - inability to implement a true market economy and lack of fiscal accountability and transparency - doesn't justify further loans. Rationales advocating new loans to Russia have ranged from concerns about Russia's alienation from the international community in case it defaults on its foreign debt, to fears that Russia itself will collapse, resulting in political chaos in a country that spans 11 time zones and still has 20,000 nuclear weapons. These scenarios, it is argued, would make Russia far more dangerous than we perceive it to be now. The fact is that this has been tried before. Last summer, a $22.6 billion loan package put together by the IMF, World Bank, and Japan at the urging of the Clinton administration was intended to help stabilize the Russian economy. The justifications given at the time were some of the exact concerns listed above. Within weeks the ruble collapsed, and in the aftermath of the financial crisis, former Finance Minister Anatoly Chubais admitted publicly that the loan package had been "swindled" from the West. Adding injury to insult was the subsequent discovery that most of the first $4.8 billion disbursement of the loan package flowed right back out of the country again in a matter of weeks. The lion's share of the billions of dollars the international community has loaned Russia since the breakup of the Soviet Union has fallen into the pockets of corrupt bureaucrats and has primarily benefited those for whom it was least intended. It is little wonder that these loans have failed to stop, or even to postpone, the devaluation of the ruble and the crisis of the Russian economy. Until a measure of transparency and accountability has been achieved in the Russian economy, the IMF might just as well deposit the money into Russian offshore holding companies directly. For the IMF to loan money to Russia in order for it to repay loans that it initially "swindled" from the IMF is not only absurd, it's fiscally irresponsible and potentially dangerous. The fundamental issue is that aid money that has gone into Russia has consistently and illegally increased the polarization of wealth in a country where more than a third of the population lives below the subsistence level. The pandemic corruption of the Russian state should have caused IMF wariness and requirements of close scrutiny as to the final destination of the loan money. It's impossible to divorce the economic quagmire in Russia from the stranglehold crime and corruption have on Russian society. Solutions to these problems are to be found in fostering a culture based on the rule of law, a judiciary that is not cowed by political forces or police organs or criminal syndicates. The best course of action for the West is not to throw money at Russians, but to help them better help themselves by providing them with the tools needed to improve their economy. Attracting foreign direct investment is the quickest path Russia can take to recovery. This requires nurturing a more transparent business climate that would subsequently generate investor confidence. Then not only would Russia free itself from dependence on the IMF, but also nurture a truly free and democratic market economy.
#7 Sakhalin 'Mutiny' Rumors Said 'Exaggerated' Komsomolskaya Pravda 25 May 1999 [translation for presonal use only] Report by Viktor Baranets and Sergey Prokopenko: "Drunken Soldiers Almost Seize Missile Unit" All Sakhalin is astir with the sensational rumor that mass disturbances took place on Cape Krilyon and a whole military unit belonging to the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army stationed in the Far East was seized and held for almost 24 hours by drunken soldiers, that people were killed and injured.... Yesterday we contacted officials in the Main Military Prosecutor's Office and the Far East Military District Military Prosecutor's Office, and we even got through to Sakhalin. From them we learned that an extraordinary incident did indeed take place, but that the rumors about the scale of the event are exaggerated. In the words of Justice Lieutenant Colonel Grigoriy Kuleshov, deputy military prosecutor of Far East Military District (who went to the scene of the extraordinary incident), three people were injured. But no one was killed. According to the investigators' version, events developed as follows. On the third floor of the barracks of the Air Defense military unit stationed in Cape Krilyon a drinking bout was in full swing. Civilian employees of the Russian Army, who were renovating the premises, were drinking together with five soldiers, who were helping them with the refurbishment. Lieutenant Colonel Troot, deputy commander of a separate Air Defense radiotechnical company, having discovered at roll call the absence of several of his subordinates, went to look for them. Attracted by the noise, he ascended to the floor where the repairmen were working. A pretty lively scene presented itself to his view. The officer ordered his subordinates to report to their subunit. This was opposed by a workman named Rozhka (who has a previous conviction). He began to insult the officer, provoking a fight. A brawl broke out. Rozhda struck the officer on the head "with a heavy object, as yet unidentified." Several officers came to Troot's aid, and the workmen and soldiers started fighting them. Seeing that the numbers were unequal, one of the officers opened up the weapons storeroom, where his double-barreled hunting gun was kept, loaded it with grapeshot, and fired into the floor. Two of the drunken soldiers were slightly injured by the ricochet. This somewhat sobered up the hooligans. Nor has there been any confirmation of the version that the soldiers tried to storm the room where the weapons were kept or that that the unit was taken under the control of Internal Troops servicemen, allegedly called out to quell the "mutiny." It is known that a police detail summoned to the scene of the extraordinary incident arrested five drunken soldiers and civilian employees. Lieutenant Colonel Troot was the most seriously injured. The base of his skull was found to have been fractured. He was taken to military hospital in a serious condition. In the words of Colonel Aleksandr Romashkin, an official of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office, criminal proceedings have been instituted against the hooligans.
