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Edited by David Johnson
| ISSUE #51 | June 4, 1999 |
| ISSUE #51 | June 4, 1999 |
#1 Moscow Times June 4, 1999 Deal Seen As Russia's Capitulation By Andrei Zolotov Jr. Staff Writer The Kosovo peace plan accepted Thursday by Yugoslavia may have champagne corks popping in the West, but back in Russia special envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin faces a tough task defending the plan and his role in the negotiations. The Russian public and politicians have been frustrated by his failure to win substantial concessions from NATO, and the settlement plan announced Thursday is almost certain to be seen as a near total capitulation to the Western military alliance. The deal - which says NATO airstrikes may continue until the beginning of a Serbian withdrawal is verified and leaves unclear who will exercise the "unified control and command" of international security personnel "with an essential NATO participation" - looks like a surrender of Russian demands for an immediate halt to the bombings and for putting the United Nations firmly in charge of peacekeeping. At least on the ever-growing anti-Western flank of Russian politics, the peace plan is perceived as Chernomyrdin's failure to defend Yugoslavia's and Russia's interests against heavy pressure from Washington and other NATO powers. Upon his return to Moscow on Thursday evening, Chernomyrdin, apparently aware of the harsh criticism, appeared to try to shift responsibility toward President Boris Yeltsin, who approved the instructions for the Russian delegation. "Russia has not retreated from those principles that were worked out under the direction of [Yeltsin]," he said. Even before the details of the Bonn agreement were released, left-wing and nationalist State Duma deputies began their session Thursday morning by lashing out at Chernomyrdin. The Duma voted to invite high-level representatives of the Foreign and Defense ministries, as well as Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow, Borislav Milosevic, for immediate hearings. But after Yeltsin's representative in the Duma, Alexander Kotenkov, insisted that no one would report to the Duma before Russian negotiators reported to Yeltsin, the hearings were postponed until 5 p.m. Friday. Fueling the harsh reaction of the deputies were media reports that Russian generals who were part of Chernomyrdin's negotiating team disagreed with the envoy. Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, who is in charge of the military's foreign contacts and is known for his hawkish position on Yugoslavia, was a member of Russian delegation. Chernomyrdin and Ivashov denied that there were disagreements.Ivashov, however, said the military part of Russia's delegation was "not quite satisfied with the imposed role of NATO and the diminishing of Russia's position in the conflict settlement." Agrarian faction leader Nikolai Kharitonov accused Chernomyrdin of carrying out a "Munich conspiracy" by appeasing NATO. "Even the generals who were at the negotiations with Chernomyrdin are puzzled," Kharitonov said at the Duma session. While representatives of Chernomyrdin's Our Home Is Russia party attempted to defend their boss, nationalist Deputy Vladimir Zhirinovsky attacked both the former prime minister and the Agrarians, saying that "a gas specialist should not be working in foreign policy," nor should agricultural lobbyists meddle in Balkan affairs. The Duma opposition's negative reaction to Chernomyrdin's efforts is not entirely new. Earlier this week, Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov labeled Chernomyrdin not a special envoy, but a "special traitor." "I have not heard from Chernomyrdin any coherent programs connected with a Yugoslavia settlement," Zyuganov said. "If he carries out the assignments of [U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine] Albright, [her deputy Strobe] Talbott or whoever else, he is playing the role of a special traitor in order to successfully sell out our interests in the Balkans." Vladimir Lukin, member of the liberal Yabloko party and chairman of the international affairs committee, tried to introduce some moderation into Thursday's heated discussion. He said deputies should find out the details of the negotiations before making a judgment. In a telephone interview Thursday, moderate left-leaning nationalist Alexei Podberyozkin, who is deputy chairman of the Duma's foreign affairs committee, predicted that when the deputies hear diplomats' and generals' reports on Friday, their reaction will be sharply negative. "The conditions that Chernomyrdin brought to Belgrade are absolutely unacceptable," Podberyozkin said. "It is impossible to withdraw troops under bombings. "America needs a victory. In this case, that is precisely what this turns out to be: Yugoslavia has been broken by NATO's strikes and will be occupied. Chernomyrdin brought [to Belgrade] the conditions for Yugoslavia's capitulation," Podberyozkin said. Only last week Chernomyrdin had warned in an article in The Washington Post that if NATO did not stop its bombings, Russia might withdraw from the negotiating process. His public appeal, which reiterated that Russia's role was to mediate and not to sell NATO's demands to Belgrade, was in response to U.S. President Bill Clinton's article in the New York Times on May 23, in which he said that Russia was "helping to work out a way for Belgrade to meet our conditions." Clinton turns out to have been right, Podberyozkin said. "Russia, represented by Chernomyrdin, negotiated not even on behalf of NATO, but on behalf of the U.S.A." Yeltsin's attempt to give Chernomyrdin a chance to earn political capital at home, which could have increased his meager chances in next year's presidential elections, has failed, Podberyozkin said. "Chernomyrdin has proved once again that as a politician, he is null." But standing behind Chernomyrdin's apparent failure to win more substantial concessions from NATO is a greater problem of Russia's current economic weakness and dependence on the West. Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin countered nationalist frustration with Russia's role in the Balkan crisis by saying Thursday that it is wrong to keep saying how "great" Russia is while it is "treated like a third-rate power." Russia can only speak of its greatness when it achieves a "European level" in GDP, standard of living, and development of science and culture, Stepashin said.
