#4
IntellectualCapital.com
May 13, 1999
Governed by Chaos
by Richard Pipes   			 			

Primakov received his appointment last September, shortly after the
financial crash that drove the ruble down from 20 cents to the dollar to
less than five, and cost the Moscow Stock exchange 90% of its value.
Ostensibly, he had been brought in to carry out major economic reforms.
But Primakov, whose background was that of a Middle East expert for Soviet
Intelligence services, had no economic experience.  The more likely reason
for his appointment was that, having established good connections with the
Communists who liked his Soviet-style mindset and personality, he could
defuse the looming showdown between the Communist-led Duma and the president.

Up to a point he succeeded in this task, bringing a certain amount of
political stability to Russia.  His lack of ideology combined with his
moderate anti-Westernism and equally moderate opposition to economic
liberalization corresponded to the mood of the Russian people.
Unfortunately for him, it also made him Russia's most popular politician, a
rival of Yeltsin and a leading prospect in the presidential elections
scheduled for next year.  Yeltsin is exceedingly jealous of competition and
this was a major factor in his growing coolness toward Primakov.

In his formal announcement, the president justified the prime minister's
dismissal by his inability to come up with a strategic plan for improving
the nation's economy.  While the charge is true it rings hollow because
Sergei Stepashin, the man Yeltsin nominated to succeed Primakov, is even
less qualified to produce a comprehensive economic blueprint.  His whole
experience has been with the security organs, first as head of the Federal
Security Service, a successor to the KGB, then as justice minister and
finally as minister of the interior.  His main qualification for the job is
undeviating loyalty to Yeltsin, a quality that Primakov apparently lacked. 

To the extent that one can penetrate the fog of Byzantine intrigue that
engulfs the Kremlin, the event that triggered Primakov's fall from was his
inability to fend off the Duma's impeachment proceedings against Yeltsin
due to begin today.  He had valiantly tried various compromises but none
worked and there is a good chance that at least one of the impeachment
articles -- charging the president with waging an illegal war in Chechnia
-- will win the required majority.  Because of various constitutional
safeguards, it is most unlikely that the vote will lead to Yeltsin's
removal from office but it may well paralyze Russia's government.

The prospects are that the Duma will reject Stepashin's nomination.  If it
does so three times in succession, the president can either submit the name
of another candidate or dissolve the Duma and call for new parliamentary
elections.  In either event, the political crisis will be exacerbated and
burning economic problems even less likely to be dealt with.

A long standstill

On the other hand, it is not unlikely that this crisis will spawn social
upheavals: the Russian people today have an appetite for violence and not
even the Communists think of seizing power by force. Most plausible is a
stand off between the legislative and executive branches which will defer
for at least one more year any serious attempt to deal with the country's
pressing problems.

Will these events affect Russia's involvement in the Kosovo conflict? I
think not. Russia's inability to prevent NATO's hostilities against
Yugoslavia has made it keenly aware how powerless it has become on the
international stage. By the same token, it has made it very eager to play
the role of peacemaker. The satisfaction of having the mighty United States
and the NATO allies plead with Moscow to extricate them from a seemingly
unwinnable war is too great to give up. The domestic crisis may divert
somewhat Yeltsin's attention from Kosovo but the chances are that he will
continue to be personally involved in the matter, successful resolution of
which will enhance his personal prestige and that of his country.

On balance, the ever impulsive Boris Yeltsin seems to have committed a
serious blunder in firing a man who, whatever his limitations, did bring
Russia a modicum of political unity. It only serves to demonstrate how cut
off Yeltsin is from Russia's public opinion to which at one time he had
been so finely attuned. 

Richard Pipes is Research Professor of History at Harvard University. In
1981-82 he served as Director of East European and Soviet Affairs in the
National Security Council. He is a contributing editor of
IntellectualCapital.com. 

#5
Excerpt
is a professor of
Russian studies at New York University and the
author of numerous books on Russia.

Welcome, gentlemen. 

Leon Aron, how do you explain this move by Yeltsin today, firing his prime
minister? 

