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Edited by David Johnson
| ISSUE #59 | July 30, 1999 |
| ISSUE #59 | July 30, 1999 |
#1 Intellectualcapital.com July 29, 1999 Spreading the Gospel of Democracy in Russia By Richard Pipes Although the media rarely report on such activities, since 1991 there have been numerous contacts between western intellectuals as well as academic centers and Russian institutions for the purpose of acquainting Russians with democratic procedures. One of the most effective of these exchanges takes place several times a year under the aegis of the Moscow School of Political Studies, a private organization supported financially by various European and American sponsors. Founded in 1992, it strives to introduce "members of Russia's new political class to the skills and concepts of democratic politics." The school holds seminars in various cities of Russia; it also occasionally transports its rotating student body to European cities to have it observe democratic politics in action. The school's founder and director, Dr. Elena Nemirovskaya, is a remarkably energetic woman, dedicated to spreading the democratic gospel among those young Russians who are likely to step into positions of power in the years ahead. Its typical students are men and women in their thirties employed by the national and regional dumas, ministries, city governments and the media. The school also carries out a publication program directed by her husband: it brings out books, mainly translations from foreign languages, which are distributed free of charge to universities and libraries. What I saw in Moscow I attended a session of the school held in Golitsyno, outside Moscow, in the third week of July and delivered a talk to some 100 attendees on the subject "What Russians should do and avoid doing in the Twenty First Century." In dealing with the second part of my subject, I stressed the need to give up -- at least for some time to come -- the notion that Russia is a world power. Russia qualifies for this status neither in terms of economic prowess nor those of influence on global mass culture. True, it has a vast arsenal of nuclear missiles but these weapons have no practical utility. The illusion of being a world power diverts the country from its most essential task which is constructing a lawful society able to protect the individual rights and private property of its citizens. Russians are accustomed to treating professors, especially foreign ones, with deference and rarely take issue with them. Thus my remarks did not elicit a sharp response. But both on this occasion and during a talk delivered to another but similar audience in Moscow, I had the distinct sense of resentment. No matter how hard one tries, it is difficult for a Western speaker to avoid giving the impression that he is lecturing to a defeated nation, and this inevitably gives offense. This became evident when an elderly participant rose to make some irrelevant remarks about the pollution of Russian culture allegedly caused by American films: it was the only comment from the audience that elicited spontaneous applause. Russian opinion A notable contribution to the seminar was made by Iurii Levada, the director of a major public opinion institute and a man with a profound understanding of the Russian psyche. He stressed in his report the apathetic mood of the Russian public since 1996-97, when the early illusions that democracy and capitalism would bring instant prosperity gave way to disappointment and bitterness. Today's Russians, he observed, rely on themselves and expect very little from the government. For that reason they desire first and foremost stability and order. On these grounds Levada predicted that the winner in next year's presidential elections will be the candidate able to persuade the voters not that things will get better -- only 20% entertain such hopes -- but that they will not get worse. Levada emphasized the failure of the Russian government to mobilize public opinion by appealing to national passions whether on the issue of Chechnya or of Kosovo. There does exist widespread resentment of the West and its main intellectual exports, democracy and capitalism, but when push comes to shove, Russians prefer not to press the issue too far. Thus 62% of the people polled believe that Russians can intervene in Yugoslavia only in agreement with the West. According to Levada, there are extremist trends both among the elderly and the young, mostly the uneducated. Thus 15% of the population is aggressively anti-Semitic, and the number of neo-Nazis among youth is growing. But these phenomena are marginal and do not represent a threat to society. The impression one gains both from personal observation and public opinion surveys is contradictory. On the one hand, the majority of Russians is estranged from government and prefers to rely on itself. This is all to the good in a country where for so long government ran everything and people came to depend on government largesse. On the other hand, such estrangement makes it difficult to rally the public for the constructive work of creating a modern Russia, which should be the country's foremost priority. Richard Pipes is Research Professor of History at Harvard University. In 1981-82 he served as Director of East European and Soviet Affairs in the National Security Council. He is a contributing editor of IntellectualCapital.com.
#2
Stepashin Visit Seen Aiding Russian-U.S. Cooperation
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
28 July 1999
[[translation for personal use only]
Report by Vladimir Lapskiy under the "Topical Issue" rubric: "Key
Words Are Stability and Investment"
Sergey Stepashin's speech at the U.S.-Russian
Business Council reception was devoted mainly to economic problems.
"We realize how much Russia depends on foreign investment, but Russia's
long-term future will be determined by its national capital, by the
development of its national industry, and by the class of national
entrepreneurs, who will be good partners," he said. The Russian premier
noted the special role of the state. In order for its alliance with
national entrepreneurs to be fruitful and mutually beneficial, the state
must play the role of a strict judge who upholds the letter of the law
rather than the interests of a select few. Only this, he said, will
enable us to use our wealth productively, to cooperate with our neighbors
as equals, and to increase the heritage of which Russia can and should be
proud. Sergey Stepashin defined the essence of the Russian cabinet's
actions as follows: "Our key words are stability and investment."
