#1
Moscow Times
July 15, 1999 
DEFENSE DOSSIER: Yeltsin Woos the Generals 
By Pavel Felgenhauer 

This week President Boris Yeltsin left town for a summer recess and the 
political life in Moscow has slowed down in the simmering heat. July and 
August in Russia, as in many other countries, is traditionally a time when 
the nation's decision-makers go to a country dacha or to the sea, and 
journalists do not know where to find stories to write about. 

Of course, in recent years the old Soviet tradition of doing no serious 
business in the July-August heat has often been abused. In August 1991, the 
old Soviet nomenklatura tried to stage a coup to restore full party rule. The 
coup failed and the Soviet Union subsequently collapsed. 

Seven years later, last August, the pro-Western liberal economic reforms 
collapsed together with the Russian financial system, leaving the country 
high and dry, stranded helplessly between two worlds. Russia first failed in 
Communism and then - even more dramatically - in capitalism. 

In August 1991, Yeltsin won the fray not because he had the courage to climb 
on a tank to declare that he would defy the coup and its plotters. Yeltsin 
and his supporters won because there was a tank easy to climb on: Its crew, 
and the crews of other tanks that were sent to Moscow to crush resistance to 
the coup, were not ready to shoot or arrest or do anything to stop Yeltsin, 
his supporters and armed guards from prancing on their armor. 

In August 1991, the Russian military, including high-ranking generals, was 
not ready to fight in the streets of Moscow to maintain Communist rule. Quiet 
insubordination engulfed unit after unit as soon as they moved into Moscow. 
In three days it was all over: The generals had to move the troops back into 
the barracks, since keeping them in Moscow would have meant having to cope 
with open disloyalty and even armed insurrection in the ranks. 

Two years later, in August 1993, when Yeltsin was planning an armed coup of 
his own - to use force to dislodge the Supreme Soviet, the Russian parliament 
- he did his best to befriend the military in advance. The Russian military 
got hefty pay raises that year. Yeltsin traveled to military units dressed in 
uniform and freely handed out decorations and promotions. 

The same is happening today. Last April the Russian government substantially 
increased military pay. Last week Yeltsin met Russia's most important 
military leaders in the Kremlin and promised them more money, presidential 
support and understanding of their needs. Yeltsin heaped praise on the 
military and announced that rumors of the Russian army's collapse were "utter 
nonsense." The president also handed out more decorations and promised more 
promotions for the faithful. 

Handing out decorations and promotions is, of course, the cheapest way to 
keep a military man happy. Finding money for meaningful military reform or 
simply keeping officers pay at a subsistence level for long periods of time 
is much harder. But Yeltsin has been a public politician for more than 10 
years. Yeltsin knows that to win elections you need to combine small handouts 
with great promises. Afterward the promises can be forgotten. 

Today Yeltsin behaves in public as if the presidential election campaign were 
in full swing, as if he, Yeltsin, were running, and as if the only people 
eligible to vote for president were oligarchs, regional governors and 
military officers. Yeltsin is desperately fighting to win the hearts and 
minds of Russia's military. During last week's meeting with the generals, and 
during a Kremlin reception for graduating military cadets,Russia's old and 
unsteady president, who never served in the army, pathetically tried to goose 
step, as a way of being accepted by the troops as one of their own. 

The possibility of unconstitutional actions, for which Yeltsin will need 
military support, is growing. Free and fair elections are not an option for 
Yeltsin and the oligarchs that control the Kremlin. Pro-liberal, pro-market 
forces will surely lose any genuinely free election in the coming years in 
Russia. Mikhail Prusak, the pro-reform governor of the Novgorod region, said 
in an interview last week that Yeltsin, "as father of the nation," should 
disband both houses of parliament and call a non-elected assembly, a zemskoi 
sobor, to rewrite the Constitution and "mend the economy." 

Yeltsin and the people he represents know that if they lose the Kremlin, 
there will come a time of reckoning in Russia. The "young reformers," 
"democrats" and oligarchs who have stolen Russia will go to prison and then 
be put on show trials, together with Yeltsin. It is highly probable that the 
future of Russia will be decided by the gun, not the ballot box. 

#2
Defense Minister Sergeyev Quoted on Nuclear Use

Trud
July 10, 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Sergey Ishchenko entitled, "Sensation: Don't Drive Russia 
into a Corner." 

Yesterday RF Minister of Defense Marshal Igor 
Sergeyev emphasized that during the course of the recently completed 
"Zapad-99" command-staff exercises the Russian Armed Forces worked out a 
variant of a preemptive use of a nuclear weapon against an enemy. In 
Sergeyev's words, this previews "one of the theses of Russia's military 
doctrine,--when in the event of a war all measures have been exhausted, 
we have not achieved success in the defense, and the enemy continues to 
penetrate into the depth of our territory..." Thus, it is obvious that 
the Kremlin and the Ministry of Defense leadership in a possible major 
armed conflict today is making a decisive gamble on strategic weapons of 
destruction. ... 

#3
RUSSIA DOES NOT PLAN TO "UNFREEZE" RELATIONS WITH NATO

   MOSCOW. July  15 (Interfax) - The Russian Defense Ministry does not
plan to "unfreeze" relations with NATO, a highly-placed Defense Ministry
source told Interfax Thursday.

    No exchanges  of visits,  or talks  or meetings between Russian and
NATO representatives  "will take  place at least until autumn," he said.
The source  said that  contacts between  Russia  and  NATO  have  to  do
exclusively with the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo.

