#1
The Nixon Center
www.nixoncenter.org
June 17, 1999 
REALITY CHECK: We Can Ignore Russia, But Only at a Price 
by Paul J. Saunders, Director 

While the occupation of the airport in Kosovos capital, Pristina, by
Russian troops has relatively little immediate military significance, it
dramatically demonstrates that Russia can be ignored only at a price.
Although it has often been the Clinton Administrations preference to stress
engagement with Russia  but only on American terms  Moscow showed that even
in its weakened condition, it can complicate the achievement of U.S.
objectives. 

With a paltry force of 200 soldiers, Lieutenant General Viktor Zavarzin
managed to move from Bosnia through Serbia to Kosovo and seize the airfield
before the larger, slower NATO force could reach Pristina from Macedonia.
Unwilling to risk combat with the Russian troops in an effort to expel them
forcibly  and the serious political consequences that could result  NATO
commanders have instead negotiated with the Russians for access to a
portion of the airfield. 

As a result, Moscow has forced NATO and the Clinton Administration into
more serious talks on Russias role in the Kosovo peacekeeping operation;
the topic will now be the subject of bilateral discussions between
President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin later this week at
the G-7 summit in Cologne. Senior administration officials have begun to
mention a "zone of Russian responsibility" in Kosovo, although they
continue to insist that the Kosovo peacekeeping force (KFOR) be under
unified NATO command. 

This episode shows clearly that even in its present very weak condition,
Russia can complicate Americas and NATOs efforts to achieve their
objectives. Of course, the Russian move was successful only because Russian
soldiers were already in the region, because they could count on assistance
from Belgrade, and because their action was surprising  and contrary to
officially expressed policy. Given the limitations in Russias ability to
move troops and equipment around the world, it is unlikely that a similar
event could occur elsewhere. 

But that is not the point. Just as military power is not the only tool
available to American foreign policy  which often relies on economic means,
such as economic sanctions or promises of aid  it is not the only
instrument available to Russia. Perhaps most threatening to American
interests, Russia inherited a vast legacy of military technology and
hardware from the former Soviet Union. Although Russia has invested little
in maintaining its technology and equipment during its economic decline,
its arsenal  and the plans behind it  remain far beyond the capabilities of
many less developed nations, not to mention terrorist groups. As a result,
sales of certain weapons or military technologies could have a major impact
on the balance of power in regions of great importance to U.S. interests,
such as the Middle East and East and Southeast Asia, and could endanger the
United States directly as well. 

Also, Russias crumbling military and economy remain vastly larger and more
powerful than those of most of its neighbors, especially the new
independent states of the former Soviet Union. Russia has not hesitated to
use its economic leverage (primarily natural gas deliveries) to pressure
the Baltic States and Ukraine and has used military pressure against
Georgia and Azerbaijan by assisting Georgias separatist Abkhazians and
Armenia, respectively. Although these actions have received little
attention in the U.S., they do affect American interests, especially in
Georgia and Azerbaijan, which have differing but important roles in the
development of the tremendous oil and gas resources of the Caspian Basin. 

In addition to showing that Moscow still can influence world events, the
occupation of the Pristina airport illustrates another reason that Russia
cannot be ignored: growing opposition to Boris Yeltsins Western-oriented
foreign policy. While Yeltsin was quick to endorse the seizure of the
airport once it was successful in getting attention from NATO without any
real cost to Russia  and even promoted General Zavarzin the following day
he appears to have been unaware of the plan in advance. Rather, the move
seems to have been orchestrated by a group of military leaders dissatisfied
with special envoy Viktor Chernomyrdins concessions to NATO. 

The generals apparently believed that Russia had caved in to NATO demands
while gaining nothing in return; judging from recent writings by senior
military officials, they likely also viewed the Alliance air campaign in
Yugoslavia as an attack on Russian interests and a possible prelude to
direct action against Russia. The countrys parliament is also deeply
skeptical of the agreement negotiated by Chernomyrdin and overwhelmingly
approved a non-binding resolution calling on Yeltsin to fire him. 

This strong opposition to Yeltsins foreign policy is of significant
importance to the U.S., especially as just over one year remains in his
final term as president (if his health holds out that long). The
possibility of that Russian foreign policy may turn in a hostile direction
in the near future is a serious concern  despite Russias weakness  because
Moscow still retains the ability to affect key U.S. interests. 

Also troubling is the fragmentation of the countrys decision-making
structures. At precisely the time that Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov was
assuring Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that Russian troops would
not enter Kosovo before an agreement had been reached with NATO, General
Zavarzin was on the move. Freelancing by Russian enterprises selling
technology to Iran, China, or others is troubling, but the possibility of
similar actions by senior military officials is considerably more
disturbing, not least because of the much greater range of information and
firepower at their disposal. 

