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Edited by David Johnson
| ISSUE #49 | May 21, 1999 |
| ISSUE #49 | May 21, 1999 |
#1 Christian Science Monitor 21 May 1999 This latest Russian premier inspires few Yeltsin's choice, approved by Duma on May 19, is a loyal caretaker, not a fixer. By Judith Matloff, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor Russia's new prime minister, Sergei Stepashin, has vowed nobly to push on with economic reforms demanded by the West. But few analysts expect sustained economic recovery until presidential elections due in 13 months change the face at the helm of Russia's ship of state. Analysts say Mr. Stepashin is hardly the man to lead the country out of its financial mire of defaults, lost investor confidence, and corruption. A former interior minister who has made a career in the security services, he was endorsed by Mr. Yeltsin for his loyalty and by parliament only because it feared dissolution if it rejected him. He may be able to push through the Duma, the Russian lower house, unpopular laws necessary to win a $4.5 billion credit from the International Monetary Fund to stave off default. And he may boost the profile of free marketers in his Cabinet. But the political instability that so unnerves foreign creditors remains: Yeltsin's lack of vision, his tendency to fire cabinets on a whim, and looming elections that could reverse fiscal policy. In addition, the roots of the economic conundrum - poor tax collection, massive capital flight, and industrial decline - are unlikely to be properly addressed. "No prime minister could make long-term reforms under these circumstances," says Andrei Neschadin, director of the Expert Institute, a think tank based in Moscow. Leonid Fituni, head of the Strategical and Global Research Center in Moscow adds: "Stepashin does not have enough time, credibility, or influence to change things." Stepashin is the fourth prime minister in a little more than a year to serve the unpredictable Yeltsin, whom many observers pinpoint as the main source of instability in Russia. During his eight-year post-Soviet presidency, Yeltsin undermined his own promises to turn Russia into a thriving, rich democracy. Instead the economy went bust and parliament became toothless when faced with his near-authoritarian powers. Indeed, Yeltsin manufactured another crisis last week when he abruptly fired Stepashin's predecessor, Yevgeny Primakov, just before the Duma was to hold an impeachment vote. Lawmakers, fearing the president might dismiss the Duma as well and move up December parliamentary elections, rejected impeachment and easily confirmed Stepashin Wednesday. A confrontation was averted, but the apparent new passivity does not solve the country's underlying problem - politics dominated by an ailing leader who lacks commitment to back up his free-market rhetoric. Like his master, Stepashin mouths words the West wants to hear. Like his predecessors, he vowed to continue reforms. His priorities include "decriminalizing" the economy, tougher tax collection, revival of the banking sector, and fighting capital flight. But as interior minister he failed to install a rule of law in the financial realm and there is no indication he would be more effective now. "When Stepashin was interior minister he never made life worse for criminal financiers or oligarchs. He is making empty statements," says Sergei Isayev, with the government-linked Sociology, Scientific and Research Center based in St Petersburg. Besides, there will be little time to enact long-term policy with the elections coming up. Stepashin is seen as little more than a caretaker. He may well go down in history as the most malleable prime minister of all. Stepashin lacks the vision of the first acting premier, Yegor Gaidar, who was fired in December 1992 for introducing radical and unpopular free market measures. He is not a political heavyweight like Viktor Chernomyrdin, an old-Soviet apparatchik with close ties to the oligarchs who survived for more than six years until Yeltsin felt threatened by his popularity. Stepashin is not as well-versed in finance as Sergei Kiriyenko, who doggedly tried to implement reforms during his brief five months in office. The last man in the job, Mr. Primakov, was a seasoned foreign minister who overshadowed Yeltsin at home and abroad. He was also booted when Yeltsin grew jealous - a lesson Stepashin is sure to study well.