#8 The Russia Journal http://www.russiajournal.com May 24-30, 1999 Moscow Must Address Role of Armed Forces in Possible Social Unrest If Russia's current economic crisis turns into a social one, the Kremlin may not be able to control the situation with the forces at its disposal. This is why political and economic means must be found to resolve the situation. Shortly before the failed impeachment vote of the president in the Duma lower house of parliament took place, several high-ranking officials paid a visit to the Federal Security Service's (FSB) Anti-Terrorist Center. With the increasing threat of social and political destabilization in Russia, it is possible the visit was not just routine, but rather an indication of what the government believes may lie ahead. Defense Minister Igor Sergeev said the meeting was connected to political developments in the country and stressed that the armed forces would not be dragged into internal squabbles. "The aims and tasks of the armed forces are determined by the president and remain unchanged," Sergeev said. This last statement, however, suggests the army might still be used by the authorities for actions inside the country in case of civilian strife or social unrest. A presidential decree issued in November 1993 allows use of the army to suppress "illegal action by nationalistic, separatist and other forces aimed at destabilization in the country, the overthrow of the constitutional regime, etc." Is it possible for such events to take place in Russia in the near future? Can Russia fall apart and plunge into civil war? Unfortunately, this is a possibility. The failure of the impeachment, the anti-Kremlin stance of the left-wing opposition, problems related to the formation of a new government, further aggravation in the North Caucasus and the ongoing economic crisis - all of these factors promote instability and tension. Protest rallies that took place during the May holidays indicate that under the guidance of opposition parties and movements, a great number of people could rebel against the ruling regime. Does Russia's political system have enough strength to effectively resist these destabilizing trends and forces? Lieutenant General Stanislav Kavun, deputy commander of the Interior Troops, told The Russia Journal that his force is able to enforce law and order in the country. Kavun says mobile units, which can be relocated anywhere in less than 24 hours, have been formed within the Interior Troops this year. And, according to sources in general headquarters, a number of airborne units are maintained in permanent combat readiness. But if massive civil disobedience breaks out simultaneously in several regions, Interior Minstry and airborne troops might not be able to effectively control the outbursts. The former Soviet Union had some 400,000 Interior Ministry Troops, an airborne force nearly 100,000 men strong and a number of special divisions within the KGB. And even these forces failed to prevent the bloody wars in Central Asia, Nagorny Karabakh, Abkhazia and Trans-Dniester that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Officially, Russia has only 203,000 men in the Interior Ministry Troops and 32,000 men in the Airborne Troops. Four out of a total of five rapid reaction divisions of the Interior Ministry troops are deployed in the North Caucasus. Russia is approximately 40 percent smaller in terms of area and population than the Soviet Union, but the numerical strength of forces designated to enforce law and order in the country has shrunk nearly 60 percent. Most of the remaining units are concentrated in European Russia. Another destabilizing factor in the country stems from reform in the hierarchy of military structures. By the end of this year, military districts are to be converted into territorial army groups, subordinate entirely to their respective commanders. This will increase the dependence of military units on governors and local business and political elite. Given the present unstable situation, there is the risk that an ambitious governor might develop a desire to take control of military units stationed in his domain. In July 1998, Krasnoyarsk Territory governor Aleksandr Lebed threatened to "privatize" the Strategic Missile Corps Division deployed in his territory if the government did not pay delayed wages to the division's officers. While the threat of social unrest becomes more unrealistic, no one has addressed the matter of the role armed forces are likely to plan.