The Clinton Administration would do well to take heed of these dangers and
give greater time and attention the U.S. relationship with Russia. This is
not to suggest that America cannot or should not prevail over Russia when
key interests are at stake; there is little question at present about which
nation is more powerful politically, economically, or militarily and the
U.S. should not hesitate to use its power to advance important objectives.
Nevertheless, as events in Pristina have illustrated, our determination to
prevail can lead to unexpected costs. Moreover, if such incidents occur too
frequently, they could lead to a rapid downward spiral of action and
reaction in U.S.-Russian relations. America could not afford to ignore a
hostile Russia  and should strive to avoid creating one. 

#2
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
June 15, 1999
The mysterious 'Family' that keeps Yeltsin in power  Cronies keep cash 
flowing into election war chest
By Geoffrey York

Moscow-- When the Kremlin went looking for a new chief to run the lucrative
$12-billion-a-year Russian customs service last month, it chose an unlikely
candidate: a customs official who had been suspended from his job for a
year on suspicion of corruption.

   The new customs boss, Mikhail Vanin, was apparently not disqualified by
the taint of corruption. According to the Russian media, he has two
sterling qualifications.

   He is loyal to the "Family," the small circle of cronies surrounding
President Boris Yeltsin. And he is willing to funnel money to the Family's
interests.

   The customs service, which supplies an astounding 40 per cent of all
Russian budget revenue, is one of the biggest cash cows in the Russian
government. It was a ripe target for the Family's grasping hands.

   With elections approaching, the Yeltsin entourage needs to control every
"profit centre" in the government. The money will be crucial in the power
struggles that could determine Russia's future.

   Among the Family's members are the President's daughter, Tatyana, two
senior Kremlin aides, and two shadowy businessmen: Boris Berezovsky and
Roman Abramovich.

   The goals of this "mini-Politburo" are clear: either to keep Mr. Yeltsin
in power, beyond the expiry of his legal two-term limit next year, or to
engineer the selection of a hand-picked successor who would equally well
serve their interests. 

    The division of spoils began when Mr. Yeltsin sacked the government of
Yevgeny Primakov last month.

   This triggered weeks of frenetic activity, which left almost all of the
state's most profitable agencies in the hands of Yeltsin loyalists.

   Those include the oil and gas ministry, the state tax agency, the
railways ministry, the weapons-export agency, and even the State Pension Fund.

   Since the Russian economic crisis of last summer, the amount of cash
sloshing around in the Russian government has been considerably reduced.

   As the pie shrinks, the fighting over it has intensified.

   "The main goal of the fight between political groups is to get control
of financial flows for the elections," Moscow political analyst Yevgeny
Volk said in an interview.

   One weekly newspaper, Argumenty i Fakty, calculated that the Family has
seized control of $125-billion in annual financial flows from ministries
and state agencies.

   "Never before have the intrigues surrounding the elderly and unhealthy
President been so scandalous and humiliating for the country," the
newspaper said.

   "A new family business has appeared: the management of the country. Not
the whole country, with its poverty and problems, but the budget. . . .
It's just a matter of time until Russia becomes a country like Brunei,
where a single family controls everything."

   Another newspaper, Vremya, said the political and financial interests
are more "indecently naked" than ever before.

   The underlying motivation for the financial consolidation is the
beginning of Russia's election season and, more significantly, the possible
demise of Mr. Yeltsin, which would produce a new head of state for the
first time in almost a decade.

   Russia is entering one of the most crucial 12-month periods in its
post-Soviet history.

   The parliamentary election in December and the presidential election
next July could determine whether Russia is a true democracy, where a
genuinely peaceful and democratic transfer of power is possible, or whether
it is still under the thumb of a small circle of authoritarian Kremlin
officials.

   Election fever is beginning to grip Russia's elites.

   Election advertising is already appearing on Russian television, and
several parties are saturating the airwaves with expensive commercials.

   This week, Mr. Yeltsin signed a decree to create a 20-person "department
for political planning" inside his administration.

   Its duties include social and economic analyses and opinion polls.

   Media speculation is growing wildly. Some say the Kremlin could cancel
the elections by declaring a state of emergency, or even by creating a new
nation, a merger of Russia and neighbouring Belarus, that could allow Mr.
Yeltsin to retain power in a new office.

   "When someone has great power, even the thought of losing it seems
appalling, and the temptation to do something to prolong the Kremlin days
becomes irresistible," the daily Moskovsky Komsomolets said. "The Family is
cornered, and it will fight fiercely."

   Others say the Kremlin's strategy is to ensure an election victory by a
pliable Yeltsin loyalist, perhaps Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin or deputy
prime minister Nikolai Aksyonenko.

   To do this, the Yeltsin entourage must deny money to its most dangerous
rivals: Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov.

   "Power is up for grabs at the moment," said a Western diplomat in Moscow.

   "Yeltsin is a spent political force, so the question is who comes next.
The stakes are so high that the struggle has already begun. It's a brutal
system. People want to control the financial flows, to deny them to others."

   Even in its shrunken post-crisis condition, the Russian government still
holds some attractive sources of wealth in unlikely places. The railways
ministry, headed by Mr. Aksyonenko until his promotion to deputy prime
minister last month, is a money-losing operation.