#4 Moscow Times May 20, 1999 DEFENSE DOSSIER: Some U.S. Ties Survive War By Pavel Felgenhauer U.S.-Russian military cooperation suffered severely as a result of the NATO air attacks on Yugoslavia. Numerous visits by U.S. defense officials were canceled. However, time has passed and Russian generals have decided that some cooperation programs are too important to let slip into oblivion. General Thomas Kuenning is in charge of the Pentagon's Cooperative Threat Reduction program. CTR was initiated in 1991 to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction from Russia and the former Soviet republics. CTR is also commonly referred to as the Nunn-Lugar program, after its Congressional sponsors - former Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar. Kuenning was supposed to visit Moscow at the end of March, but did not. However, he was cordially received by Russian Defense Ministry and Nuclear Power Ministry officials when he visited Moscow this week to discuss continuation of CTR projects despiteU.S.-led NATO aggression in the Balkans. Many Russian defense and nuclear officials genuinely want CTR to continue. Unlike other Western aid programs, where billions were spent and no one in Russia (except corrupt officials and oligarchs) benefited, concrete things did happen with Nunn-Lugar money. Congress has so far appropriated $1.2 billion for CTR projects earmarked for Russia. In total, over $2 billion has been appropriated for all countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Much of the money is already spent. Since nuclear warheads, nuclear materials and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) have been removed from other CIS countries, in the future CTR funding will be almost exclusively given to Russia, Pentagon officials say. For this fiscal year, the U.S. Congress has approved $440 million for CTR. President Bill Clinton has asked for $475 million for the fiscal year 2000. This week Kuenning visited Sergiyev Posad, north of Moscow, where the United States has helped establish a training center to improve the safety of Russian nuclear weapons. At this center U.S. and Russian military officers will test various security equipment that should improve the safety standards at Russian nuclear weapons and nuclear material storage facilities. After joint testing, selected samples will be ordered for use at Russian nuclear bases. Kuenning also visited the Zvezdochka military shipyard in Severo-Dvinsk, where workers are destroying Russian nuclear submarines under contracts with the U.S. government. The Pentagon is also considering similar future contracts with the Nerpa military shipyard in Murmansk and Zvezda in Vladivostok. Many other CTR projects are ready to start: the processing of poisonous liquid ICBM fuel into commercial chemical compounds; the conversion of three Russian nuclear reactors still producing weapons-grade plutonium in closed nuclear cities Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26; the construction of a facility to destroy solid ICBM fuel in Votkinsk, etc. U.S. officials insist that CTR projects are in no way a charitable undertaking, that the United States benefits from them no less and sometimes even more than Russia, because threats to its national security are removed. Today U.S. diplomats say all U.S.-Russian military exchanges have been effectively terminated. Washington would not want CTR to follow suit. But this could nonetheless happen very soon. The 1992 U.S.-Russian agreement that began CTR expires in less than a month - on June 17. Russian Foreign Ministry officials say the old agreement does not conform with current Russian law and must be rewritten. U.S. and Russian diplomats have been working on a new document since last February, but without success. If an extension of the framework agreement is not signed in time, Washington will terminate all CTR programs immediately. The Pentagon estimates that at least 14,000 jobs in Russia will be lost. It is hoped that such pressure will make an agreement possible and that the Russian government will find a way not to send it for ratification to the State Duma, where so many other U.S.-Russian agreements have perished. However, both Russian and U.S. officials express optimism that bureaucratic hurdles will be somehow removed. All agree that CTR will be the last program to end, as U.S.-Russian relations deteriorate, and will be the first to be revitalized when a dītente takes place.