#2
Russian Military Skeptical about Yugoslav Deal .
MINSK, June 4 (Itar-Tass) - "Whether we have or have not betrayed
Yugoslavia signing peace agreements, each of us should know in his own
heart," said Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, Chief of the Department for
International military cooperation of the Russian Defence Ministry.
General Ivashov told Itar-Tass on Friday that if Russian peace-keeping
forces are sent to Kosovo "this will make us depend on the will of NATO and
the United States, notwithstanding whether it is a good or a bad will," he
noted. The general emphasised that in the forthcoming peace-keeping
operation in Kosovo it is "NATO and the United States who will determine an
extent, a place and a formula of our participation subordinate to them.".
Ivashov is a member of a delegation of the Russia government led by Prime
Minister Sergei Stepashin which arrived in Minsk to attend a session of the
Council of the CIS heads of state.
#3
St. Petersburg Times
June 4, 1999
NOTES OF AN IDLER
No Concern for 'The Family' in Dacha Country
By Fyodor Gavrilov
Fyodor Gavrilov is the editor of Kariera-Kapital.
I'M a dyed-in-the-wool city slicker. The charms of country living aren't for
me. But this past weekend I paid for my urbanity: I was subjected to the
non-stop media lowdown on the latest Russian political "crisis."
It began Saturday morning, with the resignation of the liberal Deputy Prime
Minister Mikhail Zadornov, and continued until late Sunday evening, when news
anchors and pundits alike declared that Russia isn't ruled by the ailing
President Yeltsin, but by "the family."
Mysterious tycoon Roman Abramovich heads "the family." First Deputy Prime
Minister Nikolai Aksyonenko, a Berezovsky protege, controls all "financial
flows." These allegations were repeated so many times that when I woke up
Monday morning I expected to hear that Interior Ministry troops loyal to
Prime Minister Stepashin had surrounded the Kremlin, while Yeltsin had been
sent to Switzerland for "treatment," taking "the family" with him.
This didn't come to pass. But if the mass media and their political backers
really had wanted to scare the public, they miscalculated: This past weekend,
the streets of Russian cities were empty. Russians were at their dachas.
Dacha is an old Russian word derived from the verb dat, to give. The
frequently cash-poor Mos cow tsars would give their servants plots of land so
that they could feed themselves. At the turn of the last century the word
took on the Chekhovian twist more familiar in the West - the dacha as the
site of summertime idleness. Chekhov's days are long past, however, and the
word has returned to its origins: Today the dacha is an essential means of
sustenance for millions of Russians. The army captain and the professor, the
opera singer and the welder, the communist and the liberal all race to their
dachas on Friday evening.
What is the dacha today? It's a small plot of land (usually .06 hectares)
somewhere between 15-150 kilometers from the city. On this plot stands a
house - sometimes tiny, sometimes spacious - with a verandah. As a rule,
there's electricity, but telephones are a rarity. Plumbing is absent, so
water is drawn from wells and carried in buckets, just as during the reign of
Ivan the Terrible.
At their dachas, Russians become, as it were, Germans - hard-working,
detail-oriented, and efficient. The plots are crowded close together. Trees
are sparse since they cast shadows on the gardens surrounding the house -
beauty takes a back seat to high yields.
Russians grow anything that thrives in our northern latitudes: potatoes,
tomatoes, cucumbers, apples, raspberries, strawberries. Come autumn, the
harvest is canned, providing food for much of the winter. As long as Russians
have their dachas, the prospect of empty stores isn't so frightening. Of
course, a little Nebraska wheat doesn't hurt.
But let's get back to politics. On Monday, Aristotelian catharsis ensues:
Mikhail Zadornov is appointed chief negotiator to the IMF talks, and liberals
end up with a number of posts in the new cabinet. True to form, Yeltsin once
again shows he hasn't lost all his wits: He's able to balance conflicting
forces within the government and, it stands to reason, within "the family."
Meanwhile, the real Russia, the Russia of dachniki, barely registers the
latest crisis. Crisis on a sunny summer weekend just isn't our style.
