However, he said, Putin will be judged by the world "by how he deals with the country's internal instabilities, how he engages with weak neighbors across Russia's borders, and the role that Russia chooses to play internationally, as well as by his own personal skill at furthering Russia's economic and political reform."

Pickering offered his analysis of Russia after the presidential election at a Meridian House/Smithsonian Institution Seminar in Washington entitled "Russia: Sleeping Superpower?" Russia's new president has a mandate, according to Pickering, but the course he will follow is not yet clear. Most important, he said, "the hallmarks of a democracy -- free and fair elections, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, the rule of law, a civil society -- are beginning now to take hold, although this process is very far from being complete."

Pickering pointed to the dramatic development of Russian civil society as grounds for optimism. Although the transition of the Russian economy from a state-run to a market-driven system has been slow and has disappointed many people, he said, "Rich in natural resources, perhaps the richest in the world, and with a skilled labor force, Russia has the potential to become a globally competitive market economy."

The transformation of Russia, however, "is not a matter of months or years, but something that probably will take decades and generations," he added.

Pickering described the U.S.-Russia relationship as a "mature" one that enables the two countries to cooperate on common interests and to manage differences, even when they are profound. He also offered a few "thoughts" on what the United States hopes Russia will do with respect to one of those differences -- the conflict in Chechnya:

-- "Let the International Red Cross come back in to deal with detained and displaced people.

-- "Let the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's assistance mission return to deal with human rights monitoring and humanitarian relief.

-- "Let the Council of Europe provide its expertise to the staff of Russia's human rights ombudsman [Vladimir] Kalamanov to investigate the allegations of atrocities.

-- "And let Russians begin to explore with Chechens the development of a political settlement."

The United States has three overriding goals in its relationship with Russia, Pickering said:

-- to increase the safety of the American people by working to reduce Cold War arsenals, stop proliferation, and create a stable and undivided Europe;

-- to work with Russia internationally;

-- to support Russia's effort to transform its political, economic, and social institutions at home.

The United States has "nothing to lose by a Russia that is economically and politically strong and confident about its own security, and everything to gain by a Russia that can be a full partner in the world community," the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs said.

Ivanov told his audience yesterday that Moscow will not allow itself to be "deprived of an independent voice in world affairs" or to be "forced to play a secondary role" in the international arena. He also suggested yet again that international criticism aimed at Moscow over its bloody war in Chechnya is not only unjust and misdirected, but also the product of some sort of vast international propaganda campaign aimed at discrediting Moscow and diminishing Russian influence in the world. Interestingly, Ivanov appeared to point in particular at Europe in this regard. He accused "some European organizations" of engaging in "concrete political consultations" aimed at "pushing Russia into the background and depriving it of an independent voice in world affairs by manipulating public opinion" and declared that "Russia will not allow this to happen," though the tone of his comments suggested that Moscow will attempt to address European concerns not by altering its behavior-- particularly in Chechnya--but rather by propagandizing more forcefully on its own behalf. Given such comments, Ivanov's subsequent assertion that Russia would nevertheless not allow itself "to slide towards a primitive anti-Western policy or self- isolation" rang a little bit hollow. Ivanov, it is worth noting, was himself an enthusiastic practitioner of the "primitive anti-Western" foreign policy which Moscow followed during 1999, one which it is now allegedly intent on leaving behind.

The Center is expected to make a comprehensive economic program by the time the new Russian cabinet is formed, he said.

"The key ideology of the program has been outlined and the range of individuals and organizations working for the Center has narrowed," Gref said.

Apart from the long-term development program, the Center of Strategic Projects and the Finance Ministry are working on the presidential budget message for a period of four years, Gref said. That message "will be read out by the same time or, probably, a little earlier," he said.

On Thursday President-elect Vladimir Putin decided to form a group for coordinating the work of the Center of Strategic Projects, the government and the presidential administration on the Russian development program, Gref said. The group includes chief of the Kremlin staff Alexander Voloshin, First Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, First Deputy Minister of Finance Alexei Kudrin and German Gref. The program, which is being drafted by the Center, comprises "many areas of state activity," Gref said. It will have 300 pages but a brief version will be prepared for the public, he added.

Gref excludes the possibility of the cabinet's rejection of the program drafted by the Center of Strategic Projects. "I exclude any variation forming around a rejection of our program. How can they reject a program drafted by a Center that exists under the president and the cabinet?" he said.

"There are alternative views of various sections (of the program). If they are grounded, we inform the president and the government about that. The final decision is taken up there," Gref said.

The average citizen wonders whether prices will remain stable or skyrocket and whether the United States dollar, Russia's unofficial second currency, will be banned from circulation.

Russia's regional elite wonder about the future of the federation and the constitution. Most expect some type of drastic change. Regional governors in the future may be appointed, rather than elected as they are now. This would certainly restrict democratic procedures and consolidate the power of the Kremlin.

Business leaders wonder about the future of the economy, particularly in the areas of taxes and export-import regulations. An outline of the government's new economic policy isn't expected until mid-April and is currently being drafted by the Moscow-based Center for Strategic Developments, headed by Gherman Gref.