#5 The Russia Journal http://www.russiajournal.com May 17-23, 1999 New Military Doctrine Still Includes Nuclear First Strike Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev says that the new strategic policy NATO adopted at its recent 50th anniversary meeting will force Russia to modify its defense philosophy. Changes will pertain not only to the strategic deterrence forces but also to general-purpose troops. Moscow is alarmed at NATO's new world view, by which it uses force outside its domain without United Nations approval. Russians also worry about the possibility of NATO's further enlargement, specifically the incorporation of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. In December 1998, a delegation of Russian lawmakers and General Headquarters chief General Anatolii Kvashnin visited the United States to discuss the military relationship between Russia and NATO. Russian politicians and generals complained that the United States and NATO did not respect Russia's opinions in world politics. That same month, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense Roman Popkovich declared that NATO's new attitude might destroy many of the achievements of the post-Cold War period. During his visit to the United States, Popkovich stressed that Russia pledged not to use nuclear arms against non-nuclear countries in its draft military doctrine, and he emphasized that Russia's strategic nuclear forces were for deterrence, not first strike. Although it is difficult to pinpoint how Russia's defense philosophy has changed since December 1998, it is likely that the official prohibition of using nuclear arms against non-nuclear countries will change. On March 15, 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin approved a document called "Main Provisions of Russia's Nuclear Deterrence Policy." The document declares Russia's nuclear forces as the guarantor of national security and a means to deter aggression against Russia or its allies. It says nothing about Russia's stance toward the possibility of first nuclear strike or using nuclear arms against non-nuclear countries. The document's approval came shortly before the official entry of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO, and obviously it was a kind of reply to possible threats posed to Russia by NATO. In May 1997, Secretary of the Security Council Ivan Rybkin and his deputy Boris Berezovskii noted in a draft security plan that Russia reserved the right to deliver a first nuclear strike. The plan adopted later that year stated that "Russia reserves the right to use all means at its disposal, including nuclear arms, when confronting an aggression threatening the very existence of the Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state." Although the document does not expressly reserve the right to a first nuclear strike, it follows that such a strike can be dealt in a situation where Russia faces aggression, even by non-nuclear countries. The military doctrine of the United States contains a similar provision. Several weeks before the adoption of the plan in late 1997, United States President Bill Clinton signed a directive establishing that his country may use nuclear arms against countries possessing chemical or bacteriological weapons. Article 63 of NATO's strategic policy reads that "circumstances where the question of using nuclear arms may arise appear completely unrealistic." Despite NATO's policy discouraging the use of nuclear weapons, the bombs NATO is using in Yugoslavia contain uranium kernels. Although they do not produce nuclear explosions, these bombs have greater explosive force and inflict radioactive pollution on the environment. Russian Deputy Minister of Nuclear Energy Viktor Mikhailov says the United States may have been developing a mini H-bomb that produces low radioactive pollution and could be used in local wars. Russia understands that its romance with NATO is over. The Security Council convened a super-secret meeting on April 29 to discuss the current status and prospects for developing the country's nuclear capabilities. According to an official release by Security Council members, in addition to problems of upgrading and developing the country's strategic nuclear forces, the meeting raised the possibility of using non-strategic nuclear arms. Apparently, the issue was prompted by NATO's new strategic policy, which permits deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO member countries. In certain circumstances, such as NATO's further enlargement or confrontation, tactical nuclear arms may become vitally important for Russia and its allies. After all, NATO may deploy nuclear weapons within several hundred kilometers of Moscow. In response, Russia is revising its defense policy and seeking to boost its military potential and to find new allies and partners in the world. This will be hugely expensive and may trigger a new arms race.