#4 Russia Today press summaries Izvestia June 3, 1999 Russia's Radioactive Zone THEY ARE TURNING THE COUNTRY INTO AN INTERNATIONAL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DUMP Summary The U.S. has proposed building an international storage facility for spent nuclear fuel in Krasnoyarsk-26. The project has been formulated as follows: Russia would accept nuclear waste from abroad, in exchange for safe storage of its surplus weapons grade plutonium. In other words, profit from storing other countries' waste will be used to fund the construction and use of Russian plutonium in Chelyabinsk-65. But according to the daily, the project will only bring profit to the U.S., because most of the revenue will never come to Russia. The project was developed by the Non-Proliferation Trust Corporation. They plan to import nuclear waste from Japan, Taiwan and South Korea to Krasnoyarsk at an estimated $5-10 billion in profit. According to the plans, the profit will go to the U.S., to avoid the possibility of it being stolen in Russia. Then, under the eye of an American board of trustees, the money will be allocated for projects in Siberia. The project has a long history and many lobbyists in the Nuclear Power Institute and the Nuclear Power Ministry. These officials argue that the market for nuclear fuel storage and treatment is promising, and that Russia has technology for this that the U.S. does not. The daily noted in conclusion that storing nuclear waste near Krasnoyarsk, with a population of 1 million, and near the great Yenissey river would be extremely dangerous.
#5 Capital Punishment in Russia Virtually Abolished. MOSCOW, June 3 (Itar-Tass) - Russian Justice Minister Pavel Krasheninnikov said capital punishment in Russia had virtually been abolished. He said this on Thursday at the All-Russian conference on problems of abolishing capital punishment. "Two moratoria are operating in Russia -- on capital punishment and on death sentences, so there is virtually no capital punishment in Russia," he noted. Krasheninnikov also said that Russian President Boris Yetsin on Thursday signed the pardon for the last person sentenced to death, "so today is really a historic day." "We must bring legislation in accord with international documents, with the Russian president's decree and resolution of the Constitutional Court," the justice minister said, adding that these are "technicalities". The justice minister expressed the hope that the law on the pardoning will be passed by the Duma before the election campaign begins. "Very many deputies who will seek reelection will be saying that capital punishment should not be abolished now," Krasheninnikov said. "They see that the public opinion does not favour the abolishment of death penalty."
#6 Russian Official Warns of Worsening Relations With US MOSCOW, May 31 (Interfax) - If NATO continues its military operations, especially if it launches a ground phase, if the U.S. side shows no interest in a peaceful solution of the Kosovo problem, "a negative process that would be very difficult to reverse could begin" in Russian-U.S. relations, Russian Security Council deputy secretary Valentin Sobolev said on Monday. "We are against confrontation, against a collapse of our cooperation," he said on Monday after a meeting with a delegation of the Aspen strategic group. Sobolev said that the NATO operations against Yugoslavia are violating all international law norms. They have harmed and continue to seriously harm Russian-American relations, and undermine stability in Europe and the whole world, he said. Russia is doing its utmost to find a peaceful solution to the crisis, he went on. "It is our purpose to restore the leading role ofthe U.N. in addressing fundamental security problems and stability, and simultaneously preserve the positive experience accumulated in Russian-American relations," he said. In addition to the Kosovo crisis, the meeting addressed a wide range of international problems, as well as Russian-American relations, in particular cooperation in export control and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles. The Aspen strategic group brings together leading U.S. law-makers and academics. Their main task is to offer recommendations on national security, defense and conflict settlements.
#7 Moscow bitter at serving as Washington's "little helper" MOSCOW, June 4 (AFP) - Progress towards ending the Kosovo crisis has failed to erase the deep scars left on Russia's ties with the West, nor ease bitter suspicions that Moscow was relegated to a bit part as Washington's "little helper." Some predict that the bruising treatment of Russia, particularly NATO's refusal to heed its calls to end the bombing, may also have handed the Communists an ideal campaign tool in the looming national elections. "The bombing of Kosovo seriously reduces the pro-democracy electorate," said Konstantin Titov, the powerful governor of central Russia's Samara region. "It seriously undermines democracy in Russia and seriously undermines the image of Russia's president, the first president legitimately elected. "(US President Bill) Clinton and the entire NATO Atlantic Alliance may well win the war in Kosovo and get control of Kosovo, but they will also put the Communists back in control of Russia," Titov warned. As Europe glimmers with its first rays of hope that the 72-day old Balkans war may finally be over, Moscow's political elite is gloomy. The image of a NATO military alliance rubbing shoulders in a friendly manner with Russia -- a picture Washington took pains to paint when the alliance expanded into eastern Europe this year -- lies in ruins. "It wasn't easy to create a new NATO image in Russia and this effort has been reduced to nothing," Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said one month after NATO's air assault began. Today analysts say that the Kremlin is furious that Washington took a sceptical view of Russia's efforts to mediate an end to NATO strikes against its traditional ally. "I think that relations have suffered a great deal," said Moscow's Institute of Europe director Pavel Kandel. "This conflict has marked the start of a new era in international relations," Kandel said. "In the post-Yugoslavia world, Russia has been handed the role of NATO's little helper when US leaders think Moscow's assistance is necessary." Others point to Cold War-era generals who still staff the upper echelons of Russia's creaking but potentially destructive military machine. Moscow media has reported that the military remain deeply unhappy with presidential envoy Vitkor Chernomyrdin's diplomacy tactics, accusing him of selling out Russia's old ally Yugoslavia. "Of course certain frictions (between Russia and NATO) will remain on the military front. The position of our military leadership is more hawkish than the official position," said Yevgeny Volk of Moscow's Heritage Foundation office. "On the political level, many of the problems that have flared up since the start of the bombings will gradually dissipate. This will not happen quickly -- the two sides went too far along the path of confrontation," Volk said. Russia's elderly, who have long been taught by the Soviet system to view NATO as a deadly foe, in large part call the Balkans conflict an "aggression" designed to get Washington a foothold in southeast Europe. Now analysts point out that even younger Russians have become disenchanted with the US-led alliance and are questioning whether a western beliefs system is for them. "No one any longer supports a purely western model in any case -- even the democratic forces are coming out in favor of economic self-reliance," Volk said. And all this may play well into the hands of Communists this December when the nation goes to the polls to elect a new parliament. Leftist forces that were weeks ago humiliated by failed attempts to impeach President Boris Yeltsin are again brimming with life. "The most negative consequence of the Kosovo crisis for Russia's internal politics is that the parliamentary and possibly presidential elections have been handed to the Communists," said Kandel.