As Sergey Stepashin said, the Russian Government's main strategic goal
is a program of further dynamic reforms aimed at achieving progress
throughout society: "People who believe that this sort of long-term
program will not emerge until after the presidential election are
mistaken." According to Stepashin, the Russian economic situation has
changed substantially since August 1998, and the recovery from the crisis
has proved considerably swifter than Western and Russian experts
envisaged. Just one month of implementing economic stabilization measures
has produced important results: A stable ruble exchange rate has been
achieved; inflation is under control; industrial output is rising; the
process of restructuring banks has been stepped up; and there is major
improvement in the balance of payments. The government's current tactic
is to consolidate the results that have been achieved, to stabilize, and
to free the economy from such destabilizing factors as, above all,
foreign and domestic debt and the state budget deficit. A plan of urgent
economic measures has now been formulated clearly and coordinated with
the IMF. According to the prime minister, this document is "also our
program for the next 5-10 years; it is our main goal, and it determines
the pragmatism and the sound, enlightened conservatism of the government
that I head."
Tuesday [27 July] was the second, main day of the visit. The Russian premier
held talks with Albert Gore, met with Bill Clinton, chatted with Congress
leaders, and spoke at the National Press Club.
Sergey Stepashin received representatives of the United States' Russophone
community at the Russian Embassy in Washington. Many Russian expatriates
were invited, including actress Natalya Andreychenko, who now lives in
Los Angeles; artist Mikhail Shemyakin; and sculptor Ernst Neizvestnyy. In
his conversation with the representatives of the "Russian diaspora," the
Russian Government head lamented the former lack of attention paid to his
compatriots, and said that "it is wrong when Russia forgets about them."
Moscow and Washington believe that Sergey Stepashin's working trip to the
United States will substantially advance Russian-U.S. cooperation in a
number of key areas, first and foremost in the commercial and economic
sphere. Both capitals recognize the extraordinary importance of
strengthening a system of international relations founded on respect for
the norms of international law.
[Description of Source: Rossiyskaya Gazeta -- Government daily newspaper.]
#3
Voice of America
DATE=7/28/1999
TITLE=STEPASHIN - POLITICS
BYLINE=ANDRE DE NESNERA
DATELINE=WASHINGTON
INTRO: Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin is in
Washington meeting U-S political and business leaders.
In this report from the U-S capital, former Moscow
Correspondent Andre de Nesnera looks at Mr.
Stepashin's tenure as Prime Minister - and his chances
of becoming Russia's next President.
TEXT: Sergei Stepashin has been Russian Prime Minister
for only two months. Last May, Russian President Boris
Yeltsin fired then Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov,
replacing him with the 47-year-old Stepashin - a
former Justice and Interior Minister.
Mr. Stepashin is a loyal Yeltsin supporter. Before
being part of previous Russian governments, he spent
most of his career in the Intelligence Services,
including directing the Federal Security Services -
the domestic successor to the Soviet K-G-B.
Western experts say Mr. Stepashin has done a good job,
given the short time he has been in office.
Paul Saunders -an expert on Russia with the
(Washington-based)"Nixon Center" research
organization, says he has performed well if you take
into account the economic and political situation in
the country.
/// FIRST SAUNDERS ACT ///
The economy is in a very difficult situation,
which is really challenging to resolve. The
political situation is unstable and somewhat
confusing - and he has to work with a President
who began undermining his effectiveness in the
eyes of his co-workers and other people in the
country within two or three weeks of when he was
appointed. I am talking about Yeltsin's comments
at the (G-8) Cologne Summit and even earlier,
that he was partially satisfied with Stepashin's
work. And it is not constructive to have a
President say things of that nature,
particularly so early after Stepashin assumed
his duties. So I think taking into account all
the challenges he has faced, he has done fairly
well.
/// END ACT ///
Analyst Paul Saunders.
Whenever a Russian politician becomes Prime Minister,
he is automatically seen as a potential presidential
candidate. The Russian Constitution prohibits Boris
Yeltsin from running for a third term.
An analyst with the (Washington-based) "Carnegie
Endowment" Research Center - Michael McFaul - believes
Mr. Stepashin could be a viable candidate.
/// McFAUL ACT ///
First and foremost, he can run as a candidate of
stability. Second, he can run as a candidate of
the younger generation. He is almost 20 years
younger then all of the other candidates who
could run against him. He can run as a "law and
order" candidate, given his background in the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and later running
the F-S-B, the former K-G-B. And he has good
relations with regional leaders. He promotes a
kind of federal order in Russia as opposed to
some of the candidates who stress a more unitary
state within Russia. So he has a lot of
attractive qualities as a candidate. He just has
to make it through and survive as Prime Minister
in order to have a chance to run.