   Yet it enjoys as much as $24-billion in annual revenue, which it funnels
through a series of highly profitable joint-venture companies with
connections to ministry officials.

   There are persistent reports that Mr. Aksyonenko's son and nephew are
senior figures in companies that enjoy price discounts from the ministry.

   The nephew's chauffeur and his former business partner were killed in
gangland-style slayings in recent years, according to one report. The
ministry "smells of funerals," it said.

   The oil and gas ministry is another key source of money.

   After the cabinet overhaul last month, the ministry immediately awarded
an Iraqi oil concession to a company controlled by two of the Kremlin
Family's members.

   The State Pension Fund, with about $15-billion in annual revenue, is a
source of investment funds that can be diverted to temporary uses such as
election spending. Parliamentary investigators say the fund lost more than
$1.5-billion in dubious investments from 1995 to 1998.

   Not all of the state financial flows are controlled yet by the Kremlin's
loyalists.

   Analysts say they expect the Family to grab soon for the last remaining
jewels in the state's crown: the huge gas monopoly Gazprom, the electricity
monopoly UES, and the Central Bank.

#3
Moscow Times
June 17, 1999 
Russian Arms Sales Grow in Conflict and Crisis 
By Simon Saradzhyan
Staff Writer

Russia's arms sales will jump this year by at least $300 million thanks to 
the ruble devaluation, efficient management of exports and NATO's bombing 
campaign in Yugoslavia, industry insiders said. 

Total sales are expected to ring in at no less than $3 billion in 1999 
compared with $2.7 billion last year, said Konstantin Makiyenko, deputy head 
of the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies. 

The lion's share of those sales f $2.5 billion worth f is expected to be made 
through the country's chief arms exporter, Rosvooruzheniye, while smaller 
arms dealers such as Promexport and the defense factories themselves will 
account for the other half a billion, Makiyenko said in a telephone interview 
Tuesday. 

Moscow-based Rosvooruzheniye is already well on its way toward reaching its 
goal. 

The arms exporter said Tuesday that it has already raked up $1.08 billion in 
hard-currency revenues from foreign customers over the first five months of 
this year. That figure is a five-year high, the company said in a statement. 

Promexport, Russia's second largest arms exporter, has signed deals for the 
sale of $670 million worth of arms from January last year to May 1999, 
company spokesman Alexander Uzhanov said Tuesday. 

This Moscow-based company, which exports surplus weaponry, spare parts and 
ammunition from the Russian military, has already delivered $120 million 
worth of products since the beginning of 1998 and will supply the rest in the 
near future, Uzhanov said. 

He said the company expects to sign contracts worth another $300 million in 
the near future. 

At first glance, it might appear that the projected leap in revenues are 
inflated, since Rosvooruzheniye general director Grigory Rapota announced the 
forecast in an apparent attempt to keep his post amid rumors of a pending 
reshuffle in the country's defense exports establishment, said Dmitry Trenin, 
senior expert with the Moscow Carnegie Center. 

Rapota told the Omsk International Exhibition of Land and Airborne Equipment 
held in Omsk, Siberia earlier this month that 1999 sales would rise to $2.5 
billion from $2.3 billion in 1998. 

No matter the reason for prompting Rapota to forecast this year's sales so 
early, his prediction will probably come true, Makiyenko said. 

Chief among the factors boosting revenues is the long-lasting effect from the 
ruble devaluation in August 1998, experts said. Since then, the Russian 
currency has lost about 70 percent of its value. 

The devaluation led to a mild revival in export-oriented branches of the 
Russian economy, including some sectors of the national defense industry such 
as aviation and air defense. 

Also, NATO's bombing campaign in Yugoslavia has prompted some countries to 
inquire about Russian-made air defense systems and fighters, said Makiyenko 
and a Rosvooruzheniye official, who asked not to be identified. 

"There has been a lot of talk about how Yugoslavia could have defended itself 
if it had had enough S-300 [air defense] systems," the Rosvooruzheniye 
official said. 

Sales of aircraft have already come to account for 50 percent of 
Rosvooruzheniye's exports and will probably continue to grow, he added. 

Another positive factor is the continuing economic recovery in Southeast 
Asia, Makiyenko said. 

Once stricken by a severe economic crisis, those countries have recovered 
enough to start considering foreign-made arms again, Makiyenko said. 

He identified Malaysia and Indonesia as being among the countries that may 
buy Russian-made weaponry. 

Indonesia had announced a decision to buy Su-27 fighters, but then backed 
away due to the economic crisis. 

Malaysia has already bought a batch of MiG-29s, but may be planning to 
acquire more of these fighters, Makiyenko said. 

A source close to MiG manufacturer VPK MAPO said in a recent interview that 
Malaysia plans to buy some 20 advanced MiG-29 SMT fighters to reinforce its 
aging and relatively small fleet of warplanes. 

Not the least among the reasons arms exports are booming is the efficient 
leadership of Rosvooruzheniye's Rapota, Makiyenko said. 

"A head of such a company is required to ensure three main conditions: the 
normal management of the company, a normal corporate culture, and the 
protection of the company from political [infighting]," he said. "Rapota is 
doing this job better than his predecessors." 