#8 Kosovo peace plan failure of Russian influence: press MOSCOW, June 4 (AFP) - The Kosovo peace plan has underscored Moscow's failure to maintain its influence in the Balkans and to play a leading role on the world stage in negotiations to end the crisis, Russian media said Friday. Still smarting from the loss of its superpower status, Russia viewed the peace plan approved by Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic on Thursday as one more example of its waning influence in the West, newspapers said. The press was nearly unanimous in its criticism of Russia's special envoy on the Kosovo crisis, Viktor Chernomyrdin, accusing him of giving in to western negotiators too often while the 10-point peace plan was hammered out. "Belgrade gave its final agreement to what was, to all intents and purposes, NATO's plan delivered by Russia's special envoy," the daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta said Friday. "Now Russia will be given a formal place as an important participant in the Balkans process, but the alliance will take care of the settlement," the paper said. "Chernomyrdin failed to maintain Russian influence not only in the Balkans but in the general geopolitical sense as well," the newspaper said. The well-respected Kommersant daily bemoaned the fact that the peace plan allowed the West to strengthen its economic, military and political position in the Balkans region. "This means a long-term presence of NATO in the Balkans," Kommersant said. In tallying up the 10-point peace plan, Kommersant noted Russia's influence in the negotiating process on only three points: the settlement must come under the aegis of the United Nations; the Kosovo Liberation Army must be disarmed; and there will be a presence, "although not significant," of Serb forces to protect cultural sites and government buildings in Kosovo. The most important points of the peace plan "represent NATO's and not Russia's interpretation of the G8 principles -- specifically the alliance's conditions which were put forth from the beginning," Nezavisimaya said. The newspaper said halting the airstrikes only after Serbian troops start to leave Kosovo would be "extremely difficult to carry out in practice." Serbian troops could be targeted by NATO as they leave Kosovo, therefore the ceasefire should be initiated first, the newspaper said. The outcome of the Kosovo peace process also does not bode well for Chernomyrdin who has said he will run for president in the next election scheduled for June 2000. Russian "hawks" accuse Russia's Kosovo envoy of being an accomplice to a new "Munich Agreement," Izvestia said, a reference to Allied appeasement of Hitler's Germany before the outbreak of World War II. The newspaper noted the growing rift between Chernomyrdin and Russia's powerful military which opposed any compromise with the West on Kosovo. "This schism signifies the influential forces in Moscow who opposed any rapprochement with the West over Kosovo," Izvestia said. While the Kosovo crisis would appear to be winding down, "we can expect some unpleasant surprises not only from Belgrade, but also from Moscow," Izvestia warned. In any case, President Boris Yeltsin can play a key role in affirming that Chernomyrdin was acting with the approval of the Kremlin. "In any case, yesterday's (Thursday's) events in Belgrade mean Russia has lost more than it won," Nezavisimaya concluded.