#6 Russian Advisor Urges 'Early Use' of Nuclear Weapon COPENHAGEN, May 17, BNS - Russia should adopt a policy of "early use" of nuclear weapons to counter NATO expansion and use of force outside of its member states, a leading Russian foreign policy analyst said Monday [17 May]. "Probably we will have to move to a policy of early use of nuclear weapons at the first sign of a threat," said Sergey Karaganov, director of the influential Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. Karaganov said the NATO airstrikes on Kosovo had led to a cardinal change in the security situation in Europe, and that Russia had a right to react. "They [NATO] have committed worse than a crime, they have committed a mistake, a very serious mistake, and I think we also have the right and the obligation as Europeans and as friends to put certain limits on it to remind people that they are not acting in complete freedom, and arrogrance brings crime," said the analyst. Karaganov, who is also an advisor to Russia's foreign minister and other top officials, said that he believed "absolutely" that Moscow would soon adopt an "early use" nuclear policy. Preparations for an attack on Russia or another country, such as Sweden, would likely be the trigger for such an "early use" policy, and NATO expansion is now viewed as a springboard for further military action by the security alliance, said Karaganov. The analyst said Russia would "hopefully not" intervene in the Kosovo crisis, saying it would be another criminal mistake. Speaking at the Baltic Development Forum being held in Copenhagen, Karaganov said that Russia cannot accept NATO expanion because it has changed from a defensive to an offensive organization. "NATO is becoming a threat to the security of other nations," he said. "For political and military reasons we can no longer cooperate with NATO. There will continue to be some talking, but it will be a different conversation.
#7 State Duma Passes Law on Nuclear Weapons. MOSCOW, May 20 (Itar-Tass) - The State Duma lower house of the Russian parliament has passed a Federal law "On the Development, Maintenance, Elimination, and the Ensurance of the Safety of Nuclear Weapons". The document determines a legal basis and principles for the State regulation of activities connected with the development, maintenance, elimination and the ensurance of safety of nuclear weapons and for social protection of the citizens of the Russian Federation. The Law also establishes responsibility for a breach of Russia's legislation concerning this field. Nuclear weapon facilities and those for the development, testing, production, maintenance and elimination of nuclear charges, nuclear ammunition, and components thereof are exclusively Federally owned, the document stipulates. Nuclear weapons developed on the territory of the Russian Federation but deployed outside it are likewise a Federal property. A decision on nuclear disarmament shall be taken by the President with the consent of the Federation Council upper house of the Federal Assembly (parliament). The provisions of the Convention on Prompt Notifications about Nuclear Breakdowns and of other international treaties of the Russian Federation are applied in the event of a nuclear weapon breakdown, which resulted oR could result in a discharge of radioactive substances or their trans-border spread. The Convention was signed in Vienna on September 26, 1986. pop/ast
#8 Russia Say Its Nuclear Materials Are Safely Protected. MOSCOW, May 20 (Itar-Tass) -- The safety of protection of Russian nuclear materials meets and, in some ways, even exceeds international standards, a spokesman for the Russian Atomic Energy Minister, Yuri Bespalko, said on Thursday. Commenting on statements, circulating in the West, that "the safety of protection of Russian nuclear materials is lower than it has earlier been estimated," Bespalko said that "during their visits to Russia the U.S experts have more than once been convinced that the nuclear materials there were safely protected". He regarded the assertions that Russian plutonium and enriched uranium could easily be reached by terrorist groups as nothing more than "an attempt to deprive Russia of its nuclear power status."