    The source  said that  Russia's  military  envoy  to  NATO,  Viktor
Zavarzin, recalled to Moscow, will visit NATO's headquarters in Brussels
for the  sole purpose of coordinating the operations of the peacekeeping
forces in Kosovo.

    He announced  that Russian  Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev plans to
visit the  Russian peacekeeping  grouping at the beginning of August. In
September, Sergeyev  intends to go to Sweden for an official visit which
was earlier  postponed from  June  18-19  due  to  Sergeyev's  talks  in
Helsinki with  U.S. Defense  Secretary William  Cohen on the location of
the Russian contingent in Kosovo.

    The Russian  Defense Ministry  ruptured all  contacts with NATO and
with the  Alliance's member-states  after air strikes on Yugoslavia were
launched on March 24.

#4
Stratfor
www.stratfor.com
GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATE 

Ukraine Struggles Now for Neutrality
July 15, 1999

SUMMARY

The pendulum of Ukrainian foreign policy swung closest to the West on June 
12, when Kiev briefly closed Ukrainian airspace to Russian aircraft trying to 
reinforce Russian troops at Slatina airbase in Kosovo. For Moscow that was 
too far and Russia has launched a major campaign to reverse Ukraine’s 
trajectory. Following very pointed discussions with Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin on July 4, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma has reaffirmed Ukraine’s 
strategic partnership with Russia, while declaring neutrality to be at the 
root of Ukraine’s foreign policy. For Kiev, NATO was a fleeting dream and 
neutrality is a desperate hope, but strategic partnership may be the final 
reality.

ANALYSIS

According to Russia’s ITAR-TASS news agency, Ukrainian President Leonid 
Kuchma told members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on July 13 that Russia is a 
strategic partner of Ukraine. "There is no and there cannot be an alternative 
to the development of friendly, equal and partner relations between Ukraine 
and Russia," Kuchma said. Kuchma went on to call for the settlement of 
economic issues and increased military cooperation. He also called neutrality 
the essence of Ukraine’s foreign policy. 

Kuchma’s comments came two days prior to Russian Prime Minister Sergei 
Stepashin’s two day visit to the Ukraine. According to TASS, items on the 
agenda include the status of the Dnester region, Ukraine’s debt to Russia, 
the status of the Black Sea Fleet, and the demarcation of the 
Russian-Ukrainian border. In other words, the discussions will cover the full 
range of Russian-Ukrainian relations.

Kuchma’s comments on Ukrainian-Russian relations also come in the wake of a 
meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin on July 4, which focused on the 
two countries’ bilateral relations in the wake of the Kosovo crisis. More 
pointedly, the meeting dealt with Ukraine’s short lived decision on June 12 
to deny its airspace to Russian aircraft attempting to reinforce Russian 
troops at Slatina airbase in Kosovo. Though Kiev swiftly reopened Ukraine’s 
airspace, calling the incident a misunderstanding, Russia’s military 
commanders were furious. It was bad enough that NATO convinced ostensibly 
neutral Romania and Bulgaria to deny their airspace to Russian aircraft, but 
Ukraine was a step too far. Ukraine had to clarify its relationship with NATO 
and with Russia. 

On June 29, Yeltsin called Kuchma to discuss "a range of important 
international problems, as well as the development of Ukrainian-Russian 
relations," according to Ukraine’s DINAU news agency. During the call, 
Yeltsin "invited" Kuchma to his country home outside Moscow to discuss 
"several large outstanding problems" burdening Russian-Ukrainian relations, 
according to Yeltsin aide Sergei Prikhodko. In addition to Ukraine’s debts to 
Russia for fuel, Prikhodko said the two leaders discussed "the situation in 
Europe in the aftermath of the military phase of the Kosovo crisis and ways 
to give a new impetus to the Russian-Ukrainian strategic partnership to solve 
problems jointly."

Kuchma emerged from the talks declaring they had given a great boost to 
Russian-Ukrainian relations. Ukraine would transfer to Russia the recently 
completed cruiser Moskva, the fuel and financial disputes would all be 
solved, as would territorial disputes. Now Kuchma has declared that Ukraine 
will be neutral and become Russia’s strategic partner. 

Kuchma’s use of the term "neutrality" is key. It is a theme Kuchma adopted 
with great vigor in the days after Ukraine briefly closed its airspace to 
Russia and before he answered for that action to Yeltsin. It is both a signal 
to Russia that Ukraine’s perceived tilt toward NATO and away from Russia 
during the Kosovo crisis was either misunderstood or corrected, and a 
declaration that Ukraine has no intention of being absorbed into a greater 
Russian dominated federation. Kuchma intends that Ukraine be neither a pawn 
of NATO nor of Russia. The question, now that Kuchma has abandoned the idea 
of siding against Russia, is how "equal" and "neutral" Kuchma can keep 
Ukraine in the strategic partnership.

There is an extremely important game being played out between Moscow and 
Kiev. Russia was stunned when NATO managed to persuade Bulgaria and Romania, 
non-NATO members and putatively neutral, to close their airspace to the 
Russians. The Russians discovered that central Europe, far from being a 
neutral buffer zone, is effectively under the control of NATO. For a few 
hours it appeared that Ukraine was in the same position. That would have been 
intolerable to the Russians. From the Russian point of view, the events in 
Kosovo are an argument for reasserting their power. Now, Russia may not be 
able to assert much power against NATO in Kosovo, but there are areas where 
it remains much more powerful than NATO. Ukraine is not only one of those 
places, but it is also of fundamental strategic importance to the Russians. 
Without Ukraine, it has no way to influence events in the Balkans and 
Hungary. Without Ukraine, the long southern flank of Russia and its partner 
Belarus are vulnerable.