#9 Boston Globe June 4, 1999 [for personal use only] CRISIS IN KOSOVO / RUSSIAN REACTION At home, no peace for accord's architect By David Filipov MOSCOW - Having helped win Yugoslavia's backing for a plan to end the Kosovo conflict, Russia's Balkans envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin returned home yesterday to meet another challenge, getting the rest of his countrymen on board. It promises to be no easy task. As Western leaders hailed yesterday's approval by Yugoslavia's parliament of the peace proposal as a major step toward ending the Balkans crisis, Chernomyrdin faced an angry reaction from Russian legislators - and dissent among military members of his negotiating team. In addition, Moscow and the West remained far apart on how Russian and NATO peacekeeping troops should be deployed and commanded. Chernomyrdin, who with Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari spent the past two days selling the plan to Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic, yesterday played down the problems raised by the deal and said peace is expected in a matter of days. ''The main thing is to stop'' the conflict, Chernomyrdin said after arriving last night in Moscow. ''I think we have reached that stage and it will be stopped.'' Chernomyrdin said the plan would work because it meets the West's main demands - that Yugoslavia withdraw its 40,000 troops from Kosovo as a condition for NATO to stop its airstrikes, and that the 50,000 peacekeeping troops will be a NATO-led force with a large US contingent. Since being appointed in April, Chernomyrdin, a former prime minister, who has been meeting regularly with US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and other senior Western officials, has gradually reversed the pro-Serb, anti-Western stance taken by Moscow in the first days of the NATO airstrikes. Back then, officials talked angrily of arming the Serbs and breaking ties with the West. The trouble is, many Russian politicians still feel that way. Yesterday, Russian lawmakers complained that Chernomyrdin had sold out to the West by dropping Moscow's objection that any deal would have to be preceded by a halt to the Western alliance's airstrikes against Yugoslavia. Politicians in Moscow also panned another point of the plan: that NATO troops would form the core of the peacekeeping force in Kosovo. In the Russian view, all peacekeeping activity should be under the auspices of the United Nations. Angry lawmakers in the State Duma, the lower house of parliament, threatened a no-confidence vote against Chernomyrdin and demanded more details. Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, a senior Defense Ministry official and part of Chernomyrdin's delegation, bluntly criticized the deal, saying military officers were ''not quite satisfied with the role of NATO that is being imposed and the diminished role of Russia.'' Meanwhile, while NATO insists its forces will make up the core of any peacekeeping force, Chernomyrdin said Russian troops would also be present and ''under separate Russian command,'' not under NATO auspices. Chernomyrdin also suggested that Russian troops, which could number as many as 10,000, would serve in a different sector than NATO forces. If the reaction at home highlights the difficulties Chernomyrdin faces in negotiating a Kosovo settlement, Chernomyrdin's status in Russia underscores the risks the West runs by putting too much faith in the deals he brokers. Chernomyrdin was appointed by President Boris N. Yeltsin, who is by most accounts in poor health and rarely engaged in day-to-day problems. Chernomyrdin is thought to be at odds with Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, who was pushed aside when Yeltsin named his special envoy. Further, Yeltsin's new prime minister, Sergei Stepashin, has been too preoccupied with a power struggle over the formation of his Cabinet to be involved in Balkans negotiations. ''We do everything through Chernomyrdin,'' said Michael McFaul, a Russia specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace Studies in Washington. ''But who is Chernomyrdin reporting to?'' Staff reporter Anne Kornblut of the Globe's Washington Bureau contributed to this report.
#10 Izvestia June 4, 1999 Belgrade Accepts Peace Plan, But Russian "Hawks" Accuse Chernomyrdin Of Abetting "Munich Pact" By Maxim Yusin The Yugoslav leadership has agreed to accept the peace plan that was tabled in Belgrade by the international mediators - President Yeltsin's personal envoy to the Balkans, Viktor Chernomyrdin, and Finland's President Martti Ahtisaari, IZVESTIA writes in its story. The leaders of the main states in the West have already congratulated the mediators with this "outstanding success." However, the author points out, the details of the "Chernomyrdin- Ahtisaari plan" have not yet been made public. Yugoslavia's President Slobodan Milosevic has not yet signed the peace document, and has not clearly announced - before TV cameras - his acceptance of the peace plan. This being the case, the author points out, there is no point in giving in to euphoria ahead of time. Many times in the past, Milosevic, at the last moment, has put forward his own "counter demands," nullifying all the efforts of the mediators. Unpleasant "surprises" can be expected not only from Belgrade, but also from Moscow, the author remarks. It has become known that a rift appeared in the Russian delegation that negotiated the peace plan in Bonn with representatives of the United States and Europe. Representatives of the Russian Defense Ministry, Leonid Ivashov, Chief of the International Military Cooperation Department, and Viktor Zavarzin, Russia's representative in NATO, disagreed with the stand of Chernomyrdin. In the opinion of the two generals, the former Prime Minister of Russia has agreed to "excessive" concessions to the West. During the Bonn consultations with Ahtisaari, the Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, Chernomyrdin gave in to his negotiating partners on two key questions. First of all, Chernomyrdin agreed that the air strikes on Yugoslavia must be stopped only after when the Serbs begin to pull out their armed forces from Kosovo, and that this fact [withdrawal] must be monitored by international observers. (Up till now, Russia had insisted upon an immediate stop to the air strikes without any preliminary conditions). And second, Chernomyrdin acknowledged the right to NATO to define the lineup of the international peacemaking contingent by itself. Here, too, Russia has departed from its initial stand, the author comments. Until the very last moment, Moscow had totally sided with Belgrade's approach, and had insisted that only those countries that had not participated in the aggression could send their troops to the peacemaking contingent in Kosovo. Chernomyrdin's press secretary has hastened to deny that there was a rift in the Russian delegation participating in the negotiations in Bonn. However, it is difficult to believe in the sincerity of his words, the author notes. Perhaps, Chernomyrdin himself will have to make a public denial. Nonetheless, the author comments, this does not change the essence of the matter. And the essence lies in the following: very influential forces in Moscow meet any steps aimed at reaching an agreement with the West on the Kosovo settlement at loggerheads. Just as in Yugoslavia, Russia too has its own "war party" that rejects any compromises. And it is precisely this fact that plays into the hands of the "hawks" in Washington, London and Brussels, who are not at all delighted with the peace negotiations and call for a more effective solution to the Kosovo problem by way of unleashing a "victorious" ground operation. In Moscow, the "war party" made itself known on Thursday (June 3) when Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari were negotiating in Belgrade. In the State Duma, the leader of the Agrarian faction, Nikolai Kharitonov, accused Chernomyrdin of laying the grounds for a miniature "Munich Pact." Other faction leaders also spoke out against Chernomyrdin's concessions. In such a situation, the author notes, much depends on the Kremlin. Either President Yeltsin must publicly confirm that Chernomyrdin acted with his sanctions in Bonn and Belgrade, or he [Yeltsin] must agree with the top brass and the so-called "patriots" that his special envoy [Chernomyrdin] had exceeded his authority and sanctioned a "Munich Pact," thereby abetting NATO's triumph.