LEON ARON: Well, the government of Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov was -- it
was a product of a very interesting
compromise in the wake of the financial collapse of last August. In essence,
President Yeltsin told the Communist-led
parliament, I will keep my hands off economic policy; I will let the
government run economic policy and I will let the
parliament in essence support the government that for the first time
actually in Russian post-Communist history was beholden
not to the president but to the parliament majority. 

MARGARET WARNER: Because a lot of the hardliners in the Russian parliament
liked Primakov very much? 

LEON ARON: Exactly. He was, I think, an optimal choice at the time. There
were two tasked understandings in this
compromise. The first one is that the government develop some coherent
economic policy and that it tries to get through the
Duma - the lower House of the Russian Parliament -- at least some key
measures that would help to get the country on the
road to economic recovery and at the same time help propagate the kind of
economic policy that the previous reformist
governments, right of center governments, could not pass through the
Communist plurality in the Duma. The second
understanding was this: that in exchange for the sort of hands-off policy by
the president, vis-à-vis the economic affairs, the
parliament refrains from direct attacks on the president, most certainly
from impeachment. And it seems to me that the basis
of that compromise, that both of these points, from Yeltsin's point of view
did not work out. The government did not develop
an economic policy. It failed, even though the head of the economic policy
in the Primakov government was the leading
member of the Communist faction in the Duma, the government still failed to
pass some key measures through the
Communist-dominated Duma that were necessary. And, secondly, it also, I
think most importantly yesterday on the political
front, the parliament voted to start impeachment proceedings. So from
Yeltsin's point of view I think the basis upon which
the Primakov government, that compromise rested, disappeared. And more
broadly, I think there was -- it was a house
divided and of course I think Yeltsin decided that it's time to end the
stalemate. 

MARGARET WARNER: How do you explain it, Dimitri Simes? 

DIMITRI SIMES: Well, I think that Yeltsin is unfit to govern, that we just
could see his face. We could see how he talks.
This is a man who lost his physical and intellectual faculties. He cannot
govern but he is very envious when somebody
becomes visible from under him. And Primakov was Russia's most successful
politician and he was doing too well for his
own good. And Yeltsin, I think, also came to a conclusion that that Primakov
was working fairly well with the parliament.
Primakov had just concluded a deal with the International Monetary Fund and
Yeltsin was becoming kind of unnecessary.
And since he could not find a -- 

MARGARET WARNER: I'm sorry, he was becoming kind of what? 

DIMITRI SIMES: Unnecessary. He was redundant to other Russian power
arrangements. And what I think Yeltsin wanted to
do is to remind everyone who was the boss and also to create an artificial
crisis, like the one he had in 1993 when his tanks
shelled the parliament because he's at his best in crisis. But have I to say
this is a very dangerous game because Mr.
Primakov was Mr. Stability and I think that now Yeltsin appointed people
with excellent police credentials but no real
political and economic credentials. And I think that we may see more of
destabilizing confrontation in Russia. 

MARGARET WARNER: Stephen Cohen, you're nodding. You agree? 

STEPHEN COHEN: I agree mainly with Dimitri. I would add a darker motive,
which is not compatible with what Leon says
but probably compatible with Dimitri. Russia, as we all know, is a country
utterly awash in human misery, stolen property,
broken dreams. People clamor to know who's responsible. It's been clear for
months that Yeltsin fears being held
responsible for what's happened in Russia. At first he tried to strike an
agreement for immunity. Then he tried to get rid of
this impeachment proceeding, which will begin tomorrow. In the end, he came
to the conclusion that his old prime minister,
Primakov, could not protect him when he leaves power or before he leaves
power. And so now he's wagered that by putting
the man with the guns, the head of the ministry of the interior, the man who
controls the best armed, best maintained armed
divisions in Russia as prime minister, and I direct your attention, imagine
the top policeman as prime minister, who I believe
Chernomyrdin plays a role as well, he believes that this will scare the
parliament and that this will protect him. I agree with
Dimitri. I think it's wrong, it won't work, it's dangerous, it's
destabilizing. I think it's going to ramify in very bad ways for
Russia, for the Yugoslav war and for the United States. 

MARGARET WARNER: Dimitri Simes, go back to why you think it's dangerous.
What do you think it's going to lead to
internally? 