#9 From The Center for Defense Information (www.cdi.org) The Weekly Defense Monitor May 20, 1999 Standing Down Nuclear Weapons By Lt. Colonel Piers Wood, USAR (Ret.), Senior Fellow, pwood@cdi.org Those who speak ominously of the damage the Kosovo crisis has done to U.S. - Russian relations have their eyes on Russia's nuclear weapons. Lest we forget, Russia still has some five thousand warheads poised atop ballistic missiles on a hair trigger. No one is implying that nuclear weapons would be used in a confrontation over Kosovo itself. The primary concern is the increasing likelihood of an accidental nuclear war because of escalating tensions. Russia's economic and social turmoil has adversely affected their early warning systems, and Western provocations such as NATO expansion and the proposed U.S. national missile defense system have increased the Russian military's suspicions that the gaps in their early warning might actually be exploited. The Y2K problem only exacerbates the uncertainties of this situation and makes finding a solution all the more urgent. As alarmist as all this may sound, we should not forget that the same scholasticism that precipitated the Cold War reign of terror still pertains today. The use-it-or-lose-it posture of launch on warning is still in place. The only permanent solution is to remove all nuclear weapons from their hair-trigger status. To do this both sides have to conduct a substantial, mutually verifiable stand-down of strategic nuclear weapons. This could be done by placing significant impediments in the way of those who would actually launch weapons. A classic illustration of such a barrier is placing tons of dirt over a missile silo hatch. As primitive as it may sound, this simple step vividly illustrates how easy it would be to safely back away from a state of high alert. It substantially impedes rapid launch; it does not increase the vulnerability of the missile or its warhead; it is mutually verifiable; and it is even reversible. More importantly, however, the immediate result would be an increase in the time required to launch any nuclear weapon against each other's homeland. Of course, disassembly can be just as effective and is a more generally applicable method of standing down nuclear weapons. If the U.S. and Russia could agree to separate warheads from delivery or propulsion systems for each of their nuclear weapons, the world would take a giant step back from the precipice of accidental nuclear war. In this scenario, the great obstacles to rapid reduction in alert levels are problems with verification and vulnerability of the separated weapons components. But these impediments also can be overcome by the application of low-tech thinking and return to first principles. The crux of the issue is how to slow down a frantic decision process, not merely to find some new or more elegant way to control nuclear arms. For example, bombs and air launched cruise missiles can be stored aboard cargo aircraft based thousands of miles from the bomber designed to deliver them. The stored warheads can be protected by putting the cargo aircraft on "strip alert," making them as invulnerable to surprise attack as the B-52 fleet was during the Cold War. Warheads from silo based nuclear missiles can be handled the same way as bombs. Mutual on-site inspection of loaded cargo aircraft could be confirmed by continuous spy satellite surveillance of airbases where the warhead carrying planes would have to be parked in the open. Nuclear submarines would be more difficult to stand-down. However, if both parties agreed to reduce the numbers of weapons on patrol, then detached warheads could be placed in separate launch tubes from the missile. Since re-mating warheads to missiles is impossible while submerged, a submarine would have to surface and re-mate missiles and warheads with the assistance of another vessel before it could be made launch-ready again. The time it might take nuclear submarines to link up and re-assemble weapons could be considerable. Nonetheless, because of the near invulnerability of nuclear submarines at sea, this approach would go far toward preserving their unique retaliatory capabilities -- their most important feature. No treaty would be necessary to make these changes. The presidents of both nations could implement them through mutual, reciprocal initiatives similar to that of Presidents Gorbachev and Bush when they mutually and reciprocally withdrew deployed tactical nuclear weapons in 1991. Mutual disassembly of strategic nuclear weapons -- verifiable, sustainable, reversible, protected and substantial -- warrants early trials of this stand-down approach. The deteriorating early warning situation in Russia and the uncertainties of nuclear command and control during the approaching Russian Y2K crisis suggests that immediately implementing this concept would be none too soon.