Rapota, a career intelligence officer, replaced Yevgeny Ananyev as head of 
Rosvooruzheniye last November. 

The company's sales dwindled substantially under Ananyev, who was appointed 
head of the company in August 1997. 

An increase in weapons sales could also mean a boost to Russia's dwindling 
share of the world arms export market. 

By the end of 1997, Russia accounted for 14 percent of all sales, down from 
17 percent the previous year, according to a report by the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute. 

The report said Russia sold only $3.466 billion worth of arms in 1997 
compared with $3.904 billion in 1996. 

Makiyenko of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies blamed 
the slump on Ananyev as well as the stronger ruble and the then-raging 
economic crisis in Asia. 

In 1990, the Soviet Union exported $15 billion worth of arms, although only 
$1 billion of the exports were made in cash. 

Moscow supplied the rest as payments for debts or gave them as gifts to 
socialist allies, according to Rosvooruzheniye. 

In the following two years, as the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia was 
born, arms exports plummeted some 85 percent, according to the Stockholm 
institute. Weapons sales fell to $7.1 billion in 1991 and to $2.3 billion in 
1992. 

In 1993, the government set up Rosvooruzheniye as an arms sales monopoly to 
coordinate exports, and sales started to slowly recover, peaking at $3.5 
billion in 1996 under Alexander Kotyolkin. 

Rosvooruzheniye's virtual monopoly began to diminish after President Boris 
Yeltsin signed a decree to establish Promexport in August 1997. 

While $3 billion in expected 1999 sales looks remarkably healthy compared to 
previous years, Makiyenko said Russia is capable of doing even better: Up to 
$4 billion worth of weaponry could be sold every year if all of the country's 
arms exporters were strictly coordinated by the federal government or if the 
dealers better coordinated their sales. 

#4
St. Petersburg Times
June 15, 1999
OPINION
FSB Runs Over Democracy In Race To Control Internet
By Jen Tracy
Jen Tracy is a staff member of The St. Petersburg Times. She has written 
extensively on the SORM-2 regulation.

THE Internet is one of the most important tools of information and freedom in 
Russia's halting democratic experiment - international contact at the touch 
of a finger. But it may soon cease to exist, at least as an instrument of 
democracy. What it will become instead, if the FSB has its way, is 
reminiscent of Soviet times - Big Brother made real. 

Russia's current social structure is such that the Internet stands very 
little chance of survival. The FSB - the country's Federal Security Service - 
is trying to turn it into a personal spy network. Providers are likewise 
willing to compromise their integrity in return for financial gain. And 
citizens, far from defending their constitutional right to privacy, are still 
passively sitting back, afraid to confront the fears that have haunted them 
for over 80 years. 

The FSB has masterminded and is now implementing a technical regulation, 
SORM-2, which will give it comprehensive control over the Internet. It will 
reroute, in real time, all electronic transmissions - originating in or 
addressed to Russia - to FSB headquarters, targeting not potential threats to 
national security but regular citizens. In so doing, the FSB will no longer 
need a warrant to obtain private information of any kind - an overt violation 
of both the Russian Constitution and the Law on Investigative Activity, which 
has so far gone unchallenged in court. The Soviet-era practice of stockpiling 
information on private citizens is ready to resume in force.

With this technology - which the providers are expected to pay for and train 
agents to use - the FSB will have access to e-mail passwords, classified 
transmissions of private companies and financial information. Such control 
over the Internet will make anything possible for the agency: blackmail, easy 
access to industrial secrets and the ability to sell company-to-company 
information. The FSB needs money to operate. Control of the Internet could, 
at the very least, fund their future.

The FSB has already shut down two providers for their refusal to conform to 
SORM, and is getting away with it. SORM's strength is in its shadowy status - 
as a "technical regulation," it is not a law, requiring neither a reading in 
the Duma nor a presidential signature. Why then do providers comply? Because 
the FSB controls the licensing process for all Internet activities. No 
provider can operate without FSB approval; any license can be revoked by the 
agency. Any provider who refuses to cooperate with SORM will see his business 
shut down within a matter of weeks. 

The only way to fight this encroaching threat is by taking the FSB to court 
on constitutional grounds. But while service providers should be the primary 
protector of the Russian Internet, many are siding with the FSB, and only one 
so far has been willing to risk his business. Nailj Murzahanov, general 
director of Bayard-Slavia in Volgograd, saw his firm summarily shut down 
three weeks ago after he threatened to sue the FSB for forcibly requesting 
client passwords and other agency information without a warrant. 

Officially, however, Bayard-Slavia's satellite channel was disconnected and 
its capital frozen not because of its refusal to comply with SORM but over a 
so-called licensing "error" - an easy out for the FSB, which is eager to 
avoid subjecting its regulation to the scrutiny of the court. In fact, most 
small providers could find themselves called to task on similar "errors." 