Thus, any strategically minded Russian understands that defining Ukraine’s 
relationship to Russia is a matter of fundamental national interest to the 
Russians. Kuchma has been under constant pressure since the Kosovo crisis to 
demonstrate that he is not a threat to Russia. Part of the pressure comes 
from Russia and part of the pressure comes from pro-Russian factions inside 
of Ukraine who promise to be important in upcoming presidential elections. 
Between geopolitics and local politics, Kuchma, whose heart is with the West, 
has been forced to try to define Ukraine’s position as being somewhere 
between neutrality and Russia’s strategic partner.

Still, we are convinced that strategic partnership with Russia is the likely 
outcome, given the local correlation of forces, economic as well as military. 
Neutrality would have been something Russia might have tolerated before the 
supposedly neutral Bulgarians and Romanians closed their airspace to the 
Russians. Russia is now very suspicious of neutrality. And unlike many other 
regions, NATO and the West can offer Ukraine little more than moral support. 
We predicted in our 1999 Annual Forecast: A New and Dangerous World that the 
fate of Ukraine may be the burning issue of 1999. We are seeing that issue 
played out now. 

#5
Excerpt
Subject: NIS Observed V4N11 (1 of 2)
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 99 15:08:03 -0500
x-sender: mlanskoy@acs-mail.bu.edu
From: Miriam 

The NIS Observed: An Analytical Review
Volume IV, Number  11 (14 July 1999)
To subscribe or unsubscribe to Perspective and The NIS Observed send a 
request to mlanskoy@bu.edu.
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy at Boston 
University.
To access back issues of Perspective and the The NIS Observed, 
information about the Database and the Institute and its work, please see 
our web site at http://www.bu.edu/iscip/

Part I: Russian Federation
(1) Executive Branch by Susan J. Cavan
(2) Foreign Relations by Chandler Rosenberger and Sarah K. Miller
(3) Domestic Issues & Legislative Branch by Michael DeMar Thurman

Part II: Newly Independent States
(1) CIS by Sarah K. Miller
(2) Western Region by Tammy Lynch
(3) Transcaucasus by Miriam Lanskoy
(4) Central Asia by Monika Shepherd
(5) Baltic States by Kate Martin


(2) FOREIGN RELATIONS
'Globalizing' security
As peacekeeping troops were deployed in Kosovo, the Russian foreign 
ministry stepped up its campaign to bind NATO to international 
organizations and develop a "European" security system.
by Chandler Rosenberger

Moscow appears to place its greatest hopes in the United Nations.  In a 
meeting with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Russian Foreign Minister 
Igor Ivanov stressed the importance of financing "restoration in Kosovo 
and the entire Yugoslavia," despite US insistence that no aid go to "rump 
Serbia" until Slobodan Milosevic leaves office.  Russian President Boris 
Yel'tsin and Annan agreed, a Russian spokesman said, that security and 
stability in Europe could be best protected if the UN adopted a 
"multipolar world" model.  (INTERFAX, 0852 GMT, 24 Jun 99; 
FBIS-EEU-1999-0624 )  Opposition to such a model would 
only come from "those who want to impose a one-dimensional model on the 
world," Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said.  (INTERFAX, 0857 GMT, 
29 Jun 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0629 )  

The foreign ministry released a number of trial balloons about reforms 
needed to strengthen the UN's hand:  Membership on the Security Council 
might be extended to Germany and other states, or its major operations 
could be handed over to the G-7 plus Russia and China, to make a new G-9. 
 Only a stronger UN could help "to avoid anarchy in international 
relations," Ivanov said.  The Yugoslav crisis had shown the need to take 
law into account in international relations.  Russia, he added, would 
join efforts to "return the situation in [sic] a legal aspect." 
(ITAR-TASS, 1607 GMT, 8 Jul 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-0708 )

 Also high on the Russian agenda are new attempts to build a common 
European security structure, even at the expense of the United States.  
Proposing the adoption of a new European Security Charter, Ivanov said 
NATO's "unilateral use of force" had presented Europe with a choice 
between old divisions and new European unity.  "A durable European 
architecture can be built on common European beginnings," Ivanov said; a 
charter could "become Europe's political constitution in the 21st 
century."  (INTERFAX, 1556 GMT, 8 Jul 99; FBIS-EEU-1999-0708)

The Russian foreign ministry is so faithful to the "multipolar" doctrine 
first laid out by Yevgeni Primakov that his removal from high office 
appears inconsequential.  Either the doctrine has sunk in, or the 
ministry does not anticipate that his absence from power will be 
permanent.  Primakov himself gave the proposed reforms the momentum of a 
veiled threat. There were two options, Primakov wrote in a Dutch 
newspaper.  The NATO countries would admit "they committed a strategic 
error by acting the way they did in Kosovo"; the United Nations would 
then return to "the pedestal from which it was taken down."  The 
alternative, too dark to contemplate, would be that the US continues on 
its belligerent course by, for example, pursuing the Strategic Defense 
Initiative.  In this case, the most popular candidate for the Russian 
presidency wrote, his country would "build up its military strength 
again, despite its economic problems, which would have major consequences 
for the democratic process today."  (ALGEMEEN DAGBLAD, 30 Jun 99, p. 10; 
FBIS-WEU-1999-0701  www.fedworld.gov) 

#6
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
July 15, 1999
Russia's leaders blamed in rise of anti-Semitism
Tolerance for racist attacks, speeches
puts country on path to fascism, some say
Geoffrey York
Moscow Bureau, Moscow

A stabbing attack on a Russian-Jewish leader has raised new fears that 
Russian politicians are inciting violence against Jews by allowing their 
followers to express virulently anti-Semitic sentiments.