#10 Russia To Defy USA, Build Second Iranian Reactor Unit Rossiyskaya Gazeta 19 May 1999 [translation for personal use only] "Observer's View" article by political observer Vladimir Lapskiy: "Rubbing Salt in Washington's Wound" Iran has asked Russia to build another reactor unit at the Bushehr Nuclear Electric Power Station. The first unit is already being erected by Russian specialists, arousing overt displeasure and objections in the United States. The history of Bushehr is as follows. Germany's Siemens Company started building the nuclear power station in this city on the shore of the Persian Gulf in 1975. But construction was frozen in 1979, following the shah's overthrow. All subsequent attempts by Tehran to resume its nuclear program have encountered the Americans' resistance. Every year the White House includes Iran on a list of countries which encourage terrorism. Because of U.S. pressure, many potential builders and suppliers of equipment to nuclear electric power stations have been forced to abandon cooperation with the Iranians, losing considerable sums of money as a result. A recent example was provided by the Czech Republic. Last month U.S. intelligence reported to its government that at least four of Skoda's daughter enterprises, including the Skoda Praha and Skoda Plzen Companies which produce high-tech equipment, were negotiating with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy and the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization over the Bushehr Nuclear Electric Power Station. "It is not secret technology in itself," a U.S. Administration spokesman declared in this regard, "but we believe that there should not be such cooperation." The shout from Washington had an effect on Prague, which wavered and gave in. Let me note, by the way, that completing construction of the first unit at Bushehr will bring our country approximately $1 billion. So, only Russia is continuing to cooperate with Tehran in the sphere of the use of the peaceful atom, even despite the Americans' abrupt movements. Wishing to harm the Iranian economy, the Americans announced that they would impose severe sanctions against those who invest more than $20 million in it. But, despite that threat, three companies -- Russia's Gazprom, France's Total, and Malaysia's Petronas -- invested $2 billion in their project in the sphere of oil extraction in Iran. Their example was followed recently by the Italian firm of Eni and France's Elf Aquitaine, which signed a contract worth $1 billion with the Iranians to develop the Dorud [name as transliterated] field. Anglo-Dutch Shell is ready to invest money in Tehran's oil and gas projects. The White House's persistence in its desire to punish Iran at any price hits primarily at U.S. businessmen, who are losing a rich and perfectly reliable partner. Ultimately, it gives an inestimable advantage to their competitors across the Atlantic. Meanwhile, Iran is now trying to extricate itself from the isolation to which it was sentenced by the United States. For the first time in 20 years President Mohammad Khatami, who is considered a liberal by Iranian yardsticks, has traveled to arrange relations with European countries, and literally a few days ago he undertook an "Arabian campaign" to Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. The wall of international alienation around Iran is crumbling before our eyes. ...Let us return, however, to the second unit of the nuclear electric power station at Bushehr, where approximately 1,000 highly qualified Russians are already working. The Atomic Energy Ministry's new deal with Tehran promises big money for our country and work for nuclear specialists. As for the U.S. accusations that we are allegedly helping the Iranians to create a nuclear bomb, they have been pulled out of a hat, as the saying goes. Iran has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, its nuclear program is monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and it allows international inspectors into any part of the country if even the smallest suspicions are aroused. In this way it demonstrates its honesty and openness, wishing at last to become a full member of the international community.
#11 Russia: Public Council Suggests Dividing Kosovo MOSCOW, May 19 (Interfax) -- Russia's Public Council for Foreign and Defense Policy has proposed that with Belgrade's consent Kosovo be divided into Serbian and Albanian sections during a peacekeeping operation under U.N. aegis. Kosovo's Serbian part must remain under Yugoslav jurisdiction, and Russian peacekeepers should be deployed in this section, states the council's document entitled "On Contours of the Plan for Stopping Aggression against Yugoslavia." "A U.N. temporary administration may carry out the governing functions in the 'Albanian zone.' A regime of the territory run on a U.N. mandate can be introduced there," the document says. The authors said that this proposal might seem unacceptable, but "a joint habitation (of Kosovo) by Serbians and Albanians is even less realistic after what has happened." Russia should work out a plan which could serve as a draft resolution of the U.N. Security Council. "Russia must start actively imposing peaceful conditions. It must make a detour from the position of mediator, which slides either to covering up the aggression or to being fully associated with Belgrade," the document reads. Otherwise, "Russia's diplomatic and moral defeat is unavoidable."