/// END ACT ///
Analyst Michael McFaul.
Experts say for Mr. Stepashin to have any chance of
becoming Russian President, he must stay in office as
Prime Minister until the June elections. Paul Saunders
from the "Nixon Center" is not too optimistic about
that happening.
/// SECOND SAUNDERS ACT ///
So - I have to be kind of skeptical about
Stepashin's chances to become elected President,
just because I am not confident he will be able
to remain in office as Prime Minister long
enough to be able to compete effectively in the
election.
/// END ACT ///
Given President Yeltsin's track record in recent years
in naming and dismissing Prime Ministers, experts say
Mr. Stepashin's job security may be precarious. When
he was nominated in May, he was Mr. Yeltsin's fourth
choice in less than a year. And there are some reports
from Moscow indicating he may not even last until the
end of the year.
#4 Moscow Times July 29, 1999 DEFENSE DOSSIER: U.S. Still Kremlin's Patron By Pavel Felgenhauer This week's visit to the United States by Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin was the culmination of more than a month of frantic efforts to revive relations, which were severely damaged during NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia. To mend fences, Stepashin and U.S. Vice President Al Gore exchanged nice words about "friendship," and both sides made important concessions. The "strategic partnership" is seemingly back on track. Stepashin not only told his American audience that he "loves them all," but also tentatively agreed that the United States should be allowed to develop antiballistic defenses against potential missile attack by rogue regimes. In Washington, Stepashin's remarks were taken as a hint that Moscow may allow an entire reshaping of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, or ABM. In return the United States, after more than a year of wrangling, agreed to allocate Russia an additional quota of four commercial space launches a year. Last January, the U.S. administration threatened to cut back or even eliminate the launches if the Russian government failed to stop leaks of nuclear and missile technologies to Iran. There has been no significant change in Russia-Iran ties. On the contrary, the Russian Nuclear Power Ministry has recently announced that it is considering a plan to build three more big nuclear power reactors in Iran, in addition to the one already under construction. But the United States has still dropped its objections for the time being and allocated new space launches. The Kremlin and the U.S. administration have, apparently, good reason to press for a new dītente against all odds. The situation in Russia is unstable. The present regime - the kleptocracy and the oligarchs that support it - will have to twist the Russian Constitution in different ways to thwart the will of the people and stay in power despite the impending elections. To do this, the Kremlin badly needs Western political support and financial aid. To retain the West as a paying patron, the Kremlin publicly backed away from the angry statements it made at the beginning of the bombing of Yugoslavia. "Aggressors" very quickly became "friends" again. Russia even helped the West to press the Serbs out of Kosovo. The Kremlin actually helped President Bill Clinton off the hook of an unwinnable war, but this was not philanthropy and not even simply an attempt to make a quick dollar in the form of new credits and a possible write-off of old debt. Had the Kosovo war dragged on, had a NATO ground invasion of Yugoslavia been in progress in the autumn of 1999, a broad liaison between the West and the Russian kleptocracy would be in real trouble. This liaison has for years involved not only the release of International Monetary Fund credits, but also meant the West turning a blind eye to the laundering of tens or maybe hundreds of billions of dollars that the kleptocracy stole in Russia and then squirreled away in the West. For years the West acted as a fence for Russian government-connected corruption, time and again giving the Kremlin a clean bill of health, insisting that "Russia is on the right track." To keep this "strategic partnership" alive, Russia's rulers are apparently ready to pay almost any price. But for all the effort being put into the new dītente by Washington and Moscow, the practical results are minimal. Stepashin may have hinted that the ABM treaty will be amended, but the Russian generals that will be negotiating possible changes believe any rewriting of the treaty is tantamount to treason. The Kremlin makes the overall political decisions, but the Russian military negotiators at the arms reduction talks in Moscow next month will do their best to drag their feet. During NATO's war against Yugoslavia, Russian military chiefs expressed their genuine opinion about the West and its policies. Today these generals are being forced by Russia's rulers into a dītente, but they still use any occasion to show their U.S. counterparts their real feelings and thwart any true progress. The Kremlin can force through changes in the ABM treaty, but they will not be ratified by parliament. As long as U.S. officials insist on pressing deals with the present Russian regime, which is very unpopular and believed to be corrupt by a majority of Russians, even agreements that are generally in Russia's national interest will get stalled. Since President Boris Yeltsin and his administration are seen to be bad by most Russians, any deal they sign is by default considered detrimental to the national interests of the country. A sellout. Pavel Felgenhauer is chief defense correspondent for Segodnya.