Police said the latest attack was committed by a 20-year-old man with a 
swastika tattooed on his chest who walked into Moscow's Choral Synagogue on 
Tuesday and repeatedly stabbed the Jewish leader with a large hunting knife.

Leopold Kaimovsky, the 52-year-old director of the Jewish Cultural Centre at 
the Moscow synagogue, was in grave condition yesterday after a six-hour 
operation to close several wounds. He was stabbed in the face, stomach, knee, 
thigh and shoulder. His assailant was reportedly carrying three knives when 
he entered the synagogue.

Jewish officials said the young man shouted anti-Semitic threats after he was 
detained at the synagogue. "There are 50,000 of us," he yelled, according to 
one witness. "We will kill you all. We will carve you all up."

In a jail-cell interview broadcast later on Russian television, the young man 
said the stabbing was a "political act" against the "evil" of Judaism.

He denied belonging to any political organization. However, a U.S. State 
Department spokesman said yesterday that the attacker was a member of a 
Russian extremist group. The U.S. spokesman condemned the stabbing as "a 
cowardly act of terrorism."

The attack has reignited the debate over whether Russian politicians are 
helping to incite the growing wave of violence at Jewish sites across Russia. 
At least seven fires and bombing attacks have taken place at synagogues and 
Jewish sites in Moscow, including the Choral Synagogue, since 1992.

Many observers believe that some of Russia's most prominent political 
leaders, including Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov, who heads the 
largest faction in the Russian parliament, are encouraging the violence by 
failing to condemn anti-Semitic speeches by their parties' members.

The most notorious example is Albert Makashov, a Communist member of 
parliament and retired general who has called for Jewish "bloodsuckers" to be 
rounded up and executed. Thousands of Communists have rallied to his defence, 
and Mr. Zyuganov himself has accused "Zionists" of "operating stealthily" in 
a secret plot to take over the world.

The Communist chief has also complained that there are too many 
"non-Russians" (coded language for Jews) in influential posts in government, 
business and the media.

The Russian Jewish Congress called yesterday for a ban on election candidates 
who make anti-Semitic comments. The stabbing attack could lead to pogroms 
against Jews, it said. "Today knives are being used, tomorrow smoke will be 
seen rising from the crematoria."

Russia's Chief Rabbi, Adolf Shayevich, said the stabbing attack is a direct 
result of the impunity that is apparently enjoyed by extremist politicians 
such as Mr. Makashov and neo-Nazi leader Alexander Barkashov, who openly call 
for violence against Jews.

"Their fascist ideology can be openly expressed at public meetings and 
gatherings, they instigate people to look for the enemy, and they are not 
punished," Mr. Shayevich said in an interview yesterday.

"The people in power don't react to it. That's why the young people are so 
easily brainwashed. So I think the ideologists like Makashov and Barkashov 
should face trial together with this guy [the arrested suspect]. They should 
bear responsibility for this incident."

The rabbi said he had received a telephone warning yesterday that Mr. 
Barkashov had ordered hundreds of his followers to launch terrorist attacks 
on Jewish property.

Another Russian-Jewish leader, Gedalia Zakgeym, said the growing wave of 
anti-Semitic attacks is inspired by "people in power or close to power" who 
wield influence in Russian politics and the media.

"These guys are looking for an enemy. Times are hard now, especially for 
young people. Many are unemployed, or their parents are unemployed. It's 
easier for them to think that it's not their fault if they can blame Jews for 
taking all the important posts," he said.

Anti-Semitism is increasingly visible on the streets of Russian cities, where 
Communist and nationalist demonstrators routinely carry anti-Semitic placards 
and distribute anti-Semitic literature.

In March, a synagogue in Siberia was vandalized and the initials of Mr. 
Barkashov's neo-Nazi group were painted on its walls. In May, a bomb exploded 
outside the Choral Synagogue while dozens of Jews were attending a service 
inside. On the same day, a bomb exploded at another Moscow synagogue. Jews 
are sometimes attacked or verbally abused in the streets, Jewish leaders say.

The exodus of Jews from Russia has increased sharply. Emigration of Russian 
Jews to Israel has more than doubled in the first half of this year, and 
nearly a third of the emigrants cited the rise of anti-Semitism as a factor 
in their decisions to leave Russia.

Recent opinion polls suggest that as many as 10 per cent of Russians are 
aggressively hostile to Jews, while another 15 per cent are passively 
anti-Semitic and a further 30 per cent are worried about Jewish influence in 
the Russian government.

At the same time, however, 43 per cent of Russians are critical of their 
parliament for its refusal to condemn Mr. Makashov's attacks on Jews, a poll 
found.

Jewish groups around the world have condemned the stabbing attack at the 
Moscow synagogue.