#12 Partnership With NATO Now 'Ruled Out' Komsomolskaya Pravda 15 May 1999 [translation for personal use only] Second and final part of interview with Sergey Karaganov, head of Russia's Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, by Sergey Maslov; place, date not given: "The War in Yugoslavia Is Worse Than a Crime. It Is a Mistake" -- first paragraph is unattributed introduction Reference: Why is NATO trying to snatch defeat from the hands of victory in the Cold War? Today we conclude our discussion about this with Sergey Karaganov, head of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy. [Maslov] Today the West ranks Milosevic, who is undoubtedly an ambiguous figure, among "the greatest criminals of the 20th century." So are we shielding a criminal? On the other hand, we seem not to be asking ourselves this question at all: Does criminal liability apply to the actions of Solana, for example, if only aggression is still considered a very serious international crime? [Karaganov] Milosevic really is far from unambiguous. His regime has waged a civil war and undoubtedly has blood on its hands. Although there is a big question mark over who unleashed that civil war. The European Community countries contributed to some extent to the breakup of Yugoslavia by hastily recognizing territories which were striving to secede one by one. This was a prescription for civil war. Second, responsibility for the casualties in this civil war is borne by the leaders not only of Yugoslavia but also of neighboring countries, particularly Croatia. Ethnic cleansing was carried out on all sides. These were monstrous crimes, which are starting to be cleared up only today. In the early nineties Milosevic was being called the Yugoslav Gorbachev. In the West he was considered a liberal and progressive economist and politician. The main difference between him and Gorbachev was that Gorbachev had sufficient intellect and insufficient will to try to use bloodshed to stop the breakup of the Soviet Union. Milosevic had sufficient will and insufficient intellect -- I do not know which was more the case -- to offer resistance. In addition, the Serbs showed themselves to be more patriotic than, maybe, the inhabitants of the former Soviet Union. They went to fight for their motherland. This was Milosevic's main crime. Of course, this does not absolve him of responsibility for bloodshed. NATO's external aggression is still not civil war. It is an ambiguously criminal action. I would only like to say that the actions of the North Atlantic alliance, according to the formula once used by Talleyrand, are more monstrous than a crime. They are a mistake. Because almost everything being perpetrated now was absolutely predictable. It was clear that the Yugoslavs would not surrender and that an ethnic purge, tens of times stronger, would begin. There were no doubts that the situation in neighboring countries would be destabilized. It was completely obvious that the need for a ground operation would arise. It is even possible to predict what will happen next. Next will come the spread of the conflict, mass terrorism, and the Palestinization of Yugoslavia. [Maslov] Some experts believe that NATO has struck a blow not only against Yugoslavia but also against the unity of Europe. There are also bolder prognoses: The "freezing" of the conflict threatens to break up the North Atlantic alliance itself. Is such a scenario of the development of events possible, in your opinion? [Karaganov] It is very possible that political leaders will have to pay a very high price for this Yugoslav war in the next elections. But this, as it were, should not trouble us, after all. It is a small price to pay for the destabilization of world order and for the lives which have been and will still be ruined. The present figures for the dead and wounded are still not the final results of the conflict. Even when they have been totaled up, they will be followed by a long list of victims of famine, cold, terrorism, instability, and so forth. [Maslov] War is becoming technotronic. At the same time NATO is seeking to prove to the whole world, as it were, that it is possible to bomb without pain -- of course, blunders are made! Under such conditions it is quite easy to replace the very concept of war by making skillful use of propaganda support. Will mankind not arrive at a world without wars only because wars will cease to be regarded as such? [Karaganov] It is war just the same. Such means of waging it were being conceived back at the beginning of the century. In the thirties there was the theory of Italian Admiral Douhet, which proposed winning wars thanks to bombing alone. The Americans liked that idea. The problem, however, is that such actions only harden the population's resistance, without breaking its will. Therefore the theory is most likely unwarranted. But it encourages the waging of some sort of virtual wars, which are very advantageous to a certain country from an internal political viewpoint. For example, the bombing or Iraq is, as far as I know, producing no substantial results from the viewpoint of the set goals. They are simply bombing empty spaces. Everything that could be concealed was hidden or buried long ago. But America is confident that Clinton is waging a decisive