#5 Russia: IMF Renews Lending By Michael Lelyveld Boston, 29 July 1999 (RFE/RL) -- After nearly a year, Russia has mended its damaged ties to the West as the International Monetary Fund renewed lending Wednesday for the first time since the crisis of last August 17. The approval of an IMF loan program totaling $4.5 billion may have little direct effect on Russia's economic problems in the near term. Moscow will not actually receive the first installment of $640 million because the entire credit line will be used to pay the debt obligations to the IMF that Russia has already incurred. But the loan has set the stage for a series of compromises that could put Russian finances back on track. Both the Paris Club of official lenders and the London Club of commercial creditors will meet this week to deal with the problems of Russian debt. The World Bank has prepared a series of loans that could be worth some $2 billion over the next 18 months and about $600 million this year. Japan is also ready to resume lending. "Everybody has been waiting for the IMF," said Keith Bush, director of the Russia and Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. But the IMF action also follows a series of compromises that have already taken place. For months after the August default, IMF officials were adamant that they would not permit further financing that would amount to a simple rollover of past loans, although analysts say it appears they have now done exactly that. The IMF also insisted that a series of measures would have to be passed by the State Duma and implemented before there could be more loans. The Duma passed some measures but recessed with more work to be done. The Russian government has agreed to call the Duma back into special session in August to reconsider at least one rejected measure, while President Boris Yeltsin pledged to impose a four-fold increase in the land tax by decree. Russia has committed itself to new safeguards after an audit of central bank practices involving the offshore Jersey firm FIMACO and the loss of the IMF's last loan of $4.8 billion during the August collapse. The decision to resume lending was taken only after a full day of deliberation ending in the evening hours Wednesday, although an IMF official declined to characterize the process as particularly long or difficult. The flexibility on both sides may reflect the West's broad agenda with Russia and the judgment that the country cannot simply be lost. Russia's engagement with the United States is of particular importance, as demonstrated this week during the Washington visit of Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin. The Stepashin meeting with Vice President Al Gore produced no landmark agreements, but the two sides were clearly eager to renew their relations in all their difficult dimensions following the rift over Kosovo. It is notable that NATO's bombing of Kosovo, which lasted 78 days, produced a diplomatic freeze between the United States and Russia which lasted only 48 days since Serbia agreed to withdraw its troops on June 9. The needs on both sides are too great to be ignored. Perhaps the proof of that lies in the decision to begin new arms control talks in August. President Yeltsin has previously agreed to consider a START-3 pact for further cuts in nuclear arsenals, even though the Duma has already delayed ratification of the START-2 treaty, signed in 1993. The talks are unlikely to alter the Duma's reluctance, but they could provide a venue for re-negotiating the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, an issue of high importance to Washington. Although Stepashin conceded that both countries may be threatened by rogue nations, it is the United States that has repeatedly pressed for amendments to the ABM accord. Some U.S. lawmakers have threatened to scrap the ABM treaty altogether, unless allowances are made for a limited antimissile defense system in the United States. Any move to annul the treaty would set a poor precedent for arms control pacts and efforts to stem proliferation. Cooperation may also hold the key to the problem of Theater Missile Defense (TMD). Events unfolding in East Asia could raise pressure on the United States for both antimissile and TMD systems to irresistible levels. Persistent reports that North Korea is preparing to test a long-range missile have prompted calls for a TMD system in Japan. Taiwan may also seek TMD protection if its row with Beijing over "one-China" policy escalates. In both instances, Washington has only limited leverage to shape events. Russia may be able to help by showing flexibility on the ABM issue, even if no TMD systems are ever built. The option of missile defense may at least serve to increase U.S. leverage until diplomatic solutions can be found. Russia's cooperation on security may be balanced by its own economic needs. In such a relationship, Russia may seek Western flexibility in financing for years to come. Neither side is likely to be successful without the other. If such an understanding is the outcome of the Stepashin visit, then the trip may well be seen as a success.
#6
Date: Fri, 30 Jul 1999
From: Edward Lucascottrell@online.ru
Organization: The Economist
Subject: from this week's Economist
The Economist
July 31-August 6, 1999
Russia talks to America
Russia and America try to make up
M O S C O W
The visit of Russia's prime minister to Washington may have reduced tension
between the two countries, but there is little hope that western money can
turn round Russia's economy any time soon
A SHORT agenda and a large cheque. That was the happy upshot of Sergei
Stepashin's trip to Washington this week, his first as Russia's prime
minister, which coincided with the IMF's decision to provide another
bail-out worth $4.5 billion for his unhappy country.
Overall, the trip was more remarkable for what did not happen than what
did. Previous prime-ministerial visits to Washington have been flagged with
signs of progress--what diplomats call deliverables-- designed to show
that, thanks to American generosity and wisdom, Russia was shedding bad
habits and moving the right way.
This time things were different. First, because Mr Stepashin was in
Washington so briefly --barely 24 hours. Second, because there was so
little of substance discussed: a resumption of some talks on arms control
was the main outcome.