#7
The Russia Journal

www.russiajournal.com
July 12-18, 1999
The big news:Why Russian generals are fat
Russian generals often stick out in a crowd - especially when walking with 
their conterparts from Western armies.
Grigory Alexeyev/The Russia Journal 

Recent events in Yugoslavia have made Russians think about more than just the 
merits of smart missiles, stealth bombers and NATO tactics. The bombing 
campaign and subsequent peacekeeping operation in Kosovo have thrust Western 
and Russian military top brass into the public gaze. 

With an array of international military leaders becoming prominent on evening 
newscasts, viewers inevitably begin to make comparisons.

Being a soldier is not just about good looks. Nonetheless, Russian viewers 
have been asking themselves just why it is that Western senior officers are 
trim and athletic, looking like they've just stepped out of a Hollywood war 
film - witness NATO forces Supreme Commander Wesley Clark (U.S.) or 
peacekeeping troops Commander Michael Jackson (U.K.). Russian generals, on 
the other hand, seem to have trouble fitting their jowls and bellies on 
television screens.

What is the explanation for Russia's rotund generals? 

Lax fitness requirements are not to blame. The Russian armed forces, in fact, 
have tougher fitness criteria for officers over 40 than, say, the U.S. Army. 
But no one comes to a Russian divisional commander, not to mention a 
higher-ranking officer, and demands that he take a fitness test. 

The answer lies in the differing traditional career paths followed by 
officers in Russia and in the West. 

Russian and Western officers follow more-or-less the same weight curve until 
they reach the age of about 35, when they usually become majors or lieutenant 
colonels. After that, Russians begin to fill out as they make their way up 
the ranks. Westerners, on the other hand, keep themselves in shape.

Consider, for a start, the career of an American officer climbing his way to 
the top. It is practically impossible to become a U.S. general by virtue of 
connections - the Pentagon nominates officers to general's rank on a 
competitive basis. 

A would-be U.S. general cannot hope to skip rungs on the ladder. He also must 
earn a degree and acquire some experience working in government bodies such 
as the presidential administration, Defense Department or in Congress. That 
prepares him for cooperation with politicians later down the line. 

Human resource departments keep track of promising young officers from the 
time they graduate from one of America's three military academies. Depending 
on their ambitions, young officers spend the next couple of decades taking on 
an increasing number of responsibilities.

Often, American officers study while serving in the armed forces. An officer 
working in Washington will spend his vacations in his previous unit, clocking 
time as a field officer to keep his qualifications up to date. The pace of 
life tends to prevent the pounds from piling on: a good thing, too, as each 
step up requires passing a barrage of tests, including fitness tests. 

Russian officers also need plenty of energy and ambition to get to the top, 
but they use it in a different way. Promotions depend on how an officer's 
direct superior assesses his performance. In most Russian institutions, the 
work of examination and promotion commissions involves plenty of food and 
drink. A regimental commander hosts at least a dozen assorted commissions 
every year and thus has plenty of banquets to attend. 

Permanently stationed military units become integral parts of their local 
area's economy. This gives regiment commanders status as part of the local 
elite and provides many high-calorie social opportunities. In the Soviet era, 
commanding officers were also Party members, which entailed regular drinking 
sessions at the local Party committee.

Officers these days are more likely to try to ingratiate themselves with 
local farm or factory bosses, sending their soldiers to work in return for 
money, produce and equipment. The law forbids such arrangements, but officers 
resort to it to keep their men from starving. Bargaining generally takes 
place during get-togethers with local big-wigs amid generous supplies of 
liquid and solid sustenance. 

The rest of the average middle-ranking officer's diet leaves a lot to be 
desired - snacks during the day and usually only one hot meal, often late at 
night. 

An officer leads this kind of life between ages 35 and 45 - precisely the 
years when without a healthy lifestyle or regular physical exercise, men 
start to grow flabby. The result is that by the time a regimental commander 
receives his first general's star, he has to order not just a new field 
uniform but a new belt to fit around his expanding waist. 

Money plays a role, too. The U.S. Defense Department pays to have its 
servicemen insured. Personnel choose their insurance companies themselves and 
companies provide considerable discounts to clients who abstain from harmful 
habits and keep themselves in shape.

Some insurance companies provide further discounts for servicemen who accept 
periodic check-ups to make sure they are keeping their health commitments. 
That is why many Pentagon officers spend their lunch breaks jogging around 
the headquarters building, the world's largest. One is not likely to find 
anybody jogging around the Defense Ministry building in Moscow.

In general, the situation is a heavy burden for the Russian military no 
matter what the cause, and it is a problem that is likely to keep on 
expanding.

#8
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
July 14, 1999

RUSSIAN SCIENTIST INVESTIGATED FOR WORK ON NUCLEAR DUMPING. In a move likely
to raise new concerns among human rights groups in Russia and the West,
security agents in Russia's Far East have raided the home and laboratory of
a scientist studying the Pacific Fleet's dumping of nuclear wastes. Reports
out of Vladivostok yesterday said that on July 3 agents of Russia's Federal
Security Service (FSB) had seized documents and letters belonging to
Vladimir Soifer. The sixty-nine year-old scientist, who is currently in
Moscow being treated for diabetes, has spent forty years studying the
radioactive contamination of Russia's oceans. More recently, he has been
analyzing the effects of the Pacific's Fleet's dumping of liquid nuclear
wastes into the Sea of Japan. The dumping incidents, which took place
several years, caused considerable tensions between Russia and Japan.