#9 Pravda 26 May 1999 "Military Reform"(rdubin@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu) rubric The Fleet: Was it Sea-Going, or Will it Become Coastal? by Colonel Vasily Izgarshev, Pravda's Military Observer [translated by Rachel Dubin] I do not know by hearsay what kind of Navy it was not too long ago. In the Northern Fleet, at the very end of our great [Soviettrns.] Union, I had a chance to visit on board the guided-missile cruiser "Marshal Ustinov" and to acquaint myself with the military work of its excellent crew. I saw it in the business of the giant nuclear vessel's sailors and submariners. Of the boat itself, on board of which, to the surprise of the press, there was besides intercontinental missiles, also a winter garden with singing birds. The ocean depths and motor speeds of submarine navigation are dependent on the underwater nuclear vessel. It is capable of going round our Earth while underwater, without putting in and without coming to the surface. I was present at a state reception for the "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Nikolai Kuznetsov," the first aircraft carrier in the fleet. And I spent almost a month in our Mediterranean Squadron. I walked on the cruiser "Zhdanov," on the large antisubmarine ship "Krasnyy Krym" [Red Crimeatrns.]; we chased an American pirate, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier "Nimitz." I am convinced that that squadron would now be in the Mediterranean Sea, if there were not NATO aggression in the Balkans. The North Atlantic alliance would not have decided on [committingtrns.] open robbery against a sovereign Yugoslavia. Yes, our Soviet Navy was powerfulthe aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered ships, submarines and ocean-going carriers. And on the sea lanes, the world met the ships under the flag of the Land of the Soviets with respect . Indeed, besides purely military and defensive tasks, the Navy successfully solved diplomatic problems. It appropriately represented our great countryits culture and traditionsin many foreign countries. 10-15 years ago, the ships of the Soviet Navy carried out ten naval journeys with visits of friendship and peace. Where is all this now? Last year, there were a total of two journeys flying the Russian flag. The sailors maintain that such journeys are planned for this, too. But this is only a part of what once was. And in general, the Russian Navy is surviving not far from better times, like the country as a whole. However, this has been said lightly. The sea-going Navy has significantly reduced the amount of its pennants, and so it will become coastal. There are no monies, no financing, no fuel, and no lubricants. There is not even paint in order to refresh a deck and a superstructure. The West Atlantic people, who constantly track the state of affairs of the Russian Armed Forces, including the Navy, maintain that we have in operation a total of 27 combat-ready nuclear submarines that are armed with ballistic missiles. If the present material problems remain, the number of nuclear vessels will be reduced by double after five years. It will be too bad with the missiles for the submarines, but it will be even worse in the future. The Naval Command does not dispute either present estimates or future predictions. However, as possible as it is to dispute the fact that it arises directly from the situation, "in the process of disbanding the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the 1991-96 period, quantitative and qualitative changes in the needs in weapons and military technology took place, which led to a fall in the annual amounts of state defense orders and to an existing reduction in military production." This is an old citation. I extracted it from a letter last January by deputy chairman of the RF Yakov Urinson, of sad memory, who had addressed the chairman of the State Duma. But if military reform is announced in Russia, then it, naturally, and with a reduction in the amount of servicemen, must be accompanied by a forced technological retrofitting of the army and navy. Yes, a number of nuclear-powered ships can, and need to be, reduced. But their qualitative parameters and their military capability must certainly increase. Here, they want to accomplish a small retreat concerning reforms. The thing is that it has only led to a reduction of personnel. More than three million personnel were in the Armed Forces; it has been decided to bring the number to 1.5 million. The task for the Ministry of Defense has been laid out. According to the survivors, those who were needed and not needed were cut and dismissed and divisions and regiments were reduced . But the thing was done. The army was reduced by a third. However, no one calculated how many defense industries needed to be reduced or how many guns, heavy military technology, and so forth, were to be produced. None of us studied it. Defense has fallen on its side. The professionals have made an escape from industry. The old men who are left therefore vegetate without wages, as defense orders per se do not exist in nature. The previous Primakov-Maslyukov government tried to rejuvenate the military-industrial complex. Something was done, but the government was not allowed to turn it around. It is not known what will happen now. In any case, nothing will as long as Stepashin is the one in government who is responsible for the military-industrial complex. Meanwhile. Goszakaz [State Ordering Commissiontrns.] is unchangingly reducing scientific-research and defense-construction work upon the deliveries of modernized military technology and weapons. I understand that the number does not always adorn newspaper publications, but we cannot do without it. So, the government's outlay for Goszakaz before industries was (in old prices) 7 billion rubles in 1992; 920 