This reflects reality. Neither America nor Russia is investing very heavily
in the current relationship. Both presidents are nearing the end of their
terms in office. Vice-President Al Gore, Mr Stepashin's opposite number
during his visit, is already under attack for his Russian policy from his
main Republican challenger for the presidency, the governor of Texas,
George W. Bush. He and his advisers say that the Clinton-Gore
administration has spent too much time hobnobbing with corrupt and
unpopular reformers in Russia and too little time trying to strengthen
democratic institutions and values. That tends to make Mr Gores camp
cautious.
Domestic politics apart, each side was more jaundiced about the other than
at past summits. American faith in Russia's economic and political progress
has been sorely shaken by the financial crash last August; by the
appointment as prime minister, albeit (as it turned out) temporarily, of
Yevgeny Primakov, seen by many in Washington as a sinister anti-American
schemer; and by the seemingly terminal weakness of Russia's pro-western,
pro-reform camp. Russia, in turn, felt humiliated by Americas blithe
indifference to its views about Yugoslavia. Many in Russia's government
also think that western economic advice has been poor.
The main objective for both sides during Mr Stepashin's visit was to
project at least the appearance of normality. That went well. The form, if
not the content, of the previous relationship is being restored. It helps
that Mr Stepashin, aged 47, is a more engaging personality than the
ponderous Viktor Chernomyrdin, 61, the last Russian prime minister to visit
Washington, in March last year. Mr Stepashin has a nice line in
self-deprecating humour. As a former political officer in the fire brigade,
he understands something of propaganda work. Remember these two words:
investment and stability, he told an audience in Washington. He also
publicly denounced Russia's overmighty tycoons, even naming a big oil
baron, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who is locked in battle with an American
investor, Kenneth Dart.
Nice try. It would have been hard to imagine Mr Chernomyrdin, himself
closely tied to the gas industry, saying the same thing. And inviting
foreign investors to look again at Russia is not the lost cause it would
have been, say, six months ago. But Mr Stepashin's assurances of good
government and openness would have carried more weight if his entourage had
not included the notorious Yevgeny Nazdratenko. As governor of the
appallingly run Primorsky Krai (Maritime Territory) of Russia's Far East,
he is a living symbol of the problems facing foreign companies in Russia.
Much the same gap between official talk and practical reality applies to
the IMF. On paper, Russia has made enough progress this year in patching up
its finances to make a new credit from the IMF seem defensible. The
rouble's devaluation has pepped up Russian industry, at least for now.
Coupled with a higher oil price, it has helped the government collect more
taxes and balance its books. That keeps interest rates down. The economy
may even grow slightly this year; if so, it will be for only the second
time in eight years of chaotic reform.
But the real reasons for the IMF loan are different. One is pressure from
the Clinton administration, which does not want to push Russia into total
bankruptcy in an election year. Another is to save the IMF's own face: the
money will in effect be used only to pay back Russia's other debts to the
Fund. The agreements most serious result will be to give Russia a basis for
haggling with its other creditors (foreign banks and western governments)
over the debts it took over from the Soviet Union in 1991. Russia now says
this was a mistake; that it also gained the Soviet Unions assets is
breezily forgotten.
Whether Russia's economic policy will actually improve is questionable.
Revealingly, Russia's memorandum to the IMF acknowledges that the program
for 1999 contains many elements of previous economic programmes of the
Russian government that were not always implemented on a sustained basis.
The government and the CBR [Central Bank of Russia] intend to fully
implement these earlier specified measures now. With a Russian general
election due in December (and a presidential one next June), it is hard to
see Russian politicians putting in motion the painful reforms that they
have always flunked in the past.
Certainly, such progress as has been made on the all-important structural
issues--chiefly the reorganisation of the corrupt and incompetent
commercial banking system--gives little reason for confidence. MFK
Renaissance, a Moscow-based investment bank, describes the governments
actions to date as laughably pathetic.
There is also little sign of increased accountability. For all Mr
Stepashin's bold words, the oligarchs, as Russia's tycoons are known, still
control the heights (and depths) of the economy. The IMF has had to swallow
hard, even by its own standards, to overlook revelations of the Russian
central banks unorthodox practices in past years, which included keeping
the reserves in an obscure offshore company and using them to play the
government debt market--apparently, by the by, passing the profits on to
President Yeltsin's political slush fund. A report by western auditors on
this is due to come out soon. Pass the whitewash.