Although Soifer has apparently not yet been charged, the search warrant
obtained by the security service said that he had violated laws on handling
classified documents and that he posed a threat to the country. The
materials seized from Soifer have reportedly been sent for analysis to
Russian military intelligence (AP, BBC, Russian agencies, July 13).

Soifer is not the first to suffer from the Russian navy's apparent
determination to conceal from the public its nuclear waste storage and
dumping practices. Two Russian naval officers--Aleksandr Nikitin and Grigory
Pasko--have already been indicted on treason charges for their work in
bringing to light the navy's practices in this area. Their cases have been
publicized by international human rights groups, and Nikitin's case in
particular has become an issue for several Western governments. Indeed,
during last week's OSCE parliamentary assembly the objections of Russian
delegates were not limited to a resolution on Yugoslavia (see above). The
Russian lawmakers were reportedly also angered by an OSCE resolution which
voiced support for Nikitin and described him as a "victim of an unfair
judicial process" (AP, July 10).

But Soifer's case may have more to do with that of Pasko, at least if one of
Russia's best-known environmentalists is to be believed. Aleksandr Yablokov
suggested yesterday that Soifer was being persecuted because of the FSB's
failure to win a conviction against Pasko, a military journalist who was
arrested in 1997 for his investigations into the Pacific Fleet's nuclear
waste practices. Pasko's long treason trial was resumed this month, and a
verdict could be handed down as early as this week. An environmental group
whose leadership includes Yablokov issued a statement yesterday charging
that "instead of protecting Russia from the import of radioactive and toxic
wastes, the special services are persecuting those who care about Russia's
ecological safety." A counter-intelligence officer for the Russian Pacific
Fleet yesterday denied any connection between Soifer's and Pasko's cases
(AP, Russian agencies, July 13).

#9
Date: Tue, 13 Jul 1999 
From: Elizabeth Reisch lreisch@ceip.org

Organization: Carnegie Endowment
Subject: U.S.-Russian Arms Control: Where Do We Go From Here?

U.S.-Russian Arms Control: Where Do We Go From Here?, transcript of
meeting with General Alexander Piskunov, Deputy Chief of Staff to Prime
Minister Stepashin; Sergei Rogov, Director, USA and Canada Institute;
and Valery Mazing, Head of Arms Control Department, USA and Canada
Institute, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 7,
1999:

http://www.ceip.org/programs/ruseuras/ruseuras.htm

Excerpt
U.S.-Russian Arms Control: Where Do We Go From Here   
July 7, 1999 
Transcription of meeting at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace  

Arnold L. Horelick-Carnegie Endowment (Chair):

....Our topic today is "U.S.-Russian Arms Control: Where Do We Go From
Here." It’s both a timely and a timeless topic. It’s timely, of course,
because of the decision at the Cologne G-8 Summit last month, where the US
and Russian leaders announced their readiness to resume negotiations on
strategic offensive arms. And in a somewhat ambiguous formula, which has
been interpreted differently in different quarters, they also agreed to
continue efforts to "strengthen and enhance the viability of the ABM
Treaty." Talbott will be kicking off that discussion in Moscow later this
month. This topic is timeless because the agenda and most of the ideas that
have been put out so far are very familiar. These ideas go back as far as
30 years; that’s almost as long as Rogov and I have been talking about
these arms control issues. In fact, Russian-American arms control has been
in a state of suspended animation ever since the START II treaty was signed
six years ago. With the exception of agreements on goals for START III, and
the parameters for Tactical Missile Defense demarcation at Helsinki a
couple of years ago, basically the history of arms control since 1993 has
been waiting for the Duma to ratify START II. START II became, as you know,
a political football in Russia. And just as it seemed, with the advent of
the Primakov government, that it might be possible for START ratification
to be taken out of its sensitive role in domestic politics, it stalled out
once again in response to the vagaries of U.S.-Russia relations ­ Iraq,
Kosovo, and all of that. Somehow the Duma seems to have the attitude that
failure to ratify START II is some sort of a form of punishment for the
United States for its misbehavior elsewhere. But, of course, this is a
risky tactic, and it has become even more risky, because support for and
interest in arms control generally in the United States is waning.
Constituencies for it are very weak, and the Duma threat not to ratify
START II provides virtually no leverage at all for Moscow in the light of
that situation.  

In the U.S., on the other hand, ballistic missile defense ­ a national
missile defense system ­ has now risen to the top of the strategic agenda
here, and it’s clear that arms control in its timeless phase is really back
to the old questions of the 1970s. What is the appropriate relationship
between strategic offense arms and ballistic missile defense? What are the
trade-offs that could be made, and so on and so forth? The problem is that
although the issues are the same, their context is radically different --
both the technological context and especially the strategic and the
domestic political context in both countries. It used to be in U.S.-Russian
relations that we needed arms control in order to help stabilize, and
hopefully improve, the overall relationship. Nowadays, we need to improve
the overall relationship if we are going to get anywhere with strategic
arms control.... 

Sergei Rogov:
....We’ve just experienced the most serious crisis in Russian-American
relations since the end of the Cold War. Last time we met in the midst of
the crisis. And now we probably can conclude that the meetings at Helsinki
and Cologne allowed us to prevent this crisis from turning into a
confrontation. Which is good. But I think it is premature to claim that the
crisis is gone. Because the major issues where Russia and the United States
developed differences remain unresolved. And that covers all three major
areas of our relationship. 