billion in 1993; 4.2 trillion in 1997; 7.7 trillion in 1995; and 15.6 trillion in 1996. It did not decrease in 1997 and 1998. So, how does it decrease if the entire budget of the country during the reforms has been reduced tenfold? Las year's budget was a total of 10.2% of the 1990 RSFSR budget. And today's budget, it is shameful to say, is less than New York's yearly budget. So, the nuclear-powered cruiser "Pyotr Velikiy" did not accidentally stand on the ways at the shipyard's berthing walls for over 10 years. It is not accidental, either, that for the past [couple oftrns.] years, the submarine fleet has not been replenished by a single nuclear-powered vessel. Is it somewhere, the submarine "Yuri Dolgorukiy," which was featured in the press and called the nuclear vessel of the 21st century? For sure, are we going to wait for it in the 21st century? So what kind of navy does Russia need now? Ocean-going or coastal? What a question! Of course, ocean-going, capable of ensuring the country's stated interests on the planet's seas and oceans and the integrity and security of its extensive maritime boundaries. Of course, the Navy today is not what we had in the Soviet Union. Today, 75% of ships and 10-15 years' worth of servicemen make up the Navy's combat-ready personnel. But there is a basis for the Navy's future development. Naval sailors consider this foundation to be entirely sufficient. And what of military reform? It perhaps works in the Navy not as it should, but the naval sailors are not guilty of it. Here, everything also rests on financing. Yet, according to the organized establishment's plan of measures, everything is being carried out without the usual delay. Not all is smooth with the financing here, but the sailors, not hoping for money from above, have learned to make the best use of the internal resources they have. In short, in the Navy, in contrast to the Army, only a monthly lag in payment of wages has been procured. (True, sailors do not have it better with other wages than soldiers.) Much has already been done about reforming the system of management. It is subject to reformation to a large extent. The Navy has gone through two to three-layer systems of management. Until now, it was four to five layers. A year ago, as counted in Glavkomat, [Commander in Chief's officetrns.] 197 managers were above the ship's commandersthis was taken on account of the commanders of a small antisubmarine commander. But the ship is not painted; the sailors are undressed and unshod. It was reported not long ago that the sailors on the heavy missile cruiser "Varyag" (Pacific Fleet) were fed twice a day. And if one reduces the [number oftrns.] managers and hands their money over to the ship? Both paint, products for the galley, boots, and uniforms will be found. If one takes into account that the Navy's military personnel has been reduced by two and a half, then, by itself, a conclusion can be drawn: it is necessary to change the system of management and to reduce it in correspondence with the powers and parts of the navy's military personnel. Much has been done about this in relation to the Baltic Fleet, where not long ago the present Chief Commander of the Navy, Admiral Vladimir Kuroedov headed the crew. I followed attentively as this Naval Commander, outstanding and distinguished by his co-servicemen's opinions, served in the Baltics and the Pacific Ocean with proximity to the sailors and officers and what sort of order he established in the Main Directorate, being its boss, and read all his publications and published interviews. I like the admiral's reasoned, businesslike approach to reforming the Navy. Everything is done without rushing but well, with an eye to the future. A radical modernization started in the Baltic Fleet in 1993. A new structure, including the Moscow-Minsk, Proletarskii Motorized Divisions and other army troops, as well as parts of the Air Force and Air Defense that are dislocated in the Kaliningrad enclave, has already been tested and acts as a powerful operative-strategic grouping. A single grouping of two unions on a base and in Kamchatka have been created. The system of command there is different than the Baltics. But the scales are different there. The Great, or Pacific, Ocean, is not a shallow Baltic water. But the reform of other Pacific Ocean Fleet associations is next. But not only are ships being reduced; naval academies are [alsotrns.] being reduced. Reform connected with a staff reduction is a most complex and difficult process. Indeed, we are talking about people. Many established posts are being reduced by almost forty thousand. The new numerical composition of the Navy does not require 12 thousand lieutenants, but just so much as the naval higher institutions have put out up till now. Is this a way out? It is not difficult, however, but a number of naval schools have been required to be reduced. At a complex of naval schools in St. Petersburg, two naval institutes were created. They are uniting the faculties and departments that prepare officers of analogous specialties. Under a plan of command, the training of personnel for the Navy has included in a single orderly system both the academy, the institute, and officer schools, as well as the Nakhimovskiy naval school and the cadet corps of future naval sailors. However, I cannot help but talk about money again. When will we, all the same, not grow rich, but live normally so as to stretch our clothes to our feet? How it will get on our nerves to beg and watch every penny so as not only to reform ourselves, but also feed, water, dress, and shoe soldiers and sailors and pay salaries to officers. And as regards the question in the headline, it is confirmed: we are Russians, we are sea-going; we are not letting go of our shore, and we will again go out on the ocean expanses. So it will be.