DIMITRI SIMES: I think that while the Duma was threatening to impeach
Yeltsin, I don't think they have a realistic
possibility to impeach him for a variety of Russian constitutional and
political reasons. But now of course they have to
assume that once they refuse to confirm this policeman, Stepashin, who was
appointed new Russian prime minister, then
Yeltsin submits Stepashin's name or somebody else like Stepashin, a couple
of more times, and then he has to dissolve the
Duma -- if the Duma refuses - 

MARGARET WARNER: This is set up in the Russian system. 

DIMITRI SIMES: Exactly. So the only way the Duma can protect itself is now
to vote for articles of impeachment. Because
once Duma voted for at least one article of impeachment then according to
the same Russian constitution, it cannot be
dissolved. So you would have a constitutional crisis, a free-fall, where
Yeltsin, of course, will try to use the so-called
power ministries, the securities services, the military and incidentally the
only political party which fully supported Yeltsin
is the party of - Zhirinovsky -- and the prime minister is Zhirinovsky's
candidate. The Communists, of course, will use
people power; there will be mass demonstrations and they also have some
local governors controlling local police
detachments at their disposal. It may become very nasty. 

MARGARET WARNER: Leon Aron, what impact is this going to have on what the US
cares most about right now, which is
Russia's ability and willingness to continue trying to resolve this Kosovo
crisis? 

LEON ARON: I think I agree with Dimitri that this is very destabilizing. We
disagree as to the motives and where it might
lead. It's very destabilizing in the short run. I think that whatever
chances there are for Russian constructive participation in
the resolution of the Kosovo crisis are these -- these chances are going to
diminish rapidly -- because, after all, who -- the
country is in deep crisis -- if you will be dealing with the president and
here I agree with Dimitri, who because of the firing
of Chernomyrdin - 

MARGARET WARNER: The firing of Primakov. 

LEON ARON: I'm sorry, Prime Minister Primakov, because of that he angered
the yet uncommitted members of the
parliament and there may be indeed the passage of one of the articles at
least of people of they need to get two-third
majority. And the commitment of Russia will become emptier and emptier
because we don't know who we are dealing with.
Plus, don't forget that -- that the Communist-led majority or plurality, I
should say, in the Duma is arch-nationalist. They
were pro Serbian. In fact, they voted to unite Russia and Serbia. So that
added oil into that fire. And even in an imperfect
democracy like Russia, can you not really make commitments on behalf of the
executive power while the legislature is up in
arms against that policy. So I think overall impact is going to be
disturbing. 

MARGARET WARNER: Do you agree, Stephen Cohen, this is going to really hamper
Russia's ability to pursue this peace
process? 

STEPHEN COHEN: I think the moment that President Yeltsin named Chernomyrdin
as special envoy and excluded
Primakov from the negotiations with Yugoslavia, it was doubtful whether any
agreement that Chernomyrdin brought home to
Moscow could be made to stick in Moscow. Primakov is enormously popular in
Russia. Chernomyrdin has no credibility
whatsoever. Now you have a government headed by a policeman who is loathed
by the country for his contribution to the
bloody war in Chechnya, it's the first time a policeman's held such a high
rank in Russia since the bad old days. And there's
one other factor. Whether we agree or not, many, many Russians, educated
Russians, political Russians, believe that the
United States abetted, helped in the ouster of Primakov -- that in any
Primakov faction in Washington, perhaps in the IMF
wanted to be rid of Primakov. That may not be true but it's believed widely
in Russia. It's the headline in tomorrow's
newspapers -- already in the papers today. And that means this development
will deepen and further embitter Russian
anti-Americanism and make it even harder for Russia to be an intermediary. 

MARGARET WARNER: And how do you interpret or explain both Yeltsin's threat
today that - you know-- we may just pull
out of these talks if our proposals aren't taken more seriously and also
yesterday kind of embracing the Chinese view that
NATO bombing has to stop before we'll go to the UN Security Council with
anything? 