war against the Iraqi tyrant. This yields political dividends. [Maslov] This has been cited almost as an axiomatic example: In order to pull out of their peacekeeping mission in Somalia, the Americans needed a couple of dozen zinc coffins. What might be unacceptable damage this time? [Karaganov] This time things will not be confined to a few dozen coffins. We still underestimate the shift that has already occurred in U.S. public opinion under the impact of propaganda -- propaganda which, I will remind you, goes back many years. For long years Serbia, and Milosevic in particular, was presented to Joe Public as being to blame for almost all humanitarian misfortunes in the world. Therefore it is difficult to speak not only of figures but even of orders. Although, if it is a question of hundreds or thousands of coffins, that will be unacceptable damage. But the United States has no intention yet of letting U.S. soldiers go in front. It is trying to cram Albanians into the front ranks, since it does not feel sorry for them. Then, maybe, it will try to shove in Turks or someone else. [Maslov] Few people in our country have any doubt now that the war against Yugoslavia is an end in itself for America and NATO, while the Kosovo Albanians are a lever and a means of realizing it. In my view there has been little detailed analysis of just what the North Atlantic alliance wants to achieve as a result of the military action. After all, it is not Milosevic's removal, as is stated. In his place, in the present situation, the United States and NATO could most likely get, perhaps, the nationalist-minded Vojislav Seselj. So what, after all, is the aim? [Karaganov] What is proclaimed for all to hear are, of course, pretexts, not aims. I nonetheless believe that the aim is tear Kosovo away, further dismember Yugoslavia, and inflict such damage on it that there would be practically nothing left of it, and there would be a defeated country with a possible regime of occupation. The various circles in the countries of the North Atlantic alliance are pursuing their aims in different ways. Some want to frighten the whole of the rest of the world. Some are simply striving to prove that NATO is needed.... Many interests are interwoven. Very many of them are false. [Maslov] All wars end sooner or later. NATO has staked too much, and even for considerations purely of prestige it cannot fail to emerge from the war as the winner, albeit even a theoretical one. Must Russia help NATO to "save face" for the sake of achieving the most important thing -- peace? [Karaganov] Russia must not save NATO. Particularly as it is very dangerous for us to get involved in trying to settle the conflict while the North Atlantic alliance is making air strikes. Imagine the situation: We will be negotiating with NATO, and they will be bombing. In that case we will be indirect accomplices of aggressors. But we now have a position of moral and political superiority. The ending of the aggression -- not for 24 hours or even for two or three days but for quite a long time -- must be one of the chief conditions of our participation in the talks process. [Maslov] It is obvious that Milosevic will seek an agreement not with Russia, however important Viktor Chernomyrdin may consider his mission, but with the West. Because it is the West that he has been fighting. But it is also obvious that he will want at the same time to have the "Russian card" in his pocket. Is there not a danger here that Russia may become the object of manipulation on the part of the leader to whom it has given support? [Karaganov] This probability always exists. It simply has to be taken constantly into account. Not counting the fact that Milosevic, in trying to manipulate Russia, will be doing something wrong from the viewpoint of Yugoslavia's interests. It will be a question of how we pursue our line. It will be, as it were, a normal bargaining situation. The West will also try to manipulate us. They are already trying to do so, when they propose from all sides -- unofficially -- entering into the negotiating process in order to use us as cover, as it were, for what they are doing and to legitimate it. We must think with our heads. [Maslov] The Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, which you head, has advanced a proposal to terminate the Russia-NATO Founding Act. What can we expect if NATO, having nonetheless accepted the Baltic countries into its ranks, advances to lines approximately 100 km from St. Petersburg? [Karaganov] Unfortunately, we can expect nothing good from NATO. We must terminate the Founding Act. It has produced no real growth in our influence over the North Atlantic bloc. What is more, it might have engendered in the alliance a peace of mind and an illusion that they are able to do everything. In addition, the aggression against Yugoslavia is a direct violation of its provisions. Naturally, we will have to maintain a dialogue with NATO. But it must be a dialogue about limiting offensive elements in arsenals and in doctrine and about the transparency of policy. We will have to think about holding NATO in check and no way about developing relations of partnership. I believe that a partnership with the North Atlantic alliance within the next few years is, unfortunately, ruled out.