Over 90 percent of Russian service providers are technically sub-providers, 
leasing their frequencies from a larger provider and required by law to hold 
two operating licenses, one of which must be provided by the lessor. 
Moscowteleport, the parent provider with whom Bayard-Slavia held its lease, 
claims it "forgot" to license Bayard-Slavia, hence the unfortunate "error." 
In actuality, Moscowteleport has been similarly forgetful when it came to its 
other sub-providers, none of whom has been granted the second necessary 
license. Only Bayard-Slavia, however - the one provider to challenge the FSB 
and SORM - got closed down. 

This is where the parent providers have struck their deal with the devil, 
sacrificing the integrity of the Internet in return for monopoly control of 
the market. Because smaller providers cannot afford the technical upgrades 
required by SORM, they will have their operations terminated for failure to 
conform. Larger providers like Moscowteleport - considered by many Internet 
experts to be the pravaya ruka, or right hand, of the FSB - have no qualms 
about cooperating, knowing they will receive the lion's share of the market 
as the smaller providers are systematically squeezed out. The FSB has 
operated on a principle of divide and conquer, and has had a smooth time on 
the field so far. In the battle for Russia's Internet, Bayard-Slavia and 
Moscowteleport represent the two camps: out of business, and FSB-friendly. 

This leaves the role of Internet savior up to the country's citizens, and 
Russia just isn't ready for this. Russians have only gotten their feet wet on 
the shores of democracy. There are few people who even understand the rights 
granted them by the Constitution; those who do understand are doubtful, with 
good reason, that such rights will ever be upheld. They have lived for 
decades with a fear that's hard to shed. 

The specter of the KGB didn't die with the Soviet Union, and there is no 
assurance the FSB will ever conform to the democratic standards Russia has 
ostensibly set for itself. And this is the tragedy: Until the people realize 
that social dissent is as significant a part of democracy as the 
Constitution, the hallmarks of the Soviet era will continue to outpace 
democratic progress.

The Internet is a momentous opportunity for Russia. But if the FSB gets 
control of it, democracy and freedom have no chance.

#5
Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS)
Harvard University
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~ponars Memo No. 64                        
   
Security Implications of the Russian Identity Crisis
By Eduard Ponarin
European University at St. Petersburg June 1999
       
Introduction
       
Western policymakers and their scholarly advisers seem to focus primarily
on the oligarchical interests of the Russian elite rather than on
long-range societal processes.  This memo is an attempt to assess the
potential of ideational sources of Russian interests from a broader
sociological perspective.  It is important to understand that the search
for a Russian national identity is not merely driven by cynical elites, but
arises from a  genuine need within Russian society.
       
The inefficiency of the Soviet system led to the collapse of the Soviet
Union and made the Soviet identity unappealing.  Each national republic
that had (in many cases due to Soviet policies), developed its own national
identity by the 1990s easily shook off the superficial and amorphous Soviet
identity that had become    odious and irrelevant.  For Russians, however,
national identity still remains uncertain.  Weak before the creation of the
Soviet Union and tightly bound with the Soviet vision, Russia's weak
identity became even less clear after the Soviet collapse.
       
This situation of uncertainty will not last forever.  The present time in
Russia is of crucial importance as a formative period.  Similar processes
in turn-of-the-century China and nineteenth century Germany were completed
in twenty and fifty years, respectively.  Once established, national
identities persist: in the case of Germany, its national identity
influenced Franco-German relations from the Franco-Prussian War to World
War II.  The danger of Russia's current formative period is that it
coincides with an anti-American and anti-democratic tide in Russian public
opinion.  It may solidify the image of the West (and in particular the US)
as Russia's national enemy, and define Russo-American relations for some
years to come.  Yet because this    is a formative period, some changes in
US policy in Russia could turn back the tide.  This memo suggests some
strategic changes in US public relations policies to further that goal.
       
Why is the Identity of Ordinary Russians Important?
       
While analysts often assume that amorphous and immobile masses can be
structured and moved only by the elite, it is often the case that various
competing elites try to outbid each other using ideas and rhetoric in their
pursuit of power.  For instance, the ethnic conflict between Armenians and
Azeris over Karabagh was    mass-led, rather than elite-led.  Different
Armenian elites and counterelites successively presented increasingly
radical nationalist agendas that soon matched the radicalism of the
Armenian nationalist masses (the elite followed, rather than led, society
into nationalism).
         
This situation can be pictured as a marketplace where "masses" are
potential buyers with a certain demand and elites are competing sellers
whose profit is political power.  Those who manage to supply better than
other competitors gain the profit.  From this perspective, Russian national
identity is not only a matter of existentialist Dostoyevsky-style
philosophizing about the essence of the Russian soul, but may also become a
mass-based driving force for action and for change.  
        
To be sure, sellers may sometimes agree to fix prices, and elites may agree
on certain rules that limit the boundaries of  ompetition, such as those in
a democracy.  But trust is difficult to establish and maintain in an
emerging marketplace where there are incentives to break the rules for
short-term gain.  For example, the Bolsheviks in 1917 outbid other parties
in part because they were willing to promise land at no cost and to
unilaterally withdraw from World War I, something that all other parties
felt inhibited about, but the peasant masses desperately wanted.
       