There is already the strong suspicion among liberal economic experts that the "new program" will be nothing more than an artificial mixture of previous economic projects. The new president's doctrine is expected to call for greater state regulation of the developing market economy.

Indeed, during the campaign, Putin offered many such seemingly contradictory policies. His recipe for developing a civil society in Russia, for example, calls for the protection of democratic values and rights through the firm enforcement of "commonly acknowledged rules of behavior" and the "dictatorship of law." In an open letter to the nation, Putin argued that "the stronger the state, the freer the person." Much of his presidential campaign was comprised of such bumper-sticker slogans, including listing the battle against corruption and organized crime as one of his top priorities. What was missing, though, were any specifics on how he would implement such policies.

What most observers do expect, however, is the rapid replacement of many advisors and high-ranking administrators within the Kremlin. Putin's first comments following his election promised as much. It seems certain that most Yeltsin-era officials, many of whom were supported by the Boris Berezovsky, will be replaced by the new president's proteges, in particular those who were his colleagues in the KGB.

It also seems clear that Putin is likely to strengthen the role of the central government. Speaking of his policies towards Chechnya, for example, Putin said that "this is only the first step that may be followed by others." Now that he's received an electoral mandate, he can be expected to beef up various state institutions and enforcement agencies, not only to combat terrorism and corruption but also to exert greater control over other aspects of the society as well.

Among those expected to benefit under a Putin administration are the military (which is only natural in view of their efforts in Chechnya), state security forces, the Interior Ministry's troops and the police. After all, these are the pillars of a "strong state."

Putin supporters say that such a reliance on military might does not signal a return to the Cold-War era or a sign of Russia's increased aggressiveness. Putin himself said "It is unwise to be afraid of strong Russia. But it shouldn't be ignored."

Liberals worry, however, that the emphasis on strengthening state institutions runs the risk of taking a totalitarian turn, leaving Russia isolated from all but the rogue states of the world anxious to unite under an anti-American banner.

Too pessimistic? Maybe. But Russia's new foreign policy , adopted just two days before the elections, made clear that Russia won't seek confrontation with the West -- except on matters of principle to the country. Just what those matters of principle might be, however, remains vague.

Kremlin supporters, on the other hand, note that the government's statement demands that "foreign policy shall contribute to solving problems at home: ensure foreign investments and make it easier to get credits in the West." This, obviously, will require some type of partnership with the West. And with the cost of servicing both domestic and international debts making up the single largest item in the fiscal 2000 Russian federal budget -- nearly 29 percent of total state expenditures -- such partnerships, and the resulting Western loans, are crucial to the nation's survival.

The mere promise of change was enough for most Russian voters to support a political newcomer. While voting at his polling station, Yeltsin summed up the public's expectations. "Everyone wants changes," he said. "And, of course, they are necessary and will take place. But the main direction will be preserved."

Subordinates

At best Russian commanders proved adept at working within the limitations of poorly trained manpower and ageing equipment.

But the real issues of military reform remain to be grappled with - Russia needs much smaller, more professional forces and they need to be equipped with modern weaponry.

Much will depend upon Mr Putin's choice of key subordinates - his defence minister and chief of the general staff.

These appointments will determine whether the Russian president hears the real message about what is going on within the armed forces. The choice of defence minister appears already to have been decided, as Mr Putin extended the contract of the existing minister, Igor Sergeyev.

Export earners

Many in the military may feel that Mr Putin is in their debt - that their campaign in Chechnya helped him to victory - but it is not yet clear if Mr Putin will have the time or stamina to push through military reform given the many other issues on his agenda.

One area where Mr Putin has already shown interest is in Russia's defence and aerospace industries.

These are important export earners, but are also badly in need of head-to-toe reorganisation.

Mr Putin' s recent flight to Chechnya in the back seat of a combat jet reinforced his image of a man with close ties to the military.

We have chosen Vladimir Putin's pronouncements on the key economic and political matters on the eve of the presidential election. The reader will be free to compare President Vladimir Putin's words and deeds.

The State Is Willing and Capable

Question: The talk of the day is that Russia is weak and therefore experiences a lot of problems at home and abroad. Your thesis is understandable: we must restore statehood, have a strong state. But does it not entail the restoration of state property?

Answer: Of course, not. We must have limited state property wherever it is needed, the defense industry, for instance.

Question: Do you mean the private sector must expand? Answer: The first thing to do is to guarantee the right to own property. I believe that one of the key tasks of the state is to devise rules, universal rules in the form of laws, instructions, regulations. Another task is to have these rules abided by, to guarantee they are abided by...

Question: There is a host of instructions and rules, regulations and laws, but do they work?

Answer: Right. The people therefore have little trust in the authorities. Look at the many laws made in the social sphere. One is on free transportation for the military. There is the law, but in real life the military pay their fare. There are many more examples. The authorities will have to resort to unpopular steps to ameliorate the situation.

Question: What unpopular measures do you mean?

Answer: There is the need to review the non-substantiated social commitments the state has undertaken in the past few years. There is no other way out.

Question: Will you please specify? Could you use the example of free transportation for the military?