#11 Jamestown Foundation Monitor 3 June 1999 WILL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS BE POSTPONED? The idea that President Boris Yeltsin--or, at any rate, the political regime he heads--will remain in power after next year's scheduled presidential elections is gaining more and more adherents. While some observers have predicted that Yeltsin will win a de facto third term in power by assuming the presidency of a unified Russia-Belarus state, other versions have been circulating in the press. One weekly, in its latest issue, cited a "strange document" it managed to get hold of, reportedly prepared by a group of analysts who were hired by the Kremlin administration in 1996 to work on Yeltsin's presidential campaign. According to this report, the document urges that the terms in office for members of the Russian parliament's two chambers of parliament, the State Duma and the Federation Council, be extended for two years, in the interests of "stabilizing society," "saving money" and "creating the conditions for genuinely free elections." After the two chambers have agreed to put off the parliamentary vote set for December of this year, the Kremlin will then suggest that the presidential vote be put off for at least two years (Novaya gazeta, May 31-June 6). The article was signed by "the political department," a formulation commonly used by Russian newspapers when they are dealing with controversial subjects (or want to make it look that way). 'THE FAMILY' REPORTEDLY LINING UP YELTSIN'S SUCCESSOR... According to another line of thinking, the Kremlin is indeed planning to hold the scheduled June 2000 presidential vote. To this end, it has set its allies in Sergei Stepashin's newly formed government and in other state bodies the task of establishing a monopoly over the country's main financial flows, in order, among other things, to finance the presidential campaign of Yeltsin's chosen successor. One recent report calculated that The Family--a term used for Yeltsin's inner circle, which allegedly includes his daughter Tatyana Dyachenko, the tycoon Boris Berezovsky and oil baron Roman Abramovich, among others--is now effectively in control of state bodies through which some US$80 billion flow. These include the finance ministry, customs, the tax services, the pension fund, the railways and the fuel and energy ministry. The Family apparently has its eye on Gazprom, the natural gas monopoly, United Energy Systems, Russia's electricity grid, the Central Bank and the state arms exporting agency Rosvooruzhenie (Argumenty i fakty, No. 22, June 1999). A similar version put forward today said that Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin is the most likely candidate to be Yeltsin's successor. The author of the article, Sergei Chugaev, added that the Kremlin will also put resources toward assuring a victory for its allies in this year's parliamentary vote. He listed the Kremlin's allies as Viktor Chernomyrdin's Russia is Our Home, Yegor Gaidar's Right Cause and Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. Chugaev wrote that how things develop will depend on Yeltsin's health. "If all is well with Yeltsin's health, then we can expect a referendum on uniting with Belarus. If all is not well--a 'Stepashin Is Our President' campaign" (Komsomolskaya pravda, June 3). ...AS LOSERS IN CABINET RESHUFFLE ASSESS THEIR POSITIONS. The frenzy of rumors in Russia that The Family (Yeltsin's inner circle) is planning on sticking around are, at a minimum, in the interest of those groups and individuals who feel that they lost out in the recent cabinet reshuffle. NTV television, controlled by MOST business empire founder Vladimir Gusinsky, along with TV-Tsenter, controlled by the Moscow city government, has been giving these rumors major play. On May 30, NTV suggested that Yeltsin may be unfit to be making decisions (see the Monitor, June 2). Yesterday, the Kremlin categorically denied rumors that it is planning to take "sanctions" against NTV and TV-Tsenter, including revoking their licenses. NTV, however, is vulnerable in another way: While it is privately owned, it has been allowed to pay reduced government rates for use of the airwaves. Meanwhile, several media have reported that opponents of The Family--ranging from some oligarchs to members of the State Duma and Federation Council to the Communists to Yuri Luzhkov--may push for a special meeting of the parliament to consider the idea of setting up a State Council, made up of influential governors and parliamentarians, which would find ways of stopping The Family's power grab and consider whether Yeltsin is fit to continue as head of state (Argumenty i fakty, No. 22, June 1999). Russia's Constitutional Court, meanwhile, is meeting today to consider a State Duma request to clarify the constitutional provision for removing a head of state for health reasons (Russian agencies, June 3).