STEPHEN COHEN: Well, let me say, just to get my subjective view out, I, too,
believe the bombing must stop immediately.
I don't think that's an irrational position: Stop the bombing and start the
negotiating. But, look, Yeltsin is in a dangerous,
perilous position in Russia. No matter what he says or does, he is
associated in Russia with the pro-American, pro-Western
economic and foreign policies that have led the country, for one reason or
another, to utter ruin. This is the way he's
perceived in Russia. His own positive standing is 2 percent in Russia. So,
it hardly matters any longer what he says for or
against the war. Obviously when he threatens the United States over the war,
he's trying to embellish his reputation in Russia
but it's too late. 

MARGARET WARNER: Agree, briefly, too late? 

DIMITRI SIMES: Well, Yeltsin has no reputation to protect. But he
desperately needs Clinton support. He has no domestic
political base. So actually he may want to be more accommodating in Kosovo.
But if he tries to do it, A, as Steve said, it
would politically back fire; B, the United States would be blamed for that.
And, C, I do not know how much leverage Yeltsin
really has over Milosevic. That is a very big unknown. 

MARGARET WARNER: All right. Thank you all three very much. 

#6

May 8, 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Report by Aleksey Baranov: "Parade of Fakes" 

In the history of our Soviet reality two dates -- 9 
May and 7 November -- were united by a common denominator: It was then 
that, every six months, we were shown the famed "shield of the 
Motherland." Over the granite paving passed dashing guardsmen, the latest 
tank models, and our pride and joy -- ballistic missile systems capable 
of destroying a target at any point on the globe. 

Naturally, such events were unfailingly attended by foreign military 
attaches, 
the lawful representatives of foreign military intelligence services. 
They meticulously scrutinized the hardware on show, rightly believing 
that the USSR was showing the best available models on such holidays. 
Alas for them, they did not even suspect what a simple trick they had 
fallen for. Bearing in mind that at the time this method of obtaining 
military information was practically the only legal one (let us recall 
that the USSR did not take part in arms fairs), our "competent organs" 
decided on a grandiose deception. Namely, our counterintelligence 
officers "invented"... an intercontinental ballistic missile which never 
really existed! 

This task was set following a thorough study of all characteristics which 
on close inspection could create the outward appearance of a missile. At 
that time there was universal fascination with so-called "multiple 
warheads," each of which could carry both a nuclear warhead and simply a 
target that was supposed to confuse the potential enemy's antimissile 
defense forces. When they got the data on the Soviet warheads' 
approximate volume and mass, foreign intelligence services were horrified 
-- the missile model shown on Red Square could carry several dozen 
potential Hiroshimas. They had nothing like it. 

Our sources, who were employed in the USSR military-industrial complex 
at the time, claim that the effect of the dummy missile's demonstration 
was not confined to fooling the potential enemy and simply causing panic 
in its ranks. Foreign intelligence services started actively trying to 
obtain increasingly detailed information about the Russian "wonder 
weapon" and fell victim to meticulously prepared disinformation. Our 
intelligence service's operation resulted in an extremely important 
success -- the enemy started trying to duplicate the USSR's "achievement" 
and went down a scientific route subsequently declared fruitless. 

It must be said that, according to the information obtained by us, the 
dummy missiles are still gathering dust in a Defense Ministry hangar. It 
is undoubtedly the right decision to preserve them. What if tomorrow 
somebody needs to dupe somebody again? But no -- this success of Soviet 
military intelligence's is worthy of museum immortalization. 

#8
Moscow Times
May 13, 1999 
Primakov's 8 Months Saw Stability 
By Andrei Zolotov Jr.
Staff Writer

Yevgeny Primakov left the office of prime minister Wednesday to a standing 
ovation from his outgoing Cabinet - and many others. Despite his bureaucrat's 
looks and inscrutable personality, he won high ratings for the political and 
economic stabilization he forged after last August's crisis. 

But that is part of the reason why his stay in office was abruptly ended 
after eight months. The downside of preserving his broad political base was 
inaction in many areas, and his popularity won him one important enemy: 
President Boris Yeltsin. 

Although Primakov insisted he would not run for president, polls consistently 
showed him as the most trusted politician in Russia - in notable contrast to 
Yeltsin's single-digit showing. 