Sellers can sometimes shape demand, rather than just passively responding.
But once a demand exists, it usually takes on a life and effect of its own.
 It may well be the case that many current Russian elites would like to
maintain friendly relations with th  US.  However, as rational actors in a
competitive situation, they    cannot help but notice that lip service to
Russian national interests--and increasingly Russian nationalism--pays off
because    responsiveness to Russian nationalism brings societal support.
Taken to its logical conclusion, what began as a rhetorical exercise merely
for political positioning in a competitive    environment produces
increasingly assertive rhetoric that may ultimately result in corresponding
actions.
       
Is There an Identity Crisis?
       
Immediately after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the term "Russian" was
defined in opposition to the term "Soviet."  Russia was also defined as a
nation in transition to democracy, a prodigal son coming back to the family
of Western nations.  This anti-Soviet, pro-Western, and democratic ideal
was symbolized by former Foreign Minister Kozyrev.  However, democratic
reforms have not delivered good lives to people, and Russians increasingly
perceive the West, and the US in particular, as not exactly an
all-forgiving loving father.
         
Accordingly, there has been a dramatic change in public opinion:
"democracy" and "the West" are now seen in very negative terms by
increasing segments of Russian society.  The change in Russian public
opinion has occurred in spite of Western humanitarian aid, financial loans,
and a Russian media that is on the whole pro-democratic.  What causes such
radical changes?  The answer is in the particular form and content of the
emerging national sentiment of the Russian people.  
        
Many students of Russian nationalism agree that Russians--as the
traditionally dominant imperial group--have had only a vague ethnic
awareness and have identified primarily with the state, rather than their
ethnic group.  This follows from theories that relate the rise of
nationalism to the emergence in a modernizing    multi-ethnic state of a
single standardized culture that allows even perfect strangers to easily
get along in formal contexts.  Those who, for whatever reasons, cannot
easily adopt this new culture or who are simply excluded from it by the
dominant group, are put in the humiliating position of a second-rate
citizen    struggling with hostile bureaucracy.  These individuals become
acutely aware of the difference between the standard culture and their
own--that is, they become nationalists.
      
Russians have easily identified with standard, dominant Russian
cultures--be they Russian Orthodox, Russian Imperial or Russian Soviet.  It
was other peoples of the empire, in particular Moslem and Western Christian
(Roman Catholic and Protestant), who had problems.  This is why Russians
did not have a strong ethnic    identity, whereas their many non-Russian
neighbors did.  However, this has been changing lately.  
       
Since the end of the Cold War, Russians have encountered a powerful, alien
culture that makes them feel powerless, disadvantaged, and inferior.
Globalization has nurtured the emergence of a global culture rooted in
North-European Protestant ethic and epitomized by US culture.  Many
Russians who encounter this new standard culture find it alien and
exclusionary.  Yet because of the nature of globalization they cannot avoid
it and are confronted by it every day: on television, in print media, in
advertising, and with the appearance of Western financial and economic
companies in some Russian cities.  This hostile culture is frequently
encountered at the entrance to US consulates throughout Russia, which is
unfortunate since one would expect    those Russians seeking a US visa to
be most sympathetic to the West.        

The difficulty Russians experience with this new culture can be explained
by three factors:
   
* The cultures are very different.  Among Western nations, Great Britain
has few problems with this global culture, while France experiences
conflict, as well as some anti-American attitudes.  The cultural distance
for Russia is far greater than for France: consider how different are
Russian and English, Protestantism and    Orthodoxy, American suburbia and
Russian villages, and American and Russian gender relations.  
* While European countries associate globalization with good economic
prospects, military security, and other advantages that may induce even the
French to swallow the burger, as it were, Russians associate pro-Western
reforms with economic hardship and Russia's loss of global prestige.  
* NATO expansion, followed by the action in Yugoslavia that sidelined both
the UN Security Council and Russia makes Russians fear not only a loss of
prestige, but also for the security of their country.  How can Russians
identify with a culture that does not want them, and seems to threaten them?  
      
Security Implications for the West
       
While older segments of the Russian population are becoming increasingly
nostalgic about the Soviet past, the younger generation of Russians is more
prone to look for a nationalist answer.  Even Lenin's internationalist
Soviet Communist Party has become in the Russian context more and more
nationalist.  Among the major prospective presidential candidates all but
Grigoriy Yavlinsky are using nationalist rhetoric.  It makes one wonder if
this is why Yavlinsky's chances are slim.
       
Currently there are two distinct nationalist approaches to the concept of
Russian identity.  On one hand, there are people with views like those of
former Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov who
may be termed "derzhavniki" or state    nationalists.  Then there are
ethnic nationalists, like Krasnodar Governor Nikolai Kondratenko and the
leader of RNE (a neo-fascist party), Alexander Barkashov.  While both kinds
of nationalism may seem undesirable, there are important differences
between the two    versions.  State nationalism defines Russian identity in
terms that are as close to the European idea of a civic nation as one can
possibly get in modern Russia.  Most importantly, this is an inclusive
definition that, projected into the future, gives hope for a peaceful
coexistence of the numerous ethnic groups    inhabiting the still vast
Russian territory.  While state nationalists are more assertive and vocal
about Russian national interests than Kozyrev was, they would still like to
see Russia integrated within a world community ruled by international laws.
       