#12 The Russia Journal http://www.russiajournal.com May 31 - June 6, 1999 Cold War Treaties for Peace in Europe Have Outlived Their Effectiveness And unless Russia wants NATO at its doorstep, it should stop complaining about the West's injustices and start looking for ways to participate in European security structures. By Grigory Alexeyev/The Russia Journal The Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe and the Vienna Convention were developed and put into effect at a time when European armies numbering in the millions were waiting for orders to attack each other. Logic suggests these treaties would be more effective now that Europe is less militarized and Russia and the West are moving toward partnership. But the agreements were designed primarily to prevent a large-scale war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, not to prevent the kind of action currently taking place in Yugoslavia. One good example is a basic Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) principle: all borders in Europe are inviolable. When the Helsinki Final Act was signed in 1971, few would have predicted that borders in Europe would be changed not by a war between countries but as a result of conflict within a state. All attempts to modernize the OSCE to make it effective in preventing and regulating internal conflicts have failed. The organization possesses no executive powers, and is unable even to adopt an effective decision. After it expanded by accepting former Soviet states, the OSCE turned into a discussion club. Recently, the organization has failed to succeed in a single attempt at regulating internal conflicts, including Nagorno-Karabakh or Bosnia. The Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe and the Vienna Convention on Measures of Confidence in the Military Sphere have proven even less effective. The treaties imposed quantitative restraints on all kinds of weapons and military activities, such as troop deployment and movements, and introduced a detailed system of mutual checks and inspections. The principal goal was to eliminate the possibility of a rapid concentration of troops or an actual attack by NATO or the Warsaw Pact. The treaties set limits on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, not on individual countries. In the present situation-with the Warsaw Pact no longer in existence and Russia's military no longer in Europe-it is senseless to speak about the balance of military forces in Europe. The entry of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic-former Warsaw Pact members-into NATO dealt the final blow to the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe. The West is now pursuing an idea pronounced by Richard Holbrooke in 1995: a "new architecture of European security" based on NATO. In fact, NATO has managed to create a system that is an alternative to the OSCE. On the political level, almost all European countries are members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and on the military level, NATO has managed to extend its influence in Eastern Europe and the CIS via the Cooperation for Peace program. It is clear that NATO's operation in Yugoslavia will end up in one or another form of surrender. So far, the Alliance has demonstrated unified will and decisiveness, but as the mission drags on, Western European countries will confront major problems related to the return of the refugees and the restoration of Yugoslavia's ruined industries and infrastructures. How should Russia behave in this situation? Not long ago, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, infuriated by NATO bombing, threatened that Russia would withdraw from the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe. Judging by available information, several generals in the Russian Defense Ministry demanded that a number of military formations and hardware be moved from Siberia to western frontiers. That would be a violation of the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe and would mark its end. Even if troops are successfully relocated and deployed, Russia will not manage to achieve parity with NATO. After all, from a strategic viewpoint, there is basically no difference between the ratio of 1:25 and that of 1:18. Russia can only manage such re-deployment at the cost of defense capacities on its oriental frontiers. Indeed, Russian generals began noting that Moscow and Beijing have concurring strategic interests for the first time in 30 years. Common interests extend beyond a possible joint strategy against NATO. While Moscow has shown concern for U.S. plans to develop a strategic anti-ballistic-missile defense system, China sees a serious threat in a regional anti-missile system to be created. Such prerequisites for siding with China, however, may prove to be built on sand. Damanski Island, a source of border disputes in the past, may very well reappear. A more realistic approach in Russia is maintained by those in the military who believe the existing European security system, however formal, must remain safe from distortion under any circumstances. The latter believe the West is interested in at least preserving its formal security relations with Russia with a view to the Yugoslav crisis. Negotiation on adjusting the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe may serve as a channel for maintaining these relations. As the West sees no serious threat in Russia's conventional armed forces, it can afford significant concessions. With Russia-NATO tensions high, Western negotiators have agreed to let Russia increase its armed forces in Europe and preserve its army group in Northern Caucasus under the new Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe. The new treaty affects individual countries as opposed to blocs of countries. The West has also proved itself ready to restrict its extra-territorial-boundary emergency deployment forces to three brigades. This gives Russia relative security guarantees, as even if NATO decides to deploy three brigades in Poland, the outfit will obviously be insufficient for an invasion in Russia. European NATO members, already anticipating military actions in which the United States may not wish to participate, would like to prepare exclusively European structures within the alliance's joint armed forces. Herein lies an opportunity for Russia to take part in new European security structures. Activities aimed at developing a joint non-strategic anti-missile defense system provide yet another opportunity. A reasonable strategy for Russia would be to insist on resuming joint activities aimed at creating a new European security system, instead of just complaining about the West's injustices.