Answer: Sure. Is it not better to raise the wages of certain categories of people, the military included, instead? If they are paid a bit more, they will be capable of paying the fare and feeling confident. But once the authorities say these categories should be paid the fare, they should get it.

I am confident that the Left opposition would immediately shower us with criticisms: destitute people are denied their legitimate privileges. But a state which does not live up to its commitments is a bad one. Hence the universal mistrust.

A Party With Bats In the Belfry

Question: Do you enter into collusion with the Left because you will need them when you make unpopular decisions? And did you therefore need Seleznev for the Duma speaker?

Answer: Did I? On the contrary, I was telling both Seleznev and Zyuganov to find somebody else, even though from the same party...

Question: Another Communist? Somebody else, indeed...

Answer: Look here, we have always been cooperating with the Communists in the Duma. Not a single law has been approved without Communist support. And there has been no collusion, if we are to be honest. As I see it, there are two ways of interacting with the Communists. They stand a realistic chance of becoming a modern parliamentary party in the European sense of the term.

There are many parties, groups, groupings and unions with no social base whatsoever. And there are the Communists, the only major, really big party with a social following, but they have ideological bats in the belfry.

Question: Could you specify the "bats"?

Answer: Their demand of confiscating and nationalising everything, for one.

Question: Is this possible?

Answer: Absolutely not. There will not be a new scaled tragedy. And there will be no partnership with the Communists for as long as they stick to this demand. Now if the preceding years have been marked by some illicit steps which have been established and proven in court, is quite another matter. But nationalising and confiscating without the necessary court procedure is a catastrophe. If only because this is the road to arbitrariness...

Who Cares About Court...

Question: Many people associate "strong authorities" with dictatorship. Your commentary?

Answer: I, for one, prefer another formula: efficient, rather than strong, authorities.

Question: What's in a name? How can you make the authorities be efficient? How can they monitor the compliance with the rules established by them?

Answer: There should be the working courts, law enforcement agencies, courts of arbitration. The role of these agencies has changed--something we do not seem to understand. It has come to correlate to the law. Why do we not pay the judges and law enforcers the money they should be paid? Only because we still have our heads full of Soviet ideology. Remember what we used to think: who cares about court... What can it do... Now, a party committee is different: it is full of people who make decisions.

What can a judge do? He will do what he is told to. People still think that courts are not important, and therefore should not be paid more than the average in the public sector.

Or take notaries. In the French system, if a notary applies the seal, it is a law, more than a law. And a notary cannot make mistakes because he would have to pay compensation. Two mistakes and the notary is insolvent. They are paid real good money for the risk they run.

Our society must understand that the state has to pay real good money to the minority, some categories, in order to have the interests of the majority of people guaranteed. When will we understand this? Our people are smart. Simply, they have had no adequate explanation.

Question: The role of the courts has been explained many times over in the past decade. But the courts are not improving, and are treated correspondingly. How else can you explain it?

Answer: We must be insistent, or nothing will change. And judges should be getting higher salaries.

Carriers of Understanding

Question: The governors will hardly like your ideas of efficient authorities and better manageability of the state. They fear you will limit their independence. Your opinion? Answer: I believe the local governments and gubernatorial elections should be preserved. But all interconnections should be more balanced. Sure, the governors have to be elected, but I think there should be an additional capacity of applying sanctions to them. One is releasing them.

Question: Do you mean they should be elected by some people, and be released by others?

Answer: They can be made dependent on the federal centre in other ways. There is no such thing as complete independence. Question: Do you mean devising a control system?

Answer: A system of control and influence. All constituent members of the Russian Federation should be placed in equal economic conditions by the federal centre. I mean we have a lot of agreements on the delineation of powers, but some members have unjustified privileges that others don't.

Question: Tatarstan, for one?

Answer: Tatarstan, for one.

Question: Shaimiyev may disagree with you.

Answer: You are wrong: he understands. I discussed the matter in general details with him the other day. Shaimiyev agreed with me, on the whole.

Everybody understands what specifically corrupts our common economic and political space. Countering it is a priority task.

The next step is to be made in the sphere of research and education. Nothing can be attained without modern managers, without the understanding of what and how should be done, and without carriers of this understanding.

Question: These carriers have all emigrated, haven't they?

Answer: Not all of them have. We have preserved the backbone--fundamental research and the scientific school. Now, if we lose them, that would be the end.

It Does Not Take Too Much Money

Question: Whence the money for all your plans?

Answer: You know, it does not take too much money. It is not a question of money. It is a question of understanding. Question: And how much would you pay young specialists, the ones that understand, I mean?

Answer: Well, in the West they are paid some 5,000 bucks. What if we pay them, say, 2,000 bucks?

Question: Will you?

Answer: Yes. And I will then say that the absolute majority would not emigrate. Speaking you native tongue, among your kin, family, friends, in you own country, and getting a bit more than the rest is very attractive.

Question: I don't understand. You are going to pay higher salaries to judges, to civil servants, to the military, and you need more money for research and education. Whence the money? Suppose America decides to market its strategic oil reserves tomorrow, the prices would plummet and...