#7 Russian Nuclear Missiles a Y2K Threat WASHINGTON, DC, U.S.A., 1999 JUL 29 (Newsbytes) -- By David McGuire, Newsbytes. Y2K-related computer glitches could cause nuclear early warning defense systems to go haywire, generating false information about nuclear attacks, according to a pair of US senators. Sens. Christopher Dodd, D-Conn., and Robert Bennett, R-Utah, released a joint statement today, warning of the danger and urging Russian authorities to reopen talks about establishing, on a temporary basis, a joint nuclear early warning center with the United States. Development of such a center had been under way but was suspended during NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia. "We aren't trying to get too alarmist here, but we still haven't been able to get the Russians back to the table," Dodd spokesperson Unice Lieberman told Newsbytes today. Bennett and Dodd are both members of the Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem. There are some 6,000 Russian nuclear weapons "pointed" at the United States, according to the senators. In addition to the joint statement, Bennett and Dodd today released a letter that they sent earlier this week to Sergei Stepashin, prime minister of the Russian Federation. In the letter, dated July 27, the senators wrote, "It is still our wish that key U.S. and Russian Y2K decision-makers can meet next month to examine the kind of collaborative Y2K efforts that would benefit both of our countries." Lieberman stressed that nuclear weapons in the US and abroad can't be launched automatically, but warned that dangers still exist. "Nuclear weapons can't go off by themselves, but you could have some misinterpreted data," Lieberman said. The proposed joint early warning center, called the Y2K Center for Strategic Stability has already been built in Colorado Springs, Colo., but needs to be linked to Russia to be operational.
#8 Popkovich: Duma May Ratify START II Treaty in Oct/Nov SOCHI. July 28 (Interfax) -- The State Duma may ratify the START II treaty as early as October or November of this year, Head of the Duma Committee for Defense Roman Popkovich of the Our Home is Russia faction, told Interfax Wednesday. "But deputies will do so only under certain conditions. The foreign-policy context must be favorable for taking such a decision," he said. Popkovich said that the future of START II and START III, and of the ABM treaty was discussed by Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin in the United States, and he expressed the hope that upon his return to Moscow Stepashin would disclose the details of these consultations. He said Russia might agree to partially reconsider the ABM treaty. "But if we do so, the problem should be considered in all its entirety, which means that adjustments should also be made in START II and the level of armaments lowered, he said, adding that "we must ensure that the country's defences are not weakened." Furthermore, new agreements must exclude the repetition of the situation connected with START I, the individual provisions of which are not being implemented by the United States, he said. "We have not received any coherent explanations as to why this is happening," said Popkovich.
#9 Boston Globe July 28, 1999 Gangs create terror zones at Russia-Chechnya border By David Filipov MALYUGAYEVSKAYA, Russia - The last thing Lidiya Semyonova and her friends probably felt was the way their relief abruptly turned to terror. They were strolling back to their homes in this small, dusty border village late one night when a Russian police patrol offered to escort them. Here in the violent badlands that separate Russia and breakaway Chechnya, a little armed protection is never a bad idea. Only this time it was not enough. Sometime after midnight, gunmen opened fire from close range on the officers' jeep, riddling it with machine-gun bullets and rocket-propelled grenades. Semyonova, 24, three other young women, and two police officers died instantly. Two others were seriously wounded. The gunmen gathered the Russians' weapons and disappeared into the woods that mark the border with Chechnya. That attack last week - unexplained and senseless - was typical of the wave of bloodshed that has left dozens dead and hundreds missing, turning the territory surrounding the separatist North Caucasus republic into a virtual war zone. Russia lost control over Chechnya in 1996, when its troops were forced to withdraw after two years of fighting with rebels that killed 80,000 people by most estimates. Now, with the recent events on the Chechen border, Moscow is having trouble protecting its own territory. Armed gangs operating around Chechnya have already turned the border regions of Stavropol, Dagestan, and Ingushetia into zones of terror, where murder is common, hostage-taking for ransom is a daily event, and cattle-rustling and car theft are no longer looked upon as serious crimes. ''We demand Moscow's help with the border,'' said Yuri Samarkin, deputy head of the local administration, about Galyugayevskaya. ''But it's only getting worse.'' In the last three months, the gangs have grown bolder, launching full-scale military attacks on the undermanned, poorly equipped, and woefully few Russian police checkpoints set up along the border. The shooting near Galyugayevskaya was followed by two more deadly attacks the next day, once again by unseen gunmen against Russian police patrols. This time, two Russian commanders were killed and seven police wounded. ''Officially, there's not supposed to be a war on, but the killing hasn't stopped and we find corpses every couple of days,'' said Sergeant Yevgeny Tkachenko, 23, as he and two comrades patrolled the sand dunes that span the unmarked border between the Stavropol region and Chechnya. The other day he came across the bodies