As far as the economic field is concerned, the dominant issue for Russia’s
future remains the issue of Russia’s foreign debt. And there are other
problems like economic sanctions against some Russian companies, quotas,
Jackson-Vanik, etc. But still the crucial issue for Russia’s future remains
the resolution of the debt issue. And at the G-8 Summit, the United States
and other Western partners indicated their willingness to do something, but
in extremely vague terms. So we could expect that Russia will get another
piece of the IMF salami soon, but it seems that the crucial issue of the
Soviet debt may not be touched upon for the next 18 months, until the new
political cycle begins in the United States and Russia.  

If we look at the regional problems, Russian-Western disagreements remain,
and while it seems that we are beginning to cooperate in Kosovo, the terms
of cooperation are not clear. And Mr. Chernomyrdin, as a special
representative of President Yeltsin, agreed to many of NATO’s terms, which
the Russian government previously refused to accept. But nevertheless, some
of the fundamentals related to Kosovo, to the KFOR, remain unresolved. We
were already here in Washington when an agreement was reached between NATO
and Russian military authorities on the line of command. I haven’t seen
this agreement, but it’s not clear at all whether Russian units will be
truly integrated into the KFOR, or as in Bosnia, as in IFOR/SFOR, remain in
fact segregated from the rest of the peacekeeping operation, having a
different set of rules of engagement, and not accepting the political
control of the North Atlantic Council.  And that is the most important
question concerning Kosovo, because at Helsinki, [U.S. Defense] Secretary
Cohen mentioned that the Permanent Joint Council of Russia and NATO will be
involved in the political decision-making concerning the KFOR. And in fact
the Russian position was that we wanted the PJC to be the political body,
which supervises the operation. But that was rejected by NATO. And thus I
am not enthusiastic about the agreement reached in Moscow yesterday, or the
day before yesterday, because clearly Russian units will not be fully
integrated if the political control remains within NAC. And Russia as a
non-NAC member, is not going to accept the political guidance of a body to
which we don’t belong. 

In the arms control area, we have a major development. And as Arnold
mentioned, the two presidents agreed to start negotiations simultaneously
on START III and modification of the ABM treaty. Which seems to be the
first concessions from both sides. The United States didn’t want to discuss
officially START III until START II is ratified. And now, of course,
ratification of START II is totally out of question. So, the START III
negotiations will continue while START II is not ratified. On the other
hand, Russia agreed to negotiate modifications of the ABM treaty. Which is
a departure from our previous position, when we said that we like the
treaty and don’t see any need to change anything at all. 

So if you’ll permit me, I’ll try to speculate on what is achievable in the
arms control area. First of all, we have the deadline, next June, when the
Clinton Administration is committed to announce its BMD deployment plans.
Which means that the negotiations have to be finished within 11 months,
which is quite unusual for any arms control negotiations at all. Secondly,
because of the election campaigns and other domestic political pressures,
probably the window of opportunity to negotiate meaningfully is no longer
than three or four months. Since next fall, it will be difficult to achieve
any breakthroughs, any agreement on key components of the future package,
if it’s not done now.  

Let me start with START III, and I want to remind you that while this
meeting is for the record, but Sergei Rogov is totally unofficial, I don’t
have any position in the Russian government, except membership in a number
of advisory councils. But what I’m saying is my personal position and not
the position of the Russian government. Although I don’t exclude that
sometimes my views are not far away from the views of Russian bureaucrats;
and of course I don’t mean General Piskunov. 

Well, I suggest we should look at the START III-ABM package as the maximum
which Russia and the United States can achieve within the model of mutual
nuclear deterrence. So how far can we go within this model before the
essence of the relationship changes? I don’t see these new agreements, if
they are concluded, changing the mutual nuclear deterrence model. But
within it, it’s possible to reach the limits without crossing them. And on
the offensive side, we probably should go to the lowest possible limit. And
that means that Russia would look for very low ceilings, which are
economically affordable for Russia. The magic number for us is 1,000. 1,000
warheads is seen as a force that is sufficient to provide credibility to
the Russian nuclear deterrence posture, and at the same time, economically
affordable. Preferably, it should be a ceiling for all kinds of strategic
nuclear weapons. But as a minimum, that should be the number of nuclear
warheads on both types of ballistic missiles: ICBMs and SLBMs. With a few,
in that case, a few hundred additional nuclear weapons to be allowed for
heavy bombers. But clearly we would prefer a 1,000 overall ceiling.
Thirdly, under this umbrella, it’s possible to agree on a common ceiling
for the number of launchers -- both ICBMs and SLBMs. Let’s say 500, with
each side being permitted to make a mix of warheads and missiles the way it
considers is better for its own interests. That means a departure from the
START II prohibition on MIRVed ICBMs, and the permission to deploy MIRVs on
mobile ICBMs, which is the SS-27 or Topol.  

That leads us to a few other important issues related to the strategic arms
reductions. One is the sudden breakout potential, or the "strategic
reserve." If you try to think how many warheads the United States can bring
back on downloaded D-5 and Minuteman-3, or on conventional heavy bombers,
the number will be at least 2,500. Which means that the United States will
have, if you accept my numbers, 1,000 deployed weapons, and 2,500
deployable weapons in strategic reserve. If Russia is not permitted to test
SS-27 with MIRVs, we hardly could have more than 500 weapons, deployable
weapons, in strategic reserve. Which makes it necessary to establish some
kind of verification for deployable weapons, which are storaged in
strategic reserve.  