Primakov was seen as a patriot not affiliated with any political party or 
tainted by the crony capitalism presided over by Yeltsin. His caution and 
apparent lack of an economic strategy became a strategy in itself as Russia 
gradually edged away from last year's abyss. 

Primakov's government took small, undramatic steps, trying to halt capital 
flight and putting modestly tighter controls on currency exchange rates to 
support the ruble. But he resisted pressure to index pensions and salaries, 
thus avoiding growth in the money supply and hyperinflation. 

After tough negotiations, he won a limited, $4.5 billion release of stalled 
credits from the International Monetary Fund - not as much as he said he 
wanted, but enough to avoid a disastrous debt default. The worst scenarios of 
Russia's economic collapse were, for a time, deferred. 

But the downside of Primakov's cautious approach was an unwillingness to 
charge ahead with politically dangerous measures, such as reforming the 
collapsed and underregulated banking system. And there were few structural 
economic changes, such as better tax laws. 

Primakov, 69, reluctantly became prime minister Sept. 11 as a compromise 
figure after the communist-run State Duma twice refused to approve Viktor 
Chernomyrdin for the post. 

He formed a coalition Cabinet that included representatives of the Duma's 
main factions. That meant, for the first time in Russia's modern history, a 
Cabinet with a political base among the Duma communists with leftists Yury 
Maslyukov and Gennady Kulik as his deputies, plus communist-backed Central 
Bank head Viktor Gerashchenko. 

Vyacheslav Nikonov, director of the Politika research center, called Primakov 
"the strongest premier Russia has had in the last decade. He was the only 
prime minister who managed to have a normal working relationship with the 
parliament." 

Peter Westin, an economist with the Russian-European Center for Economic 
Policy, praised Primakov for keeping a tight grip on monetary policy and said 
he managed to push through some overdue legislation, such as the 
production-sharing law enabling foreign investment in the crucial oil sector. 

But some positive developments, such as growth in domestic production, were 
due to the ruble devaluation giving Russian goods an advantage over imports. 
"Those were mostly short-term effects, and to make them long term, one has to 
launch structural economic reform," Westin said. 

Independent Moscow-based economist Robert Devane focused on what Primakov had 
left undone, saying he "had allowed himself to become a hostage of the 
leftist and nationalist forces, which in effect nullified his claim to the 
role of a political stabilizer." 

With his high ratings, Primakov is likely to be in demand as a candidate or 
ally among the contenders in parliamentary and presidential elections, with 
Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov already suggesting he could head the parliamentary 
ticket of his Otechestvo, or Fatherland, movement in December elections. 

#10
CHRONOLOGY-Russian political crises
[for personal use only]
  
MOSCOW, May 14 (Reuters) - Russia's opposition-dominated State Duma lower 
house of parliament convened on Friday for the second day of impeachment 
debates against President Boris Yeltsin. 

The debate is expected to run until Saturday and culminate in a vote on five 
separate charges against the president, who plunged Russia deeper into 
political and economic crisis on Wednesday by sacking Prime Minister Yevgeny 
Primakov. 

Following are some of the key events and government crises in the seven years 
Yeltsin has been in power. 

June 16, 1991 - Yeltsin elected as Russia's first executive president within 
the Soviet Union. 

Aug - Yeltsin plays a key role in helping to put down a hardline Communist 
coup attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. He later humiliates 
Gorbachev by suspending the activity of the Communist Party in Russia. 

Oct - Yeltsin starts radical economic reform. 

Dec - Yeltsin and leaders of Byelorussia (now Belarus) and Ukraine sign an 
agreement declaring end of the Soviet Union. 

Dec 14, 1992 - Facing opposition to market reform by a conservative 
parliament, Yeltsin appoints Viktor Chernomyrdin, ex-head of state gas 
company Gazprom, as prime minister. 

Sept 21, 1993 - Yeltsin sets aside constitution to dissolve parliament and 
call for new elections. Rebel deputies stay inside the parliament's White 
House, leading to long siege. 

Oct 4 - After a night of violence as supporters of the parliament try to 
storm Moscow's central TV station, Yeltsin puts down the rebellion with 
tanks. Deputies surrender. 