of two fellow police who had been shot in an ambush, again at close range. The gunmen took the jeep and fled to Chechnya. Officially, Tkachenko and his men are just police officers patrolling their own Russian territory in the border town of Mirny - on cop's pay of less than a buck a day. But when they put on their 40-pound flak jackets in the sweltering heat and leave the heavily guarded police compound to patrol the border, they have the furtive, watchful look of soldiers in an occupying army - eerily reminiscent of the way Russian forces in Chechnya's capital, Grozny, used to look during the war. That is because gunmen from the other side can easily cross the border, an essentially unguarded and unmarked stretch of sand. The 200 men in Tkachenko's force are hard pressed to protect themselves, much less prevent anyone from crossing the 80 miles of no man's land they are supposed to be guarding. One night last week, someone crept up to within shooting range of the compound and had begun digging breastworks before they were detected and forced to flee. ''Most of the people in these villages are Chechens, and some of them are spies,'' Tkachenko said as his patrol lumbered over the dunes in a borrowed van. He was going to explain what that meant when a voice crackled excitedly over his walkie talkie: ''Get OUT of there RIGHT NOW!'' The van spun around and sped away as quickly as it could. An armored personnel carrier rumbled in the opposite direction toward a nearby checkpoint that was under attack. The toll this time: four Russian servicemen wounded. Tkachenko, like many Russians here, would solve the problem by installing fences, watchtowers, trip wires, and a legitimate border guard force. But that would merely legitimize Chechnya's claim to independence, which Moscow refuses to accept. There is another reason people in Stavropol do not want the border closed. The huge, largely agricultural region depends heavily on trade with oil-rich Chechnya for fuel, which it pays for in grain and flour. A closed border would cause even more economic chaos in an already dirt-poor region. And closing the border would hardly improve the lot of the hundreds of ethnic Russians who still live in Chechnya and travel by day across the border to find work and goods, or the 2,400 ethnic Chechens who live on the Russian side. ''No one here in any position of authority supports the idea'' of closing the border, said Captain Igor Pogosov, a spokesman for the Stavropol region's police force. ''If our fields are plowed, it's thanks to the Chechens.'' Instead, Russian forces have tried to fight fire with fire. Earlier this month, Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo vowed to use artillery and helicopters to defeat the gunmen. Yesterday, Rushailo said at a press conference in Moscow that the tactic was having a positive effect. On the ground, police tell a different story. ''They start firing out of those woods over there,'' said a Chechen war veteran manning a police border post called Checkpoint Number 7. ''We fire back. They start using mortars, rockets, heavy artillery. We have machine guns. We call in the helicopters, but by the time they get here, [the gunmen] are gone.'' While the situation on the ground looks like war, it lacks two things all wars are supposed to have: a clear enemy, and a clear reason. While the Russian police routinely refer to their tormentors as ''the Chechens,'' in fact the only thing they truly know is that the attackers come from the Chechen side of the border. Are ''the Chechens'' trying to scare them? To test their resolve? To win more territory for their separatist state? Or is this all some dark political conspiracy dreamed up in the Kremlin? No one on the Russian side can agree on the answer. The makeup of the gangs is even harder to ascertain. Pogosov said police recently broke up a large kidnapping and rustling ring in which most of the members were Russians. The gang would leave clues to make police think they were operating out of Chechnya, when in fact they were herding captured people and stolen cattle to a neighboring Russian region. The Chechens themselves deny involvement in the crimes. Edelbek Ibragimov, until recently Grozny's chief envoy to Moscow, suggested that the upsurge in the fighting was a plot by Russian hawks to derail planned talks between President Boris N. Yeltsin and Chechnya's popularly elected leader, Aslan Maskhadov. ''We don't want the world to think we're bandits,'' Ibragimov said. ''Why do they blame every crime that happens in Russia on Chechnya? This is an open effort to discredit Maskhadov.'' Ibragimov has a point there - every time a bomb goes off in Moscow, police, security forces, and the media start looking for ''a Chechen trail.'' But it is also true that the main effort to discredit Maskhadov is coming from within Chechnya. Maskhadov, a former Soviet military colonel who led Chechnya's lightly armed guerrillas to victory against Europe's largest military, has been unable to rein in his former lieutenants who say he is too close to Moscow. Some of these ''field commanders,'' as they are known in Russia, talk about setting up a radical, Islamic confederation that would include Chechnya and the neighboring Russian regions to the east and west, Dagestan and Ingushetia. Among the most notorious commanders is Khattab, who has a military training camp for Islamic fighters right across the Terek River from Russia's Checkpoint Number 7. Moscow accuses Khattab and the other commanders for the kidnappings of many of the 500 hostages in Chechnya - of police, soldiers, actors, journalists, aid workers, priests, youngsters, or anyone else who might win a ransom. ''Instability,'' said a captain at Checkpoint Number 7, who requested anonymity. ''He wants instability. And he has got it.''