With strategic weapons going to 1,000, the number of sub-strategic weapons
could exceed the number of strategic weapons. Russia, for obvious reasons,
is interested in a higher number of sub-strategic nuclear weapons. The
United States doesn’t share this view. So including sub-strategic nuclear
weapons in START III will probably guarantee that we will not reach any
legally binding agreement within the time frame I described. So in
sub-strategic weapons, what is possible is a continuation or building
further, on the  Bush-Gorbachev political commitments of 1991, including
possibly both sides unilaterally promising not to deploy more than 2,000 or
1,500 non-strategic nuclear weapons. In fact one can also apply to
non-strategic weapons this idea of deployed weapons and deployable weapons
storaged in reserve. Then the number of deployed tactical nuclear weapons
would be, let’s say, 1,000, and 1,000 additional tactical nuclear weapons
could be storaged and kept in reserve. But this arrangement should be in
the form of parallel political commitments, not a legally binding treaty,
which will be simply impossible to negotiate.  

Russian flexibility on this issue will be linked to American flexibility on
something, which is of tremendous concern to Russian military planners, and
that is conventional precision guided munitions, which could be used to
attack our strategic assets. The recent war strengthened even more Russian
concern about non-nuclear weapons, which could put at risk our strategic
forces. Probably here, too, one cannot expect any legally binding bilateral
agreements. But is it possible to try the same approach as with tactical
nuclear weapons? Something like parallel statements concerning the
deployment and the normal, the regular, mode of operation of some types of
weapons within the vicinity of each country.  

If that happens one can envisage an agreement between Russia and the United
State on the modification of the ABM treaty. Of course, we don’t want to
have any changes in the treaty ­ we are pretty happy with this treaty. But
the United States insists that it’s necessary to do. So we face a very
unpleasant choice. Whether to see the United States unilaterally go beyond
the limitations of this treaty, with the possible collapse of the entire
arms control regime as the result of this unilateral action; or to
negotiate with the United States very limited modifications in the ABM
treaty. What, of course, we would like to see is that these changes don’t
allow the United States to produce a thick territorial ballistic missile
defense. And this approach can lead one to the conclusion that we may agree
to the changes related to the geographic position of the permitted site,
from North Dakota to some other place, to protect the sector where a threat
form a third party can appear. And that means the Western direction, the
Pacific direction. Because from this direction, the United States may face,
besides Russian missiles, North Korean missiles, and of course Chinese
missiles. So if the Unites States claims that this defense is not against
Russia, then from the Pacific sector, one can find possible threats to the
United States besides Russia. But you cannot find such possible threats
from the Atlantic sector. Because the notion that Iran or Iraq will, in the
foreseeable future, have intercontinental ballistic missile defense . . .  

Voice: [whispered] Offense. 

Sergei Rogov: Offense, I’m sorry, is totally fantastic. At least for the
next 20 or 30 years. So if there is a change in deployment, we could be
flexible as far as limited protection of the U.S. from a Pacific direction.
But if the United States insists on the similar protection for the east
shore, it would be very difficult to see it as anything else than a
preparation to build a real territorial defense, which will, of course,
have, even as a limited defense, a mature battle management system. But if
the interceptors are deployed at several bases, then this system could be
very quickly built up into thick territorial defenses. And we wouldn’t like
that. 

We would prefer that the number of permitted interceptors remain the same ­
no more than 100. What if the United States insists on two areas of
deployment? Of course we would object against it. But if the United States
proposes to have a smaller number of interceptors -- instead of 100, a
smaller number -- here one can envisage a very unusual solution: like
establishing a common ceiling for both offensive ballistic missile and
interceptors. So each side, let’s say, is permitted to have 500 ICBMs,
SLBMs, and interceptors. And if you want to deploy more interceptors, you
have to reduce the number of your offensive missiles. I know it sounds like
a crazy idea, but I understand the purpose of our meeting today to
speculate about possible new approaches to the problems of arms control.     

Well, maybe the components of the package could be different. But it seems
to me, personally, that we have to deal with all these issues to reach an
agreement between Russia and the Unites States within the next several
months. That also means that any new legally binding treaty will be very
short. We simply will not have time to negotiate, like START I, 800 pages
of small print. And thus, there will be plenty of problems related to the
compatibility of START I, START II, and this START III arrangement. I
believe that the visit of Prime Minister Stepashin to Washington on July 27
permits to push for an early agreement on strategic issues, within the next
several months. So we will have negotiations between our two teams, what is
important is that we also shall have, in the beginning of August, a meeting
between Marshal Sergeyev and Secretary Cohen, so a U.S.-Russian dialogue on
these issues will continue on several levels. But if we don’t achieve an
early breakthrough, then one hardly could expect a new arms control package
concluded before next summer, and probably the unresolved problems in
Russian-American relations, not only in the arms control but also in other
areas, will remain unresolved for quite a time. And the recent events
demonstrated how fragile is the relationship. So unless we put it on the
right track, by the year 2001, Russian-American relations may reach a point
of no return. And by that I mean that not only new arms control agreements
will become impossible, but even the existing base ­ arms control base ­
will collapse, if the United States will unilaterally move to decide to
deploy the national missile defense.