The alternative, ethnic definition of Russian identity is by blood.  While
currently state nationalists have much better chances of coming to power in
Russia in the 1999-2000 elections than the proponents of ethnic
nationalism, it is not inconceivable to picture the latter's success around
2008 or even 2004, if the    derzhavnik leadership were to fail in
reversing Russia's economic collapse.  Considering the current state of the
Russian economy, such a failure is quite likely.  Coupled with the trend
from a democratic and pro-Western attitude towards its opposite, the
2004/2008 scenario is especially pregnant with security implications for
the Western countries, as well as for many of Russia's neighbors.
     
As the experience of Turkey early this century suggests, even a relatively
successful attempt to turn a multi-ethnic empire into an ethnically defined
nation-state may have disastrous consequences for numerous ethnic
minorities such as Greeks, Armenians, and Kurds.  Russian ethnic
nationalists in power would probably be no better than their Turkish
counterparts.  They would make anti-Semitism a formal or informal
government policy.  They would try to crack down on the ethnic republics'
autonomy and possibly implement russification policies.  Irredentist
policies with respect to the so-called "near abroad" would also be likely.
All these policies would likely cause Russia's international isolation.
But that would also justify the nationalist prophecy    about the inimical
West, and push Russia towards alliance with states like Iran.  In short,
Russia would turn into a huge, nuclear-armed rogue state with ethnic
conflicts simmering within and beyond its borders.
       
This is why the choice that ordinary Russians will make during the next few
years between the two versions of national identity is of crucial
importance and long-term significance.
     
Going back to my market analogy, it seems that Western policies with
respect to Russian public opinion--to the extent    they exist--have
concentrated on their existing supply.  Western media such as Radio Liberty
offers the Russian public a variety of alternative--but never
nationalist--opinions, perhaps in the hope that they can thus reverse the
nationalist tide.  However, by ignoring the existing and rapidly developing
public demand at a time when even mainstream Russian media are turning
nationalist, they lose their bid.  For the most part, recent efforts of the
Western media in Russia have been either negligent or counterproductive.
Propaganda can be a powerful tool, but not when it is completely
insensitive to its audience.
      
Rather than continue to ignore the demand or be the last to passively
follow it, the West should try and take an active stance to help Russians
make the better choice out of the two nationalist alternatives.  The
potentially huge resources of the West in terms of Russian public opinion
may make the difference if the West can present itself as caring for
Russian national interests and the moderate version of Russian national
identity--state or civic nationalism.  While opposing fascism from the
platform of Kozyrev no longer makes sense, doing so from the platform of
Luzhkov does.     
       
To engage Russian public opinion, a concerted effort is needed with respect
to the mass media, especially television.  Virtually 100% of the Russian
population has access to television, including those living in remote areas
that are rarely visited by a Westerner.  Television is the major source of
news and    entertainment for most Russians.  Investing in media programs
that work to communicate the positive connections between Russian culture
with its global counterpart could be effective if sensitive to Russian
concerns and perspectives. 
       
Cooperation of Russian elites is crucial to engaging the Russian public.
For that reason, the West should consider supporting expressions of civic
Russian national identity, and recognize that elites who "sell" this idea
are meeting a genuine demand for a moderate nationalism.  The best support
the West can provide would be sensitivity to Russian national interests and
 Russian public opinion.

#6
The Russia Journal
http://www.russiajournal.com
June 14-20, 1999	
RJ INTERVIEW 
'After These Barbaric Bombings'
Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, head of the Defense Ministry's Main
Department for International Military Cooperation, spoke to The Russia
Journal about the Kosovo crisis.  

Russia Journal: The war in Yugoslavia is over. Some see this as a defeat
not only for Yugoslavia but for Russia, its ally, as well. Do you agree? 

Leonid Ivashov: The U.S. did more than any other country to trigger the war
in the Balkans, and Russia did more than any other country to bring it to a
close. The military action against Yugoslavia was an example of open
aggression against a sovereign state. The world community, represented by
the United Nations, did not go far enough in condemning this, which, in a
sense, does give cause to speak of defeat. The fact that a new world order
has been established represents a defeat for Russia and for the whole world
community. What we have allowed to emerge is a one-polar world, where one
country or group of countries can impose their will on others and, when in
the name of peace, entire countries can be transformed into ruins and
people die.  

I don't claim to be able to see the future, but unless we learn the lessons
from what has just happened, it could well be that the bombing of
Yugoslavia was only a beginning - the beginning of a new re-division of the
world through the use of force. If force can be used to make peace between
Serbs and Albanians, then where's the guarantee that NATO, acting with the
noblest of intentions, won't decide to use force to reconcile North and
South Korea, Taiwan and China, to bring democracy to Belarus, Iraq and
Syria, or to intervene in Kashmir or Nagorny Karabakh?  