#10 U.S. 'Self-Aggrandizement' Drove Kosovo War Rossiyskaya Gazeta 23 July 1999 [translation for personal use only] "Rejoinder" article by Vladimir Fedorov: "Self-Importance As a Feature of National Character" Last Wednesday Rossiskaya Gazeta published an interview with Colin McMahon, chief of the Chicago Tribune's Moscow bureau, who has observed the Kosovo conflict at close quarters. The piece contains many interesting details which flesh out the general picture of the dramatic events in the Kosovo region. But there was one point in the U.S. correspondent's replies to Rossiyskaya Gazeta's questions that caught my eye. His reaction to the Russian airborne troops' dash from Bosnia to the Kosovan city of Pristina. The final part of the answer is as follows: "It is important that the Russians came to Kosovo and became part of the peacekeeping force. When the history books are written, this is what they will write about. The dash to the airport will be mentioned in the notes rather than in the main text." What he said about "notes" in the margin of history encapsulates that particularly quality that conveys one of the main, if not the main character trait of the contemporary American -- what we have called in previous Rossiyskaya Gazeta pieces self-aggrandizement. But let us return to Kosovo. The dash to Pristina was the final act in the first phase of the peacekeeping mission Russia had undertaken, a logical act in every respect. The Western powers were right when they rated highly Moscow's previous efforts to halt the bloodshed in Yugoslavia -- had it not been for Russian shuttle diplomacy and its efforts to iron out seemingly irreconcilable differences between Belgrade, Washington, and NATO headquarters in Brussels, you might now be hearing tanks, shells, and gunfire of a NATO military campaign in the Balkans (it is clear from NATO documents that were secret until recently that President Milosevic agreed to withdraw Yugoslav forces from the region literally three days before the planned NATO ground campaign -- he heeded the Russian mediator's urgent recommendations). So the alliance's victory was not least a victory for common sense at the Russian-Yugoslav negotiating table. And as soon as that happened the West tried to move Russia aside and play down its involvement in very important events in Europe, right next to its borders. Why? It is what the United States wanted. Using NATO as an instrument, it wanted to become master of the Kosovo house, establish its ways there, and ultimately give the ethnic Albanians and "Kosova Liberation Army" gunmen all the advantages over the indigenous population -- the Serbs. Russia was obliged to intervene in order to restore justice. The importance of its direct involvement in the Kosovo settlement and the urgent need for it become clearer with each passing day. Why, then, one wonders, should its constructive role be "expunged" from the history books? As we can see, the United States intends to write this history itself and decide whom to include and whom to leave out. But compiling legends for the world's annals is not actually the most important thing. The main thing as far as it is concerned is that this history should conform to its stereotypes. And the best, the latest example of this is Kosovo. Washington badly wanted the military campaign. In the first place it had to show that NATO and the U.S. presence in Europe are needed; second, it had to rouse the European allies, and third, it wanted to test new weapons systems "in the field." The pretext it found was ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. I believe that had it not been for U.S. pressure on the allies the Europeans themselves would never have sent the airmen and seamen to the Balkans. It was a war that was wanted above all by the Americans, to satisfy their bellicose imperialism, to assert their status as the "leading world power, and to subjugate everyone else -- first and foremost, paradoxically, the European allies: After all, their desire for independence has increased enormously of late. Why, to compile a history without Russia by providing it with a glossy cover bearing the American flag is a perfectly simple affair.
#11 Moscow Times July 29, 1999
EDITORIAL: Threatening News Media Not the Way
Newspaper, radio and television editors write an open letter to the president saying they are being persecuted by a rogue Kremlin official. They accuse this official - the presidential chief of staff - of using politically motivated tax raids to intimidate them. Boris Yeltsin meets with his accused chief of staff, Alexander Voloshin. Voloshin then comes out - while Yeltsin hides in the shadows - and says Yeltsin is worried about "informationalracketeering" and "impermissible" pressure exerted on the government by NTV television and other news outlets of the Media-MOST publishing empire. This is a disturbing turn of events. It is one thing for two television stations, ORT and NTV, to snipe at each other, as they have been doing for weeks now. It is something else again for the Russian president to threaten the Media-MOST crowd. And make no mistake, this is a threat - and one that has Yeltsin's seal of approval. Let's not have any of that ridiculous wishful thinking that "maybe the president doesn't know." Yeltsin knows. The Media-MOST crowd is fretting publicly that the president is probably not getting good information. This argument is worth respecting only as a convenient fiction, one that leaves Yeltsin with a face-saving way to back down. The proper response to the Media-MOST editors' public letter would have been for Yeltsin himself to publicly order a formal investigation. After all, these were serious charges brought by respected media. They deserved serious consideration. Last week it was the new press minister, Mikhail Lesin - another Kremlin courtier, worrying aloud that "protection of the state from the free mass media is a very pressing issue today." Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, former privatization tsar Anatoly Chubais, Communist chief Gennady Zyuganov - all of those men were united in alarm over the so-called "media wars." But what really unites men like Chubais, Zyuganov and Stepashin is the knowledge that on their own, they are all utterly unelectable. These very different men share a similarity: They are doing well under the status quo, and very much want that status quo to continue. That can only happen if Yeltsin's courtiers can figure out a way to keep the Kremlin in the family. Shrugging off the status quo, however, is obviously in the interests of the Russian people - remember them? So it's fair enough that NTV & Co. are portraying themselves as defenders of Russian democracy: Whatever one thinks of Luzhkov or Yavlinsky, either would be preferable to a puppet president whose strings are to be pulled by a Berezovsky or a Voloshin - or, for that matter, by a President Emeritus Yeltsin.