Dec 12 - Russians vote in favour of a new constitution giving Yeltsin 
increased powers. 

Sept 30, 1994 - At a refuelling stop in Shannon, Ireland, on the way back 
from the United States, Yeltsin fails to get off the plane to meet Irish 
Prime Minister Albert Reynolds. 

Oct 11 - Russia's rouble currency nose-dives against the dollar in Russia's 
first post-Soviet currency crisis. 

Dec - Yeltsin sends troops to Chechnya to crush an independence movement, 
opening two years of bloody conflict in which tens of thousands of people 
die. 

July 11, 1995 - Yeltsin taken to hospital for two weeks with an ischaemic 
heart condition, a blood supply problem. 

Oct 26 - Yeltsin has second mild heart attack. 

Dec 17 - General election -- Communists stage a big comeback, taking more 
than one third of seats in the State Duma. 

Jan 1996 - Yeltsin replaces Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, First Deputy 
Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais and other liberals in what is seen as a shift 
away from reform. 

June - In the run-up to the presidential poll Yeltsin sacks security 
officials and top military officers, including Defence Minister Pavel 
Grachev. Yeltsin defeats Communist leader security officials and top military 
officers, including Defence Minister Pavel Grachev. Yeltsin defeats Communist 
leader 

Gennady Zyuganov, but only after appointing reserve general Alexander L 
1700947300 

Aug 31 - Lebed signs a truce with Chechnya. 

Oct - Yeltsin sacks Lebed in a dramatic televised address. 

March/April 1997 - Yeltsin completes a major reshuffle of his cabinet, 
started in February, putting reformers in key positions. Former regional 
governor Boris Nemtsov and Chubais are appointed first deputy prime ministers 
for the economy. 

March 23, 1998 - Yeltsin, returning to the Kremlin after illness, sacks the 
whole cabinet. He appoints Energy Minister Sergei Kiriyenko as acting prime 
minister. After one month and two votes against, parliament approves 
Kiriyenko. New cabinet packed with reformers is introduced a week later. 

July 13 - International Monetary Fund and other foreign lenders agree to 
$22.6 billion bail-out loan package. 

Aug 17 - Rouble is effectively devalued when the government widens the 
corridor in which it can fluctuate against dollar. A moratorium is put on 
repayments of some commercial banks' debts. 

Aug 23 - Yeltsin sacks government, appointing Chernomyrdin as acting prime 
minister. 

Aug 31-Sept 7 - Duma twice votes overwhelmingly against Chernomyrdin as 
premier. 

Sept 10-11 - Yeltsin nominates Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov as prime 
minister. Parliament approves Primakov as prime minister and he signals a 
more conservative approach to economic reforms than his predecessors'. 
Moderate Communist Yuri Maslyukov becomes first deputy prime minister for the 
economy. 

Oct - Yeltsin cuts short a Central Asian trip and scraps plans to visit 
Austria because of health problems. Kremlin aides say day-to-day affairs in 
Russia are increasingly in Primakov's hands, but Yeltsin retains his vast 
constitutional powers. 

Nov - Yeltsin is taken to hospital with pneumonia. 

Dec - Yeltsin returns to work and sacks Valentin Yumashev as his Kremlin 
chief of staff, replacing him with former border guard chief Nikolai 
Bordyuzha. 

Jan 1999 - Yeltsin is rushed to hospital with a bleeding stomach ulcer. The 
new illness forces Yeltsin to postpone a planned trip to Paris, designed as a 
comeback tour. 

March 16 - Duma agrees to begin impeachment debate against Yeltsin on April 
15 over five charges including starting the 1994-96 war in separatist 
Chechnya. 

Apr 12 - Duma deputies agree to put off until May a vote starting the 
impeachment process to work out laws. 

May 12 - Yeltsin rocks markets and confronts parliament by sacking Primakov. 
He names Stepashin acting prime minister and asks Duma to confirm him as 
full-time premier. Stepashin asks entire cabinet to stay on in caretaker 
role. 

May 13 - Duma begins impeachment debate against Yeltsin amid political 
crisis.