#13 Moscow Times June 3, 1999 Pushkin Is Everyone's Favorite Political Tool By Natalya Shulyakovskaya Staff Writer Alexander Pushkin is now the darling of the Russian political establishment. As preparations for the 200th birthday party this weekend for Russia's greatest poet sweep the capital, where seemingly each tiny shop is plastered with posters bearing Pushkin's profile, the political parties are using the Pushkin-mania to blow some wind into their own sails. They are distributing books of Pushkin's works to children, reciting his poetry and donating money to spruce up his family estate. On Monday, the Moscow regional headquarters of Mayor Yury Luzhkov's political movement Otechestvo, or Fatherland, organized festivities to present a new edition of a four-volume set of Pushkin's work published by the Khudozhestvennaya Literatura printing house. Fatherland bought 40 sets and presented them to 10 Moscow schools, the Morozov Children's Hospital and several city orphanages. "We were singing romances and giving children the books, there were even tears in their eyes," Fatherland spokesman Gennady Ivanov said enthusiastically. But Fatherland was not rushing to do too much, Ivanov said. The city government was funding so many programs related to Pushkin's birthday, he said, that the mayor's political movement "wanted to do just a few quality things." Spreading the word of Pushkin was a popular idea with another party: Our Home Is Russia, or NDR, led by the former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who was dismissed in March 1998. The party started getting ready for the literature giant's birthday well ahead of time, said Tatyana Piskaryova, an NDR spokeswoman. When Chernomyrdin was still in power, his party financed the publication of a complete 22-volume set of Pushkin's works, accompanied by academic commentary. "We consider Pushkin a symbolic figure, that is why it was important to us," Piskaryova said. She couldn't say how much NDR spent to publish the books. They were sent to every Russian region, except Chechnya, for the local party organization to distribute them to schools. The party also donated $10,000 to Pushkin's Mikhailovskoye family estate in the Pskov region, the NDR spokeswoman said. The party of the so-called "young reformers" seemed less anxious to jump on the Pushkin bandwagon. "I don't think we are doing anything," said a spokeswoman for Right Cause, a movement uniting such liberal-minded politicians as Boris Nemtsov, Anatoly Chubais and Yegor Gaidar. The Communists didn't miss their chance to pay tribute to the poet, who during Soviet times was celebrated as a bigger rebel against the tsarist regime than the experts now say he was. The Moscow Communist Party committee held a conference in April at the Pushkin Institute, where party leader Gennady Zyuganov gave a fiery speech on Pushkin and the need to maintain the purity of the Russian language. Two weeks ago, the Moscow party chief, Alexander Kuvayev, pulled in a full house at a House of Culture in an industrial region of the city for an evening of Pushkin poetry. "He read some poems himself, I don't remember which ones, but he is the type of man who remembers more than a couple of verses by heart. There were at least 800 people there. The hall was packed," said Anton Vasilchenko, spokesman for the Moscow party committee. "It's not every day you get to hear the first secretary speak on such a subject." Alexander Lebed's party requested that he be allowed to receive a medal from a charity foundation at the State Pushkin Museum, said Yelena Potyomina, the head of research at the museum. But the administration turned down the request. "We would love to see Lebed here, but we are trying to stay away from all the political games," she chuckled. "When Luzhkov helps us, it's not Luzhkov, the head of the Fatherland political movement, but Luzhkov, the head of the Moscow city administration." Molding Pushkin to fit the political needs of the day is nothing new. The poet himself, who moved from the free-spirited rebellion of his youth to fairly conservative pro-monarchy views in his 30s, provides a rich opportunity for interpretation. He was friends with many members of 1825 December rebellion. And according to legend, he answered "Yes" when Tsar Nicholas I asked him if he would have joined the Decembrists if he had been in St. Petersburg on the day of their uprising. But he was also extremely proud when the tsar himself offered to be his censor, Potyomina said, although it was the tsar's marks that prevented Bronze Horseman from being published during Pushkin's life - the poet was unwilling to change the lines to fit the tsar's tastes. Celebrations of Pushkin anniversaries have always been a reflection on the times, Potyomina said. During the centennial celebration in 1899, she said, it was the universities who took charge of heralding the poet. For the 150th anniversary, the Stalin state used Pushkin as a great national symbol. "Now, those who have the money rule," she said. The leader of a fringe nationalist group said this year's pompous celebrations are nauseating. "Hands off Pushkin!" said Eduard Limonov, a writer and the leader of the National Bolshevik Party. "Pushkin has been so soiled, just like an old bill. He is being stuffed down our throat like potatoes. It is disturbing." And as always, it seems to be Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the beleaguered nationalist leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, or LDPR, who dedicated the most extravagant political show to Pushkin. Last year, Zhirinovsky played Mozart in "Mozart and Salieri," a play by Pushkin. Konstantin Borovoi, a liberal State Duma member, was Salieri. "I was the prompter for Vladimir Volfovich [Zhirinovsky]. The monologues were really long, and although his memory is just great, he is a politician and he cannot remember everything," said Artyom Chetsov, an LDPR party worker. "He was so good, everyone said that if something doesn't work out for him as a politician, he could always make ends meet as an actor." During this weekend's celebrations, Zhirinovsky will participate in everything, Chetsov said with a zest so like his boss'. "He will go to the church services, to the charity dinners, and to Pskov, of course."