For over two months, NATO was able to use the Balkans as a testing ground
for new forms of warfare, and the Serbs, Albanians and Montenegrins did no
more than serve as interchangeable components in the big American game. But
unfortunately, the world failed to understand this. 

RJ: You don't agree then, that there was ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, that
what was happening in Yugoslavia was a mass-scale human catastrophe? 

LI: The truth still isn't completely clear. But I would point out that
refugees fled Kosovo en masse only after these barbaric bombings, which
killed hundreds of innocent people, began.  

It's by sitting down at the negotiating table that we can resolve crises,
not by dropping bombs. Russia has said this over and over. Before the
bombing began, we said to the United States and other countries that
diplomatic solutions weren't exhausted. But no one listened to us. Now,
time has passed, thousands have died, Yugoslavia's industrial potential has
been wiped out. And have the aims of the war been reached? We've just come
back to where we started, the negotiating table. Only now we're trying to
resolve the situation with a country in ruins and people facing suffering
and deprivation. Who needs this kind of peacekeeping operation? 

NATO is responsible for the humanitarian tragedy in Kosovo. It's hard to
quarrel with this conclusion. Soon representatives from different countries
will have a chance to go into Kosovo and see for themselves what really has
gone on there, and who is responsible for the situation. 

RJ: What will be the tasks of the Russian peacekeeping force in Kosovo?
Where will the Russians be stationed if NATO has already divided the whole
of Kosovo into sectors? 

LI: Our tasks will be defined by the UN mandate. Under this mandate, we
have the same right shared by all UN member states to participate in
peacekeeping operations. We don't intend to ask the Americans to give us
our own sector in Kosovo. We will establish our sector and seek the
Yugoslav side's approval. 

RJ: When can we expect to see Russian peacekeepers in Kosovo? How many of
them will there be? Will other countries have a presence in the Russian
sector? 

LI: Before we send any peacekeepers to Kosovo, we need the Federation
Council's agreement. But I don't think there should be any hold-up with
this. We will start sending our peacekeeping troops in when the other
countries do.  

Our troops are already preparing for their peacekeeping duties in the
Balkans. They will probably be stationed in the north and northwest of
Kosovo. The president will decide how many troops to send; the figure could
be from 2,500 to 10,000, mostly paratroopers. The Russian side would accept
contingents from neutral countries or CIS states in its sector. We would
also accept contingents from Greece or some of the Moslem countries.  

RJ: Will Russia cooperate with NATO in Kosovo? 

LI: Certainly. There's no other way to carry out the tasks defined by the
UN mandate. We are already working on a framework for our cooperation. But
we will not accept being directly subordinate to NATO. We are going to have
a lot of work to do together in Kosovo, and the Americans share our concern
that disarming the Kosovo Liberation Army will be one of the main problems
facing the international peacekeeping forces in the province.

#7
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
17 June 1999

FOREIGN MINISTRY TO OVERSEE POLICY TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA. The Russian
government, meanwhile, appears in recent days to be attempting to introduce
some order into its policy making vis-a-vis Kosovo. Following a meeting with
President Boris Yeltsin on June 15, Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin
announced that the Foreign Ministry would henceforth play the lead role in
coordinating policy toward the Balkans. That decision was presumably not
only Yeltsin's, but one arrived at also during a meeting of the Russian
Security Council that took place one day earlier. "The main thing on which
we agreed is that all efforts related to Yugoslavia must be coordinated. The
Foreign Ministry leads the effort," Stepashin told reporters. "Synchronized
actions by the Foreign Ministry, military and government with follow-up
reports to the president--that is the strict pattern that is already being
implemented," Stepashin said (Russian agencies, June 15).

The import of Stepashin's June 15 announcement is unclear. On the one hand,
the Foreign Ministry's new ascendancy probably signals the end of former
Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's role as Russia's pointman for the
Balkans. Chernomyrdin, appointed special Balkans envoy by Yeltsin in April,
has been widely criticized in Moscow for the Kosovo peace agreement which he
helped negotiate with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and EU
special envoy (and Finnish President) Martti Ahtisaari. Indeed, Moscow's
every action since consummation of the peace deal appears to be have been
aimed at wriggling out of the terms it set--particularly those relating to
NATO's leading role in the Kosovo security force.

Stepashin's announcement that the Foreign Ministry will coordinate policy
toward the Balkans may also be directed at reining in the hardline military
leaders who many believe have been driving Russian policy toward Yugoslavia
in recent days. Although Yeltsin seems since to have embraced the surprise
deployment of Russian troops to Kosovo, there is still speculation that he
was not fully involved in the decision to send the troops. Whether Ivanov is
capable of running Russian policy toward  Yugoslavia is another matter.
Ivanov is a career diplomat who lacks the independent political standing and
authority wielded by his predecessor in the Foreign Ministry post, Yevgeny
Primakov. It also seems unlikely that Ivanov receives the kind of respect
from the military leadership that Primakov enjoyed.